Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 11, 2020

14750974 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/750,974 06/25/2015 Vaishnav Kidambi 357156.02 2887
69316 7590 09/11/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
COUSINS, JOSEPH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2459
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VAISHNAV KIDAMBI, CHACKO DANIEL,
VIPUL MODI, and ALEX WUN
Appeal 2019-003216
Application 14/750,974
Technology Center 2400
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 16–35. Claims 1–15 are cancelled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 14/750,974

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s Specification describes distributed storage of images of a
software application in a computing fabric. Spec., Abstract. The
Specification states that nodes in a computing fabric typically rely on an
external repository to store “golden” images of software applications.
Spec. ¶ 4. However, the use of external repositories has been found to be
inefficient due to service failures and latency in the network. Id.
Appellant’s invention seeks to address these issue by “implementing
distributed storage of images of software applications in at least some nodes
in a computing fabric, [eliminating] the need for an external repository.”
Spec. ¶ 5. The Specification further explains that one of the nodes may be
designated as a primary node, which generates and stores tracking
information or metadata regarding the distributed images of the software
application. Id. When a request is received for a copy of the software, the
primary node may respond by providing only the tracking
information/metadata to the requestor, rather than the entire software
application image. By providing the tracking information/metadata, the
requestor can determine the best available nodes from which a copy may be
obtained. Id. ¶ 6.
Claim 16, reproduced below with modified formatting, illustrates the
claimed subject matter:
16. A method for distributed storage of digital data files in a
computing fabric, the method comprising:
receiving, from a user via a client device, a request to
upload and store a software application at a computing fabric
having a plurality of nodes interconnected by a communications
network, the individual nodes of the computing fabric being
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configured to execute a copy of the software application to
provide one or more corresponding cloud computing services;
in response to receiving the request to upload,
generating and storing, at one of the nodes of the
computing fabric, a record of image metadata associated
with the software application;
receiving and storing a copy of the software
application at the one of the nodes of the computing fabric;
upon receiving and storing the copy of the software
application at the one of the nodes of the computing fabric,
selecting, by the one of the nodes of the computing
fabric, one or more additional nodes of the computing
fabric to store additional copies of the received software
application based on a physical or logical proximity to the
one of the nodes or a storage capacity of the individual
additional nodes;
replicating, via the communications network, the
copy of the software application at the one of the nodes of
the computing fabric from the one of the nodes to the one
or more selected additional nodes as additional copies,
thereby distributedly storing the additional copies of the
software application at the one or more additional nodes
of the computing fabric;
upon completion of the replicating, updating, at the one of
the nodes, updating the record of image metadata containing
tracking information associated with the software application
regarding which one or more of the nodes of the computing
fabric individually contain a copy of the software application;
and
providing a copy of the software application from one of
the nodes of the computing fabric individually containing a copy
of the software application to another node of the computing
fabric to be executed by the another node to provide the one or
more corresponding cloud computing services.
Appeal Br. 21–22 (Claims Appendix).
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REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Harrington US 2008/0222154 A1 Sept. 11, 2008
Myllyla US 2008/0275960 A1 Nov. 6, 2008
Achtermann US 2009/0024693 A1 Jan. 22, 2009
Rosensweig US 2014/0101300 A1 Apr. 10, 2014
Morrison US 2014/0173022 A1 June 19, 2014

REJECTIONS
Claims 16–27, 31, 32, 34, and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Rosensweig and Morrison. Final Act. 2.
Claim 28 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Rosensweig, Morrison, and Achtermann. Final Act. 14.
Claim 29 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Rosensweig, Morrison, and Myllyla. Final Act. 15.
Claim 30 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Rosensweig, Morrison, and Moss. Final Act. 16.
Claim 33 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Rosensweig, Morrison, and Harrington. Final Act. 18.
ISSUES
First Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Rosensweig teaches or
suggests “receiving, from a user via a client device, a request to upload and
store a software application at a computing fabric having a plurality of nodes
interconnected by a communications network,” as recited in claim 16?
Second Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Rosensweig teaches
or suggests “selecting, by one of the nodes of the computing fabric, one or
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more additional nodes of the computing fabric to store additional copies of
the received software application,” as recited in claim 16?
Third Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Morrison teaches or
suggests “providing a copy of the software application . . . to another node of
the computing fabric to be executed by the another node to provide the one
or more corresponding cloud computing services,” as recited in claim 16?
Fourth Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Morrison teaches or
suggests “generating and storing, at one of the nodes of the computing
fabric, a record of image metadata associated with the software application,”
as recited in claim 16?
Fifth Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Morrison teaches or
suggests the limitations recited in dependent claim 17?
Sixth Issue: Has the Examiner erred in finding Morrison teaches or
suggests the limitations recited in claim 20?
ANALYSIS
The Examiner’s Findings and Conclusion of Obviousness
The Examiner rejects claim 16 as obvious over Rosensweig and
Morrison. Final Act. 2–6. Generally, the Examiner finds that Rosensweig
teaches receiving requests to upload software applications into a cloud
computing environment, selecting additional nodes at which to store copies
of the uploaded application based on physical proximity to the additional
nodes, and executing the software application. Final Act. 3. The Examiner
finds that Rosensweig does not teach generating metadata associated with
the software application or tracking copies of the application through
metadata updates, nor does Rosensweig teach distributing copies from one
node to another. Final Act. 3–4.
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The Examiner relies on Morrison to address these deficiencies,
finding that Morrison teaches generating and storing image metadata, as well
as replicating copies of the software among nodes. Final Act. 4–6. The
Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of
Rosensweig with those of Morrison:
One of ordinary skill in the art at the time [of] the invention
would have recognized the ability to utilize the teachings of
Morrison for the distribution of applications and software
through a plurality of peer nodes. The teachings of Morrison,
when implemented in the Rosensweig system, [would have]
allow[ed] one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize a dispersed
storage system to propagate a cloud application based on
locational demand. One of ordinary skill in the art would [have
been] motivated to utilize the teachings of Morrison in the
Rosensweig system in order to leverage the cloud capability of a
network of peer nodes to meet the flexible demand of clients.
Final Act. 5–6.
Appellant presents several arguments with respect to the independent
claims. Appellant also presents separate arguments for dependent claims 17
and 20. We address these arguments below.
First Issue—the “receiving” limitation
The Examiner finds Rosensweig teaches the limitation “receiving,
from a user via a client device, a request to upload and store a software
application at a computing fabric having a plurality of nodes interconnected
by a communications network.” Final Act. 3 (citing Rosensweig ¶¶ 39, 62).
Appellant argues the Examiner has erred because Rosensweig teaches
uploading a recipe file to a cloud controller, which is not the same as
uploading a cloud-based software application to a computing fabric having a
plurality of nodes, as recited in claim 16. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant argues
“the recipe file is not a copy of the cloud application that the recipe file
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defines. Instead, the recipe file is similar to a map that identifies the various
components or segments of the cloud application.” Appeal Br. 14.
According to Appellant, because the recipe file merely defines the
application, “execution of the recipe file (if the recipe file can be executed at
all) cannot ‘provide one or more corresponding cloud computing services.”
Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Rosensweig
discloses “[t]he application manager 160 may receive a ‘recipe file’ from the
client,” causing “the application manager . . . [to] subsequently request that
the cloud controller 120 establish the components that make up the
application defined in the recipe file.” Rosensweig ¶ 42. Rosensweig
further details that the “cloud controller 120 may receive request for the
establishment of cloud applications from client devices.” Rosensweig ¶ 39.
Taken together, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood from Rosensweig that the client request to establish a cloud
application would include, in addition to the recipe file, the uploading of the
necessary components of the cloud application in order to successfully
complete the installation. As such, we agree with the Examiner that
Rosensweig teaches, or at least suggests, the “receiving” limitation of
claim 16.
Second Issue—the “selecting” limitation
Claim 16 also recites the limitation “selecting, by one of the nodes of
the computing fabric, one or more additional nodes of the computing fabric
to store additional copies of the received software application based on a
physical or logical proximity to the one of the nodes or a storage capacity of
the individual additional nodes.” The Examiner cites Rosensweig’s
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disclosure of establishing deployments of software applications based on
geographic proximity as teaching this limitation. Final Act. 3 (citing
Rosensweig ¶¶ 46–47).
Appellant argues Rosensweig is deficient because “[a]ssuming, for the
sake of argument that the recipe file of Rosensweig could correspond to the
copy of a software application, nowhere does Rosensweig disclose or
suggest selecting one or more additional nodes in the computing fabric to
store additional copies of the recipe file.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant further
argues that Rosensweig is deficient with respect to the selecting being
performed “by one of the nodes of the computing fabric,” because “the cloud
controller 120 forwards the recipe file to the application manager 160, which
may send a request to establish one or more components specified in the
recipe file.” Appeal Br. 15.
We are not persuaded of error. Rosensweig discloses, “a policy file
specifies a country or other geographical area in which components assigned
to each segment are to be established.” Rosensweig ¶ 46 (reference
numerals omitted). Rosensweig further teaches the use of constraints
whereby “the cloud controller may seek to place the component relatively
close to other components within the segments.” Rosensweig ¶ 47.
Appellant’s first argument presumes that the Examiner relies solely on
the recipe file as being the “received software application” in Rosensweig.
However, as we discussed above, the uploading of the recipe file is an
indication of a user request to upload a software application, but the
Examiner does not rely on the recipe file as the software application itself.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded that Rosensweig fails to teach the
selecting being performed “by one of the nodes of the computing fabric.”
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As explained by the Examiner, step 440 of Rosenweig’s Figure 4 shows that
the cloud controller (which is one of the nodes of the computing fabric)
performs the selection of other nodes to receive application components.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Rosensweig teaches or suggests the “selecting” limitation of claim 16.
Third Issue—the “providing” limitation
Claim 16 also recites the limitation “providing a copy of the software
application . . . to another node of the computing fabric to be executed by the
another node to provide the one or more corresponding cloud computing
services.”
The Examiner finds this limitation obvious over the combined
teachings of Rosensweig and Morrison. Final Act. 5 (citing Morrison ¶¶ 27–
29); Ans. 7–8 (additionally citing Rosensweig ¶¶ 41–44). More specifically,
the Examiner finds Morrison’s use of a tracking service, which records
metadata to track placement of the content in a distributed peer-to-peer
network, teaches “providing a copy of the software. . . to another node of the
computing fabric.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds that
Rosensweig teaches that the distributed software application is “to be
executed by another node to provide the one or more corresponding cloud
computing services.” Id.
Appellant argues Morrison is deficient because “Morrison’s digital
content item is not provided from one peer computer to another ‘to be
executed by the another node to provide the one or more corresponding
cloud computing services.’” Appeal Br. 16.
We are not persuaded of error. The Examiner does not rely on
Morrison for teaching “to be executed by the another node to provide the
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one or more corresponding cloud computing services.” Instead, the
Examiner relies on Rosensweig to show the execution of an application to
provide cloud computing services. Thus, Appellant’s argument does not
address the findings made by the Examiner, and we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in finding the cited references teach or suggest the
“providing” limitation of claim 16.
Fourth Issue—the “generating and storing” limitation
Claim 16 also recites the limitation “generating and storing, at one of
the nodes of the computing fabric, a record of image metadata associated
with the software application.” The Examiner finds that Morrison’s use of a
tracking service, which records metadata to track placement of the content in
a distributed peer-to-peer network, teaches this limitation. Final Act. 4
(citing Morrison ¶¶ 20, 27).
Appellant argues the rejection is in error because the limitation
requires that “one of the nodes contains both the record of image metadata
and a copy of the software application.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant asserts
that the Morrison’s metadata is stored at CMS 110 or tracker service 112,
and that neither stores a copy of the software application. Appeal Br. 17.
Morrison discloses a peer-to-peer network that tracks the distribution
of content within the network using a centralized management service
(CMS) computer that may include a tracker service computer for storing
telemetry data. Morrison ¶ 27. Morrison explains, “telemetry data [is]
aggregated from peer computers of the P2P network.” Morrison ¶ 26.
Morrison further teaches that system includes a content-delivery-network
(CDN) computer that “may be an additional source to seed digital content
items.” Morrison ¶ 32. As noted by the Examiner, Morrison further teaches
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that the CDN computer may be integrated with the CMS computer. Ans. 8
(citing Morrison ¶ 34). We agree with the Examiner that “the CDN/CMS
contains the metadata for the stored content in the distributed network and
the store[d] seed copies of the content.” Ans. 8–9. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of error with respect to the “receiving and storing” limitation of
claim 16.
Claim 17
Claim 17 recites:
The method of claim 16, further comprising:
receiving from a requestor, another request for a copy of
the software application stored in the computing fabric;
in response to receiving the another request, determining
which one or more of the nodes of the computing fabric contain
a copy of the software application based on the stored tracking
information; and
communicating the determined one or more nodes of the
computing fabric containing a copy of the software application
to the requestor.
Appeal Br. 22 (Claims Appendix).
The Examiner rejects claim 17 based on the teachings of Morrison.
Final Act. 6 (citing Morrison ¶¶ 20, 27, 88–90); Ans. 9–10 (additionally
citing, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 86–87). Appellant argues, “Morrison does not disclose or
suggest determining which one or more of the nodes of the computing fabric
contain a copy of the software application based on the stored tracking
information.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant asserts that Morrison merely
describes the use of a “recommended content source,” and that because a
default node may be designated as the recommended content source, “having
a recommended content source does not necessarily, inevitably, or
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consistently involve determining one or more nodes of the computing fabric
containing a copy of the software application.” Appeal Br. 17. We disagree.
Figure 4 of Morrison depicts a process by which a network request for
content is made to the CMS, and the CMS selects a recommended peer node
for fulfilling the download request. See Morrison, Fig. 4 (blocks 402–408).
Appellant argues that because Morrison utilizes a default content source as a
backup when the recommended source is unavailable, it does not teach the
recited “determining.” That a backup source is designated does not change
the fact that a recommend content source is determined by Morrison using
the stored telemetry data. As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred
in finding Morrison teaches the limitations of claim 17.
Claim 20
Appellant also argues for separate patentability of claim 20. Appeal
Br. 18–19. Claim 20 recites, inter alia, “transmitting a deletion instruction
to each of the one or more nodes of the computing fabric containing a copy
of the software application.” Id. at 23 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner
concludes this limitation is obvious over Morrison because Morrison teaches
the use of a delete command to remove content from network nodes. Final
Act. 7–8 (citing Morrison ¶ 116).
Appellant argues the rejection is flawed because the delete command
described in Morrison deletes only a single copy of the content, and is not
issued to each of the nodes that store the content. Appeal Br. 18. However,
as the Examiner points out in the Answer, in a situation where only a single
node is identified as storing the content, the file modification request is made
to each identified node. Ans. 11. Appellant does not address this finding in
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the Reply Brief, and it therefore is uncontested. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error with respect to claim 20.
Remaining Claims
For the remaining claims, Appellant either has not presented separate
patentability arguments or has reiterated substantially the same arguments as
those previously discussed for patentability of claim 16 above. See Appeal
Br. 18–20. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections of the remaining pending
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We affirm Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
16–27, 31,
32, 34, 35
103 Rosensweig,
Morrison
16–27, 31,
32, 34, 35

28 103 Rosensweig,
Morrison,
Achtermann
28
29 103 Rosensweig,
Morrison, Myllyla
29
30 103 Rosensweig,
Morrison, Moss
30
33 103 Rosensweig,
Morrison,
Harrington
33
Overall
Outcome
16–35

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED