Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 30, 2021

2020000401 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/342,404 11/03/2016 Trevor McDiarmid 335866-US-CNT 7862 145266 7590 06/30/2021 NovoTechIP International PLLC 1717 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Suite #1025 Washington, DC 20006 EXAMINER TRAN, JIMMY H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2456 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/30/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): akhlaghi@novotechip.com docketing@novotechip.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TREVOR MCDIARMID, GURASHISH BRAR, and JOE YAP Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 Technology Center 2400 Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JUSTIN BUSCH, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 6-9, and 14-17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Corporation. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The invention generally relates to streamlining application programs. Spec. ¶ 2. More specifically, the claimed subject matter relates to pausing operations of an initial, already downloaded, portion of a streaming program when detecting that the initial portion of the program includes a jump to a portion of the program not yet downloaded and, upon downloading the additional portion, continuing execution of the program. Spec. ¶ 7. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. One or more computer readable storage devices having stored thereon at least an event handler portion of an application program for facilitating streaming of the application program, wherein the event handler portion of the application program, when executed by a hardware processor in a computing system, directs the computing system to at least: map the event handler portion and an initial portion of the application program to a range of memory allocated to the application program; monitor for an event associated with operations of the initial portion of the application program that was downloaded with the event handler portion, wherein the operations comprise a jump to a range of virtual memory allocated to an additional portion of the application program not yet downloaded to the computing system; in response to detecting the event, pause the operations of the initial portion of the application program and initiate downloading of the additional portion of the application program to the computing system; and upon downloading the additional portion of the application program to the computing system, resume the operations of the initial portion of the application program that involves the additional portion of the application program. Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Eylon US 2001/0034736 A1 Oct. 25, 2001 Subrahmanyam US 2008/0281884 A1 Nov. 13, 2008 Barr US 2010/0318988 A1 Dec. 16, 2010 REJECTION2 Claims 1, 6-9, and 14-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103{a) as obvious over Barr and Subrahmanyam. Non-Final Act. 6-12. ANALYSIS CLAIM 1 The Examiner finds the combination of Barr and Subrahmanyam teaches or suggests every limitation recited in claims 1, 6-9, and 14-17. Non-Final Act. 6-12. Of particular relevance to this Appeal, the Examiner finds Barr teaches “in response to detecting the event, pause the operations of the initial portion of the application program and initiate downloading of the additional portion of the application program to the computing system,” as recited in independent claim 1. Non-Final Act. 6-7 (citing Barr ¶¶ 25, 38, 39, Fig. 3 (340)). More specifically, the Examiner finds Barr’s disclosure that “the logical operations described herein are implemented as [(1)] a 2 Claims 2-5, 10-13, 19, and 20 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Barr, Subrahmanyam, and Eylon (US 2001/0034736 A1; Oct. 25, 2001). Non-Final Act. 12-15. This rejection was withdrawn. Ans. 10. Although claim 18 is indicated as rejected in the “Office Action Summary,” the rejection itself does identify a ground of rejection or make any findings and conclusions with respect to claim 18. See Non-Final Act. 6-15. Appellant also states the rejection of claim 18 is withdrawn. Ans. 10. Accordingly, no rejection of claim 18 is before us. Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 4 sequence of computer implemented acts or program modules running on a computing system” suggests that, the execution of an act or feature calling a portion of the application not yet downloaded is interrupted while that portion is downloaded. Non-Final Act. 6-7 (quoting Barr ¶ 25). The Examiner further finds Barr’s disclosure of determining, when executing a partially downloaded application program, to download feature blocks or data not locally present and return to executing the application upon completing the download teaches initiating downloading an additional portion of the program and resuming operations of the initial portion of the program upon downloading the additional portion. Non-Final Act. 6-7 (citing Barr ¶¶ 32, 38, 39). In the Answer, the Examiner clarifies the initial findings. See Ans. 10-11. The Examiner finds Barr’s disclosure and Appellant’s invention are both related to streaming applications that are partially downloaded. Ans. 10. Specifically, the Examiner finds that when streaming application programs require files not yet stored locally, the programs request and download the additional necessary files. Ans. 10. The Examiner further finds that Barr teaches the recited “pause” because Barr discloses interrupting execution of the program when attempting to execute a feature or file not yet downloaded resulting in the user waiting for that portion to be downloaded. Ans. 10-11 (“This waiting period is interpreted by the examiner as a ‘pause’ feature and supported by Barr by displaying a progress status of the additional files being downloaded (FIG. 3/item 350).”); see also Ans. 11 (“while the user is waiting for the portion of the program . . . to be downloaded, this is interpreted as the ‘pause the operation of the initial portion…’ since the user is displayed a progress of status of the Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 5 downloading portion.’”). Finally, the Examiner finds the Specification fails to define the scope of the term “pause” beyond what is recited in the claim itself such that the recited pause does not patentably distinguish over Barr’s disclosed interrupting in the program to download additional program portions. Ans. 11. Appellant argues Barr does not teach “paus[ing] the operations of the initial portion of the program application,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 6. In particular, Appellant asserts that, although “Barr teaches downloading wrapped feature blocks that are not locally present,” the assumption that this downloading “pauses operations of the initial portion of the application program” is not supported by the record because (1) downloading files not present and continuing operation of the initial portion of the program are not mutually exclusive, (2) Barr does not mention pausing operations of the already downloaded portion of the program files, and (3) Barr discloses downloading portions of the application in the background. Appeal Br. 6. Appellant asserts that a user waiting for a download of an additional portion of the application program does not mean that the initial portion of the application program pauses. Reply Br. 1. Appellant contends such an interpretation, which would mean that a user could not do anything while waiting, is inconsistent with Barr’s disclosure of executing an application in a partially downloaded state. Reply Br. 1-2 (citing Barr ¶ 11). Appellant quotes portions of Barr disclosing background downloading and continuing operation of the partially downloaded program when the requested features are already downloaded, and asserts this teaches that the partially downloaded program is not paused. Reply Br. 2 (citing Barr ¶¶ 24, 31, 38). Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 6 Barr relates to executing a partially downloaded application program. Barr ¶ 1. Barr discloses that existing implementations in which portions of the program are unavailable may appear to fail or hang when a user requests the unavailable portions until the requested information has been completely downloaded. Barr ¶ 1. Barr discloses that a partially downloaded program may continue to execute while downloading the remainder of the program (and its associated files) in the background. Barr ¶ 24. Although Barr allows a user to execute the program in its partially downloaded state, Barr may indicate unavailable features or functionality (e.g., via a grayed-out element) and continue to download the unavailable functionality in the background. Barr ¶¶ 24, 26-28. When the previously unavailable features are downloaded, Barr can indicate their availability. Barr ¶ 28. Requests to a portion of code identified as “wrapped functionality” (i.e., application functionality that is grouped to prevent potential delays when downloading that functionality) may trigger immediate download of the wrapped program code not yet downloaded. Barr ¶ 21. “When a code download is estimated to cause a delay of greater than a predefined time period, an indication may be presented to the user.” Barr ¶ 22. Barr may identify common entry points to wrapped functionality, and Barr also may include hooks to these common entry points to optionally provide a cancellation mechanism to allow the user to skip execution of the requested feature and continue downloading the wrapped functionality in the background. Barr ¶¶ 21, 23. Barr also discloses “on-demand loading,” which retrieves requested files and program code from a network when the requested information is not available locally, places the downloaded Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 7 information into the local data store, and makes the information accessible in local memory to the program. Barr ¶¶ 30-31. Barr’s improvement relates to “mitigating user interruption for partially downloaded or streamed virtual applications” in situations where “the application may be made available for execution by a user prior to the complete download of all application functionality.” Barr ¶¶ 1, 3. Barr may include a module that monitors for page faults related to requests for files or code used by the partially downloaded program that have not yet been downloaded. Barr ¶ 4. Barr retrieves and downloads the requested file or program code from a network in order to service the request. Barr ¶ 4. More specifically, Barr’s module determines whether memory requests by an application program can be met by local data store (i.e., determining that the requested file or program code has been downloaded already) and, if so, transfer the requested information to local memory so that the program can use the information. Barr ¶ 19. If the memory request is to a file or program code not yet locally available (i.e., not yet downloaded), the file or program code is downloaded or streamed form a network, stored in local store with the previously downloaded program code and files, and provided to local memory so that the program can use the information. Barr ¶ 19. Barr may inform a user “when streaming or virtualization delay is encountered . . . of details concerning the delay” so that “the user may also be notified that the application will return to a responsive state upon completion of the download,” which “may prevent the user from unexpectedly terminating an application while the application is delayed.” Barr ¶ 15 (emphasis added). Figure 2 of Barr shows “an illustrative process for servicing memory requests to provision application functionality from a Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 8 network according to one or more embodiments.” Barr ¶ 12. Figure 3 of Barr shows “an illustrative process for on-demand and wrapped loading over a network according to one or more embodiments.” Barr ¶ 13. In particular, Barr discloses that the system determines whether the request is locally available in step 260 and, if not, performing on-demand and wrapped network loading in subroutine 300. Barr ¶¶ 29-30. Barr explains that Figure 3 describes subroutine 300 for “mitigating user interruption for streamed and virtualized applications partially downloaded from a network” when performing on-demand and wrapped downloading. Barr ¶ 33. This method includes downloading information requested in process 200 that was not yet downloaded (i.e., downloading feature block in step 345 and on-demand load in step 320). Barr ¶¶ 35, 38. Barr may notify the user regarding downloads and delays and, upon completing the download, return to process 200 to service the memory request that was interrupted to perform download subroutine 300. Barr ¶¶ 36, 39. Barr’s disclosures related to downloading portions of the program in the background while the partially downloaded program continues and continuing to execute the partially downloaded program when requested features or files are already downloaded, see Reply Br. 2 (citing Barr ¶¶ 24, 31, 38), are not inconsistent with the Examiner’s findings and do not contradict other portions of Barr that teach or suggest pausing the partially downloaded program. These aspects of Barr merely describe conventional background downloading of partially downloaded programs. Barr’s disclosure relates to features to mitigate user interruption by providing hooks to cancel downloads and to provide a user with notifications regarding delays encountered when downloading program portions that have Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 9 not yet been downloaded when requested. Although Barr does not use the word “pause,” we agree with the Examiner that Barr’s figures and written description describe a process that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand includes pausing operations of the initial portion of the program that is already downloaded at step 300 of Figure 2. As explained above, Barr’s process 200 is interrupted (i.e., paused) when the system determines in step 260 that the memory request is not locally available. Subroutine 300 discloses the process for downloading the relevant data and, upon completing the download, returning to and resuming process 200 using the just-downloaded information necessary to service the request. For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Barr and Subrahmanyam. CLAIMS 9 AND 17 Appellant nominally argues the rejection of each of claims 9 and 17 separately. Appeal Br. 7-9; Reply Br. 2. However, Appellant argues claims 9 and 17 are not obvious in view of Barr and Subrahmanyam for the same reasons asserted with respect to claim 1. Appeal Br. 7-9 (reproducing the identical argument asserted with respect to claim 1 two times, once for claim 9 and once for claim 17); Reply Br. 2 (“For at least the reasons presented above with respect to claim 1, Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration and withdrawal of the rejection of claim 9 [(and 17)], along with [their] dependent claims.”). For the reasons discussed above, we disagree that Barr fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claims 9 Appeal 2020-000401 Application 15/342,404 10 and 17. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 9 and 17 as obvious over Barr and Subrahmanyam. CLAIMS 6-8 AND 14-16 Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent claims 6-8 and 14-16 separately. Appeal Br. 9. However, Appellant argues only that these claims are not obvious over Barr and Subrahmanyam for the same reasons asserted with respect to claims 1 and 9, from which they ultimately depend and “because of the additional features of the invention they recite.” Appeal Br. 9. This does not constitute a substantive argument separately addressing the merits of the dependent claims because it fails to identify an alleged deficiency regarding the additionally recited limitations in claims 6-8 and 14-16. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree that Barr fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation in independent claims 1 and 9. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 6-8 and 14-16 as obvious over Barr and Subrahmanyam. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 6-9, 14-17 103(a) Barr, Subrahmanyam 1, 6-9, 14-17 RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED