MICROSOFT CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 25, 2020

13705515 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/705,515 12/05/2012 Elena Apreutesei 337408.01 1410
69316 7590 02/25/2020
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
BULLOCK, JOSHUA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2153
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chriochs@microsoft.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte ELENA APREUTESEI, MICHAEL R. TENEYCK,
MICHAEL K. HIGASHI, and GUSTAVO SANTOS

Appeal 2019-001205
Application 13/705,515
Technology Center 2100

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, MICHAEL T. CYGAN, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA Administrative Patent Judges.

CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10 and 19–38. Appeal Br. 2. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft
Technology Licensing, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention generally relates to personas in communication
exchange environments. Spec. ¶ 1. Appellant defines “persona” as “an
aggregation of contact information assembled from multiple contacts, yet
presented under a single persona identity.” Id. ¶ 16. Personas permit
“contact information assembled from different contacts, but associated with
the same person, to be displayed in a more organized and efficient manner.”
Id. Many communication applications provide tools that allow users to
search for people in their contacts, initiate communications from their
contacts, and manage their contacts. Id. ¶ 2. Commonly, these contacts are
stored in more than one location. Id. A single person may be associated
with multiple contacts. Id. ¶4.
In the claimed invention, a search is requested for relevant personas.
Id. ¶ 5; Fig. 6; claim 1. A search is then made across different contact
sources for relevant contacts, and returns any relevant personas. Id. Each
relevant persona that is returned in the search results includes contact
information assembled from the relevant contacts. Id.
Independent claim 1 is illustrative, with the limitations at issue
emphasized in italics:
1. An apparatus comprising:
one or more computer readable storage media;
a processing system operatively coupled with the one or more
computer readable storage media; and
program instructions stored on the one or more computer
readable storage media for facilitating a communication
exchange environment that, when executed by the processing
system, direct the processing system to at least:
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in response to a search request comprising search criteria with
which to search for relevant personas and reply criteria with
which to populate the relevant personas, identify a plurality of
persona identities based on the search criteria;
in response to identifying the plurality of persona identities,
identify in a plurality of contact sources a plurality of contacts
associated with the plurality of persona identities; and
initiate a reply to the search request comprising a plurality of
personas, each of the plurality of personas corresponding to a
persona identity of the plurality of persona identities and
comprising contact information assembled from at least a
portion of the plurality of contacts.
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims App.).
Independent claims 9 and 15 recite a computing apparatus and a
method, respectively, which differ in scope with claim 1. Id. at 13–14.
Claim 15 is representative of claims 9 and 15 and is reproduced below.
15. A method of operating a communication exchange system
to facilitate personas in a communication exchange
environment, the method comprising:
receiving a plurality of search requests to search for relevant
personas initiated by a plurality of application platforms in the
communication exchange environment;
in response to each of the plurality of search requests, searching
a plurality of different contact sources for any relevant contacts;
and returning a plurality of relevant personas to the plurality of
application platforms in the communication exchange
environment, each of the plurality of relevant personas
comprising contact information assembled from the relevant
contacts.
Dependent claims 2–8, 10–14, and 16–20 each incorporate the limitations of
their respective independent claims. Id. at 11–14.

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REFERENCE
Name Reference Date
Postoaca US 2013/0097529 A1 Apr. 18, 2013

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Postoaca.
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being ineligible
subject matter. This rejection was made as a new ground of rejection in the
Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 2.

OPINION
A. Anticipation
With respect to claim 1, Appellant contends that Postoaca does not
disclose each and every limitation of the claimed invention. Appeal Br. 5.
Specifically, Appellant argues that claim 1 requires two steps: first, “search
criteria is utilized to find persona identities,” and second, “the persona
identities are used to identify contacts.” Id. Appellant argues that Postoaca
instead discloses merging contacts for a given persona, and then search
criteria are used to find contacts rather than persona identities. Id. at 7
(citing Postoaca ¶¶ 12, 14).
The Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose the claimed identifying a
plurality of persona identities based upon search criteria, in the form of
Postoaca’s searching interface for requesting contacts based on search
criteria. Final Act. 4 (citing Postoaca ¶ 14). The Examiner further finds
Postoaca to disclose the claimed multiple contact sources associated with
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multiple persona identities. Id. (citing Postoaca ¶ 60). Specifically, the
Examiner finds that Postoaca discloses a persona (“Andrei P.”) that is a
combination of contact information from multiple contacts into a single
identity. Ans. 4. (citing Postoaca ¶ 60). Further, the Examiner finds
Postoaca to disclose searching multiple contact sources for contact
information, through Postoaca’s statement that contact information may
come from sources including Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. Id. (citing
Postoaca ¶ 50).
With respect to claim 1, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
The Examiner has shown Postoaca to disclose replying to a search request
with personas and associated contact information. However, the Examiner
has not shown that Postoaca discloses a first step of identifying personas that
are based on search criteria, and then in response to that identifying step,
identifying in a plurality of contact sources a plurality of contacts associated
with the previously identified personas. The Examiner has not shown any
order of providing the personas and contact information, instead
characterizing Appellant’s argument for the order of steps as “(1) ‘searching
multiple contact sources’ and (2) ‘assembling contact information from the
sources for a persona on-the-fly’.” Ans. 3. The Examiner finds Postoaca to
disclose those steps. Id. at 3–4.
A claim that logically requires an order in which to carry out the
recited steps or acts is limited to that order of steps or acts. See Loral
Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1321–1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(finding that factors including the language of the claim limited the claim to
the particular sequence of steps claimed), Mantech Environmental Corp. v.
Hudson Environmental Servs, Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 1375–1376 (Fed. Cir.
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1998) (finding a particular sequence in the performance of steps to be
required by logic, and apparent from the plain meaning of the claim
language).
Claim 1 recites, “in response to a search request . . . identify a
plurality of persona identities based on the search criteria” and “in response
to identifying the plurality of persona identities, identify . . . a plurality of
contacts associated with the plurality of persona identities.” Appeal Br. 11
(Claims App.). We agree with Appellants that these limitations logically
require an order in which to be carried out. The Examiner has not explained
why the “in response to” limitations do not require a particular sequence of
performance. Because the Examiner does not accord weight to the ordering
created by the “in response to” limitations, and does not explain how
Postoaca discloses the claimed sequence of steps, we determine the rejection
to be in error. Consequently, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim
1, and the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–8 based upon the same grounds
and reasoning.
Independent claims 9 and 15, and claims 10–14 and 16–20 depending
therefrom, have been argued separately from claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–9.
Appellant argues claims 9 and 15 together, and argues claims 10, 11, 13, and
18–20 on the same grounds and reasoning. Id. Appellant characterizes
these claims as including features “generally analogous” to those discussed
in their argument against claim 1. Id. at 8. However, these claims do not
recite the “in response to” limitations of claim 1. We select claim 15 as
representative. 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant directs their arguments
against claim 1 to a lack of the aforementioned two steps occurring in a
particular sequence. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 5 (“[f]irst, search criteria is
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utilized to find persona identities. Next, the persona identities are used to
identify contacts.”), 7 (“in Postoaca, search criteria is used to find contacts –
not persona identities. Consequently, there is no two-step process taught or
disclosed in Postoaca.”).
However, such a sequence is not recited in claim 15. Representative
claim 15 instead requires responding to requests to search for personas by
searching for contacts, and returning at least one persona and at least a
portion of the contact information that forms the persona. Appeal Br. 15
(Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Postoaca describes these
limitations, in the form of a searching interface for finding contacts based on
search criteria, in which the contacts are associated with particular personas
(e.g., alias information such as “Andrei P.” for a contact), in which contact
information may come from multiple sources, and persona and contact
information are returned in response to a search request. Final Act. 4–6;
Postoaca ¶¶ 14, 60. Appellant characterizes Postoaca similarly with respect
to these limitations. Appeal Br. 7 (“in Postoaca, search criteria is used to
find contacts,” “Postoaca discusses merging contacts for a given persona
ahead of time such that the merged contacts can subsequently be searched,”
“a user 102 can decide from which external sources 104 to download
electronic contacts 106 before sharing them with other users”).
Appellant has based their arguments on a distinction that the claim
requires search criteria utilized to find persona identities, not contacts, and
next, the persona identities are used to identify contacts. Id. at 5, 7.
However, claim 15 recites searching contacts, not searching personas that
are then used to identify contacts. Id. at 13–14 (Claims App.) Accordingly,
Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate with the scope of claim 15.
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Consequently, Appellant has not provided arguments persuasive to show
error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 9–11, 13–16, and 18–20.
With respect to claims 12 and 17, Appellant further argues that
Postoaca does not disclose “a search string that is input while initiating a
communication in order to identify a person associated with the
communication.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues specifically that Postoaca
“merely suggests a searching interface through which a user can interface
with a contact management interface application- not that a search string
could be entered via the search interface while initiating a communication.”
Id. (citing Postoaca ¶ 14).
Claim 17 sets forth the additional limitation, “wherein each of the
plurality of application platforms in the communication exchange
environment includes a communication application and wherein the search
criteria comprises a search string input to the communication application
when initiating a communication.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). The
Examiner finds Postoaca to disclose this limitation through Postoaca’s
entering a search string and initiation of a request to identify a person. Ans.
5 (citing Postoaca ¶¶ 14, 60). As noted supra, Appellant admits that
Postoaca discloses “a searching interface through which a user can interface
with a contact management interface application.” Id. at 9.
Appellant has not persuaded us of error. Appellant has not explained
how Postoaca’s initiation of a search request fails to meet the claimed
“initiating a communication,” as broadly recited in claim 17. Although the
Specification provides an example of entering a search string “during the
course of creating an email” (Spec. ¶ 37), such a non-limiting example does
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not circumscribe the claim. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1369, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("We have cautioned
against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred
embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment
described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.").
The Specification provides a separate example in which the search
string is entered and the communication application initiates the search
request. Spec. ¶¶ 36, 40. Appellants have not persuaded us that the
“wherein the search criteria comprises a search string input to the
communication application when initiating a communication” limitation
fails to encompass “initiating a communication” where the communication is
the search request initiated by the communication application. The
Examiner determined that the claimed communication may be a search
request, and the Examiner found this to be described by Postoaca’s
disclosure of entering a search string and initiation of a request to identify a
person. Ans. 5. Accordingly, Appellants have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12 and 17.

B. Subject Matter Eligibility
1. Principles of Law
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
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There is, however, an implicit, longstanding exception to patent-
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). This exception precludes
patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” from
which all inventions spring. Id. at 216–17 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Invention or discovery under § 101 is distinguished as being the
application of such tools to an end otherwise satisfying the requirements of
the patent statutes. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
The Supreme Court has established a framework for this eligibility
determination. Where a claim is directed towards a law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea, the elements of the claim as a whole must
ensure that the claim, in practice, amounts to significantly more than a patent
on the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea itself. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18. In applying this eligibility analysis, our reviewing court has
stated, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier
cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen[,] . . . the
classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing
definitional context is not available.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
To address the growing body of precedent, the USPTO recently
published revised examination guidance on the application of § 101. 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter 2019 Guidance). The 2019 Guidance seeks to
improve the clarity of the subject matter eligibility analysis and improve
consistency of this analysis across the USPTO. Id.
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Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim is
directed to a judicial exception because:
(1) the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, the last of which includes certain groupings, identified as
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
and mental processes; and
(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE (hereinafter “MPEP”)
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or instead,
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, passim.
2. Analysis
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
(Ans. 2–3) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred
(Reply Br. 2–3). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention of
Examiner error in rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Because
Appellant does not argue any claim separately, we select claim 1 as
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representative of the grouping, and claims 1–20 stand or fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
a) “Recites an Abstract Idea”
The Examiner finds claims 1–20 directed to making a request for and
receiving data (i.e., the steps of a search request, and identification of
identities and contacts) for the purpose of collecting contact information and
classifying this information in an organized manner. Ans. 2. The Examiner
has found these limitations to be similar to concepts previously identified by
the courts as abstract, such as Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Ans. 2–3.
Appellant argues that the concepts described by claims 1–20 are not
similar to those concepts at issue in the cases identified by the Examiner.
Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant contends that the “subject matter in
Classen [scheduling infant immunizations to reduce the risk of chronic
immune-mediated disorders is] unrelated to the instant claims.” Id. at 3.
The USPTO’s 2019 Guidance states that the abstract idea exception
includes mental processes “when recited as such in a claim limitation(s) (that
is when recited on their own or per se).” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
In particular, Updated Guidance issued by the USPTO in October 2019
characterizes “a claim to collecting and comparing known information” as a
mental process, where such can be practically performed in the human mind.
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility 7–8, accessible at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df. The Updated Guidance refers specifically to the same Classen case that
the Examiner relies upon in determining the claims recite an abstract idea.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1’s limitations of
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receiving search requests for specific data, searching contact data for
relevant data, and returning persona data (defined at paragraph 16 of the
Specification as contact information assembled from different contacts) and
contact data together form the type of concept that can be practically
performed in the human mind, or with the assistance of pen and paper.
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract
idea.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. Under the 2019 Guidance,
the relevant inquiry is whether the claims recite an abstract idea as described
in the three groupings, including mental processes, set forth therein. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–53. It is not persuasive to show that the
subject matter is unrelated (e.g., in field of art) to a specific case identifying
a particular mental process.
b) “Directed to an Abstract Idea”
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims
are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application of that abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
The Examiner finds claims 1–20 to have elements additional to those
limitations reciting an abstract idea; namely, computer-readable storage
media, a processing system, and program instructions. Ans. 3. The
Examiner further determines these to amount to no more than a “generic
computer performing generic computer functions.” Id.
Appellant disagrees, arguing, “the instant claims pertain to much more
than merely making a request for and receiving data.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant further argues, “[t]he claimed solution provides the technical
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advantage of being able to retrieve contact information from multiple
contacts to be assembled into a persona in response to a search request.” Id.
Appellant asserts that such would avoid the need for maintenance of a third
database for merged contacts as required by Postoaca. Id. Appellant further
argues that the claims “improve the function of a computing system by
allowing personas to be populated with contact information from multiple
contacts, without having to merge the contact information ahead of time.”
Id..
An improvement to a technology or technical field may be indicative
that an additional element or combination of elements integrates the
exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. However, an
additional element that merely includes instructions to implement an abstract
idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an
abstract idea, may be indicative that the judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application. Id.
Appellant asserts technical advantages from the use of persona
identities that are identified based on search criteria and then used to identify
contact information, with the persona and contact information returned as a
search result. Reply Br. 2 (“[t]he key to how this happens is the persona
identities”). The Specification identifies “facilitating personas in
communication exchange environments” as a goal of the invention;
however, such facilitation is not identified to be more than assembling data
representing contact information. Spec ¶ 5.
The persona identities are merely data; i.e., contact information
assembled from different contacts. Spec. ¶ 16. To the extent that Appellant
has implemented an improved method of assembling data into personas for
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improved searching, we note an improved abstract idea is still an abstract
idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim
directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless patent-ineligible). See also
Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an
abstract idea.”) (Emphasis omitted).
Appellant has not argued how the additional limitations; i.e., the
computer-readable storage media, processing system, or program
instructions, act to improve any specific technology or technical field.
Petitioner has merely alleged a “technical advantage,” but has not shown
that the particularly claimed manner of assembling data improves a
particular technology or technical field. Our reviewing court provides
further guidance: “‘[t]he mere automation of manual processes using generic
computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer
technology,’” Trading Techs. Int’l v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d
1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). USPTO examination procedure also requires
that “the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the
method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement
to an existing technology.” MPEP § 2106.05(a). Consequently, we are not
persuaded that the additional elements of claim 1 reflect an improvement in
the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or
technical field.
We instead agree with the Examiner’s determination that the
additional elements of claim 1 are instructions to implement the particularly
claimed technique of assembling data in a particular manner on a generic
computer, in effect, using a computer as a tool to perform such data
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assembly. Consequently, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
c) Significantly More Than an Abstract Idea
The Examiner has determined that the additional elements of
computer readable storage media, processing system, and program
instructions do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea when
considered both individually and as a combination, since they amount to no
more than a generic computer performing generic computer functions.
Appellant argues that the specific three step solution of claim 1 is the
“something more” that provides significantly more than claiming a judicial
exception. Reply Br. 2. In particular, the “something more” is identified as
the “concept of [the] persona identities.” Id. at 3.
To the extent that Appellant identifies the “concept of persona
identities” as providing significantly more than the abstract idea, we are not
persuaded. The concept of persona identities; i.e., an assembly of data
representing contacts, is part of the abstract idea and not the additional
elements. Appellant has not persuasively shown the additional elements of
computer readable storage media, processing system, and program
instructions to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea when
considered either individually or as a combination.
Furthermore, generically claimed elements of computer readable
storage media, processing system, and program instructions have been found
to be no more than well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the
context of gathering and assembling data. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The conventional limitations of
claim 1, combined with limitations of analyzing and comparing data and
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reconciling differences between the data . . . amount to no more than
performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with
conventional computer components); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 716 (updating an activity log by computer is well-understood,
routine, conventional activity). As explained by the Supreme Court, the
presence of a generic computer performing generic computer functions, such
as calculation and transmission of data, is not enough to transform an
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573
U.S. 208, 225–226 (2014). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument.
In view of the foregoing, under the 2019 Guidance, informed by our
governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown
the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception,
i.e., an abstract idea, without significantly more, and thus is patent-ineligible
under § 101. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Since claims 2–20 stand or fall with claim 1, we therefore sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of those claims.

CONCLUSION
For the above-described reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1–8 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. §102(e), we affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 9–20 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
§102(e), and we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 as lacking
subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §101.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Grounds Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–20 102(e) Postoaca 9–20 1–8
Overall
Outcome
1–20

AFFIRMED