Michael Robles, Glenn Hiranaka, Thomas Dore, Edward Ramirez, Complainants,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 19, 2002
01991833 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 19, 2002)

01991833

08-19-2002

Michael Robles, Glenn Hiranaka, Thomas Dore, Edward Ramirez, Complainants, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


Michael Robles, Glenn Hiranaka, Thomas Dore, Edward Ramirez v. United

States Postal Service

01993974, 01991833, 01993973, 01993972

August 19, 2002

.

Michael Robles,

Glenn Hiranaka,

Thomas Dore,

Edward Ramirez,

Complainants,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal Nos. 01993974, 01991833, 01993973, 01993972

Agency Nos. 4F-926-1111-96, 1108-96, 1110-96, 1109-96

Hearing Nos. 340-97-3150x, 3151x, 3171x, 3148x

DECISION

Michael Robles, Glenn Hiranaka, Thomas Dore and Edward Ramirez

(complainants 1 - 4) timely initiated appeals from the agency's final

decision concerning their equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints

of unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeals are accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405 and, for the

sake of administrative economy, consolidated. Complainants allege that

they were discriminated against on the basis of sex (male) when they

were disciplined for alleged sexual harassment of a female employee.

Complainants 1 and 3 also allege that this discipline was motivated by

their prior protected EEO activity (unspecified).

For the following reasons, the Commission REVERSES the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that complainants, letter carriers at the agency's

Upland, California postal facility, filed formal EEO complaints

with the agency on March 28, 1996 (complainants 1 and 2), April 1,

1996 (complainant 3), and March 29, 1996 (complainant 4) alleging

that the agency had discriminated against them as referenced above.

At the conclusion of the investigations, complainants received a copy

of the investigative report and each requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The complaints were consolidated for

hearing and, following the hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding

that complainants 1 and 3 were not subjected to retaliation, but that

all four complainants were subjected to sex discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainants established a prima facie case of

sex discrimination because sexual bantering and innuendo was common

among all employees of their unit, male and female, and was known to

the supervisors, but only complainants were disciplined. The AJ also

noted that the investigation into the female employee's (FE) accusation

of sexual harassment was not even-handed and that complainants were not

treated the same as FE during the investigation.

The AJ then concluded that the agency failed to articulate a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for disciplining complainants. While the

agency argued that complainants were disciplined after an investigation

into FE's claims of sexual harassment revealed that complainants had

behaved contrary to the agency's anti-harassment policy, the AJ found

that this was not a sufficient articulation. The AJ noted that a Labor

Relations Specialist (LS) who was involved in investigating FE's claim

was �clearly operating on a stereotypical view of women,� finding that he

believed FE was upset and embarrassed about the sexual discussions that

took place in the workplace. The AJ determined that LS's stereotyped

view prevented him from conducting an adequate investigation. The AJ

also noted that both LS and the other management official involved in the

investigation (OIC) were aware that FE �misrepresented or exaggerated�

relevant information relating to her sexual harassment report, yet did

not seek further information with regard to corroboration or credibility.

From these findings, the AJ concluded that the agency failed to articulate

a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions.

The AJ then concluded that even assuming the agency articulated a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions, complainants

established that the reason was a pretext for sex discrimination.

In supporting this finding, the AJ again pointed to FE's lack of

credibility, noting that it was clear that FE lied about certain matters,

while there was no indication that complainants lied. The AJ also noted

that very severe discipline was imposed on complainants and that had

a �fair investigation� taken place, complainants would not have been

disciplined for sexual harassment.

The AJ found that complainants 1 and 3 were not subjected to retaliation,

noting that neither LS nor OIC were aware of complainants' prior EEO

activity.

The AJ went on to recommend a remedy for the agency's discriminatory

behavior.

The agency's final decision adopted the AJ's finding of no retaliation,

but concluded that complainants were not subjected to sex discrimination.

In so finding, the agency noted that when OIC became aware of FE's

allegations of harassment, he contacted the District Labor Relations

office for guidance and, subsequently, conducted an investigation.

The agency stated that this investigation was based on written and oral

testimony from the employees in FE's unit. OIC selectively interviewed

employees in the office, concentrating on those named by FE and those

in close proximity to the area in which FE worked. After the initial

interviews, FE provided more specific information about her allegations,

leading to a second interview of complainants and their supervisors.

The agency found that OIC followed agency guidelines on investigating

claims of harassment and conducted a fair and impartial investigation.

The agency noted that the AJ had no evidence on which to base her

conclusion that LS was operating under a stereotypical view of woman or

that the investigation was biased due to his participation. The agency

concluded that the discipline was issued based on a fair and impartial

investigation and according to agency guidelines on harassment.

On appeal, complainants essentially restate arguments previously made at

the hearing. Complainants ask that the AJ's recommendations be upheld

and that the agency be required to issue new harassment guidelines,

such that investigations do not treat males less favorably than females.

In response, the agency restates the position it took in its FAD, and

requests that we affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

As an initial matter, we note that complainants' joint appeal statement

requests that the AJ's decision be upheld and does not request that the

Commission reverse the FAD's determination to adopt the AJ's finding that

complainants 1 and 3 were not subjected to retaliation. Accordingly,

the retaliation claims will not be addressed in this decision.

Turning to complainant's claims of sex discrimination, the Commission

finds that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. The AJ's

determination that complainants were subjected to sex discrimination is

supported by substantial evidence. In so finding, we note that the AJ

determined that LS, one of the officials responsible for conducting the

investigation into FE's claims of sexual harassment, was operating under

a stereotypical view of women which caused him to believe FE when she

claimed to have been upset and embarrassed about the sexual discussions

that took place in the workplace. The AJ determined that LS's biased

views prevented him from conducting an adequate investigation, noting

that LS was aware that FE exaggerated and/or misrepresented information

relevant to her claims of sexual harassment, but did not seek further

information in regard to her credibility. These factual findings are

supported by substantial evidence in that LS himself testified that

he believed FE was upset and embarrassed by the sexual discussions

that took place, despite his awareness that she misrepresented and

exaggerated relevant facts. Moreover, LS acknowledged that he did not

seek adequate corroboration of FE's claims or check into controverting

evidence offered by complainants before determining that complainants

were guilty of sexual harassment.

Accordingly, we discern no reason to disturb the AJ's finding that

complainants were subjected to sex-based discrimination when they were

disciplined for the alleged sexual harassment of FE. The agency's

finding to the contrary is therefore REVERSED and this matter REMANDED

for further processing.

As a final matter, we note that the Commission, in a Guidance published

after the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinions in the sexual

harassment cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

(1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), suggests

that agencies establish, disseminate and enforce an anti-harassment

policy and complaint procedure and take other reasonable steps to prevent

and correct harassment. See Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer

Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (Vicarious Liability),

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). In this Guidance, the Commission addresses

the situation at hand, in which accused harassers claim that discipline

they received through an internal harassment procedure was discriminatory.

The Guidance notes the Commission will not find pretext based solely on an

after-the-fact conclusion that the disciplinary action is inappropriate.

Where the accused harasser claims that the disciplinary action was

discriminatory, �the real issue is whether the employer reasonably

believed the employee's allegation [of harassment] and acted on it in

good faith, or to the contrary, the employer did not actually believe the

co-employee's allegation but instead used it as a pretext for an otherwise

discriminatory dismissal.� See Vicarious Liability, fn. 71, quoting

Waggonner v. City of Garland Tex., 987 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993).

The decision herein does not contradict this Guidance. The AJ's finding

of discrimination is not based solely on an after-the-fact conclusion that

discipline was inappropriate. Rather, the finding of discrimination is

based on the fact that one of the officials involved in investigating FE's

claims held a biased view of women which predisposed him to believe FE's

version of events rather than complainants, despite evidence that she was

exaggerating and misrepresenting relevant events. As such, the agency's

decision to believe FE's allegations was not reasonable. We remind

the agency that if it conducts an adequate and unbiased investigation

into an employee's claim of sexual harassment and determines in good

faith that discipline is warranted, the Commission will not find that

decision to be discriminatory based solely on a determination that the

discipline was inappropriate.

ORDER

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall rescind any disciplinary action taken against

complainants due to its finding that they sexually harassed FE.

The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay (with

interest, if applicable) and other benefits due complainants, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the

date this decision becomes final. Complainant shall cooperate in the

agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due,

and shall provide all relevant information requested by the agency.

If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or

benefits, the agency shall issue a check to each complainant for the

undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the

agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Complainant may

petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.

The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the

Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall expunge from all agency records any mention

that complainants were found to have sexually harassed FE.

Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

the agency shall provide at least 8 hours of training in EEO law to

all supervisors and managers at the Upland, California facility who

are responsible for conducting internal harassment investigations,

including LS and OIC.

The agency shall post the attached notice.

The issues of compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs are

REMANDED to the Hearings Unit of the Los Angeles District office.

Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on these

issues in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109, and the agency shall

issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110 within forty

(40) days of receipt of the Administrative Judge's decision. The agency

shall submit copies of the Administrative Judge's decision and the final

agency action to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G0900)

The agency is ordered to post at its Upland, California facility copies

of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 19, 2002

Date

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated which found that

a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., has occurred at the United States Postal

Service, Upland, California facility (facility).

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect

to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions

or privileges of employment.

The facility supports and will comply with such federal law and will

not take action against individuals because they have exercised their

rights under law.

The facility was found to have discriminated on the basis of sex when it

disciplined four employees based on a biased investigation into a claim

that they had sexually harassed a co-worker. The facility was ordered

to: (1) rescind the disciplinary actions; (2) pay the appropriate amount

of back pay and benefits; (3) expunge mention of the disciplinary actions

from all agency records; (4) provide EEO training to the supervisors

and managers at the facility who are responsible for conducting internal

harassment investigations; (5) and post this notice. The issues of

complainants' entitlement to compensatory damages and attorney's fees

and costs were remanded to an EEOC Administrative Judge.

The facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or

retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to

oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings

pursuant to, federal equal employment opportunity law.

Date Posted:

Posting Expires:

29 C.F.R. Part 1614