Michael Lincoln. Albl et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2020

15333383 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/333,383 10/25/2016 Michael Lincoln Albl 390-RCS-03-2010 1314
86548 7590 01/31/2020
Garlick & Markison (IH)
100 Congress Avenue, Suite 2000
Austin, TX 78701
EXAMINER
KIM, PAUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2169
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MMurdock@TEXASPATENTS.COM
bpierotti@texaspatents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL LINCOLN ALBL, DAVID C. JELLISON JR., and
NIGEL ATTWELL
Appeal 2018-009036
Application 15/333,383
Technology Center 2100
Before DAVID C. MCKONE, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MCKONE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as iHeartMedia
Management Services, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention is directed to analyzing content currently being (or that
has recently been) provided to consumers and presenting to the consumers
triggered content as a result. Spec. 5:8–12.
For example, an advertiser can place an advertising buy for a
terrestrial, online, or mobile media provider, such as a radio
station, and request ads to be run adjacent to, or within a certain
time period prior to or after, an ‘ad song’ is played. An
automated media scheduling system can evaluate a media
programming log to determine if the ad-song is scheduled to be
played within a proximity threshold of a commercial set.
Id. at 5:13–17. “Identifying triggering content can include inspecting or
evaluating a media programming log, which identifies media content and the
time the media content is scheduled to be broadcast, aired, or otherwise
played out.” Id. at 9:9–11. In another example,
[p]hrases, images, or other content obtained as a result of the
monitoring can be compared to a collection of pre-determined
phrases or images, and the results of the comparison can be
used to determine whether or not a topic of interest is being
discussed, or whether an event of interest has occurred.
Id. at 9:23–26. The Specification describes detecting triggering content on
one media platform (e.g., a terrestrial radio broadcast) and delivering
triggered content on another media platform (e.g., a website). Id. at 12:18–
24.
The Specification expressly defines certain terms used in the claims.
For example, “the term ‘triggered content’ refers generally to content
scheduled by an automated media scheduler for delivery to a consumer in
response to detection of triggering content.” Id. at 6:8–10. Examples
include an advertisement including a portion of an ad-song and a media item
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including commercial content associated with a particular song or video
item. Id. at 6:10–12.
“Triggering content,” as that term is used [in the Specification],
refers to media content that causes, or triggers, an automated
media scheduling system to attempt to schedule or modify a
pre-existing schedule by adding or removing media content
from the schedule, replacing scheduled media content with
other media content, changing a scheduled frequency of
scheduled media playout, or recording the triggering content to
create or modify media content to be inserted into a media
schedule.
Id. at 6:17–22.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for use in an automated media scheduling system,
the method comprising:
maintaining information associating a plurality of
different content triggers with a plurality of
different content adjustment parameters, the
plurality of different content adjustment
parameters including information specifying a
particular media channel to be used to deliver
triggered content, by executing a program
instruction in a data processing apparatus;
monitoring media content played out across a plurality of
different media platforms for a content trigger, by
executing a program instruction in a data
processing apparatus; and
in response to detecting a particular content trigger
associated with a particular media platform,
adjusting playout of scheduled media content on
the particular media channel to include the
triggered content based on a particular content
adjustment parameter associated with the
particular content trigger, by executing a program
instruction in a data processing apparatus.
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Konig
Hartmaier
Bouazizi
Singer
Furney
US 2004/0194130 A1
US 2008/0293393 A1
US 2011/0010737 A1
US 2011/0041062 A1
US 8,341,047 B1
Sept. 30, 2004
Nov. 27, 2008
Jan. 13, 2011
Feb. 17, 2011
Dec. 25, 2012
REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–5.
Claims 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Bouazizi. Id. at 6–8.
Claims 2, 9, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bouazizi and Konig. Id. at 8–9.
Claims 3 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bouazizi, Konig, and Singer. Id. at 9–11.
Claims 4, 11, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bouazizi and Furney. Id. at 11–12.
Claims 6, 13, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bouazizi and Hartmaier. Id. at 12.
OPINION
Statutory Subject Matter Rejection Under § 101
Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
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exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice
and Mayo. See id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
Id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
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Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).2 Under that guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or a mental
process); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

The Examiner’s Rejection
The Examiner rejects independent claims 1, 8, and 15 together,
finding that the features of those claims “correspond to concepts identified
as abstract ideas by the courts, such as delivering user-selected media
content to portable devices.” Final Act. 3 (citing Affinity Labs of Tex. v.

2 We note that the Guidance was not available to the Examiner and
Appellant during the prosecution of the instant Application.
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Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). According to the
Examiner, “[a]ll of these concepts relate to organizing and sending
information resulting from the organization of information.” Id.
The Examiner further finds that “the limitations of the current claims
are performed by the generically recited computer/processor,” and that
“[t]he limitations are merely instructions to implement the abstract idea on a
computer and require no more than a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional
activities previously known to the industry.” Id. at 3–4. The Examiner finds
that these additional limitations are not sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception, whether considered individually or as an
ordered combination. Id. at 4. Specifically, the Examiner finds, “[t]he use
of generic computer components to select and insert media content does not
impose any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract
idea,” and “[t]here is no indication that the combination of elements
improves the functioning of a computer or improves any other technology.”
Id. Rather, “[t]heir collective functions merely provide conventional
computer implementation.” Id.

Judicial Exception (Step 2A,3 Prong 1)
The Examiner and Appellant address independent claims 1, 8, and 15
together. Final Act. 3–4; Appeal Br. 10–13. Appellant does not address the

3 The Guidance refers to “Step One” as determining whether the claimed
subject matter falls within the four statutory categories identified by
35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
This step is not at issue here, as Appellant’s claims recite methods
(processes), systems (machines), and computer readable media (articles of
manufacture).
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dependent claims separately. Accordingly, we select claim 1 as
representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Viewing the Examiner’s rejection through the lens of the Guidance,
we first consider whether the claim recites a judicial exception. Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The USPTO has synthesized the key concepts identified
by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings:
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity (e.g., a
fundamental economic practice), and mental processes. Id. at 52. As
explained below, the claims recite certain methods of organizing human
activity (commercial or legal interactions, including advertising, marketing,
or sales activities or behaviors) and mental processes, which are identified
by the Guidance as abstract ideas. Id.
Claim 1, in essence, recites maintaining information that associates
content triggers with content adjustment parameters (including information
specifying a particular media channel to be used to deliver triggered
content); monitoring media content played out across a plurality of different
media platforms for a content trigger; and, in response to detecting a content
trigger associated with a media platform, adjusting the playout of scheduled
media content on the specified media channel to include the triggered
content based on one of the content adjustment parameters. The
Specification makes clear that the invention relates to choosing
advertisements triggered by content relevant to an advertiser and inserting
those triggered advertisements into a media channel. “For example, an
advertiser can place an advertising buy for a terrestrial, online, or mobile
media provider, such as a radio station, and request ads to be run adjacent to,
or within a certain time period prior to or after, an ‘ad song’ is played.”
Spec. 5:13–15. Dependent claims further highlight that the claims are
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related to advertising and marketing. See, e.g., claims 2 (“specific media
content item associated both with the particular topic and a particular
advertiser”), and 3 (“replacing a general advertisement associated with an
advertiser with an ad-song advertisement associated with the advertiser”).
The Federal Circuit has found similar claims directed to advertising to
be ineligible. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The process of receiving copyrighted media, selecting an
ad, offering the media in exchange for watching the selected ad, displaying
the ad, allowing the consumer access to the media, and receiving payment
from the sponsor of the ad all describe an abstract idea, devoid of a concrete
or tangible application.”); see also Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1269 (“The
idea in this case is even broader and more abstract than the idea in
Ultramercial: The ’085 patent covers streaming content generally, not even
including an additional feature such as exchanging the consumer’s access to
the streaming content for the consumer’s viewing of an advertisement.”).
We find that claim 1 recites advertising, marketing, or sales activities or
behaviors, an example of commercial interactions that the Guidance lists as
a certain method of organizing human activity that is an abstract idea.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, the steps of claim 1 could be performed by a user in his or
her head, but for claim 1’s recitations of generic computer hardware and
instructions. For example, a user could listen to a terrestrial radio broadcast
or view a website (plurality of different media platforms) for an ad-song (an
example of a content trigger/triggering content provided by the
Specification, 6:22–24, 7:3–6), and, in response to hearing the ad-song,
choose an advertisement related to the ad-song (an example of triggered
content provided by the Specification, 6:10–11, 7:8–9) to be added to a
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media channel. Here, the claimed information associating content triggers
with content adjustment parameters can be held in the user’s memory. Thus,
claim 1 recites concepts that can be performed in the human mind
(observation, evaluation, judgement), an example of a mental process. See
Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[W]e have treated analyzing information by steps people go through
in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”). The Guidance lists a
mental process as another example of an abstract idea. Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not considered the claims’
“character as a whole” and that the claims actually are directed to an
improvement in media scheduling systems. Appeal Br. 10–11 (quoting
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); citing
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). We address these arguments in our analyses of Step 2A, Prong 2,
and Step 2B, below.
Accordingly, we find that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, namely a
certain method of organizing human activity (commercial interactions,
specifically advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors) and a
mental process. For the same reasons, claims 2–20 recite abstract ideas.

“Directed to” the Judicial Exception (Step 2A, Prong 2)
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we now proceed to
determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. Specifically, we look to
“whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the exception
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into a practical application of that exception.” Id. at 54. Limitations that are
indicative of integration into a practical application include additional
elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55. When a claim
recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a
practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. at
51.
The Examiner analyzes the remaining limitations of claim 1 and finds
that “the claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or
technical field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea
to a particular technological environment.” Final Act. 3. Specifically, the
Examiner finds that “the limitations of the current claims are performed by
the generically recited computer/processor,” and that “[t]he use of generic
computer components to select and insert media content does not impose
any meaningful limit on the computer implementation of the abstract idea.”
Id. at 3–4. As to the claim as a whole, the Examiner finds that “[t]here is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology.” Id. at 4.
Appellant contends that the claims are not directed to recitations such
as “maintaining information,” “monitoring media content,” and “adjusting
playout of scheduled media content” unless “the character of the claim as a
whole indicates” that the recitation “is the claimed advance over the prior
art.” Appeal Br. 10 (quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 (which, in turn,
quotes Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1375, (Fed. Cir.
2016)). In Enfish, the Federal Circuit explained that “the first step in the
Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific
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asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process
that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely
as a tool.” 822 F.3d at 1335–36. The disputed claims in Enfish were patent-
eligible because they were “directed to a specific improvement to the way
computers operate, embodied in [a] self-referential table.” Id. at 1336.
Appellant argues that “the claims are actually directed to an
improvement in media scheduling systems. Perhaps not an improvement in
processing speed or power usage of the media scheduling system’s
hardware, but an improvement in the capabilities of the media scheduling
system.” Appeal Br. 11. According to Appellant, the “claimed invention
improves conventional media scheduling systems by giving them the ability
to deliver triggered content on different media channels.” Id. Appellant
contends that this is “a specific technical improvement in the functionality of
existing media scheduling systems.” Id. (citing BASCOM Global Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (2016)).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As the Examiner
finds, “the claim[ed] invention fails to provide for a plurality of different
media channels. Rather, the claimed invention simply recites features
directed to ‘adjusting playout of scheduled media content on the particular
media channel.’” Ans. 6. In replying to the Examiner’s findings on
anticipation (which we address more fully below), Appellant “acknowledges
that there is not [a] separate ‘selecting a channel’ element explicitly recited
in the claims,” but argues that “the claims do require that the playout of
scheduled media is adjusted based on the particular media channel
associated with the triggering content.” Reply 8. We disagree. Claim 1
recites a “plurality of different content adjustment parameters including
information specifying a particular media channel to be used to deliver
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triggered content,” but does not recite that the parameter specifying a
particular media channel is the “particular content adjustment parameter” on
which the inclusion of the triggered content is based. According to the plain
language of claim 1, it could be another content adjustment parameter of the
recited plurality of parameters. Thus, claim 1 does not recite the
improvement argued by Appellant.
More broadly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 merely recites
abstract ideas implemented on generic computer hardware, with generic
programming instructions. Unlike the claimed invention in McRO, for
example, that improved how a physical display operated to produce better
quality images, the claimed invention here merely uses generic computing
components to evaluate content triggers and insert triggered content on a
media channel. In particular, the individual steps of claim 1 are recited as
performed by generic computer equipment, including steps performed by
“executing a program instruction in a data processing apparatus.” Consistent
with this, the Specification describes the invention as implemented on
generic computer equipment with generic computer instructions. Spec. 32–
34.
Simply reciting generic computer hardware for performing an abstract
idea does not integrate that abstract idea into a practical application. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (“Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims
simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a
generic computer. The method claims do not, for example, purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claims
at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic
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computer.” (internal citations omitted)); Dealertrack Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation
to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to
render the claim patent eligible.”). The invention of claim 1 does not focus
on improving computers as tools, but rather certain independently abstract
ideas that use computers as tools. See Elec. Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1354.
The Guidance also discusses other ways that additional elements can
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application—e.g., a particular
machine or manufacture, a particular transformation, and a particular
treatment of a disease. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Claim 1 also lacks
such features.
Accordingly, claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into
a practical application. For the same reasons, independent claims 8 and 15
do not integrate the recited abstract ideas into practical applications.
The Examiner finds that the additional limitations of the dependent
claims do not integrate the abstract ideas into practical applications; rather,
they simply recite the use of generic computer components and do not
impose meaningful limits on the computer implementations of the abstract
ideas. Final Act. 4–5. Appellant does not argue the dependent claims
separately. We agree with the Examiner. The dependent claims merely
provide more specificity as to the content adjustment parameters, content
triggers, and media platforms, more particularly claiming advertising on
media platforms such as radio data systems and signage displays, all on the
same generic computers. Thus, claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–20 do not
integrate the recited abstract ideas into practical applications.

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Inventive Concept (Step 2B)
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, we
consider the additional elements—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
(2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Also, we reevaluate
our conclusions about the additional elements discussed in the previous step.
Id.
The Examiner finds that the limitations of claim 1, individually and in
an ordered combination, do not recite significantly more than the abstract
idea because “[t]he limitations are merely instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer and require no more than a generic computer to
perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has misidentified the subject
matter of the claims and, in particular, has identified three abstract concepts
in claim 1, each of which is not significantly more than itself. Appeal
Br. 12. According to Appellant, the Examiner has misapplied Step 2B by
failing to consider the claim as a whole. Id. A recent update to the
Guidance explains that a claim might recite multiple judicial exceptions that
are distinct from one another and that, in such case, the Examiner should
identify each exception and, “if possible, the examiner should consider the
limitations together to be an abstract idea for Step 2A Prong Two and Step
2B (if necessary) rather than a plurality of separate abstract ideas to be
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analyzed individually.” October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, at
2.
Appellant argues that “[w]hen considered as a whole, appellant’s
claims do not simply tell a computer to ‘maintain information,’ ‘monitor
media content,’ and ‘adjust playout of scheduled media content.’” Appeal
Br. 12. Rather, Appellant argues, the Examiner fails to take into account
several limitations, in particular: “the specifically claimed requirement to
‘associat[e] a plurality of different content triggers with a plurality of
different content adjustment parameters . . . specifying a particular media
channel to be used to deliver triggered content’”; “that, as claimed,
monitoring media content is requires monitoring for content triggers across
multiple media platforms”; “the fact that when the claims adjust the playout
of media content, they do so by ‘including the triggered content based on a
particular content adjustment parameter associated with the particular
content trigger’”; and “the claimed requirement to ‘adjust[] playout of
scheduled media content’ in response to detecting a content trigger that has
been ‘associated with a particular media platform.’” Id. (ellipses and
brackets supplied by Appellant). Appellant argues, without further
explanation, that, alone and in combination, each of “these unaccounted for
items is significantly more than the abstract concept of ‘maintaining
information,’ ‘monitoring media content,’ and ‘adjusting playout of
scheduled media content.’” Id. at 13 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014); BASCOM, 827 F.3d
at 1349).
In response, the Examiner finds that “[w]herein the instant invention
is directed to scheduling the best content associated with a topic and
advertiser, it is noted that the instant claims are directed to features of
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selecting advertisement content which are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Ans. 5. In
support, the Examiner cites generally to the prior art references identified by
Appellant during prosecution. Id. at 4. According to the Examiner, “[t]he
use of generic computer components to further determine ‘maintaining
information,’ ‘monitoring media content,’ and ‘adjusting playout of
scheduled media content’ would not impose any meaningful limit on the
computer implementation of the abstract idea.” Id. at 5. The Examiner
notes (and we agree) that “Appellant fails to provide how the claimed
invention improves the technical field of a media scheduling system.”
Id. at 6.
Appellant reiterates its argument (discussed in Step 2A, Prong 2,
above), that claim 1 improves conventional media scheduling systems by
giving them the ability to deliver triggered content on different media
channels. Reply 6. Appellant clarifies that it intended to argue that the
claimed improvement is “‘the ability to deliver triggered content on
different media channels than the media channel on which the triggering
content was detected[,]’ [o]r perhaps ‘a media channel on a different
platform than the platform on which the triggering content was detected.’”
Id. The Examiner finds that this is not recited in claim 1. Ans. 6 (“[T]he
Examiner notes that the claim[ed] invention fails to provide for a plurality of
different media channels. Rather, the claimed invention simply recites
features directed to ‘adjusting playout of scheduled media content on the
particular media channel.’”). Appellant argues that this improvement should
be inferred from the limitations of claim 1. Reply 6–7. Specifically, claim 1
recites monitoring media content played out across a plurality of media
platforms and, in response to detecting a particular content trigger associated
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with a particular media platform, adjusting playout of scheduled media
content on the particular media channel. Id. at 6. Appellant cites a portion
of the Specification discussing media platforms. Id. at 7 (citing
Spec. 12:21–24). Here, we note, Appellant appears to conflate “media
platform” and “media channel” without sufficient explanation. According to
Appellant, “[i]n response to detecting that content trigger, triggered content
is inserted into the media channel associated with the trigger.” Id. at 7. We
do not reach Appellant’s conclusion as to the claim language. As noted
above for Step 2A, Prong 1, the recitation of including triggered content
based on a particular content adjustment parameter does not require
selecting a particular media channel from a plurality of media channels.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive.
In any case, the Specification describes implementing the method of
claim 1 using conventional computer equipment, such as “media automation
system 110,” including “billing system 120,” “streaming broadcast chain
160,” “cloud based services such as iHeart Radio® (not illustrated),”
“Internet 161,” “cellular network 166 for delivery to mobile device 168,”
“on air broadcast chain 150,” and “broadcast tower 151.” Spec. 7:12–29,
Fig. 1. See also id. at 8–9 (describing additional conventional aspects of
Figure 1). In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit determined that claims to
filtering content on the Internet, including “limitations of the claims, taken
individually, recit[ing] generic computer, network and Internet components,
none of which is inventive by itself,” was eligible because of its “non-
conventional and non-generic arrangement” of the components, specifically,
“the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the
end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user,”
which “gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local
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computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.” 827 F.3d at 1349–
50. Unlike the claims in BASCOM, Appellant’s claims do not recite
unconventional or non-generic arrangements of components that improve
computer functionality or a technological area. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that “[t]he limitations are merely instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer and require no more than a generic computer to
perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Ans. 4.
In sum, the limitations of claim 1, considered individually and in
combination, do not provide an inventive concept. For the same reasons,
claims 2–20 do not provide inventive concepts.

Conclusion
Claims 1–20 are directed to abstract ideas (certain method of
organizing human activity (commercial interactions, specifically advertising,
marketing or sales activities or behaviors) and mental processes). The
additional limitations of the claims, considered individually and in
combination, do not provide an inventive concept. Accordingly, we affirm
the Examiner’s determination that claims 1–20 do not recite patent-eligible
subject matter.

Anticipation Rejection Under § 102
The Examiner finds that Bouazizi anticipates claims 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14,
15, 18, and 20. Final Act. 6–8. Appellant disputes this rejection, focusing
on independent claims 1, 8, and 15 together (and not discussing the
remaining dependent claims with particularity). Appeal Br. 14–16.
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Accordingly, we select claim 1 as representative for this rejection. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Overview of Bouazizi
Bouazizi describes customized advertisement services based on
notifications for mobile advertising. Bouazizi ¶ 1. The content of an
advertisement can be encoded according to a target usage environment, for
example, an advertisement encoded to be similar to mobile TV content being
delivered to a user terminal. Id. ¶ 27. A notification message related to
available advertisements and associated with a media stream is transmitted
to the user terminal. Id. ¶ 28. A “notification stream is defined to carry
notification messages comprising information regarding at least one of
scheduled advertisement period(s), an announcement of availability of the at
least one advertisement and a trigger of presentation of an advertisement.”
Id.
In one embodiment, the notification message is synchronized to the
media stream (e.g., a mobile TV media stream, audio stream, or video
stream being transmitted to user terminals). Id. ¶ 30. A server can trigger
the presentation of an advertisement based on certain criteria, such as a
product or service currently being shown or content being consumed.
Id. ¶ 31. “The network server decides where to insert the advertisement
content based at least in part on the content of the advertisement, the media
content being transmitted in the media stream, the duration of the
advertisement content, the location of a user terminal and/or the like.” Id.
One example of a notification message is “AD_PERIOD_INFO,” which
includes start, end, and duration times for advertisements “to allow for
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accurate synchronization to the relevant mobile TV channel streams.”
Id. ¶ 44.

Analysis
The Examiner finds that Bouazizi’s description of a server presenting
advertisements triggered by the server based on certain criteria, wherein the
server decides where to insert the advertisement based in part on the content
of the advertisement, the media content being transmitted, the location of the
user terminal, etc., discloses “maintaining information associating a plurality
of different content triggers, the plurality of different content adjustment
parameters including information specifying a particular media channel to be
used to deliver triggered content,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6–7
(citing Bouazizi ¶ 31). The Examiner further cites to Bouazizi’s description
of an example notification message, AD_PERIOD_INFO, that includes start,
end, and duration times, “to allow for accurate synchronization to the
relevant mobile TV channel streams.” Id. (citing Bouazizi ¶ 44). According
to the Examiner, “Bouazizi disclose[s] a system wherein start and end times
(i.e., content adjustment parameters) are provided according to a 64-bit
network time protocol (i.e., a particular media channel) which is utilized in
synchronizing the content to the appropriate channel streams (i.e., used to
deliver trigger content).” Id. at 14.
The Examiner further finds that Bouazizi’s description of transmitting
notification messages synchronized to the media stream discloses
“monitoring media content played out across a plurality of different media
platforms for a content trigger,” as recited in claim 1. Id. at 7 (citing
Bouazizi ¶ 30). As to “in response to detecting a particular content trigger
associated with a particular media platform, adjusting playout of scheduled
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media content on the particular media channel to include the triggered
content based on a particular content adjustment parameter associated with
the particular content trigger,” as recited in claim 1, the Examiner cites
Bouazizi’s description of inserting advertisement content based at least in
part on the content of the advertisement, the media content being transmitted
in the media stream, the location of the user terminal, and other factors.
Id. (citing Bouazizi ¶ 31). The Examiner further cites Bouazizi’s description
of an AD-ANNOUNCE notice message example that contains filtering
information for selecting appropriate advertisement content. Id. (citing
Bouazizi ¶ 43).
Appellant argues that Bouazizi does not disclose “a) different
adjustment parameters associated with different triggers; and b) adjustment
parameters that specify which media channel is to be used for delivery of
triggered content.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant “submits . . . that broad
disclosure of ‘other criteria’ does not teach or suggest the appellant’s
specifically enumerated claim elements.” Id. at 16 (quoting Bouazizi ¶ 31
(“In another example embodiment, the presentation of the advertisement or
advertisement clip is triggered by the server/network based on other
criteria.”)).
As to the first allegedly missing aspect, the Examiner cites, inter alia,
Bouazizi’s description that “[t]he network server decides where to insert the
advertisement content based at least in part on the content of the
advertisement, the media content being transmitted in the media stream, the
duration of the advertisement content, the location of a user terminal and/or
the like.” Ans. 7–8 (citing Bouazizi ¶ 31). The Examiner further cites to
¶ 48 of Bouazizi, which states “[a] receiving terminal/device can decide to
display an appropriate advertisement based on user preference, location, and
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actual time, among other considerations.” Id. at 8. From this, the Examiner
finds that “Bouazizi discloses a plurality of triggers which may be based
upon the content of the advertisement, the media content being transmitted,
the duration of the advertisement, and the location of the user.” Id. at 8.
The Examiner further finds such triggers referenced in the XML code
reproduced on page 5 of Bouazizi. Id. According to the Examiner, “a
plurality of triggers (i.e. a plurality of different content triggers) [are]
associated with the advertisement, media content, and user information and
. . . said triggers are utilized via an application-specific message comprising
an XML schema of related parameters (i.e. different content adjustment
parameters).” Id.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error as to Appellant’s first
argument. The Examiner has shown that Bouazizi discloses “associating a
plurality of different content triggers with a plurality of different content
adjustment parameters,” as recited in claim 1. For example, presentation of
advertisements can be triggered by various “other criteria,” such as the
content of the advertisement, the content of the media being transmitted, etc.
Bouazizi ¶ 31. As Bouazizi explains, the presentation of advertising content
(e.g., when/where in the media stream the advertisement will be inserted) is
based on these criteria:
Information about trigger of presentation of an advertisement
comprises at least one of: information about when the
advertisement to be played to the user and information about
where the advertisement to be inserted within the media stream,
and/or the like. A network server, for example, sends trigger
information based at least in part on the content of the
advertisement, the media content being transmitted in the media
stream, the duration of the advertisement content, the location
of a user terminal and/or the like.
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Id. Appellant acknowledges this disclosure. Appeal Br. 15 (“The
information included in Bouazizi’s notifications includes information that
specifies when an advertisement is to be inserted, and at what point in the
media stream the advertisement is to be inserted.”) (citing Bouazizi ¶ 31).
We accept the Examiner’s finding that this is shown in Bouazizi’s XML
code reproduced at page 5, which Appellant does not contest. We further
note that Bouazizi’s disclosure is similar to how the Specification describes
content adjustment parameters:
In some embodiments, content adjustment parameters can
include system parameters, which can be used to specify an
action to take in response to identifying triggering content. For
example, a content adjustment parameter can be used to
indicate that triggering content should result in adding triggered
content, removing previously scheduled content, increasing the
frequency of playback of a designated message for a time
period, reducing the frequency of playback of a designated
message for a time period, or triggering some combination of
these actions.
Spec. 14:24–30. Appellant does not explain persuasively why the Examiner
erred in finding that Bouazizi’s description discloses “associating a plurality
of different content triggers with a plurality of different content adjustment
parameters,” as recited in claim 1.
As to Appellant’s second argument (“Bouazizi does not disclose . . .
b) adjustment parameters that specify which media channel is to be used for
delivery of triggered content,” Appeal Br. 14), Appellant characterizes
claim 1 as requiring:
when a content trigger is detected, triggered content is to be
delivered on whatever media channel is specified by the content
adjustment parameter associated with that content trigger.
When a different content trigger is detected, triggered content is
delivered on whatever media channel is specified by the content
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adjustment parameter associated with the ‘different’ content
trigger.
Appeal Br. 14.
In response, the Examiner points to Bouazizi’s description of example
notification message “AD_PERIOD_INFO,” (Bouazizi ¶ 44), and finds that
“Bouazizi provides for the parameter of ‘AD_PERIOD_INFO’ (i.e. the
content adjustment parameter) which may be further defined within the
XML schema to provide for the specific 64-bit network time protocol (i.e. a
particular media channel to be used to deliver triggered content).” Ans. 8–9.
Thus, the Examiner finds that the specific 64-bit network time protocol is
information specifying a particular media channel to be used to deliver
triggered content. Appellant does not contest this finding, and we accept it.
Thus, we find that Bouazizi discloses “associating a plurality of different
content triggers with a plurality of different content adjustment parameters,
the plurality of different content adjustment parameters including
information specifying a particular media channel to be used to deliver
triggered content,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added).
In reply, Appellant argues that
there is nothing in Bouazizi about detecting a trigger on one
platform or channel, and then choosing the channel in which to
insert triggered content ‘based on a particular content
adjustment parameter associated with the particular content
trigger,’ where that content adjustment parameter includes
including information specifying a particular media channel to
be used to deliver triggered content.
Reply Br. 8. Appellant “acknowledges that there is not [a] separate
‘selecting a channel’ element explicitly recited in the claims,” but argues
that “the claims do require that the playout of scheduled media is adjusted
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based on the particular media channel associated with the triggering
content.” Id.
We disagree. Claim 1, for example, recites “adjusting playout of
scheduled media content on the particular media channel to include the
triggered content based on a particular content adjustment parameter
associated with the particular content trigger.” According to claim 1, “the
plurality of different content adjustment parameters include[] information
specifying a particular media channel to be used to deliver triggered
content,” but are not limited to it. In other words, claim 1 contemplates
other content adjustment parameters. See, e.g., Spec. 14 (“In some
embodiments, the content adjustment parameters can specify that a general
message associated with the user is to be triggered, while in other
embodiments the content adjustment parameter can specify that a message
including specific content is triggered.”). Thus, the “adjusting playout of
scheduled media content” might be based on an adjustment parameter other
than “the particular media channel.” Moreover, to the extent that Appellant
is arguing that the claims require selection of a channel from among a
plurality of channels, we disagree for the reasons given above in our
discussion of the § 101 rejection.
In sum, Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding
that Bouazizi anticipates claim 1. As noted above, Appellant does not argue
claims 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 20 separately and we see no error in the
Examiner’s additional findings for these claims (Final Act. 7–8). For the
same reasons as given for claim 1, Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in finding that Bouazizi anticipates claims 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15,
18, and 20. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s findings that Bouazizi
anticipates claims 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 20.
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Obviousness Rejections Under § 103
The Examiner cites Konig for the additional limitations of claims 2, 9,
and 16 (Final Act. 8–9); Konig and Singer for the additional limitations of
claims 3 and 10 (id. at 9–11); Furney for the additional limitations of claims
4, 11, and 17 (id. at 11–12); and Hartmaier for the additional limitations of
claims 6, 13, and 19 (id. at 12). Appellant does not argue claims 2–4, 6, 9–
11, 16, 17, and 19 separately and does not contend that the Examiner erred
in the additional findings. Appeal Br. 17. We see no error in these
additional findings. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claims 2–4, 6, 9–11, 16, 17, and 19 for the same reasons as
given above for claim 1.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
More specifically,
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Bouazizi is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Bouazizi and Konig is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Bouazizi, Konig, and Singer is affirmed. Final
Act. 9–11.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 11, and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Bouazizi and Furney is affirmed.
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The Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 13, and 19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Bouazizi and Hartmaier is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1, 5, 7, 8,
12, 14, 15,
18, 20
102 Bouazizi 1, 5, 7, 8,
12, 14, 15,
18, 20

2, 9, 16 103 Bouazizi, Konig 2, 9, 16
3, 10 103 Bouazizi, Konig,
Singer
3, 10
4, 11, 17 103 Bouazizi, Furney 4, 11, 17
6, 13, 19 103 Bouazizi, Hartmaier 6, 13, 19
Overall
Outcome:
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED