Michael L. Hardin, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 21, 2002
01A13685 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 21, 2002)

01A13685

08-21-2002

Michael L. Hardin, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Michael L. Hardin v. United States Postal Service

01A13685

August 21, 2002

.

Michael L. Hardin,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A13685

Agency No. 4C-430-0070-00

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Postmaster, EAS-11, at the Derby Ohio Post Office, Derby,

Ohio facility. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on September 11, 2000, alleging that he was

discriminated against on the bases of race (Caucasian) and age (51) when:

(1) on or about May 19, 2000, complainant was informed that he was not

being given an Officer in Charge (OIC) assignment; and

on various dates between March 22, 1995 and January 30, 2000, complainant

was denied opportunities for higher level assignments or not selected

for higher level jobs.

Issue (2) of this complaint was dismissed by the agency, for untimely

contact of an EEO counselor. Upon review, we find that the agency

properly dismissed issue (2) for untimely EEO Counselor contact. The

record discloses that the latest alleged discriminatory incident occurred

in January 30, 2000; however, complainant failed to contact an EEO

Counselor until May 19, 2000, which is beyond the applicable limitations

period. On appeal, no persuasive arguments or evidence have been presented

to warrant an extension of the time limit for initiating EEO contact.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. When

complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in 29

C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of race, age and/or sex discrimination based on disparate

treatment. The agency also concluded that management articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Specifically,

the agency found that the criteria used in selecting OIC, were the

following: past experience; current grade level; cost of mileage to

and from the OIC position; and availability. The agency noted that

there were no specialized eligibility requirements for these positions.

The agency also found that complainant was a level EAS-11 Postmaster,

which was three Postmaster levels away from the available position.

The agency further found that the selectee was a level EAS-16, Customer

Services Supervisor, and had OIC experience at the Orient office (EAS-18),

in addition to city delivery, rural and clerical supervisor experience.

The agency noted that the other selectee had past experience in the

Orient office, no mileage costs, had experience at a level EAS-20, and

EAS-18 with a current level of EAS-15. The agency concluded that the

record supports that management considered past experience, current grade

level, cost of mileage to and from the OIC position, and availability,

and that nothing in the record shows that management was motivated by

discriminatory animus.

On appeal, complainant contends that on the basis of mileage alone, he

was a better choice than the selectees. Specifically, complainant contends

that he would need to drive less than the selectees to work in the Orient

office. Complainant also contends that the Columbus District OIC posting

dated May 8, 2001, under the heading �Eligibility Requirements�, states

that the position is open to all within six EAS grade levels or three

Postmaster levels of the level of the assignment. Complainant contends

that the position available was level 18, and the positions below 18 are:

Level 11, Level 13, and Level 15. Complainant notes that he is level 11,

and asserts that he is less than three levels away from the position.

The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDING

As a general matter, in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination,

claims of discrimination alleging disparate treatment are examined

under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analytical framework,

the complainant must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited reason was a factor

in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action(s). Texas

Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). After the

agency has offered the reason for its action, the burden returns to the

complainant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's reason was pretextual--that is, it was not the true reason,

or the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria. Burdine,

450 U.S. at 253. However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the agency intentionally discriminated against complainant

remains at all times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).

Even assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie

case of discrimination on the bases of age and/or race, we conclude

that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its action. Specifically, the record reveals that management chose the

selectees because both had OIC experience and were at a higher level

than complainant. The record reveals that the position was too high

of a level for complainant's current grade and level of experience and

that complainant did not have a trained Postmaster replacement to take

his place. The record also reveals that complainant does his job well

as an EAS-11, but needs to be promoted into an EAS-13 or EAS-15, before

training as an OIC, EAS-18.

Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed

directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Chouteau

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01973853 (Mar. 10, 2000).

Accordingly, we next examine whether complainant has presented sufficient

evidence to prove the agency's reasons are merely pretexts for unlawful

discrimination. Complainant argued that he was better qualified for the

position than the selectees, because of his past experience and lower

mileage cost. Complainant argued that he would have driven less than

the selectees to work in Orient, and that his selection would therefore

have been less expensive to the agency.

We find that complainant failed to show pretext. Complainant did not

rebut that the selectees have OIC experience and were at a higher level

than complainant. Even assuming that complainant argument about the

cost of mileage is true, the record reveals that the cost of mileage

was merely one of the criteria for the position, not the only criterion.

The record reveals that the criteria included past experience and current

grade level.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 21, 2002

__________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

Equal Opportunity Assista