Miami Valley Carpenters District Council Of Ohio, United Brotherhood Of Carpenters & Joiners Of America, Afl--Cio

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 12, 1989

296 N.L.R.B. 492 (N.L.R.B. 1989)

492 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Miami Valley Carpenters District Council of
Dayton, Ohio, United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters & Joiners of America , AFL-CIO and Con-
course Construction Company . Case 9-CB-6484
September 12, 1989
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On October 24, 1986 , Administrative Law Judge
Robert T . Wallace issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions
and a supporting brief and an answering brief to
Respondent 's exceptions . The Charging Party filed
an answering brief to Respondent 's exceptions. The
Respondent and the General Counsel filed State-
ments of Position in response to the issuance on
August 30, 1988 , of the Board's Notice to Parties
of Opportunity to Submit Statements of Position
with respect to the issues raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Royal Electric.'
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 2 and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
This case involves the issue whether the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by
filing charges and assessing fines against two of its
members, employed as supervisors , for crossing
and working behind a picket line. The Company is
a nonunion general contractor engaged in several
major construction and renovation projects at the
Mead Data Central Complex in Dayton , Ohio. The
two supervisors , Thomas Drummer and Robert
Predmore , are both members of the Respondent
and both employed as job superintendents at the
Mead Data Complex . The Respondent picketed the
Mead Data Complex in February 1986 carrying
signs stating "[p]ublic information . . . [the Compa-
ny] does not have a contract with . . . [the
Union] ." The Respondent filed charges against
' NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340 (Royal Electric), 481
U.S. 573 ( 1987).
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board 's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge 's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
Drummer and Predmore for crossing , and working
behind , the picket line.
The judge found that both Drummer and Pred-
more were supervisors within Section 2(11) of the
Act, and , applying the Board 's "reservoir doc-
trine," found that they were employer representa-
tives within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(1)(B).
However, even apart from the reservoir doctrine,
the judge concluded that the evidence established
that Drummer and Predmore are "representative(s)
for the purpose of collective bargaining or the ad-
justment of grievances " within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B).
In response to the Respondent's contention that
no violation occurred because there was no show-
ing that it had a recognitional object with respect
to the Company 's employees , the judge stated that
he was obliged to follow the Board 's policy that a
recognitional objective was not needed in order to
find an 8(b)(1)(B) violation . The judge went on to
find, however , that the Respondent in fact had a
recognitional objective. The judge found that the
Respondent 's picket sign message that the Mead
Data Complex was being built by a nonunion con-
tractor and its fining and otherwise disciplining
members who crossed or worked behind the line
evidenced a purpose of forcing the Company to
recognize and bargain with the Respondent. For
the reasons set forth below , we find that the Re-
spondent's conduct did not violate Section
8(b)(1)(B).
Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization to re-
strain or coerce an employer in the selection of its
representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or the adjustment of grievances . Section
8(b)(1)(B) was intended primarily to prevent a
union engaged in a long -term relationship with an
employer from dictating the latter's choice of col-
lective-bargaining or grievance representatives or
the form that such representation would take. S.
Rep. No . 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess . 21 (1947);
Royal Electric , 481 U.S . 573 at 591. Further, it is
clear that the Congressional purpose in enacting
Section 8 (b)(1)(B) was to protect a supervisor's
performance of grievance adjustment and collec-
tive-bargaining duties from being adversely affect-
ed by a union 's discipline of its members. Royal
Electric at 588-589.
In Royal Electric , decided subsequent to the issu-
ance of the judge 's decision in this case, the Su-
preme Court carefully defined the prerequisites
necessary for a finding that a union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B). The Court held that "union disci-
pline directed at supervisor-members without Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) duties , working for employers with
296 NLRB No. 67
CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF DAYTON (CONCOURSE CONSTRUCTION CO.)
whom the union neither has nor seeks a collective-
bargaining relationship , cannot and does not ad-
versely affect the performance of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties ." Id. at 595 . Rejecting the Board's "reservoir
doctrine" in part II of its decision , the Court first
concluded that in order to find an 8 (b)(1)(B) viola-
tion , a supervisor must actually possess grievance
adjustment or collective-bargaining responsibilities:
One simply cannot discern whether discipline
will have an adverse impact on a supervisor-
member 's future performance of § 8(b)(1)(B)
duties when their existence is purely hypothetical.
The possibility that a § 2(11) supervisor might
someday perform § 8(b)(1)(B) functions and that
past discipline might then have an adverse
effect on the performance of such duties is
simply too speculative to support a finding that
an employer has been "restrain [ed] or coerce[d]"
"in the selection of his representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment of grievances." [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 588-589. Thus, in order for an 8(b)(1)(B) vio-
lation to occur, the Supreme Court's decision re-
quires evidence of a supervisor's actual possession
of grievance adjustment or collective-bargaining
responsibilities , and not simply the possibility that a
supervisor may someday perform 8 (b)(1)(B) func-
tions.
In addition to requiring that a supervisor actually
possess grievance adjustment or collective-bargain-
ing responsibilities , the Court went on in part III of
its decision to find that a union must either have or
be seeking a collective-bargaining relationship with
the employer in order for a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) to occur:
On reasoning analogous to that in Part II, we
find that the absence of a collective -bargaining
relationship between the union and the em-
ployer, like the absence of § 8(b)(1)(B) respon-
sibilities in a disciplined supervisor-member,
makes the possibility that the Union 's discipline
of Schoux and Choate will coerce Royal and
Nutter too attenuated to form the basis of an
unfair labor practice charge. [Emphasis added.]
Royal Electric at 589.
The Court reasoned that when a union has a col-
lective-bargaining relationship with an employer, it
may have an incentive to affect its supervisor-mem-
ber's handling of grievance adjustment and collec-
tive-bargaining duties, and union discipline occur-
ring during the performance of 8(b)(1)(B) duties
may adversely affect the future performance of
those duties . The Court explained , however, that if
a union has no relationship and does not seek to es-
493
tablish one with the employer , a union has no moti-
vation or incentive to influence a company 's choice
of representative:
[W]hen a union has no collective -bargaining rela-
tionship with an employer, and does not seek to
establish one [emphasis added] , both the incen-
tive to affect a supervisor's performance and
the possibility that an adverse effect will occur
vanish . . . . In other words , the assumption
underpinning Florida Power and ABC-that an
adverse effect can occur simply by virtue of
the fact that an employer-representative is dis-
ciplined for behavior that occurs during per-
formance of § 8(b)(1)(B) tasks-is not applica-
ble when the employer has no continuing rela-
tionship with the union.
Id. at 590.
Thus, for an 8(b)(1)(B) violation to occur, Royal
Electric requires the existence of a collective-bar-
gaining relationship between the union and the em-
ployer, or evidence that a union has an actual, and
not simply a hypothetical or speculative , intent to
establish such a relationship with the employer. A
union cannot restrain or coerce an employer in the
selection of a collective -bargaining representative if
the union does not even seek to establish a collec-
tive-bargaining relationship with the employer.
Under the facts of Royal Electric, the Court had
no difficulty in concluding that the Union was not
seeking to represent the employees of Royal and
Nutter , since the Union had terminated its bargain-
ing relationship a year prior to its discipline of
union members , had filed a disclaimer of interest,
and made no subsequent organizing efforts . Thus, it
was not necessary for the Court to set forth in
detail precisely when it would find that, for the
purposes of Section 8(b)(1)(B), the union was seek-
ing a collective-bargaining relationship.
It is evident, however, from the entire thrust of
the Court's opinion in Royal Electric, that that
phrase is to be interpreted restrictively . There must
be evidence not only of an actual intent to seek
recognition , but the union must currently be seek-
ing recognition . It is not sufficient that the union
might seek to establish a collective -bargaining rela-
tionship sometime in the unspecified future . 3 Thus,
as discussed above, the Court noted that the as-
sumption that an adverse effect on a supervisor's
performance can occur simply because an employ-
er-representative is disciplined for behavior during
the performance of 8(b)(1)(B) tasks is not applica-
ble "when the employer has no continuing relation-
8 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Royal Electric, a "generalized
desire to bargain is an essential characteristic of all unions " 780 F.2d
1489, 1493 (1986)
494 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ship with the union."4 As the Court further noted,
if a union does not currently have a recognitional
objective, it has no incentive or motivation to
affect a supervisor's performance of grievance-ad-
justment or collective -bargaining responsibilities,
and there is little possibility that its actions will
have an effect on a supervisor's performance.5
The conclusion that the union must currently be
seeking recognition is buttressed by the Court's
analogy to its finding in part II of its opinion that a
supervisor must actually possess grievance adjust-
ment or collective-bargaining responsibilities in
order for an 8(b)(1)(B) violation to occur , 6 and its
conclusion in part III of its opinion that "the ab-
sence of a collective -bargaining relationship . . .
makes the possibility that the Union's discipline
. . . will coerce Royal and Nutter too attenuated to
form the basis of an unfair labor practice charge."7
(Emphasis added.) Just as it found that a supervisor
must currently possess grievance adjustment or col-
lective-bargaining responsibilities , the Court also
found that the absence of an actual and current
intent to represent an employer 's employees makes
a union 's discipline of supervisor-members "too at-
tenuated" and "speculative" to support a finding
that an employer has been coerced in the selection
of an 8(b)(1)(B) representative.
Indeed, the Court quoted with approval the
Ninth Circuit's finding that the Union had not
demonstrated an intent to represent the Companies'
employees:
We require some evidence of specific overt
acts such as picketing, handbilling , making
statements of interest to the employers, or
passing out opposition cards to find a desire to
represent these particular employees. Here
there was no evidence of such an intent.
Royal Electric at 579 fn. 3, quoting 780 F.2d 1489,
1492-1493 (9th Cir. 1986). The requirement that
there be evidence of specific overt acts indicates
that more than a generalized long-term recogni-
tional objective is required for a finding of an
8(b)(1)(B) violation.
We must now determine whether the Union's ac-
tions here establish a sufficiently current recogni-
tional objective such that the Company might be
coerced by the Respondent 's action in fining
Drummer and Predmore. The Respondent picketed
the Employer's Mead Data Complex by carrying
4 Royal Electric at 590.
5 Obviously , the further removed a union is from the possibility of the
establishment of a collective-bargaining relationship , the less likely it be-
comes that a union 's imposition of discipline on a supervisor -member will
adversely affect the supervisor's performance of 8(b)( 1)(B) duties.
6 Royal Electric at 589.
7 Id
signs stating "[p]ublic information . . . [the Compa-
ny] does not have a contract with . . . [the
Union]." The signs themselves, while reflecting a
general recognitional objective ,8 do not demand
recognition . On their face at least, they are com-
munications to the public at large . The picketing
was not accompanied by any other conduct which
would reflect a recognitional objective, i.e., the Re-
spondent made no statement of interest to or
demand for recognition on the Employer, nor did
it engage in any of the types of activity which
would establish that it was currently seeking recog-
nition from the Company. Thus, while the picket
signs indicate a general recognitional objective,
there is nothing to indicate that the Respondent's
recognitional objective was other than long term.
The specific 8(b)(1)(B) conduct alleged here is
Respondent 's imposition of fines on two supervisor-
members, Drummer and Predmore , for crossing
and working behind a picket line for a nonunion
general contractor. In Royal Electric, the Court
found that the union's act of fining supervisor-
members for working for employers that did not
have a collective-bargaining relationship with the
union did not evidence an intent to represent on
the part of the union . Thus, the primary difference
between the instant case and Royal Electric is the
fact that here the Respondent also picketed the
Employer. Absent the picket line, in both cases the
supervisors were fined for working for a nonunion
employer. In view of our findings with respect to
the picket line and particularly the absence of any
conduct indicating a current recognitional objec-
tive , we see no basis for imputing such an objective
simply because the Respondent fined its members
for crossing that picket line.
Thus, we find that while the Respondent,
through its use of informational picketing and
fining any members who crossed the picket line,
may have held a long-range recognitional objec-
tive, there is insufficient evidence here, under the
standards of Royal Electric, to establish that it had a
current recognitional objective. Therefore, we con-
clude that the Union did not violate the Act by
fining Supervisor-Members Drummer and Pred-
more for crossing and working behind the picket
line at the Mead Data Complex9 and we shall dis-
miss the complaint.
8 Crown Cafeteria, 135 NLRB 1183 (1962), affd sub nom Smitley V.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir . 1964). Our analysis here of evidence as it
pertains to a recognitional objective reflects the purposes of only Sec.
8(b)(l)(B), which we are called on to apply in this case . Nothing we say
here would necessarily apply in construing other sections of the Act,
such as Sec . 8(b)(7), which serve different purposes.
9 In light of this finding , we find it unnecessary to pass on the remain-
ing issues in this case , including whether Drummer and Predmore are
employer representatives within the meaning of Sec 8 (b)(1)(B).
CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF DAYTON (CONCOURSE CONSTRUCTION CO.) 495
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Deborah Jacobson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John R. Doll, Esq. (Logothetis & Pence), of Dayton, Ohio,
for Respondent Union.
Peter K. Newman, Esq. (Smith & Schnacke), of Dayton,
Ohio, for the Charging Company.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT T. WALLACE, Administrative Law Judge. On
a charge filed by Concourse Construction Company on 2
May 1986 , a complaint was issued on 13 June. Hearing
was held on 22 July at Dayton, Ohio.
The complaint , as amended prior to the hearing, al-
leges that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act by filing charges and as-
sessing fines against two union members who were em-
ployed by the Company as supervisors, thereby restrain-
ing or coercing the Company in its selection of repre-
sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining and
adjustment of grievances.
Based on the entire record , including my observation
of the witnesses and after due consideration of briefs
filed by the General Counsel, the Company, and the
Union , I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BACKGROUND
and Predmore and Drummer are shown to have exer-
cised such authority using their own independent judg-
ment and without need for approval by any higher offi-
cial of the Company. The fact that they supervised a
smaller number of employees than a superintendent at a
typical union jobsite is without significance as it is well
established that possession of any one of the supervisory
indicia with respect to any number of employees is suffi-
cient to confer supervisory status under the Act. NLRB
v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.
1948).
The evidence also shows that Predmore and Drummer
are employer representatives within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. The Board has long held that
the term "representative for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances " as used in
that section should be interpreted broadly so as to in-
clude all supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11).
Known as the "reservoir doctrine ," this interpretation is
based on the fact that an employer 's supervisors form the
logical "reservoir" from which it is likely to select its
representatives for purposes of collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment . As the Supreme Court stated in
American Broadcasting Cos v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S.
411, 436 (1978),
Union pressure on supervisors can affect either their
willingness to serve as grievance adjustors or col-
lective bargainers , or the manner in which they ful-
fill these functions; and either effect impermissibly
coerces the employer in his choice of representa-
tive.
The basic facts are not in dispute. The Company is an
nonunion general contractor engaged , as pertinent, in
several major construction and renovation projects at the
Mead Data Central Complex in Dayton, Ohio. The two
alleged supervisors are Robert Predmore and Thomas
Drummer . Both are members of the Union and at perti-
nent times were employed by the Company as "job su-
perintendents," each being responsible for proper com-
pletion of different projects within the Mead Complex.
On 3 February Respondent began picketing at the en-
trance to the Mead jobsite . The pickets carried signs stat-
ing "Public information . . . [the Company] does not
have a contract with . . . [the Union]." On that date and
on numerous occasions up to and through the time of
hearing, Predmore and Drummer crossed the picket line
and worked behind it. Intraunion charges were filed
against them for doing so in violation of a union bylaw,
and on 4 June, they were fined $1200 each. Neither the
charges nor the fines had any effect upon their job per-
formance.
II. STATUS OF PREDMORE AND DRUMMER
It is clear from the evidence that both individuals pos-
sessed and often exercised authority sufficient to qualify
them as supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11)
of the Act. The overall site manager to whom they re-
ported (Bill Smith) testified without contradiction that
they had authority to hire, discipline, fire, and direct the
work of employees assigned to their respective projects;
Accordingly, and under the reservoir doctrine, I find
Predmore and Drummer to be representatives of the
Company by virtue of their status as statutory supervi-
sors . Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340 (Nutter, Inc.),
271 NLRB 995 (1984), enf. denied on other grounds 780
F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1986), Teamsters Local 296 (Northwest
Publications), 263 NLRB 778 (1982); Carpenters Local 14
(Kaplan Properties), 217 NLRB 202 (1975); Toledo Lithog-
raphers, 175 NLRB 1072 (1969), enfd. 437 F.2d 55 (6th
Cir. 1971).
But even apart from the reservoir doctrine, the evi-
dence establishes that Predmore and Drummer had au-
thority to and did adjust "grievances" as the Board de-
fines the term . Thus, both investigated and caused to be
corrected employee complaints about shortages in their
paychecks, both exercised discretion in granting or deny-
ing requests for time off, and both handled complaints
from employees who could not get along together by as-
signing them to different jobs. Also, Predmore is shown
to have obtained raises for employees who complained
about low wages.
The Board has repeatedly held that the term "griev-
ance adjustment" as used in Section 2(11) and Section
8(b)(1)(B) is not limited to the resolution of formal con-
tractual grievances . Rather, it has construed the term
broadly as including "personal" as well as "contractual"
grievances . Toledo Lithographers, supra . And in Sheet
Metal Workers Local 85 (Suburban Sheet Metal), 273
NLRB 523 (1984), it found the employer's "field fore-
496 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
man" to be an 8(b)(1)(B) representative based on evi-
dence that he was a statutory supervisor, that he had ef-
fectively recommended wage increases for employees,
and had granted time off. See also Nutter, supra, where
at 997 the Board held that the employer's superintendent
was an 8(b)(1)(B) grievance adjuster based on evidence
that he "granted employees time off and resolved person-
al complaints or problems regarding job assignments."
As Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff observed in
Columbia Typographical Union 101, 207 NLRB 841, 847
(1973):
The fact that the grievances with which [the super-
visor] dealt were relatively minor can be of no con-
trolling significance . The employer's bargaining ob-
ligation under the Act is as much applicable to
minor employee grievance as to major ones. So,
too, is management 's need for representation in their
consideration and adjustment.
III. LAWFULNESS OF FINES
As noted the Union fined Predmore and Drummer for
crossing and working behind a picket line at the Mead
Complex. As they performed only supervisory duties at
that site, the obvious and admitted purpose of the fines
was to coerce Predmore and Drummer to cease working
for the Company in that capacity at least while the
picket line was in place.
Under Board law fines imposed in such circumstances
are coercive and unlawful . The applicable legal princi-
ples are concisely stated by Administrative Law Judge
Jerrold H. Shapiro in Plumbers Local 364 (West Coast
Contractors), 254 NLRB 1123, 1125 (1981):
It is . . . well settled that union discipline of su-
pervisor-members who cross a picket line or other-
wise violate a union 's no-work rule in order to per-
form their normal supervisory functions constitutes
indirect union pressure within the prohibition of
Section 8(b)(1)(B). In reaching this conclusion, the
Board and courts have recognized that the reason-
ably foreseeable and intended effect of such disci-
pline is that the supervisor-member will cease work-
ing for the duration of the dispute, thereby depriv-
ing the employer of the grievance adjustment serv-
ices of his chosen representative. [Citations omit-
ted.] Such discipline is unlawful even where, as
here, the supervisor defies the Union and continues
to work for the employer during the dispute; the
discipline is unlawful because the supervisor , having
been disciplined for working during a labor dispute,
may reasonably fear further discipline and, hence,
will be deterred from working during any future
disputes . The employer , in such circumstances, must
either replace the disciplined supervisor or risk loss
of his services during a future dispute; in either
event, the employer is coerced in the selection and
retention of his chosen grievance adjustment repre-
sentative . American Broadcasting Companies , supra,
433-437.
But the Union contends that no violation can be found
because here there is no showing that it had a represen-
tational object with respect to the Company's employees.
In support it cites two decisions' wherein the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to enforce Board orders based
upon finding of 8(b)(1)(B) violations absent a showing
that the disciplined union members worked for compa-
nies whose employees were represented , or were sought
to be represented , by the union . In its decision in Plumb-
ers Local, supra, however, the Board declined to accept
that defense, and it went on to find a violation where the
union neither represented nor desired to represent em-
ployees. See also Musicians (Royal Palm Theatre), 275
NLRB 667 (1985).
In these circumstances , I am obliged to follow the
Board policy. See Consolidated Casinos Corp., 266 NLRB
988 (1983); Lenz Co., 153 NLRB 1399 (1965). This is es-
pecially so where, as here, that policy is one of long-
standing and appears to accord with the rationale of the
Supreme Court in American Broadcasting Cos, supra, and
to have been explicitly adopted in NLRB v. Electrical
Workers IBEW Local 323, 703 F.2d 501 (11th Cir. 1983).
In any event , the factual premise of the Union's argu-
ment is false . More is involved here than advice to the
public that the Mead Complex was being built by a non-
union contractor. The Union chose to enhance that mes-
sage by use of a picket line and by fining or otherwise
disciplining members who crossed or worked behind the
line. The obvious purpose was to pressure the Company
into recognizing and bargaining with the Union. Accord-
ingly, I find that the Union in fact had a recognitional
objective.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Company is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3. Robert Predmore and Thomas Drummer, at all
times material, were supervisors for the Company within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, and had and ex-
ercised authority to adjust grievances within the meaning
of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
4. By fining Predmore and Drummer for crossing and
working behind its picket line, the Union restrained and
coerced the Company in the selection and retention of
representatives for the purpose of adjusting grievances,
and thereby acted unlawfully in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
5. The aforementioned unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Union has engaged in unfair
labor practices , the Union will be ordered to cease and
' NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 73, 621 F 2d 1035 (9th Cit.
1980) (the "Chewelah" case ) and NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW
Local 340, 780 F.2d 1489 (9th Cit. 1986) The latter partially reversed the
Board's decision in the Nutter, supra.
CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL OF DAYTON (CONCOURSE CONSTRUCTION CO.) 497
desist therefrom, to reimburse Robert Predmore and visitatorial clause for discovery purposes as requested in
Thomas Drummer for fines unlawful imposed , and to the complaint and in the General Counsel's brief.
post the appended notice . There is no need for a special [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]