Melonee Wise et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 19, 2021

2020006662 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/512,058 03/16/2017 Melonee Wise FETC-1002 6800
123519 7590 03/19/2021
Law Office of J. Steven Svoboda
1312B Mallard Drive
Richmond, CA 94801
EXAMINER
ORTIZ ROMAN, DENISSE Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/19/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MELONEE WISE and MICHAEL FERGUSON

Appeal 2020-006662
Application 15/512,058
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ERIC B. GRIMES, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and
ULRIKE W. JENKS, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected the claims 1–3, 6–37, and 89 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from
the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Fetch
Robotics, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner rejected claims 1–3, 6–37, and 89 in the Final Office
Action (“Final Act”; mailed Nov. 22, 2019) as follows:
Claims 1–3, 6–12, 16–28, 30–37, and 89 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious in view of Asaria et al. (US 2013/0317642 A1, published Nov. 28,
2013) (“Asaria”), You Young Jae et al. (KR 10-2011-0119438, Registration
date Nov. 2, 2011) (“You Young Jae”),2 and Theobald (US 9,463,927 B1,
issued Oct. 11, 2016) (“Theobald”). Final Act. 4.
Claims 13–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Asaria,
You Young Jae, Theobald, and Adachi et al. (US 2008/0161970 A1,
published July 3, 2008) (“Adachi”). Final Act. 21.
Claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Asaria, You
Young Jae, Theobald, and Plociennik et al. (US 2011/0295399 A1, issued
Dec. 1, 2011) (“Plociennik”). Final Act. 23.
There are two independent claims on appeal, claims 1 and 89.
Appellant only provides arguments for claims 1 and 89, but not for the
dependent claims. The dependent claims, all of which depend directly or
indirectly from claim 1, therefore, fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below with bracketed
numbers added to refer to the limitations in the claim.

2 The Korean patent document is in the Korean language. We rely solely on
the English translation of it with the Published Patent No. and Registration
date listed in the translation. Throughout the Decision, we use the name of
the first inventor on the English translation, which is different from the name
“Yeong-Jae Yu” used in the Appeal Brief and “Jeong-Yae Yu” in the Final
Office Action.
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1. A system using one or more robots to assist a human in order
fulfillment, comprising:
[1] a server configured to receive an order comprising an
order item;
[2] inventory storage operably connected to the server,
the inventory storage comprising inventory items;
[3] an order robot operably connected to the server, the
order robot configured to assist a human to pick the order item
from the inventory items, the server further configured to
receive a selection of the order robot by the human; and
[4] a human-operated device operably connected to one
or more of the server, the inventory storage, and the order robot,
the human-operated device configured to assist the human to
pick the order item,
[5] wherein assisting comprises one or more of leading
the human and following the human,
[6] wherein leading the human comprises proceeding
ahead of the human.

OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
The Examiner found that Asaria describes [1] the claimed server, [2]
inventory storage operably connected to the server, [3] order robot operably
connected to a server, and [4] the human-operated device operably
connected to one or more of the server, the inventory storage, and the order
robot. Final Act. 5.
The claim further recites that [3] “the server [is] further configured to
receive a selection of the order robot by the human.” To meet this limitation,
the Examiner cited Theobald, determining it would have been obvious to use
this feature in Asaria to improve the system’s efficiency. Final Act. 6–7.
The Examiner found that You Young Jae describes a robot following
a human as required by [5] of the claim, and that Theobald describes a robot
leading a human by proceeding ahead of the human as recited in [5] and [6]
of the claim. Final Act. 6. The Examiner determined it would have been
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obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate these features into
Asaria to improve the system’s efficiency. Id. at 6–7.
Appellant argues that Theobald does not teach limitation [3] of claim
1 of “the server further configured to receive a selection of the order robot
by the human.” Appeal Br. 10.
This argument does not persuade us that the Examiner erred in finding
this limitation met by the combination of Asaria and Theobald. To meet the
disputed limitation, the Examiner cited Theobald at column 7, lines 20–30.
Final Act. 6. This disclosure is reproduced below:
In step 800, the mobile robot 20 receives command data.
The communication system 46, for example, may receive the
command data from a remote computer system 74, or another
mobile robot, that coordinates the operation of the present
mobile robot 20 with one or more other mobile robots.
Alternatively, the command data may be entered by an
individual through the user interface 44.
The command data may include inventory data, location
data, scheduling data, etc. The inventory data may identify the
contents, types, states (e.g., amorphous or non-amorphous),
masses, weights, dimensions, et cetera, of one or more items 24.
Theobald 7:20–32.
The disclosure copied above describes “command data” being entered
by a human through a “user interface.” The “command data” represents
commands, namely, instructions, which are sent to a robot by a human.3 A
command can include “scheduling data,” which Theobald explains can be
the times a mobile robot “is to move to one or more of the pickup locations
92, greeting locations 94 and/or drop off locations 32.” Theobald 7:42–45. A

3 “The mobile robot 20 may also or alternatively be (e.g., remote) controlled
by an individual (e.g., a human operator) during performance of one or more
tasks.” Theobald 3:52–54.
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human is instructing a robot to move to a specific location by the user
interface and the human is therefore selecting an order robot as required by
limitation [3] of claim 1 (“selection of the order robot by the human”).
Theobald does not expressly teach that a server receives this selection
of a robot by a human. However, the Examiner cited Asaria as describing the
order robot and human-operated device as operably connected to the server.
Final Act. 5.4 Thus, it would have been obvious to the ordinary skilled
worker to send commands to the robot, as described by Theobald, through a
server, because Asaria discloses that a server is useful to communicate with
robots. Asaria ¶ 87.
Appellant acknowledges the disclosure5 in Theobald at column 7,
lines 20–30, as discussed above, but simply states in response:
The Appellants respectfully observe that this highly general
teaching that a human can enter broadly defined “command
data” can hardly approach anticipating, teaching or suggesting
the Appellants’ highly particularized and detailed recitation of
“the server further configured to receive a selection of the order
robot by the human” [emphasis added]. The Appellants
specifically recite a selection of an order robot by a human, a

4 For example, the Examiner cited Asaria ¶ 87, which describes
communicating to the robot through a server: “In some cases, where there
are a large number of robots being deployed, a wireless communication
device and a suitable wireless communication network(s) may be
implemented to facilitate communication between the robots 30 and the
server 12.”
5 Appellant reproduces various additional disclosures from Theobald, which
they deny teach the disputed limitation of “the server further configured to
receive a selection of the order robot by . . . human.” Appeal Br. 10, 11–15,
and 17–20. We have not addressed these disclosures because Theobald’s
teaching at column 7, lines 20–30 combined with Asaria is sufficient to
make obvious the claim limitation [3].
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teaching that is quite absent from the cited sections of
Theobald.
Appeal Br. 16 (alteration in original).
Appellant does not explain why the command data from a user
interface operated by a human does not teach or suggest that a human is
selecting a robot, when the user interface is controlled by the human to
provide commands to the robot via the server in Asaria. Appellant does not
address Asaria’s disclosure of using a server to communicate with the robot.
Consequently, we find Appellant’s arguments unavailing that Asaria and
Theobald do not describe “the server further configured to receive a
selection of the order robot by the human” as recited in claim limitation [3].
Appellant also argues that Asaria does describe the robot leading the
human where “leading the human comprises proceeding ahead of the
human” as recited in limitations 5 and 6 of claim 1. Appeal Br. 9–10.
This argument is not persuasive. While the Examiner cited Asaria for
“leading,” the Examiner also relied upon Theobald as teaching this
limitation. Final Act. 6. Theobald teaches in the disclosure cited by the
Examiner:
The mobile robot 20 may follow the individual 30 from the
greeting location 94 to the pickup location 92. Alternatively, the
mobile robot 20 may lead the individual 30 from the greeting
location 94 to the pickup location 92.
Theobald 8:25–29.
This disclosure describes a robot following and leading a human
(“individual 30”), meeting the corresponding limitations of claim 1
(“wherein assisting comprises one or more of leading the human and
following the human”). This disclosure was cited on page 6 of the Final
Action. Appellant did not in the Appeal Brief identify a defect in this
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disclosure, and the Examiner’s reasons for applying it to Asaria. In the
Reply Brief, Appellant for the first time addresses this disclosure. Reply Br.
5–6. A Reply Brief is not a forum to raise new arguments not made in the
Appeal Brief and not responsive to arguments raised in the Answer. 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Appellant could have made these same arguments in
the Appeal Brief, but chose not to. By only addressing this disclosure in the
Reply Brief, Appellant has denied the Examiner the opportunity to respond
to Appellant’s arguments, because the appeal is no longer in the Examiner’s
jurisdiction. For this reason, Appellant has waived the substantive arguments
concerning the teachings in Theobald. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Nonetheless, even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s
newly-presented argument, we are not persuaded by it. Appellant’s late and
improperly raised argument only addresses Asaria, but the rejection was
based on Asaria and Theobald, the latter publication which describes a
human selecting and commanding a robot as discussed above.

Claim 89
Claim 89 recites
the order robot moves so as to maintain one or more of a
substantially constant distance from the human and a
substantially constant orientation to the human, wherein leading
the human comprises proceeding ahead of the human.
The Examiner found that You Young Jae describes a robot
maintaining a constant distance from a human, meeting the limitation of
claim 89. Final Act. 20.
Appellant states that You Young Jae describes a robot confined to a
magnetic track and “cannot ‘follow’ or ‘lead’ a human who is free to move
anywhere in the warehouse.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant states: “If the human
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goes away from the track, of necessity, Yeong-Jae Yu’s robot can then never
follow the human, nor can Yeong-Jae Yu’s robot ever lead the human.” Id.
You Young Jae has the following relevant disclosures:
The human worker following mobile robot according to an
embodiment of the present invention will include a robot main
body part formed with a space capable of holding the
predetermined tools or objects while moving forward and
backward, which will be constituted by including a robot sensor
part for detecting an object located at the front and rear sides
and for checking the distance from the worker in the case when
the object is judged as a worker, a robot control part for
receiving a sensor signal provided by the robot sensor part and
controlling the distance to the worker so as to maintain a
constant distance from the worker . . . .
You Young Jae Abstract.

Claim 1
A human worker following mobile robot wherein in a mobile
robot including a robot main body part formed with a space
capable of holding the predetermined tools or objects while
being moved forward and backward,
the robot main body part will include
a robot sensor part for detecting an object located at the front
and rear sides and for checking the distance from the worker in
the case when the object is judged as a worker;
a robot control part for receiving a sensor signal provided by
the robot sensor part and controlling the distance to the worker
so as to maintain a constant distance from the worker; and
a robot driving part for operating to move forward or backward
through a control signal provided by the robot control part.
You Young Jae 2.
As indicated in the above reproduced disclosures, You Young Jae
does not limit the robot’s ability to maintain a constant distance between it
and the human it is leading, to using a magnetic field line to guide the robot.
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Neither the Abstract nor Claim 1 of You Young Jae, copied above, contains
a magnetic field limitation. This limitation is not introduced until claim 5,
which depends on claim 1, through claim 3. Claim 5 recites:
Claim 5
A human worker following mobile robot as described in the
Claim 3, wherein the above mentioned robot main body part
will include a magnetic field position sensor part for detecting a
magnetic field line embedded in a working area of the above
mentioned worker and providing a magnetic field signal
capable of detecting the magnetic field position detected by the
detected magnetic field line to the robot control part.
You Young Jae 2.
In addition to this, to the extent a magnetic field line is required by
You Young Jae, rejected claim 1 does not exclude the use of this technology
to facilitate the robot’s movement. While the claim is broad enough to
include other technologies, the claim encompasses using a magnetic field
line to guide the robot as disclosed in You Young Jae. “Claims which are
broad enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even
though they also read on nonobvious subject matter.” In re Lintner, 458 F.2d
1013, 1015 (CCPA 1972); cited in In re Cuozzo Speed Techns., LLC, 793
F.3d 1268, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Appellant also attempts to distinguish You Young Jae by asserting
that, because of the magnetic field line, the robot cannot freely lead a human
anywhere in the warehouse. However, rejected claim 1 does not require the
robot to move freely. Moreover, Appellant has ignored the disclosure in
Theobald, which states that the robot can follow and lead the human without
using a magnetic field line (Theobald 8:25–29). Appellant makes the same
unpersuasive argument in the Reply Brief without explaining how this
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argument is responsive to a new argument or newly cited disclosure in the
Answer. Reply Br. 6.

Summary
For the foregoing reasons, the obviousness rejections of claims 1 and
89 are affirmed. Claims 2, 3, 6–12, 16–28, and 30–37 were not separately
argued and fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 13–15 and
29 are rejected on the basis of Asaria, You Young Jae, and Theobald, and
additionally cited publications. These claims, however, were not argued
separately and therefore fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–12,
16–28, 30–
37, 89
103 Asaria, You Young
Jae, Theobald
1–3, 6–12,
16–28, 30–
37, 89

13–15 103 Asaria, You Young
Jae, Theobald,
Adachi
13–15
29 103 Asaria, You Young
Jae, Theobald,
Plociennik
29
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 6–37,
89

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TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED