Medic Ambulance Service, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 25, 2019

20-CA-193784 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 25, 2019)

JD(SF)–35–19
Vallejo and Sacramento, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
DIVISION OF JUDGES
MEDIC AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.,
and Cases: 20–CA–193784
UNITED EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES WORKERS, Local 4911,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO
Tracy Clark, for the General Counsel,
Nicole A. Legrottaglie, attorney
(Carothers, DiSante & Freudenberger LLP), for the Respondent,
Manuel Boigues, Esq.,
(Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld), for the Petitioner Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GERALD M. ETCHINGHAM, Administrative Law Judge. United Emergency Medical
Services Workers, Local 4911, AFSCME, AFL–CIO (Charging Party or Union), filed its charge
in this Case 20–CA–193784 on February 24, 2017. The counsel for the General Counsel
(General Counsel) issued the original complaint against Respondent Medic Ambulance Service,
Inc. (Respondent or Employer) on June 30 and amended it on September 12, 2018 (complaint).1
The Respondent answered the complaint generally denying the critical allegations of the
complaint.
The complaint alleges the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the NLRA or Act) by promulgating and/or maintaining overly broad rules
regarding employee conduct and threatening employees with reprisal in its employee handbook
(handbook) and its policies and procedures manual (manual).

1 All dates in 2018 unless otherwise indicated.
JD(SF)–35–19
2
This case was tried in San Francisco, California, on January 22, 2019. On the entire
record,2 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the
briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION5
The parties stipulate and I find that at all material times, Respondent, a corporation with
an office and place of business in Vallejo, California (Respondent's facility), has been engaged in
the business of providing emergency transportation and advanced life support ambulance
services; amongst other medical transportation services in Solano and Sacramento Counties,
California. (Stip. Fact No. 2(a); Jt. Exh. A at 3.) I further find that during the calendar year 10
ending December 31, 2016, Respondent, in conducting its business operations derived gross
revenues in excess of $500,000. (Stip. Fact No. 2(b); Jt. Exh. A at 3.) Also, during the period of
time described above, Respondent, in conducting its operations also described above, purchased
and received at Respondent's Vallejo, California, facility, goods valued in excess of $5000
directly from points outside the State of California. (Stip. Fact No. 2(c); Jt. Exh. A at 3.) The 15
parties further stipulate, and I find, that at all material times, Respondent has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. (Stip. Fact No.
3; Jt. Exh. A at 3.)
In addition, I further find that at all material times, the Union has been a Labor
Organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (Stip. Fact No. 4; Jt. Exh. A at 4.)20
The Union and Respondent have a collective-bargaining representative agreement in effect from
April 26, 2014, through and including April 25, 2021. (Stip. Fact No. 5; Jt. Exh. A at 4; Jt. Exh.
17.) The Union represents Respondent employees in its Solano County locations, other than the
City of Vacaville. (Tr. 30.) The Union does not represent Respondent’s nurses or
supervisors/management or any Respondent employees in Sacramento County. Id. 25
II. ADDITIONAL FACTUAL STIPULATIONS AND FINDINGS
Respondent operates its ambulance company in Sacramento and Solano Counties in
Northern California other than in the City of Vacaville. It is the exclusive operator in Solano
County as an ambulance operator for advanced life support (ALS), which is paramedic-level

2 The transcript in this case is generally accurate. Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for
transcript; “Jt. Exh.” for joint exhibit; “Stip. Fact No.” for stipulated fact number; “R Exh.” for Respondent’s
exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; and “R Br.” for the
Respondent’s brief. The Union did not file a closing brief. On February 26, 2019, the Charging Party Union filed,
instead, its joinder in and incorporated and adopted as its own all the proposed facts and arguments contained in the
General Counsel’s brief. Although I have included numerous citations to the record to highlight particular testimony
or exhibits, my findings and conclusions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited, but rather on my
review and consideration of the entire record. I find and reject GC Exhs. 2—4 and give them no weight as I find
them irrelevant and of speculative significance to this case for the reasons put forth by Respondent and I further find
that it has not been proven that any of the individuals in these exhibit photos are past or current Respondent
employees or that California Proposition 11 has any bearing on this case. See Tr. 32–68; R Br. at 15–16. Because I
am not considering or giving any weight to GC Exhs. 2–4, Respondent’s supplemental Exh. A and corresponding
arguments are moot and also given no weight as Respondent concedes in its closing brief at page 16.

JD(SF)–35–19
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service. (Tr. 133.) Respondent also added noncritical nurse-level services about 6 years ago. Id.
Respondent also operates basic life support (BLS) and critical care transport (CCT). (Tr. 73,
133.) Respondent performs these same services in Sacramento County and also provides a
wheelchair and gurney person. Id.
BLS includes inter-facility transports between hospital-to-hospital and hospital-to-home. 5
ALS can be 911 responses, inter-facility and CCT is hospital-to-hospital usually or hospital-to-
acute care facility and wheelchairs are usually just nonemergency to a doctor’s appointment. (Tr.
73, 133–134.)
Respondent’s Vice President (VP) and Chief Operating Officer (COO), James Pierson
(Pierson), generally testified that the various Respondent rules, policies, and procedures at issue 10
in this case are necessary and justified for business purposes due to patient privacy concerns of
Respondent’s various customers’ private personal information and their private medical
conditions and also Respondent’s fear of liability for itself and its employees related to these
potential privacy violations and violations of the Health, Information, Portability, and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Medicare regulations. (Tr. 132, 134–138.) Respondent’s 15
employees handle medical charts, records, and medical files which contain this highly personal
and private information and both Respondent and its employees are liable if this information is
not kept private. Id. In addition, Respondent must maintain payer compliance and privacy
compliance at all times and may be subject to not receiving income for its services if there is
some privacy, HIPAA, or Medicare rules violation in connection with the services it provides. Id. 20
I grant the parties’ joint motion dated January 18, 2019, and the parties further stipulate,
and I find, that at all material times, Respondent’s Operations Manager Brian Meader (Meader)
and Respondent’s Administrator, Tim Bonifay (Bonifay), have been supervisors and agents of
Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and Section 2(13) of the Act,
respectively. (Stip. Fact No. 6; Jt. Exh. A at 4; Tr. 26–28.) I further find that Respondent’s VP 25
and COO Pierson currently oversees the business operations of the Sacramento-Solano Division
and also oversees and supervises Respondent’s office managers and field supervisors and
Administrator Bonifay.3 (Tr. 131–132.)
Casey Vanier (Vanier) also testified that he works with 6 or 7 different bargaining units
besides Respondent’s union members and that as the Union’s business representative since 2014, 30
he helps union member employees at Respondent with CBA enforcement, negotiations,
grievance arbitrations, and with overall organizing activities. (Tr. 29–31.) Vanier also opined that
the employees in these bargaining units he represents use social media to post about improving
their terms and conditions of employment. (Tr. 31.)
Respondent has its own public Facebook social media account that is not attended often 35
by its employees and does not contain individual employee posts or posts from Respondent’s

3 Bonifay, Respondent’s former general manager, listed his duties as Administrator since 2010 to include: labor
relations, consultant over policy and procedure, employee disciplinary consultant with other Respondent managers,
and he tracks certification, regulatory compliance, EEOC matters, workers’ compensation, and other human
relations department functions. Tr. 212–213. Bonifay also interfaces with the Union, he was involved with
negotiating the current CBA, and is Respondent’s representative handling step 1 grievances filed by union members
against Respondent. Tr. 213–214.
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supervisors or upper management. It occasionally references a former employee who is being
remembered for their earlier employment at Respondent. (Tr. 89–90.)
Between 130–185 union member employees at Respondent run and belong to a closed or
private employee social media Facebook account where Respondent employees post comments
and can discuss social matters and terms and conditions of their employment at Respondent with 5
other employees. (Tr. 59–60, 63–64, 76.) At hearing, Respondent VP Pierson admitted that 2
Respondent supervisors are members of this closed or private employee Facebook account as
they are listed as members in the membership group listed on Facebook having become members
of the private employee Facebook account prior to their promotions to supervisor. (Tr. 206–207.)
The Respondent’s handbook was first implemented in June 2010. Respondent has 10
maintained the handbook from August 28, 2016, to the present. (Stip. Fact Nos. 7-8, 11; Jt. Exh.
A at 4; Jt. Exh. 14.) Respondent's handbook has applied to both Respondent's Union-represented
and non-Union-represented employees since at least August 28, 2016, to the present. Id.
The Respondent’s manual contains Respondent's policies and procedures, some of which
have been in effect since approximately 1999. Respondent has also maintained the manual from 15
August 28, 2016, to the present. (Stip. Fact Nos. 9-10, 12; Jt. Exh. A at 4; Jt. Exhs. 15–16; Tr.
199–200.) Respondent’s Manual has applied to both Respondent’s Union-represented and non-
Union-represented employees since at least August 28, 2016, to the present. Id.
Respondent provided the Union with copies of Respondent’s handbook and manual
during the parties’ contract negotiations over the current collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).20
(Stip. Fact No. 13; Jt. Exh. A at 5; Jt. Exhs. 14–16.) The handbook and manual are comprised of
just shy of 300 pages of policies and rules. (Jt. Exhs. 14 and 15.)
After ratification of the CBA, Respondent met and conferred with the Union about all
additions and revisions to the manual although all of the rules and policies and procedures at
issue here were already implemented and in place at Respondent when copies of them were 25
provided to the Union during contract negotiations. (Tr. 233.) Until the charge was filed in 2017,
the Union did not request to meet and confer or bargain about potential policy or rule revisions,
or object or take issue with Respondent regarding the provisions of the Handbook or Manual
which are the subject of the charge and the complaint.4 (Stip. Fact Nos. 14 and 15; Jt. Exh. A at
5; Tr. 199–200; Tr. 214–216, 230–231.) Thus, there is evidence of employee discipline resulting 30
from an alleged rule violation that was later revoked once the employee requested that the
discipline be looked at and resolved.
Since August 28, 2016, the Respondent has maintained the following policies or rules in
its employee handbook:
(a) "The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the company's e-mail 35
system to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-related information to fellow employees
is strictly prohibited," as stated in the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring

4 Bonifay noted; however, that since August 2016, there have been a couple of isolated incidents involving
Respondent employees who had been disciplined for engaging in protected activity with respect to the rules in
question in this case that were subsequently “all resolved, either through a withdrawal or through the grievance
procedure.” Tr. 217.
JD(SF)–35–19
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Rule found on pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4,
12-13.)
(b) Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit employees or
others," as stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of Electronic Communications rule
found on pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 18.) 5
(c) "Inappropriate communications . . . even if made on your own time using your own
resources, may be grounds for discipline up to and including immediate termination," as stated at
the first page of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the employee
handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
(d) "Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the company or 10
your coworkers," as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20
and 21 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
(e) "You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or otherwise
comment on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in numbered paragraph 4 of the
Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 15
at Sect. 4, 21.)
(f) "Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as stated in
numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the
employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 21.)
(g) "Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on current or 20
former employee compensation," as stated in the second paragraph of the Protecting Company
Information rule, found on page 24 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect.
4, 24.)
(h) Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or
company property" as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule 25
found on pages 34–37 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)
(i) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at the fourth page
of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34–37 of Section 4 of the
Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)30
In addition, since August 28, 2016, the Respondent has also maintained the following
policies and rules in its policies and procedures Manual:
(a) Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites to disparage the
company, its associates, customers, vendors, business practices, patients, or other
employees of the company," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet 35
JD(SF)–35–19
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Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual.
(Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, C. at 000306.)
(b) Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees on a Web
site without obtaining written permission," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the
Internet Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures 5
manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, F. at 000307.)
(c) Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or
company property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and
Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy
#106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.i at 000315.)10
(d) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at paragraphs
II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of
the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.j at 000315; Tr.
199-200.)15
All of these aforementioned Respondent policies and rules were reviewed internally by
Respondent for possible updating and revision in June 2017 by Pierson and Respondent’s
compliance manager Brandon Klug (Klug). (Tr. 199–201.)
Union member employee and paramedic at Respondent, Eric Paulson (Paulson) also
testified that at the time of hearing he was the assistant chief shop steward for the Union having 20
also been the chief shop steward from 2013 until just before hearing. (Tr. 69–70.)
Paulson admitted having a Respondent email address and that employees are permitted to
communicate with Respondent through this email address. (Tr. 81.)
Paulson recounted an incident in early 2018 when Respondent’s operations manager
Brian Meader (Meader) instructed Paulson not to post on the employees’ private Facebook25
account information pertaining to Respondent employee shift bids that had been taken or
selected to establish a list of filled shifts to inform other Respondent employees which shift bids
remained.5 (Tr. 72–73, 82–83, 91.)
Meader explained to Paulson that the reason he could not post this information on the
private employee Facebook account was because Respondent considered this shift bid 30
information to be proprietary information and Respondent did not want its competitors to know
how Respondent staffs its various shifts or how many units or ambulances that Respondent has
throughout the day and their deployment. (Tr. 73–76.)
Meader next called Administrator Bonifay who confirmed what Meader had instructed
and told Paulson. (Tr. 74.) Bonifay added that as the union representative Paulson was just there 35
to observe the shift bidding process and to file grievances afterwards should something come up

5 Paulson opined that generally Respondent’s bidded shifts change every 6 months once a shift change goes into
effect. Tr. 84–84.
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and there had been some problem with the shift bid from the Union’s point of view. Id. Paulson
disagreed with Meader and Bonifay that this shift bid information was proprietary. (Tr. 96.)
Paulson next identified a private Facebook group board site screen shot for the EMS
Workers of Solano County including many union members at Respondent who had received the
filled shifts information that Paulson had been listing before Meader told him to stop posting.65
(Tr. 75–76; GC Exh. 5.) Paulson opined that only people who are members of this private
employee Facebook account group can view the various postings on the private employee
Facebook site and he further opined that approximately 180–185 Respondent employees are
members of this private employee Facebook group.7 (Tr. 76.)
Paulson later contacted Ryan Silva (Silva), a fellow union member employee, and 10
informed him that Meader had stopped Paulson from posting this filled-shift bid information
because it was believed by Respondent to be proprietary. (Tr. 74–76.) Paulson persuasively
added that this information, the number of units deployed, influences how many calls that each
unit runs and their ability to get off work and end their shift on time. (Tr. 79.) Therefore, if there
are more units deployed, there are more units who can respond, or are available throughout the 15
day, resulting in more time for units to finish the paperwork connected to calls and work less
overtime, because the load is shared amongst more ambulances so there are more units to finish
paperwork and get rest between calls and eat meals. (Tr. 79–80.)
Paulson further explained that from 10–15 employees have complained that Respondent
does not deploy enough units or ambulances so each ambulance must run a lot of calls and being 20
held past the end of a shift just so they can finish up the normal paperwork associated with
running their calls. (Tr. 80.)
Respondent has a break room or employee lounge at its Vallejo Station No. 1 location.
(Tr. 80–81.) Respondent occasionally provides food to employees at Station No. 1 for special
events or for yearly mandatory meetings where Respondent provides breakfast and dinners to 25
employees. (Tr. 87–88.) The break room has also been used for union events and activities with
no objection from Respondent. (Tr. 112–113.)
Paulson also has seen that Respondent will communicate with its employees via
Respondent’s email system if open shifts are available for specific days due to absences from the

6 Paulson admits that he was not disciplined by Respondent for any of the postings to the private Facebook
account contained in his GC Exh. 5 screen shot or his use of Respondent’s email system to communicate union
activity to other union members. Tr. 97, 101–109.
7 Paulson admitted being the administrator or moderator of this private employee Facebook account with
Respondent employees and that in this role he has more privileges than most of the members associated with this
group such as to view exactly who is a member of this private Facebook account. Tr. 92. Paulson confidently
opined that if he became aware that a supervisor or manager at Respondent had become a member of the
employees’ private employee Facebook account, he would remove them. Tr. 119, 121. Paulson tries to provide
each bargaining unit member with an invitation to join the private Facebook member account so that the numbers
of members of the unit and the private employee Facebook account line up as best as possible. Tr. 93. Paulson
further opined that in addition to himself, there are 8 or 9 other moderators or administrators of this private
employee Facebook account. Id. Paulson further opined that if he saw that if he could not verify that someone
wanting to use the private employee Facebook account was, in fact, an employee, he would withdraw his
invitation or request to that person to join the private group. Tr. 93–94.
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regular bidded shifts. (Tr. 85.) These emails contain shift identifying numbers to identify the
specific hours open for a daily shift. Id.
Paulson communicates with other employees using his personal email rather than
Respondent’s email system network because he prefers the privacy of using personal emails
rather than using Respondent’s email system where employees would not be assured total 5
privacy because using Respondent’s emails would subject the email to ownership by Respondent
and using Respondent’s computer server. (Tr. 89.)
Respondent gives each of its employees their own Employer email addresses. (Tr. 81; R
Exh. 2.) Paulson admits that he has used Respondent’s email system for union activity over the
years, many times inadvertently, but that he has never been disciplined for it. His custom and 10
practice is to forward all of these Employer system emails to his individual personal email
address as he prefers using his personal emails so that he can be assured that his union activity is
private from Respondent especially with respect to grievances he is getting ready to file against
Respondent.
VP Pierson testified that this rule is necessary to maintain a stable computer network and 15
make sure Respondent was not allowing its employees to go to outside servers that can bring
viruses or outside malware into Respondent’s servers and computer system. (Tr. 168–169.)
Pierson claims this rule is intended to keep employees in Respondent’s network for business
related issues only. Id. Pierson also repeats that this rule is also due to privacy concerns of
Respondent’s patients and customer’s8 private personal information and their medical conditions 20
and Respondent’s fear of incurring a HIPPA regulations violation if its computer network is
compromised by non-business usage. (Tr. 169.) Pierson also points out that the rule does not
discriminate and prohibits all solicitation and distribution including side business solicitation and
solicitations to buy Girl Scout cookies. (Tr. 169–170.)
Pierson, however, thinks the rule, as written, does not prohibit employees from using the 25
Respondent’s email to solicit other employees to go to nonbusiness union meetings after work
and for exchanging non-business sports team schedules with other employees as long as the
email is employee-to-employee using only the Respondent’s email system. (Tr. 170–173.)
Pierson also opines that an exception to this rule applies for an employee to solicit another
employee to go to union meetings after work through the email system but that the employee 30
would only know of this exception to the rule by asking Respondent’s management team, a
direct supervisor, or the union shop steward. (Tr. 170–171.) In practice, the Union has used
Respondent’s email system for union activity a number of times without any discipline.
One noted disciplinary incident by Bonifay that was rescinded once the accused
employee filed a written request for the rescission occurred on May 10 or 12, 2016, when 35
employee Karin Davis (Davis) was improperly disciplined by Respondent for allegedly violating
one of its rules where Davis was being accused of engaging in union activities while on duty.
(Tr. 219–220; R Exh 2.) Respondent disciplined Davis which forced her to proactively email
Respondent to try and correct Respondent’s mistake. Id. In fact, Davis was not on duty when she

8 Pierson defines Respondent’s customers to include patients, hospitals, and sometimes fire departments. Tr. 208–
209.
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engaged in union activities as she was either off work on May 10 or she engaged in union
activities before starting her shift on May 12, 2016. (R Exh. 2.)
ANALYSIS
I. Credibility
A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors, including the context of the 5
witness’ testimony, the witness’ demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or
admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
record as a whole. Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi,
335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589
(1996)), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings need not be all-or-10
nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to
believe some, but not all, of a witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622.
I find that the 4 witnesses who testified in this case were mostly believable generating
very little factual disputes and that they each testified in a comfortable manner bringing many
past experiences from their prior work at Respondent to the hearing. 15
II. The Challenged Rules
A. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its Use of Electronic Mail for Business Only Rule
Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Pars. 5(a) and 5(b))
Paragraph 5(a) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its Employee Handbook: 20
The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the company's e-mail system
to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-related information to fellow employees is
strictly prohibited," as stated in the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring
rule found on pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
Also,25
Paragraph 5(b) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit employees or others," as
stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of Electronic Communications rule found on
pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. 30
First of all, with respect to this rule and all of the challenged rules, I find that since the
Union’s charge alleges that Respondent’s maintenance of these rules since 2016 violates the Act,
the Union alleges a continuing violation—that is, these rules were maintained during the six-
month period prior to the filing of the Union’s charge in February 2017 and that the mere
maintenance of these rules creates a new violation to occur every day that each rule is in effect. 35
(See 1/18/19 Jt. Motion at 4, paragraphs 8 and 10; GC Br. at 30.) Such allegations reset the
statute of limitations under Section 10(b) of the Act. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, I
further find that the Union’s ULP charge is timely filed.
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10
The General Counsel contends that Respondent’s ban on personal use of Respondent’s email
for all nonbusiness purposes is unlawful pursuant to the Board’s Purple Communications
presumption.9 Here, there is no dispute that Respondent’s employees have the rightful access to
Respondent’s email system because Respondent gave each of them their own personal email
address and Respondent and employees regularly use the email system to communicate. The 5
Board’s decision in Purple Communications was based, in part, on its acknowledgement of the
central role email has taken on as a workplace communication mechanism. Id. at 1057 (“[i]n
many workplaces, email has effectively become a ‘natural gathering place,’ pervasively used for
employee-to-employee conversations”) (citation omitted). An employer cannot overcome this
presumption unless it shows special circumstances make the email restriction necessary to 10
maintain production and discipline. Id. at 1063. An employer must demonstrate a connection
between the special circumstances and the restriction. Id.
It is further argued that, separate from this presumption, the ban is overbroad, because, as
written, it bans all non-business use by employees even though according to Respondent’s
corporate official, VP Pierson, employees can use it for the nonbusiness purposes of soliciting 15
fellow employees to attend union meetings after work and employees are not prohibited from
using the Respondent’s email system for exchanging non-\business sports team schedules with
other employees as long as the email is employee-to-employee using only the Respondent’s
email system. (Tr. 170–173.) In addition, Respondent allows employees to use Respondent’s
email system to externally communicate with patients, suppliers, vendors, advisors, and other 20
business acquaintances who maintain out-of-network email systems presumedly prone to viruses,
malware, and data breaches that Respondent argues it seeks to avoid. (Tr. 165–166, 168–170.) I
agree that the rule is unlawful as overbroad.
I find that these rules, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. I
further find that Respondent’s restriction on all nonbusiness email use violates the Act as it is 25
presumptively unlawful and overbroad. However, the threshold for the Purple Communications
presumption to apply is that the employer has authorized employees to use their company email
addresses to send personal messages, which while the rule does not say this, Respondent’s
corporate official admits that employees can use the Respondent’s email system to solicit other
employees to attend union meetings after work for nonbusiness purposes and for exchanging 30
non-business sports team schedules with other employees as long as the email is employee-to-
employee using only the Respondent’s email system. (Tr. 170–173.)
Moreover, I further find that Respondent has failed to show special circumstances to justify
its ban on all nonbusiness use of Respondent’s email system as Respondent’s expressed concern
about external emails causing viruses, malware, or data breaches is completely ruined by 35
Respondent’s allowance of employees to use Respondent’s email system to externally
communicate with patients, suppliers, vendors, advisors, and other business acquaintances who
maintain out-of-network email systems prone to viruses, malware, and data breaches that
Respondent argues it seeks to avoid. (Tr. 165–166, 168–170.) Also, Respondent’s email system
does not prohibit who its employees may communicate with, but, instead, Respondent prohibits 40
its employees’ use of the email system to solicit or distribute nonbusiness related information. As

9 Under the test, the Board presumes that employees who have the rightful access to their employer’s email
systems, in the course of their work, have a right to use the email system for statutorily protected communications
during nonworking time. Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB 1050, 1063 (2014).
JD(SF)–35–19
11
a result, Respondent has failed to demonstrate a connection between its concern for viruses and
data breaches and its solicitation or distribution restrictions. I further find that Respondent has
also failed to produce any evidence showing that its email system ban is necessary to maintain
production or discipline.
As such, I find the Respondent’s maintenance of its email system use limitation for business 5
purposes only rules stated in paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) of the complaint are unlawful under
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its No Social Media Use to Disparage the Company
Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Par. 5(c))
Paragraph 5(c) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016, 10
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
"Inappropriate communications, even if made on your own time using your own resources,
may be grounds for discipline up to and including immediate termination," as stated at the
first page of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. 15
Under the new analytical framework announced in Boeing Co., 365 NRRB No. 154 (2017),
the Board first analyzes whether “a facially neutral policy, rule or handbook provision . . . when
reasonably interpreted, would potentially interfere with the exercise of NLRA rights.” Boeing,
slip op. at 3–4 and 16. If it would not, the rule is lawful. If it would, the Board will apply a
balancing test and weigh whether the nature and extent of the potential impact on NLRA rights 20
outweighs the employer’s legitimate justifications for maintaining the rule. Id. See also Southern
Bakeries, LLC, 368 NLRB No. 59, slip op. at 1 (2109) (summarizing the new Boeing
framework).10
Individualized scrutiny under the balancing test is the appropriate analysis in this case for this
social media rule prohibiting “inappropriate communications” at all times even outside of work 25
using a private network because the Respondent’s challenged rule is facially neutral and not
among those types that the Board has previously designated as uniformly lawful or unlawful as
the rule does not expressly interfere with Section 7 rights.
Pierson and/or Bonifay testified broadly that this rule is necessary due to privacy concerns of
Respondent’s patients’ and customers’ private personal information and their medical conditions30
and fear of incurring a HIPAA and Medicare rules or regulations violations. (Tr. 134–135, 209.)
Specifically, VP Pierson opined that this rule is limited to inappropriate communications about
patients that employees have encountered at work and Respondent does not want its employees
talking about these patients, their patient-identifying information, or HIPAA or Medicare
protected private or medical information at work or after work. (Tr. 175–177.) 35
VP Pierson further opines, however, that this rule does not apply for any inappropriate
communications or comments or negative or critical statements about Respondent’s management
or other employees. (Tr. 175–177.) VP Pierson also opines that this rule does not prohibit

10 The General Counsel’s guidance memos and advice memos regarding the validity under the Act of the
maintenance of various Employers’ rules are nonbinding on the Board and its administrative law judges.
JD(SF)–35–19
12
employees from going on social media after work and talking about their wages, their terms and
conditions of employment, complaints about not being paid enough or having to deal with the
transfer of a very heavy patient as long as the employee does not also identify the specific patient
or any of their patient-identifying information. (Tr. 177–179.)
The General Counsel argues that this rule is unlawful because it is so overbroad as to 5
“adversely impact employees’ central Section 7 right to post potentially ‘inappropriate
communications’ about their terms and conditions of employment to social media.” (GC Br. at
21–22.) The General Counsel further cites to Triple Play Sports Bar & Grill, 361 NLRB 308,
314 (2014), affd. sub nom. Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2015), where the
Board held a rule that prohibited “inappropriate discussions about the company” was unlawful10
because employees would reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit discussions about improving
their terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 21.
I find that this rule, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. I
further find that, as written, this rule prohibiting “inappropriate communications” is unlawfully
overbroad and applies to all social media use by employees including their private social media 15
activities and, as a result, this rule has significant impact on employees’ discussions about their
working conditions. See, e.g., Boch Honda, 362 NLRB 706, 715–716 (2015) (Rules preventing
negative impact on a Company’s reputation and requiring respectful postings regarding the
Company violate the Act as employees would reasonably construe these provisions as preventing
them from discussing their conditions of employment with fellow employees and other third-20
parties such as unions and newspapers.); Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171,
1171–1172 (1990) (Employer’s parent communications rule violates Section 8(a)(1) because it
restricts employees’ Section 7 rights to communicate not only with employee-parents but with all
parents and rule also found unlawful because it interfered with employees’ statutory right to
complain about their employment to persons and entities other than the Employer including a 25
union or the Board.). Thus, I find as an initial determination required by Boeing, this rule would
potentially interfere with Respondent’s employees’ Section 7 rights.
As stated above, the Respondent’s only justification for the rule is to protect the privacy
rights of Respondent’s customers, patients, their patient-identifying information, or HIPAA or
Medicare protected private or medical information at work or after work. (Tr. 175–177.) But this 30
justification can easily be addressed with a rule much more narrowly written than this rule as
worded. I further find that the rule’s broad reach has a significant impact on the exercise of
Section 7 activity, far out-weighing the Respondent’s stated justification. In addition, I find that
this rule encompasses communications and associations among employees outside of any
workplace civility rules. Accordingly, I find this social media rule prohibiting all “inappropriate 35
communications” even if made on your own time using your own resources, complaint
paragraph 5(c), violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its Confidentiality Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1).
(Complaint Par. 5(d))
Paragraph 5(d) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016, 40
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
JD(SF)–35–19
13
"Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the company or your
coworkers…." as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the Social Media rule, found on pages
20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
The rule goes on to add as follows:
“Use of copyrighted or trademarked company information, trade secrets, or other 5
sensitive information may subject you to legal action. If you have any doubt about
whether it is proper to disclose information, please discuss it with your supervisor.”
Id.
Pierson and/or Bonifay generally testified that the legitimate justifications for this rule are to
protect privacy concerns of Respondent’s patients and customers private personal information 10
and their medical conditions and fear of incurring a HIPAA regulations violation. (Tr. 134–135,
180–181.) However, Respondent already has in place another rule that is not at issue here which
addresses Respondent’s concerns and alleged justifications for its patients’ and customers’
private information protection instead which reads: “Do not disclose information that could
subject the company to legal liability. Data about certain financial transactions, information 15
about medical and health records, and other disclosures may be restricted by State and Federal
laws. If the company is subjected to government investigation or financial liability based on your
disclosures, the company may seek to hold you personally responsible.” (Jt. Exh. 14, par. 2 of
the Social Media rule, p. 20 of Sec. 4 of the employee handbook.)
Pierson added that Respondent considers its entire shift bid schedule of its employees is 20
proprietary and Respondent’s trade secrets including its shift bid schedule and what shifts
Respondent has in place that allow a competitor to get Respondent’s exact schedule of shifts
which would allow the competitor to bid on Respondent’s competitive contracts with counties
and cities and other customers. (Tr. 179–180, 183–185.) Stated differently, Pierson also thinks
that further legitimate justifications for this rule are to protect as confidential or proprietary 25
company information as to how Respondent deploys its resources or ambulances, Respondent’s
unit hour allocation, and what hours Respondent covers in its system. Id. Also, Pierson identified
employee’s personal medical events as additional confidential and proprietary information. Id.
Finally, Pierson added that a dispatcher’s entire call volume or workload in one day is also
considered confidential and proprietary to Pierson. (Tr. 182–183.) Pierson, however, does not 30
consider employee and management wage information to be confidential or proprietary. (Tr.
181–183.)
I find that this rule, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. I
further find that the rule at issue is not limited to Respondent’s own nonpublic, proprietary
records. See e.g., LA Specialty Produce Co., 368 NLRB No. 93, slip op. at 3–4 (2019) (Board 35
holds Employer’s confidentiality rule lawful as it narrowly applies to Employer’s “own
nonpublic, proprietary records” including its customer and vendor lists). Instead, here
Respondent’s prohibition on disclosing confidential or proprietary information extends beyond
Respondent to prohibit all disclosure of confidential or proprietary information of Respondent
employees’ coworkers. (Jt. Exh. 14, par. 2 of the Social Media rule, p. 20 of Sec. 4 of the 40
employee handbook.) In addition, the confidentiality rule here does not specifically list
Respondent’s dispatch call volume records, its shift bid schedules, its ambulance deployment
JD(SF)–35–19
14
schedules, its unit hour allocation or its employees’ personal medical event records as part of its
confidential or proprietary information though it easily could spell this out in the rule especially
since its handbook is 170 pages and its manual is 126 pages. (Jt. Exhs. 14 and 15.)
The General Counsel argues that without any examples or definitions of what information
Respondent considers confidential or proprietary, employees would reasonably interpret the 5
prohibition on disclosing information regarding the company or [their] coworkers to include
information about wages and working conditions.” See Flamingo-Hilton Laughlin, 330 NLRB
287–292 (1999) (Board found rule unlawful that prohibited the disclosure of confidential
information regarding hotel’s customers, coworkers, or hotel’s business); see also Aroostook
County Regional Ophthalmology Center v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 212–213 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 10
(relying on context of rule and its location in the manual to conclude that rule was not unlawful
on its face). Moreover, the General Counsel further argues that Respondent employees would
reasonably conclude information about compensation and other terms and conditions of
employment are confidential based on Respondent’s other rule discussed below that provides:
“[o]nly Rudy, Helen, or human resources can give out any information on current and former 15
employee compensation.” (GC Br. at 14 citing Jt. Exh. 14 at 116.)
Here, I find that Respondent’s prohibition on disclosing “confidential or proprietary
information regarding your coworkers” would reasonably be interpreted to include employees’
wages and other terms and conditions of employment protected under Section 7. This prohibition
interferes with employees’ NLRA right to discuss properly obtained employee information such 20
as wages, terms and conditions of employment, and contact information with, inter alia,
coworkers and a union. See Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB 1690, 1691 (2015); Flex-
Frac Logistics, LLC, 358NLRB 1131, 1131 (2012), enfd. 746F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014); and
Labinal, Inc., 340 NLRB 203, 210 (2003). Under the Act, information concerning wages, hours,
and working conditions is precisely the type that may be shared by employees, provided to 25
unions, or given to governmental agencies. Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc., 357 NLRB
860, 871 (2011), revd. on other grounds 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
As stated above, I note that the provision follows a heading entitled “confidentiality,” not
“patient confidentiality.” Also, confidential or proprietary company information is
distinguishable and specifically listed later in the employee handbook to include company30
copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and other company sensitive information unrelated to
coworkers. The rule’s broad reach prohibiting employees from disclosing and discussing broad
confidential information regarding their coworkers has a significant impact on the employees’
NLRA right to disclose or discuss properly obtained employee information such as wages, terms
and conditions of employment, and contact information with, inter alia, coworkers and a union, 35
far out-weighing the Respondent’s stated justifications. As a result, I further find that this
confidentiality rule is ambiguous and interpreted as limiting employee disclosure and discussion
of wages and other terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. Under Century Fast
Foods, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 97, slip op. at 11 (2016), the ambiguity must be resolved against the
Respondent. Therefore, I further find that this confidentiality provision of Respondent’s40
employee handbook violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
JD(SF)–35–19
15
D. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its No Disparage/No Denigration of Company
Reputation Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Par. 5(e))
Paragraph 5(e) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
"You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or otherwise comment 5
on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in numbered paragraph 4 of the Social
Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
Once again, Pierson and/or Bonifay generally testified that this rule is necessary due to
privacy concerns of Respondent’s patients and customers private personal patient information
and their medical conditions and fear of incurring a HIPAA regulations violation. (Tr. 134–135, 10
187.) Pierson further justified the rule by opining that the rule was put in so that Respondent
would not be associated with employee social media postings about patient-related issues. (Tr.
187–188.) Pierson clarified that Respondent would not discipline an employee under this rule if
they wanted to criticize their supervisors about how bad they are or use Respondent’s logo when
they wanted to talk about what a lousy place Respondent is to work. (Tr. 187–189.) 15
The General Counsel argues that Section 7 protects an employee’s right to publicly identify
her employer to comment on an ongoing labor dispute or to initiate, induce, or prepare for group
action. (GC Br. at 16.) Moreover, the General Counsel adds that the “Board has repeatedly held
rules that prohibit employees from using their employer’s name are unlawful” and that here, the
rule prohibiting use of Respondent’s name would also be reasonably interpreted to prohibit 20
publicly identifying Respondent in posts commenting on an ongoing labor dispute, a union
organizing campaign, or a concerted attempt to improve terms and conditions of employment. Id.
I find that this rule, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. I
also agree that the rule applies to all social media use and that employees have the right to
communicate with each other and comment about the terms and conditions of employment and 25
they also have the right to seek support from the public over their working conditions. See, e.g.,
Boch Honda, 362 NLRB 706, 715–716 (2015)(Rules preventing negative impact on a
Company’s reputation and requiring respectful postings regarding the Company violate the Act
as employees would reasonably construe these provisions as preventing them from discussing
their conditions of employment with fellow employees and other third-parties such as unions and 30
newspapers.); Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171, 1171–1172 (1990)(Employer’s
parent communications rule violates Section 8(a)(1) because it restricts employees’ Section 7
rights to communicate not only with employee-parents but with all parents and rule also found
unlawful because it interfered with employees’ statutory right to complain about their
employment to persons and entities other than the Employer including a union or the Board.). 35
Here, the Respondent’s rule limiting an employee from identifying the Respondent in
communications to third parties is extraordinarily broad and inconsistent with employees
protected right to seek outside support concerning their terms and conditions of employment. It
is a facially neutral rule in that it does not expressly interfere with Section 7 rights.
Moving to the Boeing balancing test, the Respondent’s only justification for the rule was to 40
protect patient-related medical information from disclosure. But requiring employees not to post
or comment anything harmful using the Respondent’s name or reputation is an attempt to shield
JD(SF)–35–19
16
the company from criticism by its employees—a protected right. See Jimmy John’s, 361 NLRB
283, 284 (2014)(Board held that employees are protected under the “mutual aid or protection”
clause of Section 7 when they seek to improve their lot as employees through channels outside
the immediate employee-employer relationship.); Southern Maryland Hospital, 293 NLRB 1209,
1222 (1989)(Rule prohibiting “derogatory attacks” on hospital representatives found unlawful 5
because it does nothing more than place the Employer hospital or its representatives, including
physicians, in an unfavorable light.). The specific justification provided by Pierson could be
addressed with a rule much more narrowly written than the current rule in question. I find that
the rule’s broad reach would have a significant impact on the exercise of Section 7 activity, far
outweighing the Respondent’s stated justification. Accordingly, I find this prohibition of using 10
the Respondent’s name rule prohibiting the use of the company name to endorse, promote,
denigrate, or otherwise comment on any product, opinion, cause or person, at complaint
paragraph 5(e), violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its No Posting of Coworker Photos on Social Media
Without Consent Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Paras. 5(f) and 6(b))15
Paragraph 5(f) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
"Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as stated in
numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the
Employee Handbook. 20
Similarly, Paragraph 6(b) of the General Counsel’s complaint also alleges that since about
August 28, 2016, Respondent has maintained the same following policies in its policies and
procedures manual:
Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees on a Web site
without obtaining written permission," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the 25
Internet Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures
manual.
Pierson opined that no one should be sharing a coworker’s photo without their consent as
employees live with each other on 24-hours shifts and people can get into precarious situations.
(Tr. 189–190, 202.) Pierson added more justification for this rule saying that it protects the 30
sanctity of the station that employees work on sometimes over a 24-hour period of time. (Tr.
190.) Pierson stated that another justification for these rules is to prevent employees from posting
pictures of injuries or accidents. (Tr. 147.) Pierson further insists that by requiring consent,
Respondent wants to make sure that the posted partner or person is ok with having their photo
posted by another employee. Id. Pierson concludes saying that an employee could be disciplined 35
under this rule if they posted photos of their coworker without that coworker’s consent. (Tr. 191–
192.) An exception, according to Pierson, is that it would not be a rule violation subject to
discipline if an employee posts a photo of another employee who has not consented to the photo
but where the photo is used to communicate unsafe work conditions or to OSHA for the same
reason. Id. 40
JD(SF)–35–19
17
The General Counsel argues that Section 7 protects an employee’s right to post
photographs on social media that comment on an ongoing labor dispute or seek to initiate,
induce, or prepare for group action. (GC Br. at 17.)
I find that these rules, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected
activities. Photography, including the posting of photographs on social media, is protected by 5
Section 7 if employees are acting in concert for their mutual aid and protection and no overriding
employer interest is present. Whole Foods, 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 3 (2015); Rio All-Suites
Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 4 (2015). See also Bettie Page Clothing, 359
NLRB 777 (2013), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference 361 NLRB 876 (2014) (posting on
social media site constitutes protected concerted activity); White Oak Manor, 353 NLRB 795, 10
795 fn. 2 (2009) (photography was part of the res gestae of employee’s protected concerted
activity), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference at 355 NLRB 1280 (2010), enfd. 452 Fed.
Appx 374 (4th Cir. 2011).
In considering the legality of a rule prohibiting photography in Flagstaff, the Board
emphasized the “weighty” privacy interests of the patients and the hospital’s “significant interest 15
in preventing the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information,” as required
by Federal law. 357 NLRB at 663. The Board concluded that the rule in Flagstaff was lawful,
finding that employees would understand the rule as a “legitimate means of protecting the
privacy of patients and their hospital surroundings.” Id.
In analyzing the rule prohibiting employees from posting photos of coworkers at an 20
emergency and non-emergency medical transportation company at issue here, I presume that all
of the Respondent’s patients and customer hospitals and health-care facilities have significant
privacy interests similar to those articulated in Flagstaff. The Respondent’s EMT employees
perform a similar function as hospital workers in the Flagstaff case. Pierson’s justification for the
rules involve his consistent concern for patient privacy and to prevent employees from posting 25
pictures of injuries or accidents. Thus, I find that there is a legitimate basis in the record and an
identifiable government policy under HIPAA and Medicare to justify my presumption that all
Respondent’s clients have common privacy concerns of comparable weight.
However, the Respondent’s assertion that the rules are designed to protect customer
privacy is undercut by the language of each of the rules, which solely prohibits posting images of 30
its own coworkers without their consent, but says nothing about the posting of images of
Respondent’s patients or customers or their customer’s workplace in isolation from the
Respondent’s employees. In the absence of any basis for finding that the rules are tailored to
protect a legitimate privacy concern of similar weight to the patient privacy concern in Flagstaff,
I find that Respondent’s employees would reasonably interpret the rules to restrict Section 7 35
activity. See G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., 364 NLRB No. 92, slip op. at 1, 5 (2016)
(Section 7 protects an employee’s right to post photographs on social media that comment on an
ongoing labor dispute or seek to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action.). Moreover, co-
worker consent to post these photos is unnecessary because the Board has found that an
employer could not discipline employees for protected social media posts on the basis of the 40
subjective reaction of others. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. 359 NLRB 368, 370 (2012) citing
Consolidated Diesel Co., 332 NLRB 1019, 1020 (2000), enfd. 263 F.3d 345 (2001).
Accordingly, I find this prohibition on the use or posting of photos of coworkers without their
express consent, complaint paragraphs 5(f) and 6(b), violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
JD(SF)–35–19
18
F. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its Protecting Company [Employee Compensation]
Information Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Par. 5(g))
Paragraph 5(g) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on current or former 5
employee compensation," as stated in the second paragraph of the Protecting Company
Information rule, found on page 24 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
Pierson admits that this rule does not prohibit employees from discussing wages and work
hours amongst themselves at any time. (Tr. 194–195.) Pierson further opines that this rule is to
make sure that when Respondent is asked questions about an employee and some third party 10
want to verify an employee’s wages or employment, the three company officials listed -
Pierson’s Uncle Rudy, his mother Helen, or human resources (HR) are responsible for verified
HR information or accurate Respondent-held information to report to third parties such as for a
background check for a new job, or for employment verification for a new house purchase or a
rental agreement. (192–195.) 15
The General Counsel argues that Section 7 protects an employee’s right to discuss her wages
with a third-party such as a union, the public, or the Board and that this right is central to the Act.
(GC Br. At 7–8.)
I find that this rule, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. The
Act has long protected the rights of employees to discuss their wages and other terms and 20
conditions of employment with others. The Exchange Bank, 264 NLRB 822, 831 (1982), citing
T.V. and Radio Parts Co., Inc., 236 NLRB 689 (1978), and Poly Ultra Plastics, Inc., 231 NLRB
787 (1977). Forbidding employees from discussing the wages of other employees, without the
permission of the other employees, was found to have violated the Act. Labinal, Inc., 340 NLRB
203, 210 (2003). An admonition prohibiting employees from disclosing any company knowledge 25
to any client has similarly been held violative of the Act. Trinity Protection Services, 357 NLRB
1382, 1383 (2011). Under the Act, information concerning wages, hours, and working conditions
is precisely the type that may be shared by employees, provided to unions, or given to
governmental agencies. Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc., 357 NLRB 860, 871 (2011),
revd. on other grounds 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015).30
I find that Respondent has not provided sufficient evidence to justify this rule which
expressly prohibits Respondent’s employees from sharing information regarding employees’
wages and compensation with other employees and third-parties, the union and governmental
agencies. Respondent has not set forth a compelling justification for maintaining its limitations
on sharing current or former employee compensation information. 35
I find that none of the reasons advanced by Respondent’s witnesses for the maintenance of
the limitations on the sharing of employee compensation information rule outweigh its adverse
impact on its employees’ protected conduct. Thus, I find that Respondent’s maintenance this rule
at paragraph 5(g) of the complaint violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
40
JD(SF)–35–19
19
G. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its Discipline/Impermissible Conduct/No Access Rule
Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Pars. 5(h) and 6(c))
Paragraph 5(h) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or company 5
property" for any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule
found on pages 34-37 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
Similarly, Paragraph 6(c) of the General Counsel’s complaint also alleges that since
about August 28, 2016, Respondent has maintained the same following policies in its policies 10
and procedures manual:
Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or company
property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and
Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual.
Pierson opined that the rules were justified to prevent employees from selling stuff at work. 15
(Tr. 174–175.) He also opined that employees should not have to be solicited for things that are
not work-related. (Tr. 170.) Pierson added that union employees know there is an exception to
this rule for conducting union activities or business because the collective-bargaining agreement
addresses this and nonunion employees in Sacramento need only ask Respondent management
for permission to conduct union business or any personal business on company time or company 20
property. (Tr. 195–197, 203–206.) Moreover, Pierson also opines that if any employee wants to
solicit their personal business such as selling Girl Scout cookies at work during business hours,
the employee need only seek prior approval from Respondent’s management team. (Tr. 199.)
The General Counsel argues that these rules are overbroad and that they fail to clarify
that the restrictions do not apply during nonwork time and that they also do not apply in non-25
work areas such as Respondent’s break room, kitchen, backyard, and parking lots. (GC Br. at
25–27.)
Rather than be facially neutral, I find that the rules at issue explicitly restrict activities
protected by Section 7 of the Act since “personal business” is broad enough to include protected
“union business” and other protected activities. Lutheran Heritage Village Livonia, 343 NLRB 30
646, 646, fn. 5 (2004) (Lutheran) (a rule prohibiting solicitation, which is not limited to working
time, violates the Act because the rule explicitly prohibits employee activity that the Board has
found to be protected). The Board has long held that rules are overbroad to the extent they ban
Section 7 activity (1) on company property (since employees are entitled to engage in such
activity on company property during breaks and other non-working time) and (2) during 35
“working hours” (without clarifying that the restriction does not apply to non-working time).
UPMC, UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 366 NLRB No. 142 (2018); Hyundai America Shipping
Agency, 357 NLRB 860 (2011), revd. on other grounds 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Laidlaw
Transit, Inc., 315 NLB 79, 82 (1994); Valley Special Needs Program, Inc., 314 NLRB 903, 913
(1994). Based on the above, I find that Respondent’s rules prohibiting employees from 40
conducting personal business on company time or company property are unlawful because the
JD(SF)–35–19
20
proffered justifications for these work rules do not outweigh the significant potential impact of
the rules on substantial core Section 7 rights. Thus, I find that Respondent’s maintenance these
rules at paragraphs 5(h) and 6(c) of the complaint violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
H. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its No Solicitation or Distribution During Working
Hours Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Par. 5(i))5
Paragraph 5(i) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its employee handbook:
(i) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at the
fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of 10
Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
Similarly, Paragraph 6(d) of the General Counsel’s complaint also alleges that since
about August 28, 2016, Respondent has maintained the same following policies in its policies
and procedures manual:
(d) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose 15
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at
paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action
Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual.
Pierson opined that the rules were justified to prevent employees from selling stuff at
work. (Tr. 174–175.) He also opined that employees should not have to be solicited for things 20
that are not work-related. (Tr. 170.) Pierson also stated that a business justification for this rule is
specific to the distribution by employees of training literature and it is intended to ensure proper
compliance of Respondent and its employees to applicable Federal, State, and local laws and
regulations covering the EMT industry. (Tr. 197–198, 205–206.) Pierson also repeats his opinion
from earlier that an exception to this rule also applies for an employee to solicit another 25
employee to go to union meetings or distribute literature about after-hours union meetings during
working hours. If an employee has any question that this union meeting exception to the rule
exists, they need only ask Respondent’s management team, a direct supervisor, or their shop
steward for confirmation. (Tr. 170–171, 198–199.) Moreover, Pierson also opines that if any
employee wants to solicit their personal business such as selling Girl Scout cookies at work 30
during business hours, the employee need only seek prior approval from Respondent’s
management team. (Tr. 199.)
Again, the General Counsel argues that these rules are overbroad and that they fail to
clarify that the non-solicitation/distribution restrictions do not apply during non-work time and
that they also do not apply in non-work areas such as Respondent’s break room, kitchen, 35
backyard, and parking lots. (GC Br. at 25–27.)
I find that these rules, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected
activities. It is well established that employees have a right to solicit during nonworking time and
distribute literature during nonworking time in nonworking areas. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138
NLRB 615 (1962); see also Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 739 (1945) (Restrictions on solicitation, 40
without limitations or exceptions for nonwork time or nonwork areas have long been found
JD(SF)–35–19
21
contrary to the purposes of the Act.). Also, the Board has long recognized the principle that
“[w]orking time is for work,” and thus has permitted employers to adopt and enforce rules
prohibiting solicitation during “working time,” absent evidence that the rule was adopted for a
discriminatory purpose. Conagra Foods, Inc., 361 NLRB 944, 945 (2014), citing to Peyton
Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843 (1943), enfd. 142 F.2d. 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 5
U.S. 730 (1944).
However, solicitation cannot be banned during nonworking times in nonworking areas,
nor can bans be extended to working areas during nonworking time. UPS Supply Chain
Solutions, Inc., 357 NLRB 1295, 1296 (2011). In addition, rules prohibiting the distribution of
union literature during nonworking times in nonworking areas are presumptively unlawful. See, 10
e.g., Titanium Metals Corp., 340 NLRB 766, 774–775 (2003); Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp.,
331 NLRB 858, 858–859 (2000). “Interference with employee circulation of protected material
in nonworking areas during off-duty periods is presumptively a violation of the Act unless the
employer can affirmatively demonstrate the restriction is necessary to protect its proper interest.”
Waste Mgmt. of Arizona, Inc., 345 NLRB 1339, 1346 (2005), quoting Champion International 15
Corp., 303 NLRB 102, 105 (1991).
The Respondent’s non-solicitation, non-distribution policy bans solicitation and
distribution “during working hours without prior authorization from management.” The broad
definition of solicitation encompasses union activity, because it includes canvassing, soliciting,
or seeking to obtain membership in or support for any organization, requesting contributions, and 20
posting or distributing handbills, pamphlets, petitions, and the like of any kind. Given the rules’
use of the disjunctive, the Respondent has banned union solicitation and distribution during
nonwork time. Moreover, banning solicitation or distribution during working hours is overbroad
and presumptively invalid, as it would reasonably be construed as prohibiting such conduct
during break times or periods when employees are not actually working. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,25
315 NLRB 79, 82 (1994). The Respondent’s stated justification for the rule—limiting
distributions by employees during working hours to distribution of training literature intended to
ensure proper compliance of Respondent and its employees to applicable Federal, State, and
local laws and regulations covering the EMT industry—does not apply to the ban on activity
which occurs during nonwork time. In addition, I further find that being required to seek 30
management’s preapproval of an employee’s solicitation or distribution is coercive and also
unlawful. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987) (Board affirms prior holdings
that any rule that requires employees to secure permission from their employer as a precondition
to engaging in protected concerted activity on an employee's free time and in nonwork areas is
unlawful.). Accordingly, the Respondent’s maintenance of the non-solicitation/ non-distribution 35
rules as alleged in paragraphs 5(i) and 6(d) of the complaint violates Section 8(a)(1).
I. The Respondent’s Maintenance of Its No Use of Social Media to Disparage Company or
Anyone Else Rule Violates Section 8(a)(1). (Complaint Par. 6(a))
Paragraph 6(a) of the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that since about August 28, 2016,
Respondent has maintained the following policies in its policies and procedures manual: 40
(a) Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites to disparage the
company, its associates, customers, vendors, business practices, patients, or other
employees of the company," and from "post[ing] pictures of. . . other employees on a
JD(SF)–35–19
22
Web site without obtaining written permission," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F)
of the Internet Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies &
Procedures manual (bate stamped pages 306-307).
Pierson and/or Bonifay generally testified that this rule is necessary due to privacy concerns
of Respondent’s patients and customers private personal information and their medical 5
conditions and fear of incurring a HIPAA and Medicare regulations violation. (Tr. 134–135; 151,
199–202.) Nothing in this rule, however, prohibits the disclosure of patient information so I
reject this justification as illegitimate.
The General Counsel argues that this rule is overbroad as it prohibits all employee
disparagement of Respondent, its business practices, and terms and conditions of employment.10
(GC Br. at 19–21.) Moreover, the General Counsel further argues that Section 7 of the Act
protects an employee’s right to publicly disparage her employer to gain support for an ongoing
labor dispute or induce group action as long as the communication is not malicious. Id.
I find that this rule, reasonably construed, would restrict employees’ protected activities. As
indicated by the General Counsel, employees have a right under the Act to use social media to 15
communicate with each other and with the public to improve their terms and conditions of
employment. See, e.g., Three D, LLC, 361 NLRB 308 (2014), affd. 629 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir.
2015). On its face Respondent’s blogging rule would potentially interfere with that right by
effectively discouraging employees from using the common and most efficient method of
identifying and directing coworkers and others to the Respondent’s website to obtain further20
information and communicate directly with the Respondent in support of the employees’ work-
related concerns or disputes. Cf. UPMC, 362 NLRB 1704, 1704–1705 and fn. 5 (2015)
(employer’s prohibition against employees using its logos or other copyrighted or trademarked
materials on social media unlawfully interfered with employee rights under the Act).
In addition, as argued by the General Counsel, the Board has long recognized that Section 7 25
protects employees’ rights to seek support from and speak with third parties, including
customers, concerning labor disputes and other workplace concerns. See e.g., First Transit Inc.,
360 NLRB 619 (2014), and Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 NLRB 1754 (2012), and cases cited
therein. Although the Board recognizes that there are limits to what an employee might say to a
customer or the public about the employer, specifically, they are not protected when they engage 30
in disparagement of the employer’s product or to engage in malice, the Board also recognizes
that sometimes these protected discussions with third parties may result in putting the employer
in a bad light, without a loss of protection of the Act.
Here, the Respondent’s blogging rule limiting employee communications to third parties
about the employer, its employees, and terms and conditions of employment are extraordinarily 35
broad and are not consistent with employees protected right to seek outside support concerning
their terms and conditions of employment. These are facially neutral rules, in that they do not
expressly interfere with Section 7 rights. However, in encompassing the right to reach out to
third parties about their working conditions, these rules have a reasonable tendency to interfere
with employees’ Section 7 rights. The Respondent has not asserted any specific justification for 40
these rules, although it is understandable that the Respondent would want to control its image
and the information made public, and that it would not want its customers to be dissuaded from
maintaining their relationship with the Respondent. However, these generalized explanations for
JD(SF)–35–19
23
the rules do not outweigh the important, long-recognized protected right of employees to seek
support from third parties, including customers or the public, in labor disputes or a concerted
attempt to improve terms and conditions of employment. Thus, on balance, I find that this
blogging rule at paragraph 6(a) of the complaint violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act pursuant to
the Boeing balancing test.5
III. Respondent’s Other Affirmative Defenses Lack Merit
I reject Respondent’s argument that the Union waived its right to challenge the
maintenance of Respondent’s Employee Handbook and Manual rules as no evidence in support
of this argument was provided that the Union explicitly stated that it was waiving the Section 7
rights implicated by Respondent’s rules.11 Also, a union cannot waive an employee’s right to 10
solicit during non-work time and distribute literature in non-work areas, as this waiver right
resides with the employee and not the union.
In addition, I further reject as irrelevant Respondent’s evidence and argument that it did
not enforce its rules to restrict Section 7 activity and that Respondent’s employees have not
complained about its rules. The rules are found to be unlawful due to their likely interference 15
with employees’ protected activity regardless whether a grievance has been filed or they have
been disciplined under the questioned 13 rules. Moreover, Respondent has issued a written
discipline to an employee for speaking to a union representative during non-work time in a non-
work area, although Respondent subsequently rescinded the written discipline. (R Exh. 2. ) This
shows that even some Respondent supervisors interpret these rules and policies to restrict 20
Section 7 activity.
Finally, the CBA does not supersede any of the 13 questioned rules as it only supersedes
Respondent’s policies that conflict with the express terms of the CBA and none of these
questioned rules conflict with the terms of the CBA. (Jt. Exh. 17, pp. 4 and 33.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW25
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent has unlawfully interfered with employees’ exercise of their NLRA
rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining the following rules
in its employee handbook and manual:30
(a) "The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the company's e-mail
system to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-related information to fellow employees
is strictly prohibited," as stated in the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring

11 As pointed out by the General Counsel, Respondent’s rules are undisputedly unlawful with respect to its non-
unit employees. GC Br. at 31.
JD(SF)–35–19
24
rule found on pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 12–
13.)
(b) Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit employees or
others," as stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of Electronic Communications rule
found on pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 18.) 5
(c) "Inappropriate communications . . . even if made on your own time using your own
resources, may be grounds for discipline up to and including immediate termination," as stated at
the first page of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the employee
handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 20.)
(d) "Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the company or 10
your coworkers," as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20
and 21 of section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 20.)
(e) "You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or otherwise
comment on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in numbered paragraph 4 of the
Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 15
at sec. 4, 21.)
(f) "Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as stated in
numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of section 4 of the
employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 21.)
(g) "Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on current or 20
former employee compensation," as stated in the second paragraph of the Protecting Company
Information rule, found on page 24 of section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4,
24.)
(h) Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or
company property" as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule 25
found on pages 34-37 of section 4 of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 37.)
(i) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at the fourth page
of the Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34–37 of section 4 of the employee
handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at sec. 4, 37.)30
(j)Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites to disparage
the company, its associates, customers, vendors, business practices, patients, or other
employees of the company," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet
Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual.
(Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, C. at 000306.)35
(k) Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees on a Web
site without obtaining written permission," as stated at paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the
Internet Social Networking and Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures
manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, F. at 000307.)
JD(SF)–35–19
25
(l) Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company time or
company property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and
Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual.” (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy
#106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.i at 000315.)
(m) Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for any purpose 5
during working hours without prior authorization from management," as stated at paragraphs
II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of
the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.j at 000315; Tr.
199–200.)
3. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) 10
and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that they must cease and desist such practices and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. In a typical case involving unlawful workplace rules, the 15
promulgator of the rules is ordered to rescind the unlawful provisions, provide inserts of
revisions to the employee handbooks and manual and post an appropriate notice at Respondent’s
Solano and Sacramento Counties facilities.
On these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record, pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended Order.1220
ORDER
The Respondent, Medic Ambulance Service, Inc., Sacramento and Solano Counties,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Maintaining the following unlawful employee handbook and manual rules that state 25
that:
ï‚· "The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the
company's e-mail system to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-
related information to fellow employees is strictly prohibited," as stated in
the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring rule found on 30
pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at
Sect. 4, 12-13.)
 “Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit
employees or others," as stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all
objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–35–19
26
Electronic Communications rule found on pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of
the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 18.)
 "Inappropriate communications … even if made on your own time using
your own resources, may be grounds for discipline up to and including
immediate termination," as stated at the first page of the Social Media 5
rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
(Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
ï‚· "Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the
company or your coworkers," as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the
Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee 10
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
ï‚· "You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or
otherwise comment on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in
numbered paragraph 4 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 21.) 15
ï‚· "Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as
stated in numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages
20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4,
21.)
ï‚· "Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on 20
current or former employee compensation," as stated in the second
paragraph of the Protecting Company Information rule, found on page 24
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 24.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property" as stated at the fourth page of the 25
Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4
of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible 30
Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites
to disparage the company, its associates, customers, vendors, business
practices, patients, or other employees of the company," as stated at 35
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt.
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, C. at 000306.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees
on a Web site without obtaining written permission," as stated at 40
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt.
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, F. at 000307.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and 45
JD(SF)–35–19
27
II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01
of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01,
II.B.1.iii.i at 000315.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from 5
management," as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of
the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies &
Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.j at
000315; Tr. 199-200.)
10
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the right guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the following provisions located in Respondent’s employee handbook and
manual:15
ï‚· "The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the
company's e-mail system to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-
related information to fellow employees is strictly prohibited," as stated in
the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring rule found on
pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at 20
Sect. 4, 12-13.)
 “Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit
employees or others," as stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of
Electronic Communications rule found on pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of
the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 18.) 25
 "Inappropriate communications … even if made on your own time using
your own resources, may be grounds for discipline up to and including
immediate termination," as stated at the first page of the Social Media
rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
(Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.) 30
ï‚· "Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the
company or your coworkers," as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the
Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
ï‚· "You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or 35
otherwise comment on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in
numbered paragraph 4 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 21.)
ï‚· "Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as
stated in numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 40
JD(SF)–35–19
28
20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4,
21.)
ï‚· "Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on
current or former employee compensation," as stated in the second
paragraph of the Protecting Company Information rule, found on page 24 5
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 24.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property" as stated at the fourth page of the
Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4
of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)10
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible
Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)15
 “Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites
to disparage the company, its associates, customers, vendors, business
practices, patients, or other employees of the company," as stated at
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. 20
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, C. at 000306.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees
on a Web site without obtaining written permission," as stated at
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. 25
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, F. at 000307.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and
II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01
of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, 30
II.B.1.iii.i at 000315.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of
the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies & 35
Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.j at
000315; Tr. 199-200.)
and remove such rules from any and all employee publications or documents to which
it is a party.
(b) Furnish employees at the Solano and Sacramento Counties facilities with inserts 40
for the current policies that (1) advise employees that the unlawful prohibition or restriction has
been rescinded, or (2) provide the language of a lawful prohibition or restriction, or to the extent
that the Respondent has not already done so, publish and distribute revised policies that (1) do
JD(SF)–35–19
29
not contain the unlawful prohibition or restriction, or (2) provide the language of a lawful
prohibition or restriction.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in and around
Solano and Sacramento Counties, California, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”13
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being 5
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall also be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, 10
posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent 15
at any time since February 23, 2017.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
20
Dated, at Washington, D.C. October 25, 2019
25
________________________
Gerald Michael Etchingham
Administrative Law Judge

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
),?7/(L5/e-
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
• Form, join, or assist a union;
• Choose a representative to bargain with us on your behalf;
• Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection;
• Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the above rights.
WE WILL NOT maintain the following rules in our employee handbook or manual, or
anywhere else, that can be construed to prohibit you from talking to each other about your
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or otherwise restrict you from
engaging in protected activities:
ï‚· "The e-mail system is intended for business use only. The use of the
company's e-mail system to solicit fellow employees or distribute non job-
related information to fellow employees is strictly prohibited," as stated in
the second paragraph of the Electronic Mail and Monitoring rule found on
pages 12 and 13 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at
Sect. 4, 12-13.)
 “Prohibiting employee use of the company's email System "To solicit
employees or others," as stated at the third page of the Acceptable Use of
Electronic Communications rule found on pages 16 to 19 of Section 4 of
the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 18.)
 "Inappropriate communications … even if made on your own time using
your own resources, may be grounds for discipline up to and including
immediate termination," as stated at the first page of the Social Media
rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook.
(Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
ï‚· "Do not disclose confidential or proprietary information regarding the
company or your coworkers," as stated in numbered paragraph 2 of the
Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 20.)
ï‚· "You may not use the company name to endorse, promote, denigrate or
otherwise comment on any product, opinion, cause or person," as stated in
numbered paragraph 4 of the Social Media rule, found on pages 20 and 21
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 21.)
ï‚· "Do not use or post photos of coworkers without their express consent," as
stated in numbered paragraph 5 of the Social Media rule, found on pages
20 and 21 of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4,
21.)
ï‚· "Only Rudy, Helen or human resources can give out any information on
current or former employee compensation," as stated in the second
paragraph of the Protecting Company Information rule, found on page 24
of Section 4 of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 24.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property" as stated at the fourth page of the
Discipline/Impermissible Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4
of the Employee Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at the fourth page of the Discipline/Impermissible
Conduct rule found on pages 34-37 of Section 4 of the Employee
Handbook. (Jt. Exh. 14 at Sect. 4, 37.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "us[ing] blogs, SNS, or personal Web sites
to disparage the company, its associates, customers, vendors, business
practices, patients, or other employees of the company," as stated at
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt.
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, C. at 000306.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "post[ing] pictures of . . . other employees
on a Web site without obtaining written permission," as stated at
paragraphs III(C) and III(F) of the Internet Social Networking and
Blogging Policy #105.04.01 of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt.
Exh. 15 at Policy #105.04.01, F. at 000307.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Conducting personal business on company
time or company property, as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and
II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01
of the Policies & Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01,
II.B.1.iii.i at 000315.)
 “Prohibiting employees from "Solicitation or distribution of literature for
any purpose during working hours without prior authorization from
management," as stated at paragraphs II(B)(1)(iii)(i) and II(B)(1)(iii)(j) of
the Discipline and Corrective Action Policy #106.03.01 of the Policies &
Procedures manual. (Jt. Exh. 15 at Policy #106.03.01, II.B.1.iii.j at
000315; Tr. 199-200.)
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL rescind the employee handbook and manual rules set forth above, and either WE
WILL (1) furnish all current employees with inserts for our employee handbook and manual that
(a) advise that the overly-broad provisions or requirements have been rescinded, or (b) provide
language of the lawful provisions or requirements; or (2) publish and distribute revised employee
handbooks and manuals that (a) do not contain the overly-broad provisions or restrictions, or (b)
provide language of the lawful provisions or restrictions.
MEDIC AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
901 Market St., Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
415-356-5130
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-193784 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 602-640-2146.