McGraw-Edison Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 18, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 462 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Speed Queen , a Division of McGraw-Edison Co. and
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO. Case
26-CA-3920
February 18, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
Upon a charge filed on February 12, 1971, by United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union, and duly served on Speed Queen, a division of
McGraw-Edison Co., herein called the Respondent,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board, by the Regional Director for Region 26, issued
a complaint on September 3, 1971, against Respondent,
alleging that Respondent had engaged in and was en-
gaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice
of hearing before a Trial Examiner were duly served on
the parties to this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed its answer to the complaint admitting in part, and
denying in part, the allegations in the complaint.
On October 4, 1971, counsel for the General Counsel
filed directly with the Board a Motion for Summary
Judgment. On October 12, 1971, the Respondent filed
Respondent's Opposition to General Counsel's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Subsequently, on October 13,
1971, the Board issued an order transferring the pro-
ceeding to the Board and a Notice To Show Cause why
the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment
should not be granted. Respondent thereafter filed a
response to Notice To Show Cause.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
On the basis of the entire record, the Board makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is a corporation with an office and plant
in Searcy, Arkansas, where it is engaged in the manu-
facture of washers and dryers. During the past 12
months the Respondent received at its Searcy, Arkan-
sas, location goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Ar-
kansas. During the same period Respondent sold and
shipped from its Searcy, Arkansas, plant goods and
195 NLRB No. 84
materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points
located outside the State of Arkansas.
We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Respond-
ent is, and has been at all times material herein, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectu-
ate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In a prior unfair labor practice proceeding involving
the parties to this proceeding,' the Trial Examiner
found that Respondent had engaged in certain unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act and recommended that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to remedy the violations. Soon after, Re-
spondent received notification of the Trial Examiner's
findings and recommendations, but before the Board
issued its Decision and Order adopting the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision, Respondent posted the notice which
is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The complaint herein alleges, in material part, that
on or about January 20, 1971, Respondent posted a
notice on its bulletin board in the lunchroom of its
Searcy, Arkansas, plant which read as follows:
Notice to All Employees
The Company has recently received notification
from the N.L.R.B. Trial Examiner that he has
recommended to the labor Board in Washington,
D. C. that in his opinion the Company committed
unfair labor practices when it discharged former
employee Billy Nixon for his repeated failure to
wear safety glasses while on the job and in showing
the employees a movie about an actual union
strike at another plant, among other things.
The Trial Examiner's decision comes as no sur-
prise to the Company. It is well known that the
Labor Board and its Trial Examiners are pro-
union and one-sided. This is why Unions always
file a bunch of unfair labor charges with the Labor
Board when they are trying to organize the em-
ployees in a plant. They use this as a "smoke-
screen" to get your attention off the real issue-
which is-that only the Company can make
changes in its employees' wages, benefits, and
working conditions and, Unions cannot force
' Speed Queen, a Division ofMcGraw-Edison Co., 192 NLRB No. 142.
SPEED QUEEN 463
companies to do things which are not in the best
interest of the Company or its employees. Their
only weapon is to try to drive a wedge between the
Company and its employees , to set employee
against employee through the filing of false
charges and then try to take advantage of the bad
feelings they have produced.
We don't have to let this happen at Speed
Queen . Don't let anyone do your thinking for you
or mislead you into thinking that a Union can
prevent any company from disciplinging an em-
ployee who breaks plant rules.
In the meantime , you may be assured that the
Company intends to appeal the Trial Examiner's
opinion eventually to a federal appeals court, if
necessary , in order to get a fair ruling on the Billy
Nixon case . We will continue to keep you in-
formed as to the facts of the matter.
ROLAND
SPRINGSTROH,
PLANT MANAGER
It is the position of the General Counsel that the
posting of this notice, without more, amounted to an
unlawful threat of discipline or discharge in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent contends that
its notice to employees was protected free speech under
the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and Section 8(c) of the Act. We find merit in this con-
tention. While the notice is derogatory of the Board, it
contains no threat and is not, in and of itself violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' The allegations of the
complaint that the posting of this notice was unlawful
then cannot be sustained. We therefore deny the Gen-
eral Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment inas-
much as the complaint on its face does not allege con-
duct unlawful under the Act, and we shall, dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
The Brearley Company, 163 NLRB 637, 638, fn 1, relied on by the
General Counsel, is not in point . There, the Board did not find that a letter
which the respondent circulated to its employees informing them of a Trial
Examiner 's adverse decision was, per se, unlawful . There, the Board deter-
mined only that, in a context of unfair labor practices found therein, the
remedy should include provisions neutralizing the effects of the respond-
ent's letter