Maytronics Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2022

2021001304 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/702,773 09/13/2017 Sharon Goldenberg 8949-US1 8392 69054 7590 01/31/2022 RECHES PATENTS HaArba''a Towers North Tower TEL AVIV, 6473925 ISRAEL EXAMINER NGUYEN, THUY-VI THI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3664 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/31/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OREN@I-P.CO.IL eofficeaction@appcoll.com patents@geraghtyipservices.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SHARON GOLDENBERG, YAIR HADARI, OFER REGEV, and SHAY WITELSON ____________ Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,7731 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-7, 9-11, 20, 22, 36, 37, 55, 109-121. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm in part (37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)). 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies “Maytronics Ltd.” as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 2 THE INVENTION Appellant states that its invention relates to “[s]ets of pool cleaning robots, one or more pool cleaning robots of a set, methods for programming one or more pool cleaning robots and methods for cleaning a pool.” Spec. ¶ 10. Claim 1 reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A set of pool cleaning robots for cleaning a pool, wherein the set comprises pool cleaning robots that are configured to perform allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots; Appeal Br. (Claims Appendix). THE REJECTION The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Erlich US 2012/0285486 Al Nov. 15, 2012 van der Meijden US 2014/0303810 Al Oct. 9, 2014 Torem US 2018/0044936 Al Feb. 15, 2018 The following rejections are before us for review. Claims 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 20, 22, 36, 37, 55, 109-111, 113-117, 120, and 121 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Torem. Claims 10, 11, 118, and 119 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Torem and Erlich. Claims 3 and 112 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Torem and van der Meijden. FINDINGS OF FACT Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 3 1. Figure 3 of Torem shows cleaner robot movement. Figure 3 above shows cleaner robot movement. 2. Torem discloses, “FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a pool cleaning system in which multiple robotic pool cleaners operate concurrently in a pool, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.” ¶ 93. 3. Torem discloses: robotic pool cleaner 10a and robotic pool cleaner 10b may each be configured to operate in separate regions of pool 34. The regions may each be delimited by one or more region boundaries 78. (Although Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 4 region boundary 78 is represented by a straight line, region boundary 78 may have a more complex closed or open shape. ¶ 106. 4. Torem discloses, “each of the plurality of robotic pool cleaners may be configured to operate in a limited portion of the pool.” ¶ 39. 5. Torem discloses, “The [power cable] length may be selected to be sufficient to enable the robotic pool cleaner to reach all parts of the pool that the robotic pool cleaner is expected to clean (e.g., all interior surfaces of a small pool, or a part of a large pool).” ¶44. 6. Torem discloses: Pool cleaner control method 100 may be executed when robotic pool cleaner 10 is traveling on an interior surface (e.g., wall 44, floor, or other surface) of a pool 34 (block 110). For example, robotic pool cleaner 10 may be traveling upward or downward along a substantially vertical wall 44. The motion may include a component in a horizontal direction (e.g., to enable robotic pool cleaner 10 to apply suction to all surfaces of pool 34). ¶120. 7. Torem discloses “[a] controller of the robotic pool cleaner may control locomotion of the robotic pool cleaner so as to avoid interference with the operation of other robotic pool cleaners.” ¶46. 8. Torem discloses: Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 5 When one or more sensors indicate that robotic pool cleaner 10a and robotic pool cleaner 10b are approaching one another, controller 50 of each robotic pool cleaner 10 may be configured to alter the direction of motion of that robotic pool cleaner 10. For example, the direction of motion of robotic pool cleaner 10a may be altered to the direction indicated by modified motion arrow 76a (in the example shown, a 90° turn to the right, other turning directions and angles may be used). Similarly, the direction of motion of robotic pool cleaner 10b may be altered to the direction indicated by modified motion arrow 76b. ¶ 99. 9. Erlich discloses, In another embodiment of the invention, a method is provided to minimize or prevent a self-propelled robotic pool cleaner, which includes at least one pair of power-driven rotational support members (e.g., brushes, wheels and/or rollers) for propelling and cleaning along a surface of a pool or tank, from slipping on start-up or while commencing a turn along a surface of a pool or tank. ¶ 48. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) REJECTION Concerning independent claims 1 and 55, Appellant argues, “Torem merely suggests positioning the PCRs [pool cleaning robots] at different locations and avoiding each other - but this does not amount to [the claimed recitation of] set comprises pool cleaning robots that are configured to perform allocating, in a Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 6 distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots.” (Appeal Br. 6). We disagree with Appellant because the ordinary and customary meaning of “allocating” is, “to apportion for a specific purpose.”2 Torem discloses “each of the plurality of robotic pool cleaners may be configured to operate in a limited portion of the pool,” and the robotic pool cleaners “may each be configured to operate in separate regions of the pool.” (FF. 3, 4). We thus find that these disclosures meet the claimed, “allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots” because each robotic pool cleaner is apportioned or allocated to operate in a limited/separate or different portions of the pool. We also read Torem’s, “to operate in a limited portion of the pool” and similarly, “to operate in separate portions of the pool,” to meet the claimed, “operating in a distributed manner,” because operating in each limited/separate portion of the pool distributes the cleaning load between plural robots. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Claims 4 and 113 Representative claim 4 recites in pertinent part, “the pool cleaning robots are configured to trigger the allocating as a result of a completion of tasks.” The Examiner found Torem discloses this feature at paragraphs 114, 126, 2 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/allocate Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 7 and 128. (Final Act. 4). Appellant argues, “[t]he proximity based change of direction (interpreted, by error, in the [Final Office Action] and in relation to claim 1, as teaching of allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots) is made regardless of a result of a completion of tasks -thus - claim 4 should be allowed.” (Appeal Br. 7). We disagree with Appellant because claims 1 and 113 do not define “completion of tasks” and the phrase has a broad meaning. As such, we find that one of the tasks in Torem to be completed by the pool cleaning robots is “to avoid interference with the operation of other robotic pool cleaners” (FF. 7), which as shown in Figure 3 (FF. 1), is accomplished by the avoidance program used by each robot. (FF. 8)). Claims 6 and 115 Representative claim 6 recites in pertinent part “the pool cleaning robots are configured to perform the allocating based on a state of at least one cleaning robot of the set.” The Examiner found that Torem discloses this feature at paragraphs 47, 48. (Final Act. 5). Appellant asserts: The paragraphs cited by the office (¶ 47 and 48) teach of sensors and a transmission of sensor information between PCRs. Nevertheless-the proximity based change of direction (interpreted, by error, in the [Final Office Action] and in relation to claim 1, as teaching of allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 8 tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots) is made regardless a state of the PCR. (Appeal Br. 7). We disagree with Appellant. We find it inherent that as between the two remote pool cleaners 10(a) and 10(b), the allocation of their respective areas of operation is affected by the state of the other robot. That is, surface allocation is affected by the state of the other robot because the avoidance mechanism in each device limits interaction and hence the surface allocation of the turning robot. (FF. 8). According to Torem, based on the state or the presence of cleaning robot (a) at one point on the pool surface, an approaching cleaning robot (b) will alter direction and hence allocate a different part of its cleaning area to avoid interference with the operation of the other robotic pool cleaner. “It is well settled that a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limitations not expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it. [...] ‘Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.’” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349, (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Claims 7 and 116 Representative claim 7 recites in pertinent part, “the pool cleaning robots are configured to perform the allocating based on a fullness of a battery of at least one pool cleaning robot of the set.” The Examiner found Torem discloses this feature at least at paragraphs 0003, 0044, 0079, 0084. (Final Act. 5). Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 9 Appellants argue, Torem fails to teach or suggest measuring the fullness of a batte1y of at least one pool cleaning robot of the set[.] Furthermore - the proximity based change of direction (interpreted, by error, in the [Final Office Action] and in relation to claim 1, as teaching of allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots) is made regardless of the fullness of battery of the PCR. (Appeal Br. 7) We disagree with Appellant. We find it inherent that the self-contained power supply in the form of a storage battery disclosed by Torem at paragraph 44 would inevitably deplete thereby making the state of that robot inoperable. For the same reasons as stated above with respect to the limitations of claim 6, allocation would be affected by the inoperable state of one robot in that the working robot would allocate its area differently if it was not trying to avoid the other robot. See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d at 1349. Claims 9 and 117 Representative claim 9 recites in pertinent part, “the pool cleaning robots are configured to perform the allocating based on a state of the filtering elements of the pool cleaning robots.” The Examiner found Torem discloses this feature at least at paragraphs 0040, 0043, 0052, 0083 (Final Act. 5). Appellant asserts, “[t]he proximity based change of direction (interpreted, by error, in the [Final Office Action] and in relation to claim 1, as teaching of Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 10 allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots) is made regardless of the state of the filtering elements.” Appeal Br. 8. We find it inherent that the filters used in each robotic pool cleaner disclosed by Torem, for example in paragraph 43, would inevitably clog and therefore make the state of that robot inoperable. For the same reasons as stated above with respect to the limitations of claim 6, allocation would be affected by the inoperable state of one robot in that the working robot would allocate its area differently if it was not trying to avoid the other robot. See In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d at 1349. Claim 36 Representative claim 36 recites in pertinent part, “wherein the first pool cleaning robot is configured to change a communication parameter related to communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot when the first pool cleaning robot reaches a demarcation between regions allocated to the first and second pool cleaning robots.” The Examiner found Torem discloses this feature at least at paragraphs 0068-0070; 0081 (Final Act. 5-6). Appellant argues, Torem teaches of allocating different communication parameters to different PCRs to allow them to operate in the same pool (¶ 68), that one PCR can be a master PCR (¶ 69), that a slave PCR can not transmit (¶ 70), and that a PCR may change its movement when reaching a beacon (¶ 81) - but fails to teach or suggest the first pool cleaning robot is configured to change a communication parameter related to Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 11 communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot when the first pool cleaning robot reaches a demarcation between regions allocated to the first and second pool cleaning robots - and claim 36 should be allowed. (Appeal Br. 8). We agree with Appellant. Torem at best discloses “[s]electing different parameters may ensure that signals that are transmitted by a transceiver of a robotic pool cleaner are distinguishable from signals that are transmitted by the other robotic pool cleaners,” ¶ 68, but this falls short of disclosing the claimed change a communication parameter related to communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot when the first pool cleaning robot reaches a demarcation between regions. Distinguishing between robots is not distinguishing between regions. Claim 37 Representative claim 37 recites in pertinent part, “the first pool cleaning robot is configured to determine a communication parameter related to communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot based on a distance between the first pool cleaning robot and the second pool cleaning robot.” The Examiner found Torem discloses this feature at paragraphs 0068-0070; 0074-0076; 0081. (Final Act. 6). Appellant argues, Torem teaches of allocating different communication parameters to different PCRs to allow them to operate in the same pool (¶ 68), that one PCR can be a master PCR (¶ 69), that a slave PCR can not transmit (¶ 70), that an external controller may determine the position of a PCR Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 12 74), that a position of a PCR may be shared with other PCRs (¶ 75), that a PCR may transmit using an antenna position information (¶ 76), and that that a PCR may change its movement when reaching a beacon ¶ 81)[.] Nevertheless - Torem fails to teach or suggest the first pool cleaning robot is configured to determine a communication parameter related to communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot based on a distance between the first pool cleaning robot and the second pool cleaning robot. (Appeal Br. 8-9). We agree with Appellant. Torem at best in paragraph 69 discloses “[t]he master pool cleaner may be configured to transmit a synchronization signal to other robotic pool cleaners that are operating in the same pool as slave pool cleaners,” which does not equate to the first pool cleaning robot is configured to determine a communication parameter related to communication attempts with the second pool cleaning robot based on a distance between the first pool cleaning robot and the second pool cleaning robot. Same pool synchronization signaling is not a parameter based on communication attempts. We also affirm the rejections of dependent claims 2, 5, 20, 22, 109, 110, 111, 114, 120, and 121 because Appellant has not challenged such with any reasonable specificity (see In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION Claims 3 and 112 Representative claim 3 recites in pertinent part “the pool cleaning robots are configured to trigger the allocating as a result of a failure.” Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 13 The Examiner rejected these claims over Torem in view of van der Meijden. In so doing the Examiner found: VAN DER MEIJDEN suggest such limitation in at least paras {0011 and 0023}. It would have been obvious to an ordinary skill in tile art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teaching of VAN DER MEIJDEN into the system of TOREM in order to trigger the allocating when there is a failure in order to control the robot cleaners properly. (Final Act. 7). We disagree with Appellant. We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known to modify the cleaning robots of Torem to include a failure signal of van der Meijden (¶ 11) which we find by inference would trigger an allocation different from if the robot had not failed as discussed above in our analysis of claim 6. (FF. 1, 7, 8). (See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). (In making the obviousness determination one “can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”) Claims 11 and 119 Representative claim 11 recites allocating based on a slipperiness state of the pool surfaces. The Examiner found that ERLICH suggest such limitation in at least pars. {0048, 0099, 0107, 0134}. It would have been obvious to [a person of] ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to incorporate the teaching of Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 14 ERLICH into the system of TOREM in order to control the pool cleaner robots affectively on the slipping and drifting pool surface. (Final Act. 6-7). Appellant argues, Erlich teaches of reducing a slipping of a pool cleaning robot by (a) controlling a rotational speed of rotational support members ¶ 48), (b) increasing the rotation of a brush (¶99), controlling rotational rates and duration of rotation to (¶107) and control rotation of the brushes ¶ 134). The proximity based change of direction (interpreted, by error, in the [Final Office Action] and in relation to claim 1, as teaching of allocating, in a distributed manner, cleaning tasks for cleaning different regions of the pool between the pool cleaning robots) is made regardless of slipping and drifting of the pool cleaning robot planned cleaning trajectories. (Appeal Br. 10). We disagree with Appellant. We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known to use the non-slip robot of Erlich (FF. 9) in the slippery area of Torem thereby allocating a device which is capable of moving across slippery surfaces without slipping. “[The] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. Claims 10 and 118 As a procedural matter, we reverse the rejection of claims 10 and 118 under § 103. A rejection of a claim, which is so indefinite that “considerable speculation as to meaning of the terms employed and assumptions as to the scope of such Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 15 claims” is needed, is likely imprudent. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (holding that the examiner and the board were wrong in relying on what at best were speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.) We find it imprudent to speculate as to the scope of claims 10 and 118 in order to reach a decision on the obviousness of the claimed subject matter under § 103. It should be understood, however, that our reversal is based on the indefiniteness of the claimed subject matter and does not reflect on the merits of the underlying rejection. We enter a New Ground of Rejection of Claims 10 and 118 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) Claims 10 and 118 recite that “allocating is based on slipping and drifting of the pool cleaning robot planned cleaning trajectories.” But, the “planned cleaning trajectories” would not include the slipping and drifting because these are undesirable attributes of robot movement. Thus, these claims are indefinite. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 20, 22, 36, 37, 55, 109-111, 113-117, 120, and 121 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 36 and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 3, 11, 112, 119 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 16 We conclude that claims 10 and 118 are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as a new ground of rejection, therefore we reverse, pro forma, the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 20, 22, 36, 37, 55, 109-111, 113-117, 120, 121 102 Torem 1, 2, 4-7, 9, 20, 22, 55, 109-111, 113-117, 120, 121 36, 37 10, 11, 118, 119 103 Torem, Erlich 11, 119 10, 118 3, 112 103 Torem, van der Meijden 3, 112 10, 118 112 Indefiniteness 10, 118 Overall Outcome 1, 2-7, 9, 11, 20, 22, 55, 109-117, 119-121 10, 118 36, 37 10, 118 DECISION AFFIRMED IN PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides Appeal 2021-001304 Application 15/702,773 17 “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 CFR § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: • (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner . . . . • (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record . . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).