Martin Electronics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 8, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 66 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Martin Electronics , Inc. and Laborers 1101,
Laborers International Union , AFL-CIO.. Case
12-CA-4472
June 8, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS
On October 30, 1969, Trial Examiner Robert L.
Piper issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in certain unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Martin Electronics,
Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
' We find no merit in Respondent's contention that each employee who
signed an authorization card must appear in person at the hearing and
authenticate his own card See Don the Beachcomber, 168 NLRB 275, fn 2
In addition , we find no record evidence to support Respondent's claims in
its brief that at 9 30 a in those unreplaced employees were offered work or
that the employees , either at 9 30 a in or when they again returned at
11 30 a in , to any way placed conditions upon their requests for reinstate-
ment
4 While we agree with and adopt the Trial Examiner's recommendation
that Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Charging Party, we do not
rely or pass on the Trial Examiner's conclusion that even if Respondent
had not committed any unfair labor practices, independent of its refusal to
bargain, Respondent violated Sec 8 ( a)(5) of the Act when it refused to
bargain with the Union
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT L. PIPER , Trial Examiner: This proceed-
ing, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Tal-
lahasee, Florida, from July 8 through 11, 1969,1
pursuant to due notice. The complaint, which was
issued on May 14, on a charge filed March 11, al-
leged in substance as amended that Respondent en-
gaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by (1) various
specified acts of interference, restraint, and coer-
cion; (2) discriminatorily discharging 50 named
striking employees and discriminatorily refusing to
reinstate said employees after their unconditional
application for reinstatement; and (3) refusing to
bargain with Laborers 1101, Laborers International
Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter called the union), on
and after March 3. Respondent's answer denied the
alleged unfair labor practices. None of the parties
filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent is a Delaware corporation engaged
in the manufacture and sale of grenade fuses with
its principal office and place of business located in
Perry, Florida. During the past year it sold and
shipped products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside the State of Florida and
held contracts with the United States Department
of Defense for providing grenade fuses valued in
excess of $500,000. Respondent admits, and I find,
that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
This proceeding involves an alleged refusal to
bargain with the Union after its request based on
the possession of signed authorization cards from a
majority of the employees in the appropriate unit,
subsequent alleged interference, restraint, and
coercion of employees, alleged discriminatory
discharge of striking employees, and alleged dis-
criminatory refusal to reinstate such employees
after their unconditional application therefor.
' All dates hereinafter refer to 1969 unless otherwise indicated
183 NLRB No. 4
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 67
The issues as framed by the pleadings are: (1)
refusal to bargain on and after March 3 with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative
designated by a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit ; ( 2) after the request to bargain,
interference , restraint , and coercion by (a) uni-
laterally instituting an increased production quota
and threatening employees with discharge if such
quota was not met, (b) contrary to past practice
forbidding employees to talk, eat candy, or chew
gum while working , ( c) threatening never to let the
Union in the plant and to close or move the plant if
the union movement was successful , ( d) advising
employees that Respondent would not permit the
plant to go union and threatening to close the plant,
(e) requiring employees to pick up handfuls of ex-
plosive detonators at one time and work faster in
this dangerous manner , ( f) advising employees that
there was no union and warning them that there
was not going to be any union in the plant , and (g)
interrogating employees concerning their union ac-
tivities and warning them that Respondent was not
going to take such activities sitting down ; ( 3) dis-
criminatorily discharging 50 named employees for
striking ; ( 4) discriminatorily refusing to reinstate
51 named striking employees after their uncondi-
tional application for reinstatement ; and (5)
whether the strike was caused by and/or prolonged
by the aforesaid unfair labor practices.
B. Chronology of Events
Respondent commenced production of its fuses
for hand grenades for the Defense Department in
October 1968 . Most of its production employees
were women . Because the fuse detonator contained
an explosive, there was an element of danger in the
production work and safety precautions had to be
taken . In the latter part of February , because of
dissatisfaction with working conditions , primarily
safety , some of the employees contacted a
representative of the Union with a view to organiz-
ing the employees and joining the Union. As a
result Herbert Hendry, a business representative of
the Union , scheduled a meeting of all interested
employees on Saturday evening , March 1, at a
restaurant in Perry , Florida. Hendry explained the
purposes and desirability of union organization,
what benefits could be sought , that if more than 30
percent of Respondent 's production and main-
tenance employees signed authorization cards the
Union could petition for an election , and that if
more than 50 percent of the employees signed
cards the Union could request recognition and bar-
gaining of Respondent . The meeting was attended
by 34 employees all of whom signed cards authoriz-
ing the Union to represent them for the purposes of
collective bargaining . A number of the employees
took additional blank cards to seek additional
signers.
From March 1 to and including March 3, an ad-
ditional 16 employees in the hereinafter found ap-
propriate unit signed authorization cards. The
record establishes that as of March 3, the Union
had secured 50 signed cards . On March 3 the
Union sent Respondent a telegram advising it that a
majority of its production and maintenance em-
ployees had designated the Union as their bargain-
ing representative , requesting recognition and a
meeting to commence contract negotiations, and
offering to present proof of majority status at such
meeting to any mutually agreeable impartial party.
Respondent received this telegram March 4, at
which time the Union had secured 58 signed
authorization cards . Between then and March 10
the Union received an additional 5 signed cards for
a total of 63. Respondent did not reply to or
acknowledge the Union 's telegram until March 17.
On the morning of March 6 , Jess H. Meadows,
Respondent's plant manager , assembled and ad-
dressed all of the employees , approximately 65, in
Respondent 's assembly department . Louise Pitt-
man, Respondent 's only supervisor below the
management level, was present . Meadows informed
the employees that Respondent had contractual
committments with the Defense Department, that
they would have to increase their production of
fuses to approximately 35,000 a day, that they had
done it in the past and could do it again, that he
was rough and could get rougher , that if they did
not meet such production quotas he would replace
all of them with a crew that could, and that they
had 1 day within which to so increase their produc-
tion . He also informed the employees that , contrary
to past practice, they would have to stop talking,
chewing gum, and eating candy while working. The
record establishes that the average daily production
of fuses prior to March 6 was between 17,000 and
20,000, that the highest number previously
produced in a single day was 21,400 , and that the
employees had never approached a figure of
35,000. Production increased that day to 20,125
and the following day to 21,275. The foregoing
findings are based upon the composite testimony of
numerous employees present at the meeting, whom
I credit.
Pittman 's version of Meadows ' speech was
similar, except that she could not recall his saying
anything about what would happen if the em-
ployees failed to meet such increased production
quotas , could not recall any specific figures, and
could not recall his mentioning talking , chewing
gum, or eating candy . Meadows admitted telling the
employees that they would have to produce at the
rate of 35,000 fuses a day in order to meet Re-
spondent 's contractual committments , that they had
produced at that rate in the past, per operator, and
that if they did not do so he would get another crew
that would. Meadows admitted that production had
never approached 35,000 fuses a day, but con-
tended that he was referring to an individual
production rate achieved by some of the best
operators which, if multiplied by and applied to all
of the operators, would total 35,000 fuses a day.
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 6
68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Meadows admitted threatening the employees with
discharge if they did not achieve such increased
production . Meadows denied saying anything about
how much time the employees would have to meet
such production quotas or making any reference to
talking , chewing gum , or eating candy while work-
ing. To the extent that his testimony was incon-
sistent with the above findings , I do not credit
Meadows.
During the workweek of March 3 to 7 , Pittman
asked Mavis Weekly, an employee , if she had
signed one of the Union 's authorization cards.
When Weekly replied that she had , Pittman said
that she did not know what to do about the Union
and that DiRubio ( Respondent 's vice president)
was not going to "take this thing sitting down."
Pittman did not specifically deny such interrogation
and threat , instead testifying that she could not re-
call such a conversation . I credit Weekly.
On Sunday evening , March 9, the employees held
a union meeting at a cafeteria in Perry presided
over by Earl Niccum , business manager of the
Union , a Mr. Collins , the Union 's International
representative for the State of Florida, Frank
Hamilton, the Union's attorney, and Hendry. Fifty
employees who had signed authorization cards at-
tended the meeting . The employees were informed
that Respondent had not replied to the Union's
telegram of March 3 requesting recognition and
bargaining , and discussed what steps should be
taken . It was unanimously agreed that the em-
ployees would assemble the following morning be-
fore 8 a . m., their work starting time , accompanied
by Niccum and Collins, in front of the building
where they punched the timeclock , request
Respondent to recognize and bargain with the
Union as their representative, and refuse to work,
or strike , until 8 : 30 a.m . unless Respondent agreed
to recognize the Union as their representative. The
employees elected Doris Stephens as their em-
ployee spokesman . The following morning, Mon-
day, March 10, as agreed, at approximately 7:45
a.m. the 50 employees named in Appendix A at-
tached hereto , substantially the same as those who
attended the meeting the previous evening, met
Niccum and Collins at the plant and assembled in
front of the building which housed the offices and
the timeclock.
Meadows arrived at the plant about 7 : 55 a.m.
Niccum approached him, attempted to introduce
himself and Collins. and informed Meadows that
Niccum was the Union' s business manager . There-
upon Meadows advised Niccum and Collins that
they were on private property and ordered them to
get off, which they did, proceeding to the road out-
side the plant. Meadows then went to the porch in
front of the office building. Stephens, the employee
spokesman , informed Meadows that the employees
wanted Respondent to recognize their Union and
that they were going to strike and not clock in until
8:30 a . m. unless Respondent agreed to do so.
Meadows replied , " no," informed the employees
that work started at 8 a.m., that everybody who was
not punched in by then would be penalized , and en-
tered the building . At 7:58 a.m., the customary
warning buzzer alerting the employees to the im-
minence of 8 a.m. sounded . Meadows came out and
again informed the employees that they should
punch in or they would be penalized . Stephens
again informed Meadows that the employees would
not go to work until 8:30 a.m . unless Respondent
recognized the Union . When the 8 a.m. starting bell
rang Meadows returned and informed the em-
ployees that if they were not going to go to work
then , they were on private property and to get off.
When there was no immediate reaction, he in-
structed William Bolton , Respondent 's purchasing
agent , to call the sheriff . The employees thereupon
left the property and joined Niccum and Collins in
the road . Meadows followed them there and or-
dered them to remove their cars because they were
blocking Respondent's access road. They all drove
to downtown Perry and met at the cafeteria where
they had met the previous evening . All of the strik-
ing employees signed a register at that meeting.
After conferring they decided to return to the plant
and unconditionally offer to return to work. The
same group of employees, without Niccum and Col-
lins, returned at 9:30 a . m. Respondent regularly
had applicants for employment in its office Monday
mornings and between 8 a.m. and 9 : 30 a.m. hired
five employees.
Meadows again met them in front of the office
building . Stephens informed him that they had
returned and were ready to go to work. She also
told him that the reason they had refused to work
and struck at 8 a . m. was to let him know that the
Union in fact represented the employees . Meadows
replied that they no longer had jobs and that they
were all fired and to get off the property, at the
same time making a brush off gesture with his arm.
All the employees got in their cars and returned to
the meeting place at the cafeteria . About 10 a.m.
Hamilton called Meadows to request that the em-
ployees be returned to work. According to
Meadows, he replied that he had replaced some of
them , but to send them back to the plant and he
would talk to them . Hamilton advised the em-
ployees to return to the plant , informing them that
those who had not been replaced would be
returned to work.
The same group of employees returned to the
plant at 11 : 30 a.m., this time entering the office
building where the timeclock was located, where-
upon they discovered that their timecards had been
removed from the rack. They again informed
Meadows that they were ready to go to work.
Meadows replied that they no longer had jobs and
were through, that he had already replaced 50 per-
cent of them and did not need the others, that they
should advise Respondent's office if their telephone
numbers had been changed , and not to call him, he
would call them. The entire group again left.
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 69
In addition to the 5 new employees hired
between 8 and 9 : 30 a.m ., Respondent hired 12
more employees March 10, or a total of 17. The
record establishes that on March 10 the 50 em-
ployees named in Appendix A participated in the
strike at 8 a . m., were fired by Respondent at 9:30
a.m., and were refused reinstatement by Respond-
ent at 11 : 30 a.m . Contrary to Meadows ' statement
at 11:30 a.m. to the employees when rejecting their
offer to return to work that he had replaced 50 per-
cent of them and did not need the others, record
stipulations and Joint Exhibit 1 offered by both
parties establish that Respondent hired 17 new em-
ployees on March 10, not 50 percent, and
thereafter employed 33 additional employees to
and including March 24 , for a total of 50, substan-
tially the .same number as the total of striking em-
ployees.
The foregoing findings are based on the com-
posite testimony of numerous employees, whom I
credit . The conversation between Meadows and
Niccum shortly before 8 a . m. on March 10 was sub-
stantially undisputed . Much the same was true with
respect to the conversation between Stephens and
Meadows immediately before 8 a . m. Meadows ad-
mitted that he recognized the group were his em-
ployees, that there were approximately 50 present,
and that he understood from Stephens that they
were requesting recognition of their Union and
refusing to work until 8:30 a . m. unless Respondent
would recognize the Union . He admitted telling
them to clock in and that if they wouldn't do so to
get off the property . He conceded that it was clear
to him that the employees were trying to demon-
strate the strength they had because of wanting
Respondent to recognize the Union , and that it was
entirely possible that they had so stated to him.
While he did not concede telling the employees
that they would be penalized, the balance of his
testimony makes clear that Meadows believed that
the employees had lost their right to employment
by refusing to start working at 8 a.m.
With respect to the conversation at 9:30 a.m.
when the employees returned to work and
Meadows told them they were all fired and to get
off the property , there was some variance in
Meadows' testimony , but he conceded that the em-
ployees informed him they wanted to return to
work and that he told them they were no longer
employed by Respondent . The 11:30 a . m. conver-
sation between the employees and Meadows when
they again returned and unconditionally requested
reinstatement is substantially undisputed . Contrary
to what Meadows then told the employees and con-
trary to what he had told Hamilton , Meadows had
not replaced over 50 percent of the striking em-
ployees, having hired only 17 employees, had not
filled his total employment requirements and did
need additional employees , as demonstrated by
Respondent 's continuing to hire employees until 50
of the strikers had been replaced.
About 10:30 p.m. on March 11, Hendry and two
of Respondent 's employees , Ann Tomlinson and
Layfern Ratliff , entered Bill's Lounge , a local bar,
for some refreshments . Vincent DiRubio , Respond-
ent's vice president , and Bolton were already in
the bar , having arrived around 6 p . m. Hendry,
Tomlinson , and Ratliff occupied one of the booths
and Bolton , who was acquainted with all of them,
joined them . Both men bought several rounds of
drinks. The conversation ultimately turned to the
Union , the strike , and the employees ' termination
the prior day. Bolton asked the girls why they had
not come to him with their complaints and
grievances since he was a friend , had legal training,
and could have given them better advice than the
Union . Bolton insisted that the employees had quit
their jobs and the girls insisted that they had not.
Bolton then said it didn 't really make any dif-
ference because DiRubio was going to close the
plant anyway and write it off as a tax loss, because
he did not need the employees and had plenty of
money . Bolton also asked the employees why they
wanted the Union and why they had started such
activities in Perry because it had happened before
and they could not win . The conversation ap-
parently was not acrimonious but remained on a
friendly plane . Bolton admitted telling the girls that
because he was a friend and had had legal training
he was disappointed in them for not seeking his ad-
vice with respect to their complaints and problems
rather than going to the Union . Bolton denied mak-
ing any reference to DiRubio closing the plant
because of the union activities or writing it off as a
tax loss. I credit Tomlinson and Ratliff . As will be
noted hereinafter , there was substantial discrepan-
cies in Bolton 's and DiRubio 's testimony concern-
ing the incidents of that evening.
Hendry left the group about 11 p.m. The two
girls and Bolton remained in the booth . Shortly be-
fore midnight , closing time , DiRubio joined the
group in the booth . He was not present in the booth
during the prior conversation among Bolton,
Hendry, and the two girls . When the bar closed at
midnight , DiRubio suggested to Bolton and the two
girls that they continue the party at DiRubio's
home . Ratliff knew DiRubio quite well and had
been at two parties at his home previously . DiRubio
and Bolton drove to the former 's home and Tomlin-
son and Ratliff followed in Tomlinson's car. DiRu-
bio as host provided the drinks and like many good
parties this one wound up in the kitchen.
Bolton and Tomlinson left the party about 2 a.m.
Ratliff and DiRubio continued talking and drinking
until daylight . During the course of their conversa-
tion after the others left they discussed what had
happened at the plant. DiRubio told Ratliff that he
was sorry the Union had come in , that he had had
,no trouble in his other plants , that it would not hap-
pen again, and that before he would go union he
would shut the plant down. Patently DiRubio and
Ratliff were friendly because he lent her his car to
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
drive home, she being without transportation after
Tomlinson left.
DiRubio admitted meeting the girls in the bar, in-
viting them to his home to continue the party, the
fact that Tomlinson left earlier, and a conversation
with Ratliff until about daylight. However, DiRubio
denied discussing the Union or threatening to close
the plant. According to DiRubio their only discus-
sion concerning the plant dealt with safety factors,
primarily the type of explosive used by Respondent
in its detonators. I credit Ratliff. There are a
number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony of DiRubio and Bolton. Contrary to the
testimony of Ratliff, DiRubio claimed that prior to
that evening he did not know where she worked,
yet the record established that they were well
acquainted. According to Bolton, DiRubio never
joined the group in the booth at Bill 's Lounge, con-
trary to the testimony of all the others including
DiRubio. According to DiRubio, Bolton was not in
the group in the booth or present at the party at
DiRubio's home, contrary to the testimony of all
the others including Bolton.
On March 12 Annie Howell, an employee who
had not joined the strike on March 10 and had
worked March 10, 11, and 12, signed an authoriza-
tion card. On March 14 the striking employees
began picketing Respondent's plant. The picket
signs contained the names of Respondent and the
Union and the legend, "Unfair Labor Practices."
The picketing continued through March 28. On
March 14 Howell joined the strikers by refusing to
cross the picket line from then through March 28.
On March 17 Respondent for the first time
replied to the Union 's telegram of March 3
requesting recognition and bargaining by a letter
from Meadows stating, inter alia , that Respondent
had a "good faith" doubt that a majority of the em-
ployees had designated the Union to represent
them, suggesting an election, and asking which if
any of the striking employees desired to return to
work. On March 24 all of the striking employees ex-
cept Howell, Monroe, and Mosley sent registered
letters to Respondent unconditionally requesting
reinstatement and renewing their continuing appli-
cations for employment. On March 28 the Union
made another continuing unconditional application
for reinstatement by telegram on behalf of 52 em-
ployees set forth in an accompanying list. (One ad-
ditional employee was apparently included therein
by mistake. On March 31 Respondent recalled 19
of the striking employees, 3 more between April 2
and 6, and the balance of the 51 employees on
April 7. Joint Exhibit 1 lists the respective dates of
reinstatement.
Respondent recalled employee Mary L. Branch
April 1. On April 2 Pittman transferred Branch to
the job of putting detonators on fuses. She had
previously done this only a few times and was not
familiar with the task. Her regular job was putting
on washers and packing. Connie Sands, another
employee who had been working on the detonators,
continued working with Branch that day and was
picking the detonators up by the handful to place
them on the fuses. Pittman told the girls that they
would have to speed up their-work. Branch knew
that Pittman was referring to Branch because she
was placing the detonators on the fuses one at a
time. Branch knew that it was dangerous to pick up
more than one detonator at a time because of their
explosive nature. Pittman told Branch that if she
would take a handful at a time like Sands, Branch
could put them on the fuses faster, but that she
should not let the boss catch her doing it. Neverthe-
less Branch continued to place the detonators on
the fuses one at a time and warned Sands that it
was dangerous to pick them up by the handful.
Shortly thereafter Pittman transferred Branch back
to the job she had previously been performing.
Both DiRubio and Meadows conceded that it was
dangerous to pick up more than one detonator at a
time and that Respondent had instructed the em-
ployees not to do so. In fact, the employees were
required to perform this function with a plastic
safety screen between their hands and faces. Pitt-
man denied telling Branch to pick up more than
one detonator at a time, but admitted telling her to
work faster. I credit Branch.
Near the end of that day, Meadows summoned
Branch to his office. Meadows accused her of
spreading untrue rumors about the Union during
working hours, and told her that it was contrary to
Respondent's rules to talk about the Union during
working hours. Branch replied that she did not
know that there was such a rule. Meadows then
told her that the Union could not help the em-
ployees, that they were in a big mess, that they did
not have any union and that there was not going to
be a union. Branch admitted that the untrue rumor
which Meadows had referred to concerned the fact
that she had discussed the Union with Sands that
day, had extolled its advantages to her and had in-
formed her that those who joined the Union in 31
days would only have to pay $20 but those who
joined later would have to pay $100. Branch in-
formed Meadows of Pittman's instruction to her to
pick up a handful of detonators at a time in order
to speed up her work. Meadows replied that he did
not believe that Pittman had told her that but that
he would check with Pittman about it. Meadows
admitted summoning Branch to his office because
he had received a complaint from Sands through
Pittman about Branch trying to get Sands to sign an
authorization card. Meadows stated that Branch
conceded that she had talked to Sands about the
Union during working hours and that he had in-
formed her that this was contrary to the rules and
that Respondent did not allow solicitation during
working hours. Meadows denied that there was any
other discussion about the Union. I credit Branch.
Contrary to Pittman's testimony, Meadows ad-
mitted the discussion with Branch about Pittman in-
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC.
structing Branch to pick up a handful of detonators
at one time, and admitted that that was contrary to
Respondent's policy and that he said he would take
that matter up with Pittman. There is no evidence
in the record that he did so.
C. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
The complaint alleged that on or about March 6
Meadows, in retaliation for and to discourage union
activity, unilaterally instituted an increased produc-
tion quota, threatened employees with discharge if
such quota was not met, and instituted a new policy
forbidding employees to talk, eat candy, or chew
gum while working. As hereinabove found, on
March 6, 2 days after the receipt of the Union's
telegram requesting recognition and bargaining and
informing Respondent that a majority of its em-
ployees had selected the Union as their bargaining
representative, Meadows informed all of the em-
ployees in the assembly department that by the next
day they would have to produce 35,000 fuses a day,
substantially more than not only the prior average
production but than the maximum ever produced,
or he would discharge them and replace them with
another crew. During the same speech, Meadows
ordered the employees not to talk, eat candy, or
chew gum while working, contrary to Respondent's
prior practice and custom. Under all of the circum-
stances I am satisfied and find that Respondent, by
such statements, demands, orders, and threats, in-
terfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The complaint as amended at the hearing alleged
that during the week of March 3 Respondent by
Pittman interrogated an employee concerning her
union activities and stated that Respondent's vice
president was not going to "take this matter sitting
down." As hereinabove found during the workweek
from March 3 to 7, Pittman asked Mavis Weekly if
she had signed a union authorization card. When
Weekly replied affirmatively, Pittman stated that
she did not know what to do about the Union and
that DiRubio was not going to take this thing sitting
down. I conclude and find that by such interroga-
tion and threat, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The complaint alleged that on or about March
11, Respondent, by Bolton, threatened employees
that it would never let the Union in the plant and
that it would close or move the plant if the union
movement was successful. As hereinabove found
during the evening of March 11 at Bill's Lounge
Bolton asked two employees why they had not
come to him with their complaints and grievances
because he could have given them better advice
than the Union, asked them why they had started
such union activities because it had happened be-
fore in Perry and they could not win, and told them
that it made no difference in any event because if
the Union won Respondent would close the plant
71
and write it off as a tax loss. I am satisfied and find
that by such statements Respondent threatened its
employees that it would never let the Union in and
that Respondent would close the plant if the union
movement was successful, thereby interfering with,
restraining , and coercing its employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act.
The complaint alleged that on or about March
11, Respondent, by DiRubio, told an employee that
it would not let the plant go union and threatened
to close the plant. As hereinabove found in the
early morning hours of March 12, DiRubio at his
home told Ratliff that he was sorry the Union had
come in, that he had had no trouble in his other
plants, that it would not happen again , and that be-
fore he would go union he would shut the plant
down. I am satisfied and find that by such state-
ments and threats, Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The complaint alleged that on or about April 2,
Pittman required an employee to pick up handfuls
of explosive detonators at one time and work faster
in such dangerous manner because the employees
had engaged in union activities. As hereinabove
found, on April 2 Pittman told Branch that she
would have to work faster and that if whe would
pick up a handful of detonators at a time she could
put them on the fuses faster, but that she should not
let the boss catch her doing it. Branch, who knew
that it was dangerous to pick up more than one
detonator at a time because of their explosive na-
ture, continued to work in the same fashion and
later that day was transferred back to her regular
job by Pittman. While the record establishes that
Pittman did suggest to Branch that she work faster
by picking up a handful of detonators at a time, it is
clear that Pittman did not require Branch to do so
and that Pittman's suggestion was contrary to
Respondent's established policy and practice.
Moreover, there is no reliable, probative, or sub-
stantial evidence in the record that Pittman made
such suggestion because Branch or the employees
had engaged in union activities. Accordingly, I con-
clude and find that the General Counsel has failed
to sustain his burden of proof with respect to this
allegation.
The complaint alleged that on or about April 2,
Meadows told an employee that there was no union
and warned that there was not going to be any
union in the plant. As hereinabove found at the end
of that same workday Meadows summoned Branch
to his office and warned her about soliciting for the
Union during working hours, based upon a com-
plaint from Sands through Pittman. Branch ad-
mitted talking to Sands about the Union during
working hours and told Meadows that she was.
unaware of any company rule against such solicita-
tion. Branch also informed Meadows of Pittman's
request to pick up detonators a handful at a time,
which Meadows admitted was contrary to Re-
spondent's policy. During the course of the conver-
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sation Meadows told Branch that the Union could
not help the employees , that they were in a big
mess , that they did not have any union , and that
there was not going to be any union . I conclude and
find that by such statements and warning , Respond-
ent interfered with, restrained , and coerced its em-
ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. Discrimination in Hire or Tenure , Terms, or
Conditions of Employment
The complaint alleged that on or about March 10
Respondent by Meadows discharged all of the strik-
ing employees named therein and since then, after
their unconditional offers to return to work on
March 10 , 24, and 28 , respectively , failed and
refused to timely reinstate said employees , because
of their union or concerted activities and/or par-
ticipating in the strike commencing March 10. As
hereinabove found , shortly before 8 a.m. on March
10 the 50 employees named in Appendix A hereof
assembled in front of Respondent 's office building,
having agreed to strike or not work until 8:30 a.m.
unless Respondent would recognize the Union pur-
suant to its request of March 3 . The employees in-
formed Meadows that they were striking and would
not go to work until 8:30 a . m. unless Respondent
would recognize their Union . It was self-evident
and Meadows knew that a substantial majority of
his employees were present and requesting such
recognition . He ordered them to start working at 8
a.m., told them they would be penalized if they did
not and when they refused to do so ordered them to
leave the property . At 9:30 a. m. they all returned
and unconditionally offered to return to work.
Meadows thereupon fired all of them and again or-
dered them off the property. There can be no
question but that this discharge was for engaging in
a protected concerted activity, namely, striking,
and therefore constituted discrimination in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Thus it follows that the strike became an unfair
labor practice strike at 9:30 a. m. if it was not one
prior thereto . The record establishes that between 8
and 9 : 30 a.m . Respondent employed five "replace-
ments" for the striking employees . It is of course
elementary that unfair labor practice strikers are
entitled to immediate reinstatement upon their un-
conditional offer to return to work , regardless of
replacements employed after the commencement
of such a strike, and thus the replacements em-
ployed by Respondent after 9 : 30 a.m . are immateri-
al with respect to the reinstatement rights of the un-
fair labor practice strikers , and at least 45 of the
50 strikers were then and there entitled to im-
mediate reinstatement to their former positions. In
addition , all of the striking employees again
returned at 11:30 a.m., again unconditionally
requested reinstatement , and Respondent again
refused to reinstate any of them , although admit-
tedly engaged in seeking employees to fill their jobs
both then and thereafter until it ultimately hired the
same number of employees as the striking group.
Assuming that the strike was economic in its incep-
tion and did not become an unfair labor practice
strike until the discharge at 9:30 a . m., with respect
to the five employees "permanently replaced"
between 8 and 9 : 30 a.m . ( whom Respondent failed
to identify ) it is now well settled that employees en-
gaging in an economic strike , upon their uncondi-
tional and continuing application for reinstatement,
retain the status of employees and are entitled to
reinstatement as vacancies occur , absent substantial
economic or business justification for a refusal to
reinstate them with respect to which the burden of
proof is upon the employer , and a refusal to rein-
state them without such justification constitutes an
act so inherently destructive of employee rights as
to be an unfair labor practice without reference to
intent or improper motivation . The Board , pursuant
to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
in its Fleetwood and Great Dane decisions,' was
held:
Similarily , we are guided by Fleetwood and
Great Dane in our consideration of the strikers
whom Respondent terminated and did not re-
call after their application for reinstatement on
February 11 and thereafter . As in the case of
Massey, they remained employees , and their
right to reinstatement did not expire on the
date they first applied , even though replace-
ments filled most of the positions at the precise
time they sought reinstatement . As employees
with outstanding unconditional applications for
reinstatement at the time the strike changed
into an unfair labor practice strike, these
strikers were entitled to full reinstatements as
vacancies arose in their old positions....
Furthermore, we would so hold even if we
did not concur in the Trial Examiner 's finding
that the strike was converted from an
economic to an unfair labor practice strike on
February 11. As economic strikers their situa-
tion would have been essentially the same as
Massey 's; i e., they remained employees who
had offered to abandon the strike and who
were available to fill openings as such arose.
As Respondent brought forward no evidence
of business justification for refusing to reinstate
these experienced employees while continuing
to advertise for and hire new unskilled em-
ployees, we find such conduct was inherently
destructive of employee rights. This right of
reinstatement continued to exist so long as the
strikers had not abandoned the employ of
Respondent for other substantial and
equivalent employment . Moreover , having sig-
nified their intent to return by their uncondi-
tional application for reinstatement and by
their continuing presence , it was incumbent on
Respondent to seek them out as positions were
2 N L R B v Fleet,, ood Trailer Co , 389 U S 375, and N L R B v Great
Dane Trailers , 388 U S 26
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 73
vacated. Having failed to fulfill its obligation to
reinstate the employees to their jobs as vacan-
cies arose , the Respondent thereby violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. [Citations
omitted.]'
Thus it follows, with respect to the five strikers
who had been replaced and whose applications for
reinstatement were continuing and unconditional,
that, assuming the strike was economic from 8 until
9:30 a.m., Respondent was obligated to reinstate
them as vacancies occurred, absent proof by it of
substantial economic or business justification for
not doing so. Respondent not only offered no proof
of such justification, but admittedly employed inex-
perienced applicants from any available source
while not recalling said strikers and indeed specifi-
cally refusing to reinstate them upon their applica-
tion. After their unconditional application for rein-
statement, Respondent hired 12 new and inex-
perienced employees the same day and during the
following 2 weeks 33 more without reinstating any
of the striking employees, including the 5
"economic" strikers.
Because of Respondent 's unfair labor practices
prior to the strike , including its refusal to recognize
the Union just prior thereto when confronted by a
self-evident majority, the strike could be concluded
to have been an unfair labor practice strike from its
inception, in which event the "replacement " of five
of the strikers between 8 and 9:30 a.m. would have
been immaterial . However, it is unnecessary to
resolve this issue , inasmuch as the order and
remedy would be the same, because as found above
the same morning Respondent discriminatorily
refused to reinstate said five strikers to admittedly
available jobs.
The record establishes and I find that on March
10 Respondent discriminatorily discharged the 50
employees named in the complaint and set forth in
Appendix A attached hereto for engaging in a pro-
tected concerted activity, and that day and
thereafter until their respective reinstatements
between March 31 and April 7 discriminatorily
refused to reinstate said strikers upon their uncon-
ditional applications for reinstatement because of
their union and concerted activities, including strik-
ing, thereby discriminating against said employees
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
In addition to the 50 employees named in Appen-
dix A hereof, the complaint alleged that another
employee, Annie Howell, joined the strike on or
about March 14. As hereinabove found Howell
worked March 10,11, and 12 and joined the strike
on March 14. Accordingly, Howell was not among
the applicants for reinstatement on March 10, and
the record establishes that she was not one of the
employees who applied for reinstatement in writing
March 24. Her first and only application for rein-
statement was made March 28. Inasmuch as
Respondent reinstated Howell on March 31, the
' Laidlax Corp, 171 NLRB No 175
first working day and available opportunity to do so
after her application, I conclude and find that the
record establishes no discrimination by Respondent
with respect to Howell.
E. Refusal To Bargain
1. The appropriate unit
The complaint alleged , Respondent stipulated,
and I find the following to be a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by Respondent at its Perry, Florida
plant, excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
2. The majority designation
The complaint alleged that on or about March 3,
a majority of Respondent's employees in said ap-
propriate unit signed authorization cards designat-
ing the Union as their representative for purposes
of collective bargaining with Respondent , that on
and since march 3 the Union was and is the exclu-
sive representative of all the employees in said ap-
propriate unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining , and that on March 3 by telegram and
orally on March 10, the Union requested and con-
tinued to request Respondent to bargain collective-
ly with it as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees in said unit. The parties stipulated
and their Joint Exhibit 1 establishes that on March
3 there were 78 employees in the appropriate unit,
on March 4 there were 81, and on March 10 there
were 85. The record establishes that on March 3
the Union had signed authorization cards from 50
of the employees in the appropriate unit, on March
4, 58, and on March 10, 63, all of which were
properly authenticated and identified on the
record. The authorization cards were both single
purpose and unambiguous, of substantially the
same type and language as those recently approved
by the Supreme Court in its Gissel decision.' They
merely designated the Union as the employees' col-
lective-bargaining representative and applied for
membership in the Union, just as the cards ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. There is no evidence
in the record that any of said cards were secured by
misrepresentations made to the signers with respect
to the use or purpose of the cards. Thus they
clearly comport with the criteria of the Board's
Cumberland Shoe doctrine, also approved by the
Supreme Court in Gissel.s
The record establishes that the Union's telegram
requesting recognition and bargaining was received
by Respondent March 4 and that the Union's oral
'NLRB v G:sse! Packing Co , 395 US 575.
' Fn 4, supra
74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
request for recognition and bargaining was trans-
mitted to Respondent on the morning of March 10
shortly before the strike. On March 4 the Union
had signed authorization cards from 58 of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit , then consisting of a
total of 81 employees, and on March 10 the Union
had signed authorization cards from 63 employees
in the appropriate unit, then consisting of a total of
85 employees. I conclude and find that at the time
of the original request for recognition and bargain-
ing received March 4, and thereafter, including the
oral request for recognition and bargaining on
March 10, the Union was designated by a majority
of the employees in the appropriate unit as their
bargaining representative and was then and
thereafter the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit.
3. The refusal to bargain
The complaint alleged that on and after March 3
and continuing to date Respondent refused to
recognize and bargain with 'the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in said ap-
propriate unit. In the light of the Supreme Court's
recent Gissel decision,6 it must now be considered
well settled that the majority status of a union
under the Act may be established by methods,
other than certification by the Board after an elec-
tion, including the securing of a majority of unam-
biguous authorization cards. However, the Court
also approved the Board's current practice of not
requiring an employer to bargain with a union
requesting same based upon the possession of such
cards, absent substantial unfair labor practices
either making the holding of a fair election unlikely
or so coercive in nature as to justify a bargaining
order even without a finding of a refusal to bargain.
Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the well-
established doctrine, previously approved by the
Board and the Court, that an employer, even
though he has committed no unfair labor practices,
may not reject a request to bargain when he has in-
dependent knowledge, aside from authorization
cards, that the Union in fact represents a *majority
of the employees. The Court stated (395 U.S. at
596-597):
Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it
was recognized that a union did not have to be
certified as the winner of a Board election to
invoke a bargaining obligation; it could
establish majority status by other means under
the unfair labor practice provision of §
8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support, for
instance, by a union-called strike or strike
vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed
by a majority of the employees authorizing the
union to represent them for collective-bargain-
ing purposes. [Citations omitted.]
Fn 4, supra
The Court (395 U.S. 591) approved and noted
that the Board's current practice includes:
When confronted by a recognition demand
based on possession of cards allegedly signed
by a majority of his employees, an employer
need not grant recognition immediately, but
may, unless he has knowledge independently of
the cards that the union has a majority, decline
the union's request and insist on an election . .
.. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this connection the Court further noted (395
U.S. at 594):
The Board pointed out, however, (1) that an
employer could not refuse to bargain if he
knew, through a personal poll for instance, that
a majority of his employees supported the
union, ... .
In construing the Supreme Court's holding in
Gissel, the Board recently observed:
Insofar as relevant here, the Supreme Court
in Gissel, supra, approved the Board's authority
to issue a bargaining order to redress unfair
labor practices "so coercive that, even in the
absence of a Section 8(a)(5) violation, a bar-
gaining order would have been necessary to
repair the unlawful effect of those [unfair labor
practices]." Additionally, in circumstances
where the unlawful conduct is less flagrant in
nature, the court held that the Board may find
an 8(a)(5) violation and issue a bargaining
order where "the possibility of erasing the ef-
fects of [the] past practices and ensuring a fair
election (or a fair rerun) by the use of tradi-
tional remedies . . . is slight and ... [therefore]
employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected
by a bargaining order [Citations
'omitted. ]7
As hereinabove found, on March 4 Respondent
received the Union's first request for recognition
and bargaining, at which time the Union
represented a substantial majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit. Instead of replying thereto
(Respondent never replied until March 17), 2 days
after its receipt Respondent engaged in serious un-
fair labor practices: unilaterally increasing its
production quota to a patently unreasonable level,
threatening its employees with discharge for failing
to meet such quota within one day, and rescinding
its past policy of permitting its employees to talk,
chew gum, and eat candy while working, all
because of their union activities. During the same
week Respondent interrogated an employee about
her union activities and threatened that Respondent
was not going to take the union activity without
retaliation. On March 10 Respondent discharged all
of the employees who engaged in the protected
concerted activity of striking in support of their
request for recognition of the Union. On March 11
7 Garland Knitting Mills of Beaufort , South Carolina, Inc., 178 NLRB
396
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC 75
and 12 Respondent warned the employees that it
would never let the Union in and that Respondent
would close the plant if the union movement was
successful. On April 2, Respondent informed its
employees that they had no union and there was
not going to be any union.
Thus the record establishes that after the Union's
request for recognition and bargaining, at which
time it clearly represented a substantial majority of
the employees, Respondent promptly engaged in a
series of serious and coercive unfair labor practices
tending to destroy the Union's majority. As the
Board further observed in Garland, after its above-
quoted statement with respect to the Supreme
Court's holding in Gissel:
In our opinion, a bargaining order is war-
ranted on the facts of this case under either of
the above standards. The unfair labor practices
committed by Respondent included a half-
dozen discriminatory discharges or layoffs of
employees, in addition to serious 8(a)(1) viola-
tions. These unfair labor practices tended to
destroy the Union's majority and in the ag-
gregate were so flagrant and coercive in
character as to require, even in the absence of
an 8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining order to
repair their effect. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the lingering coercive effect of these unfair
labor practices could be neutralized by con-
ventional remedies so as to ensure a fair rerun
election. We therefore find that the employee
sentiment expressed through the cards is a
more reliable measure of employee desires and
that statutory policies are better effectuated by
issuing a bargaining order than directing a
rerun election.
Based upon substantially similar facts substantially
the same considerations apply here. Accordingly I
conclude and find that under either of the applica-
ble standards a bargaining order is required. In ad-
dition, a preponderance of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence in the entire record con-
vinces me, and I find, that Respondent refused to
bargain with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Assuming arguendo that Respondent had not en-
gaged in any unfair labor practices, independently
of its refusal to bargain, or that such unfair labor
practices were not of sufficient gravity to support
an 8(a )(5) finding or bargaining order,' as noted
above, the Board and the Supreme Court have held
that an employer , sans unfair labor practices,
nevertheless is required to bargain with a union
when he has independent knowledge that the union
in fact represents a majority of his employees. The
record establishes that on the morning of March 10
Meadows knew that the group of employees was
requesting recognition of their Union and intended
not to work or strike unless Respondent granted
such recognition, that he recognized the employees
as his, and that the group totalled approximately
50, patently a substantial majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit. Thus the Union, as noted
by the Supreme Court in Gissel, supra, had shown
convincing support and a substantial majority by a
union-called strike and Respondent knew, indepen-
dently of authorization cards, that the Union in fact
represented a majority of its employees. I further
conclude and find that under such circumstances,
regardless of any independent unfair labor prac-
tices, Respondent was obligated to recognize and
bargain with the Union, and by refusing and failing
to do so, refused to bargain in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the entire record in the case, I make the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce, and the Union is a labor organization,
within the meaning of the Act.
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing
its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By discharging the 50 employees named in
Appendix A attached hereto because of their pro-
tected concerted activity, namely, striking, and
thereafter refusing to timely reinstate said em-
ployees upon their unconditional application for
reinstatement because of their union or concerted
activities, Respondent engaged in discrimination to
discourage membership in the Union, thereby en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. All production and maintenance employees
employed by Respondent at its Perry, Florida,
plant, excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. At all times on and after March 3, the Union
has been and now is the exclusive representative for
the purposes of collective bargaining of the em-
ployees in the above unit within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
6. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and
after March 4, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. Respondent has not, as alleged in the com-
plaint, required its employees to pick up handfuls
of explosive detonators and work in such dangerous
manner because they engaged in union activities, or
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
" Poughkeepsie Nenspapers , Inc., 177 NLRB 972, and Gissel , fn. 4, supra . (7) of the Act.
76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action of the type which is conventionally
ordered in such cases as provided in the Recom-
mended Order below, which I find necessary to
remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair
labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act. Because of the character and scope of the un-
fair labor practices found, I shall recommend a
broad cease-and-desist order.' Having found that
Respondent reinstated all of the striking employees
between March 31 and April 7, the customary rein-
statement order will not be included. The customa-
ry backpay order, making the employees named in
Appendix A hereof whole from March 10, the date
of Respondent's refusal to reinstate them, to the
date of their respective reinstatements between
March 31 and April 7 is included.Upon the forego-
ing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the en-
tire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Martin Electronics, Inc., its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unilaterally instituting unreasonable produc-
tion quotas or threatening its employees with
discharge for failure to meet them, in retaliation for
their union activities.
(b) Changing its established practices concern-
ing talking, eating candy, or chewing gum by its
employees while working, to discourage union ac-
tivities.
(c) Coercively interrogating its employees con-
cerning their union membership or activities.
(d) Warning its employees that it will not take
their union activities sitting down.
(e) Threatening its employees that it will never
let a union in or that it will close the plant if a
union movement is successful.
(f) Telling its employees that they have no union
or warning them that there is not going to be any
union in its plant.
(g) Discouraging membership in Laborers 1101,
Laborers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization of its employees, by
discharging employees, refusing to reinstate striking
employees upon their unconditional application for
reinstatement, or in any other manner discriminat-
e N L R B v Express Publishing Company, 312 U S 426, N L R B v
Entx istle Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532 (C A 4), Consolidated Industries, Inc,
108 NLRB 60, and cases cited therein
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
ing against employees in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
(h) Refusing to bargain collectively with the
aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclusive represent-
ative of its employees in the appropriate unit found
herein.
(i) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the
aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclusive represent-
ative of its employees in the appropriate unit found
herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours,
and all other terms and conditions of employment,
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Make each of the employees named in Ap-
pendix A hereof whole for any loss of pay he may
have suffered by payment to him of a sum of money
equal to that which he would normally have earned
from March 10, 1969, the date of Respondent's
refusal to reinstate him, to the date of his reinstate-
ment, less his net earnings during said period (Cros-
sett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440), said backpay
to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner
established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon
at the rate of 6 percent per annum (Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716).
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Post at its plant in Perry, Florida, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix B."10 Co-
pies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 12, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12,
in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC. 77
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith."
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 12, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
Eunice Allen
Jeanette Aman
Dutchella Benton
Elease Bodiford
Mary Branch
Howard Chester
Ella Mae Clark
Norma Clark
Sandra Counce
Katie Sue Denmark
Verdie Denmark
Geneva Ellison
Edna Franch
LaVerne Gunter
Margaret Heartsfield
Teresa M. Heartsfield
Betty Hill
Irene Hill
Jewel Horton
Margree Hunter
Frankie Jerrells
Erna Kinsey
Peggy Lee
Vonceil Marchand
Ola G. Mauldin
Charlie Mae Monroe
Ola Mae Mosley
Memorie Padgett
Kay Parker
Pearlie Beatrice Peeples
Stella Eloise Peppers
Berdine Poppell
Thelma C. Ragans
Layfern Ratliff
Mary Nell Roberts
Dorothy Rodgers
Roger Sadowsky
Ella Virginia Sheffield
Ruby Sistrunk
Mary Skinner
Mamie Slaughter
Doris Stephens
Frances Spradley
Ann Tomlinson
Wanda Walker
Mavis Weekly
Mae Frances White
Sherry Lee Wilson
Barbara Wise
Jo Ann Wise
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with Laborers 1101, Laborers International
Union , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representa-
tive of our employees in the appropriate unit
noted below with respect to wages, hours, or
any other terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
aforesaid Laborers 1101, or any other labor or-
ganization of our employees , by discharging
employees , refusing to reinstate striking em-
ployees upon their unconditional application
for reinstatement , or in any other manner dis-
criminating against employees in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally institute un-
reasonable production quotas or threaten our
employees with discharge for failure to meet
them, in retaliation for their union activities.
WE WILL NOT change our established prac-
tices concerning talking, eating candy, or
chewing gum by our employees while working,
to discourage union activities.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union membership or
activities.
WE WILL NOT warn our employees that we
will not take their union activities sitting down.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees that
we will never let a union in or that we will
close the plant if a union movement is success-
ful.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that they
have no union or warn them that there is not
going to be any union in our plant.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them
by the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with the aforesaid Laborers 1101 as the exclu-
sive representative of our employees in the ap-
propriate unit noted below with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and all other terms
and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such un-
derstanding in a signed agreement.
The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance em-
ployees employed by us at our Perry,
Florida, plant, excluding all office clerical
employees, professional employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL make each of our employees
named in the list attached hereto whole for any
loss of pay he or she may have suffered as a
result of our discrimination against him or her.
All of our employees are free to become, remain,
or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of
the above-named or any other labor organization.
MARTIN ELECTRONICS,
INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Room 706, Federal Office Building,
500 Zack Street, Tampa, Florida 33602, Telephone
228-7711.