Marsden Electric Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsNov 22, 1976

226 N.L.R.B. 1097 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

MARSDEN ELECTRIC COMPANY Marsden Electric Company , Inc. and Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Cases 7-CA-12371, 7-CA-12512, and 7-RC- 13263 November 22, 1976 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS On May 5, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Marsden Electric Com- pany, Inc., Howell, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HENRY L JALETTE, Administrative Law Judge : On Octo- ber 8 , 1975,' Local Union No. 98 , International Brother- hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and t Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereinafter are 1975 1097 Helpers of America, herein the Union, filed a charge in Case 7-CA-12371 Pursuant thereto, complaint issued on November 28, alleging that Marsden Electric Company, Inc., herein Respondent, had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with plant closure if they selected the Union to represent them and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging one Lois Marrow be- cause of her activities on behalf of the Union Lois Marrow had cast a challenged ballot in an election in Case 7-RC- 13263, which was determinative of the results of the elec- tion and, in a report on challenged ballots issued simulta- neously with the complaint, the Regional Director directed hearing on her ballot and consolidated the cases for hear- ing. On November 18, the Union had filed a charge in Case 7-CA-12512 and on January 5, 1976, a consolidated amended complaint was issued to add the allegation that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging one LaVern Lober because of his activities on behalf of the Union. On March 1 and 2, 1976, hearing was held in Howell, Michigan. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses , and after due consideration of the brief filed by Respondent, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Factual Setting Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and re- pair of transformers at a plant in Howell, Michigan, em- ploying about 16 production employees at the times rele- vant herein.2 Raymond Marsden is its president and Norman Canfield is the foreman involved in the conduct here in question. It is admitted that Canfield is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. On October 1, following employee discussions about wages and working conditions, employee Lois Morrow dis- tributed union cards during the lunchbreak to employees in the parking lot. Later that day, some of the cards were deposited on her timesheets in the plant. On October 6, Morrow was terminated for the asserted reason of lack of work. On October 8, the Union filed the petition in Case 7- RC-13263 and thereafter the parties entered into a consent election agreement whereby an election was scheduled for November 4. There were 15 valid votes counted, 7 in favor of the Union, and 8 against. There were three challenged ballots. As noted earlier, in a report on objections issued simultaneously with the complaint herein, the Regional Di- rector directed hearing on the ballot of Lois Morrow. He sustained the challenge to one ballot and overruled the challenge to another. On November 6, LaVern Lober, an employee in the re- pair department, left work with employee Jack Gardner 2 Jurisdiction is not in issue I find that Respondent meets the Board's direct inflow and outflow standards for the assertion of Jurisdiction 226 NLRB No. 176 1098 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD shortly after the lunchbreak. They did not obtain permis- sion and notified the foreman, Norman Canfield, by plac- ing a note on Gardner's machine. On November 7, Gard- ner and Lober were discharged for leaving work without permission. Lober had been active on behalf of the Union; he had signed a union card and distributed union cards on October 1 and union literature in the shop on November 3. B. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices 1. The alleged threats of plant closure LaVern Lober, one of the alleged discriminatees, testi- fied that in the morning of October 6 Foreman Canfield called him to his office for a conversation. Canfield began by asking Lober what was wrong and Lober replied noth- ing, but he complained of having to wait around frequently for job assignments. Canfield asked him if he was satisfied with his job and Lober said no and that he was not the only one in the shop who was not. Canfield then remarked, "like cards being passed around and talking union," and Lober replied possibly. Canfield said he was speculating, but if the Union did come into the shop Mr Marsden would probably close down. He said Marsden did not have enough money to make pay raises or anything like that. Later that day Canfield approached Lober and told him he had talked to Marsden and that if the Union did come in, Marsden would close the shop. Lober said nothing. Canfield admitted talking to Lober in the morning of October 6. According to Canfield, the purpose of the talk was to discuss Lober's work performance. Canfield could not remember how the Union got into the conversation, but near the end, Lober remarked that there were things going on in the shop about which Canfield was not aware. Canfield rejoined that if Lober was referring to the em- ployees trying to form a union he was very much aware of it. As to the matter of plant closure, Canfield did not ex- pressly deny mentioning the subject in the meeting in his office on October 6, nor did he deny telling Lober later that same day that he had talked to Marsden and that if the Union did come in Marsden would close the shop. Canfield admitted talking to Lober about the Union and possible plant closure, but he testified what he told Lober, as well as all but two of the employees, was that Marsden was very well aware of the wages he was paying and that they were not what they could be, but that it was all he could pay at the time. At such time as the Company could afford to pay more, it would. However, if the Union came in at the present time and forced higher wages upon him, then he would have to shut the doors. The initial question posed by the foregoing is whose tes- timony to credit. Respondent appears to urge that I credit Canfield, although it also appears to contend that neither version, Lober's nor Canfield's, was unlawful. In Gissel Packing Co., Inc v. N.L.R.B., 395 U.S. 575, 616-619 (1969), the Supreme Court articulated rigorous standards to which an employer's statements, when they constitute predictions of the effect unionization will have on the employees, must conform, in order not to be found threatening. Respondent, in brief, acknowledges the exis- tence of such standards, but contends that Canfield's state- ments to Lober conformed to the standards. I do not agree. In Gissel, the Court held that an employer may make a prediction as to the precise effect he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, "the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objec- tive fact to convey an employer's belief as to the demon- strably probable consequences beyond his control." In nei- ther of Canfield's conversations with Lober, whose testimony I credit, can it be said that his prediction was carefully phrased, was based on objective fact, or that it represented a demonstrably probable consequence. In the first conversation, the lack of objective basis was express; Canfield admittedly was speculating. In the sec- ond conversation, Canfield enforced his speculation by af- firming that Marsden was confirming his prior statement. He did not, according to Lober's version, explain that the position of Marsden was based on objective facts, nor did he demonstrate why plant closure was probable. I credit Lober and, accordingly, I find that Canfield's remarks to Lober constituted threats of plant closure violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I would also find Canfield's version of his remarks to Lober and other employees to constitute threats violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent offered no evi- dence to support the statement that if the Union came in and forced higher wages upon the Company it would have to shut the doors. True, Respondent offered to prove that it had a net operating loss during the 6-month period, but this reflects operations partly after Canfield's statements and there is no showing that any such data was relied on for statements of Canfield. To the contrary, the basis for Canfield's statement is found in Marsden's testimony that, "We were assuming that if the Union became a part of the shop, then this would mean automatically that they would want more money, and there was no way we could afford to pay it." Thus, on Marsden's own admission, Canfield's statements were not based on objective fact; rather, they were based on assumptions. In addition to the foregoing, the statements of Canfield implied that the Union had the power to force higher wag- es despite Respondent's economic condition. As Respon- dent knew, selection of the Union merely gave it the right to negotiate. In this case, the Union indicated in preelec- tion literature that if it could not negotiate a wage increase, due to the Company's inability to pay more, it would "step out of the picture." In other words, the consequences of plant closure pictured by Canfield were not demonstrably probable. Accordingly, I find that Canfield's statements, as admitted by him, were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' 3 I have considered the cases cited by Respondent, Westmoreland Kitchen, Inc, 209 NLRB 153 (1974) and East Side Shopper, Inc, et al d/b/a Dawn (Detroit Area Weekly Newspapers, Inc), 204 NLRB 841 (1973), and I deem them factually distinguishable In my judgment, the instant case is compara- ble to N L R B v Gerbes Super Markets, Inc, 436 F 2d 19 (C A 8, 1971) where the court enforced a Board finding that a statement that the "compa- ny might have to close the store because it couldn't afford union wages" was unlawful MARSDEN ELECTRIC COMPANY 2. The alleged discriminatory discharges a. The discharge of Lots Morrow Lois Morrow was employed on July 7, 1975, as a produc- tion employee. Initially, she assembled transformers. After a period of time (not specified in the record) she was trans- ferred to coil winding where she worked for about 2 weeks and was transferred back to assembly. She had been hired at $2.10 per hour and received two 10-cent-per-hour raises before she was terminated on October 6. As noted earlier, when terminated she was told it was for lack of work; how- ever, Respondent contended at the hearing that Morrow was terminated because of her inability or unwillingness to do the work assigned to her. I conclude Morrow was dis- charged because of her union activity. An essential element of a finding that an employee was discharged because of union activity is a showing that the employer had knowledge of such activity. In this case, both Canfield and Marsden denied any knowledge of Morrow's union activity. I do not credit them. While there is no di- rect evidence of company knowledge, it is well settled that knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the size of the plant, the timing of the discharge, and the pretextuous reasons asserted for discharge ° In the instant case, the plant force consisted of about 16 produc- tion employees, some of Morrow's activities were on a parking lot immediately adjacent to the plant, and Morrow had expressed views in favor of union representation in the plant. Moreover, Canfield admitted overhearing people in the shop talking about the Union the week before Morrow's discharge and being told by an employee on Oc- tober 1 or 2, that cards were being passed around. Canfield informed Marsden.5 As to the timing of the discharge, since it occurred only 5 days after Morrow had passed out union cards, an infer- ence is warranted that the discharge was attributable to her union activity, unless, of course, there was evidence of some other intervening causation. As noted earlier, Mor- row was told she was terminated for lack of work, and Respondent sought to explain that this was the reason for the termination by Marsden's testimony that "we de- termined that we had to make a cut." Marsden did not indicate when this determination was made, but I gather from his testimony that it was either on Friday, October 3, or Monday, October 6. However, this was no explanation of the timing, because he never did indicate what economic event occasioned a decision to make a cut on either of those dates beyond a vague observation that "the work load was becoming less." But, if this were true, one would assume that the need was evident before the end of the workday on Friday, October 3, so as to notify the affected employee at the end of the week, rather than at the end of the first workday of the week. As a matter of fact, the Wiese Plow Welding Co, Inc, 123 NLRB 616 (1959). N L R B v Long Island Airport Limousine Service Corp, 468 F 2d 292 (C A 2, 1972), N L R B v Tru-Line Metal Products Company and Tru-Line Screw Products. Incorporated, 324 F 2d 614 (C A 6, 1963), cert denied 377 U S 406 5 Marsden claimed to have had no knowledge of any union activity until he received a copy of the petition in Case 7-RC-13263 filed on October 8 Canfield 's testimony belies this 1099 record indicates that Morrow had been sorting nuts and bolts on several occasions before October 6 because work was slack. Why was she not laid off then? As is already seen , Marsden's explanation cannot withstand analysis. In addition, Canfield denied that lack of work was the real reason for discharging Morrow. I, therefore, do not credit Marsden's testimony. Another explanation offered for the timing of Morrow's discharge was that she was a probationary employee near- ing the end of her probationary period. This is really an irrelevancy in explaining timing. Probationary periods have no limiting effect on an employer's right to discharge where there is no collective-bargaining agreement. Apart from that, the probationary period was 90 workdays and Morrow had only worked 66 days through October 6. However, perhaps Morrow had done something on or about October 6, to precipitate the decision to discharge her. Canfield suggested as much when he testified that on Friday, October 3, it had been reported to him just before going home that Morrow was playing chess when she was supposed to be working and he mentioned this to Marsden in the discussion leading up to her discharge. If this were credited, it would explain the timing of the decision to dis- charge Morrow. The testimony is not worthy of credence. Apart from the fact that Marsden made no mention of this in his testimony, there is the conflict in Canfield's own testimony as to when the chess incident was reported to him. On direct examination, he did not indicate precisely when the report was made to him, but it was sufficiently before October 3 that as a result "at this time I then ob- served her more closely than I had in the past." In addition, according to Morrow, the chess incident re- ferred to an occasion about I or 2 weeks before her termi- nation when she and fellow employee Tom Flanders were sorting nuts and bolts because work was slack and to re- lieve the tedium they made a game of the job for about an hour. There is no showing that the sorting job was delayed by reason of this game. Significantly, Canfield never inves- tigated the matter and did not speak to Morrow about it. Nor is there any showing he spoke to Flanders about it. The incident cannot therefore account for the discharge. In the final analysis, Respondent defended its decision to discharge Morrow on the ground of her alleged inability or unwillingness to do the work In my judgment, the evi- dence compels a finding that this was not the real reason. In the first place, this was not the reason given to her; rather, she was told that her termination was for lack of work. Respondent contends this reason was given to pro- tect Morrow from a loss of employment compensation benefits. This contention has no merit . If such had been Respondent's reason, it could have told Morrow it was dis- satisfied with her work and still reported her termination as attributable to lack of work Secondly, it is undisputed that Morrow had never been criticized or warned about her work performance and that she had received two wage in- creases during her brief tenure. Thus, the only basis for a finding of incompetency is Canfield's unsupported testi- mony. Actually, not only was it unsupported, it was in a sense contradicted. Canfield testified that Morrow was un- happy about being transferred back to assembly from coil winding and that she did not really try to do her job prop- 1100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD erly in assembly, but Quality Control Inspector Doris Bon- nawell called as a witness by Respondent testified that the quality of Morrow's work remained the same from the time she started to the time she was terminated. While Bonna- well was critical of Morrow's lack of improvement, it must be remembered that it was during this period that Morrow received two wage increases. Accordingly, I find that the record does not support Respondent's assertion that there was any change in the quality of Morrow's work and I do not credit the assertion that she was discharged because of an inability or unwillingness to do the work. On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that the reasons asserted for the discharge of Morrow are pretextuous, and in light of the timing of the discharge, the inference is war- ranted, and I so find, that the real reason for the discharge was Morrow's union activities. b. The discharge of La Vern Lober LaVern Lober was employed by Respondent on June 10, 1974. His duties consisted of repairing transformers. As noted earlier, Lober had been active on behalf of the Union. In his case, unlike Morrow's, there is direct evi- dence that Respondent knew of his union activities be- cause on the day he was passing out the union literature Canfield approached him and asked if he was to get a leaf- let too. Lober told him he could have one if he wanted one, but Canfield declined. In Lober's case, also unlike Morrow's, there is no dispute that he gave cause for dis- charge on November 1, because it is undisputed he left work early without permission. However, it is settled law that "Even if there might be a justifiable reason for the discharge of an employee, if the real motive for the firing is discrimination against him because of his union activities or affiliation, there is a violation of the Act. . . . The true reason for the discharge is the controlling and ultimate fact." N.L R B v. Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc, 374 F.2d 147, 152 (C.A. 6, 1967). The issue then in Lober's case is whether his leaving early was the real reason for his discharge. In my judgment, the conclusion is warranted that Lober's discharge was attributable to his union activi- ties rather than his leaving early. Such a conclusion is supported by the undisputed fact that Lober had left work early many times during his 17 months of employment. Respondent's Exhibit 4 indicates that Lober left early eight times between March 1, 1975, and September 13, 1975, and he testified, without contra- diction, that he had left early about 20 times during his entire period of employment. Some of these were with per- mission and some without. Lober testified he had never been reprimanded for leaving early and there is no proba- tive evidence to the contrary As noted earlier, Canfield called Lober into his office on October 6 and the burden of his testimony is that he did so to discuss "this," meaning his leaving work early, with him. However, a careful reading of his testimony fails to dis- close what he said to Lober about the matter and fails to disclose any warning about leaving early In one part of his testimony, Canfield stated he called Lober into his office because he was not happy with his work; yet he never did specify in what respect Lober was deficient. More impor- tantly, he never did specify what prompted him to call Lo- ber in on October 6. It cannot have been because of his leaving work early, because the last time Lober had left work early according to Respondent's Exhibit 4 was on September 13. In the circumstances, it seems appropriate to ask why Canfield called Lober in on that date. According to Lober, the conversation began with an inquiry about what was wrong and "aren't you satisfied with your work here" and it progressed to the point where Canfield held out the pros- pects of a leadman's job at a higher rate of pay. Thus, the purpose of the call was not to warn Lober, but as its timing indicates to hold out to Lober prospects of improved work- ing conditions to dissuade him from his support of the Union. It is true that there are differences between Canfield's version of the conversation and Lober's. I am persuaded that Lober's is the more accurate version, but Canfield's own version supports a finding that he held out to Lober prospects of advancement. It is with the foregoing factors in mind that the question of Respondent's motive must be assessed. Additionally to be weighed is the fact that Respondent has rules of em- ployee conduct which provide standard disciplinary proce- dures, including verbal notification of violation, written warnings, disciplinary suspensions, and discharge. Under these rules, leaving work without permission provided for written warning, disciplinary suspension, or discharge. In the case of Jack Gardner, absent from work with Lober on November 6, Respondent had invoked the written warning procedure. For some unexplained reason , in Lober's case, Respondent chose summary discharge. It might be argued that, as both had left early together, Respondent treated both equally Why9 It had not done so earlier; only Gard- ner had been given a written warning. Evidence was ad- duced of a rush job on that date, but Lober had nothing to do in connection with it. In short, Respondent's summary dismissal of Lober is in sharp contrast to its prior permissive attitude and absent some showing of a reason for the change, and in light of Respondent's demonstrated hostility to the Union as shown by its discharge of Morrow, the inference is war- ranted that the real reason for the summary action against Lober was his union activity and not his leaving work early without permission. I so find. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Marsden Electric Company, Inc., is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening employees with plant closure if they selected the above-named Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining, Respondent engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. By discharging Lois Morrow and LaVern Lober be- cause of their union activities, Respondent engaged in, and MARSDEN ELECTRIC COMPANY 1101 is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, I find it necessary to order Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As I have found that Respondent discharged Lois Mor- row and LaVern Lober because of their union activities, I shall order it to offer them immediate and full resinstate- ment to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of their unlawful discharge by payment to them of a sum of money equal to that which they normally would have earned as wages, from the date of their dis- charge to the date of the offer of reinstatement , less net earnings , to which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716 (1962). The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent strike at the very heart of employees' rights safeguarded by the Act. I shall therefore place Respondent under a broad order to cease and desist from in any other manner infring- ing upon the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941). Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions of law , and upon the entire record in this case, I hereby issue the following recommended: or, if such jobs no longer exist , to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment to them of a sum of money equal to the amount they normally would have earned as wages from the date of their discharge to the date of their rein- statement in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports and all other records rele- vant and necessary to a determination of the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (c) Post at its Howell, Michigan, place of business cop- ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by the Respondent's rep- resentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the challenge to the bal- lot of Lois Morrow be overruled and it is hereby ordered that Case 7-RC-13263 be severed and remanded to the Regional Director for further proceedings in respect to such ballot. ORDER6 Respondent, Marsden Electric Company, Inc., Howell, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with plant closure if they se- lect the Union as their bargaining representative. (b) Discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of, Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or in any other labor organization, by discharg- ing employees, or otherwise discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any terms or conditions of employment of its employees. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Lois Morrow and LaVern Lober immediate, full, and unconditional reinstatement to their former jobs 'In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec 10246 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings. conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 7 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which both sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice. WE WILL NOT discharge employees because of their activities on behalf, or support, of Local Union No. 1102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 98, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization. WE WILL offer Lois Morrow and LaVern Lober their jobs back or, if their jobs no longer exist , substantially equivalent jobs, and WE WILL pay them the wages which they lost because we discharged them unlawful- ly. WE WILL NOT threaten to close the plant if employees select the Union to represent them. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. You are free to become and remain members of Local Union No. 98, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization MARSDEN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.