Marriott Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 22, 1993

310 N.L.R.B. 1152 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

1152
310 NLRB No. 196
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 As requested by the General Counsel, we correct the following
inadvertent errors which do not affect the results. In the 11th par.
of the judge’s decision, in regard to a March 1, 1990 meeting be-
tween the Respondent’s officials and employees, it should read that
‘‘[Employee] Watkins told Respondent officials that the wage in-
crease did not meet the cost of living increase.’’ Under ‘‘Analysis
and Conclusion’’ section, 10th par., of the judge’s decision, it should
read that the ‘‘Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when
[General Manager] Keyes stated that if employees did not go with
the Union, they’d get more than a 50-cent-per-hour raise.’’
Finally, we note that the original charges filed in this proceeding
on August 3, 1990, alleged that both the suspensions and the dis-
charges of the three discriminatees violated the Act.
2 We shall modify the recommended Order and notice to conform
to the violations found. We shall also order, as requested by the
General Counsel, that the Respondent expunge from its records any
reference to the suspensions and discharges of the three
discriminatees.
Marriott Corporation and Robert Elliott and Earle
Timmins and Keith Watkins. Cases 2–CA–
24526–1, 2–CA–24526–2, and 2–CA–24526–3
April 22, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS DEVANEY, OVIATT, AND
RAUDABAUGH
On November 4, 1992, Administrative Law Judge
Howard Edelman issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed limited exceptions, a supporting
brief, and a brief in support of the judge’s decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions as modified and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified and set forth in full below.2
The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure
to find that the suspensions of employees Earle Tim-
mins, Keith Watkins, and Robert Elliott violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. We find merit in these
exceptions.
The judge found, and we agree, that the General
Counsel presented a prima facie case that the Respond-
ent suspended and thereafter discharged these three
employees in violation of the Act. The judge rejected
the Respondent’s rebuttal case in regard to the dis-
charges, in which the Respondent attempted to show
that the three employees were discharged for leaving
the premises without permission. He concluded that the
Respondent’s discharge of the three employees vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The judge,
however, failed to rule on the Respondent’s rebuttal
case in regard to the suspensions, which were followed
by the discharges and which were precipitated by the
same events as those surrounding the discharges. As
the General Counsel notes, the Respondent’s defenses
to the suspensions and discharges were the same. Thus,
as the General Counsel further argues, it follows that
if the Respondent’s defense to the discharges lacked
merit, then its defense to the suspensions that preceded
the discharges must also fail. We agree. Accordingly,
we find, as urged by the General Counsel, that the Re-
spondent’s suspensions of the three employees violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below, and orders that
the Respondent, Marriott Corporation, Palisades, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting employee grievances and promising to
remedy such grievances in order to discourage union
activities and support.
(b) Promising improved wages and other benefits in
order to discourage union activities and support.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union activities or sympathies.
(d) Increasing employees’ wages, food benefits, uni-
form benefits or other benefits relating to their wages,
hours, or conditions of employment, in order to dis-
courage the employees’ activities or support for the
Union.
(e) Suspending its employees because of their union
activities or support.
(f) Discharging its employees because of their union
activities or support.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer to Robert Elliott, Earle Timmins, and
Keith Watkins immediate and full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed.
(b) Make the above employees whole for any loss
of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them dating from their suspen-
sion until their reinstatement as set forth in the remedy
section of this decision.
(c) Expunge from the personnel files of Robert El-
liott, Earle Timmins, and Keith Watkins any reference
to their suspension and discharge and notify them in
writing of the expunction.
(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
1153MARRIOTT CORP.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its place of business at IBM Palisades,
New York, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Ap-
pendix.’’3 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these pro-
tected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT solicit employee grievances and
promise to remedy such grievances in order to discour-
age union activities and support.
WE WILL NOT promise improved wages and other
benefits in order to discourage union activities and
support.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees con-
cerning their union activities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT increase employees’ wages, food ben-
efits, uniform benefits or other benefits relating to their
wages, hours, or conditions of employment, in order to
discourage the employees’ activities or support for the
Union.
WE WILL NOT suspend our employees because of
their union activities or support.
WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because of
their union activities or support.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Robert Elliott, Earle Timmins, and
Keith Watkins immediate and full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed.
WE WILL make the above employees whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of
the suspensions and discharges.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
suspensions and discharges of Robert Elliott, Earle
Timmins, and Keith Watkins, and notify them in writ-
ing that this has been done and that the suspensions
and discharges will not be used against them in any
way.
MARRIOTT CORPORATION
Margit Reiner, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Julienne Bramesco, Esq., Carlton J. Trosclair, Esq., Michael
C. Ford, Esq., for the Respondent.
James W. Devor, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD EDELMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me on March 20 and 21 and May 20
through 23, 1991, in New York, New York.
On November 29, 1990, a consolidated complaint based
on individual charges filed on August 3, 1990, and amended
charges filed on November 21, by Robert Elliott, Earle Tim-
mins, and Keith Watkins, individuals, against Marriott Cor-
poration (Respondent), issued alleging that Respondent dis-
charged the above-named Charging Parties because of their
membership in, and activities on behalf of Local 30, Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO (the
Union). The complaint also alleges various independent acts
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
Respondent is a domestic corporation with an office and
place of business at IBM Palisades, Route 9, Palisades, New
York, where it is engaged in overseeing the food and bev-
erage services and the operation and maintenance of the heat-
ing, ventilation, and air conditioning systems at IBM’s con-
ference center. In connection with this operation, Respondent
annually derives gross revenues in excess of $1 million, and
purchases and receives products at this New York facility di-
rectly from, enterprises located outside the State of New
York, valued at in excess of $50,000. It is admitted, and I
find, that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
It is also admitted, and I find, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1154 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 Timmins and Watkins credibly testified that Keyes asked the em-
ployee about the Union. Keyes denied asking this question. I found
Timmins and Watkins to be credible witnesses. Both displayed ex-
cellent demeanor and were very forthright in response to questions
put to them on both cross and direct examination. Timmins dis-
played an excellent recollection of facts throughout his testimony.
Watkins, at times required leading questions, but my impression was
that he was nevertheless telling the truth. Both employees at times
willingly admitted to facts which were against their interest. In con-
trast, as set forth below, Respondent witnesses impressed me as par-
ticularly incredible witnesses.
Respondent employs at this facility approximately 15
maintenance mechanics, including the above-named Charging
Parties. These employees are directly supervised by Gordan
Scott-Ramsay an admitted supervisor within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act. The general manager of the entire
facility is Edward Keyes, also an admitted supervisor within
the meaning of the Act.
Sometime in February 1990, the maintenance employees
began discussing certain dissatisfactions they had with work-
ing conditions, and the possibility of obtaining union rep-
resentation to remedy such dissatisfaction. Respondent was
aware of such activity as early as February 15, when Re-
spondent Night Manager Karen Halsey informed Carolyn
Lengers, Respondent’s human resource director, that one of
the maintenance employees had told her that the men were
complaining about their wages, training, the quality of the
food and the lack of sufficient work uniforms, and were con-
sidering obtaining union representation. Halsey and Lengers
reviewed this information with Gene Castellitto, Respond-
ent’s then general manager who was succeeded by Keyes.
Since Respondent admitted that Keyes was a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act, I conclude that Castellitto
was similarly a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
Castellitto instructed Lengers to obtain more information
concerning the employees’ complaints and any union activi-
ties.
The following day Lengers met with Greg Sturgis, a su-
pervisor and Ramsay, and reviewed with him the information
reviewed with Castellitto. Presumably, pursuant to authoriza-
tion by Castellitto, Lengers initiated certain changes in the
employees’ working conditions which were specifically ad-
dressed to their complaints. Arrangements were made for hot
breakfasts to be served to the employees and on February 21,
additional replacement uniforms were ordered.
In the meantime, during this same period, the employees,
particularly, Timmins, Elliott, and Watkins engaged in activi-
ties on behalf of the Union. Timmins attended a union meet-
ing with other employees at a location outside of Respond-
ent’s facility. At this meeting Timmins signed a union card.
The next day Timmins distributed union cards to other em-
ployees on the job, including Elliott and Watkins. These
cards were signed and submitted to the Union.
On or about February 23, a representative from the Union
called Castellitto and informed him that a majority of Re-
spondent’s employees had signed union cards and demanded
recognition. Castellitto then contacted his supervisor, Joseph
Sebestyen, Respondent’s district manager, and an admitted
supervisor within the meaning of the Act, and informed him
of the Union’s demand.
On March 1, Keyes replaced Castellitto as the general
manager and attended a meeting at Respondent’s facility.
Present was Gorden Ellis, human resource manager from Re-
spondent’s home office in Washington, D.C., and an admit-
ted supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Also present
were Sebestyen and Keyes. During the course of this meeting
Respondent officials spoke about the Union’s organizing
campaign and the employee concerns described above which
led to the employees interest in the Union.
Later that day, following the above meeting, the same Re-
spondent officials met with maintenance employees Watkins,
John Henriques, and Jimmy O’Connor. These officials in-
formed the employees that they were aware of their com-
plaints. Although the employees had received recent wage in-
creases pursuant to Respondent’s annual wage survey, they
were not satisfied with the amount of the increase. Watkins
told Respondent officials that the wage increase did meet the
cost-of-living increase. Henriques stated that a new wage sur-
vey should be made which would include local facilities and
commercial buildings. O’Connor stated that they did not
have enough uniforms and the employees complained about
the food on the evenings and weekends. Food had already
been improved since the start of union activities, as a result
of employee complaints, by the serving of hot breakfast. Re-
spondent officials told the employees that their complaints
would be taken care of.
That same evening Respondent made arrangements to up-
grade the food served the employees, and food was upgraded
that same evening. As set forth above, Respondent had al-
ready ordered additional uniforms, but that evening Keyes
ordered additional uniforms over those ordered on February
21.
On March 2, Keyes held an employee meeting with the
full compliment of maintenance and engineering employees.
Present also for Respondent was Sebestyen, Ellis, and
Lengers. Keyes acted as the spokesman. Keyes told the em-
ployees that Respondent was aware of the employees’ com-
plaints concerning training, uniforms, food, and wages.
Keyes told them that he would take care of these complaints
to the best of his ability. He told them that the quality of
the food had already been improved and that additional uni-
forms had been ordered, and that Respondent was looking
into improving training and reviewing its wage survey.
Keyes then asked them why they wanted a union.1
On March 2, Respondent received a petition for an elec-
tion filed by the Union.
Following the petition, the Union held two meetings which
were attended by the Charging Parties. Additionally, the
Charging Parties were avid union supporters and spoke in
favor of the Union to employees in Respondent’s facility and
in the presence of Respondent’s supervisors, especially
Ramsay.
On or about March 15, Richard Carver, Respondent’s
labor relations representative from Respondent’s Washington,
D.C. office came to the New York facility and met with the
employees. During the course of this meeting Carver told the
employees that their wages would be increased over and
above the original annual wage increase, food would get bet-
ter, and there would be additional uniforms. Carver then stat-
ed that Respondent would listen to employee complaints and
do what it could to remedy them.
Several days later, Respondent held another meeting of
employees. This meeting was conducted by Keyes. During
this meeting Keyes told the employees that Respondent was
1155MARRIOTT CORP.
2 The facts of this meeting are based primarily on the credible tes-
timony of Watkins.
3 The facts set forth above are based on the credible testimony of
the respective Charging Parties. As set forth above, I have concluded
each individual to be a credible witness. In connection with Tim-
mins’ testimony, Keyes’ statement that Timmins should stick with
Respondent because he and Timmins were old ex-Air Force men has
a ring of truth. Similarly, Elliott’s statement that it was none of
Keyes’ business how he would vote and Keyes’ reply has a ring of
truth. Moreover, Keyes admitted that he called these three employees
into his office and spoke to each one individually. He denied that
he asked them how they would vote, but admitted that he asked
them if the food was better and he hoped that they would see that
he was a man of his word. In view of my very unfavorable impres-
sion concerning Keyes’ credibility set forth below, and in view of
what he admits that he said to the three individuals, and in view of
the fact that these employees, most active employees for the Union,
were the only employees called in, I do not credit Keyes’ denial.
4 Pearl was not a supervisor employee at the time of the events
of June 7 and shortly thereafter. She was promoted to a supervisory
position sometime thereafter and was a supervisory employee at the
time of this trial.
working on getting the employees additional uniforms, im-
proving the food, and working on a new wage survey. In this
connection Keyes stated that if the employees rejected the
Union, they would get at least a 50-cent-per-hour raise.2
Watkins credibly testified that right after this meeting,
Scott-Ramsay and Greg Sturgis approached him and Elliott
and Scott-Ramsay asked them to give Respondent a chance,
and that if they went with Respondent, things would get bet-
ter. Watkins’ testimony was uncontradicted. Shortly after this
meeting there was additional improvement in the food, and
the employees received additional uniforms. Shortly after
these improvements in working conditions took place, Re-
spondent held another employee meeting conducted by
Keyes. During the course of this meeting Keyes told the em-
ployees about the improvements in the food and clothing and
repeated that Respondent’s wage survey was still in progress,
but that if the employees went with Respondent, their wages
would improve.
On April 10, Keyes summoned Timmins to his office.
They met alone. Keyes stated that he would deny what was
said if it later came to anyone’s attention, but he was con-
cerned about the union election, scheduled for April 13, and
he wanted to know how Timmins was going to vote. Tim-
mins told Keyes that the Union was best for the workers and
would win. Keyes replied that they were both ex-Air Force
men and that they should stick together. Timmins repeated
that the Union was best for the employees.
On April 12, Keyes summoned Watkins and Elliott into
his office and spoke to each individually, and alone. With re-
spect to Watkins, Keyes asked him how he believed the
other employees would vote. Watkins replied that he could
not speak for the other employees but that he intended to
vote for the Union. Keyes said ‘‘Thank you, at least you’re
honest.’’ With respect to Elliott, Keyes asked him how he in-
tended to vote. Elliott responded that it was none of his busi-
ness and Keyes replied that he respected Elliott for saying
that.3
The election was held on April 13. The Union lost by a
vote of 8 to 7. After the election results were certified, Re-
spondent informed the employees that they would be receiv-
ing a wage increase pursuant to their supplemental wage sur-
vey. The wage increases were received during the first week
in May, retroactive to April 16.
During the month of May the maintenance employees
were required to work long hours under heavy pressure in
order to ready the center for a big conference that was sched-
uled to take place during the first week in June. Notwith-
standing the admitted difficulty of their job, it was accom-
plished with Respondent’s usual excellence. In this connec-
tion, Respondent admits that the Charging Parties were each
individually excellent employees with unblemished work
records. By June 7 the scheduled conference had concluded
and the work pressure had ended.
On June 7, during the lunchbreak, Timmins, Watkins, and
Elliott were having lunch with Jean Pearl, an administrative
assistant.4 The conference was over and the people attending
were leaving. At some point during the lunchbreak, Watkins,
Timmins, and Elliott decided to take some personal time to
see Timmins’ boat, which was moored nearby. Pearl said
they would get in trouble if they left. Either Timmins or El-
liott stated that according to Respondent’s rules they would
get at most a written warning. After lunch, Watkins and Tim-
mins left their beepers in Pearl’s office and the three employ-
ees went down the hall on their way to leave the building
and see Timmins’ boat. By sheer coincidence they met Scott-
Ramsay who was talking with Bill Diefus, IBM’s facilities
manager, and Ed Coulter, a site supervisor for IBM’s secu-
rity contractor. Timmins, Watkins, and Elliott credibly testi-
fied that on seeing him they asked him if it would be all
right to take some personal time to take a quick look at Tim-
mins’ boat, and Scott-Ramsay replied they should go ahead,
not punch out, hurry back, and not let anyone know. At this
point Pearl, who was angry that they were leaving with no
one to answer calls, came up to Scott-Ramsay and asked if
he were letting them leave. According to the credible testi-
mony of Pearl presently employed as a supervisor by Re-
spondent, and Coulter, a neutral employee, Scott-Ramsay
stated that they would be back shortly. Scott-Ramsay testi-
fied that the employees told him that they were going to see
Timmins’ boat and he said ‘‘have a nice day.’’
I conclude that based on the mutually credible testimony
of Timmins, Elliott, and Watkins and especially the inher-
ently credible testimony of Pearl and Coulter and the virtual
admission by Scott-Ramsay, that Scott-Ramsay gave the
above-named employees’ permission to leave the building to
see Timmins’ boat without punching out.
It is undisputed that at this time Respondent had issued a
memo dated March 3 which set forth that employees had to
punch out whenever they left the premises for personal rea-
sons. However, the employees had been told by Jim O’Con-
nor, Greg Sturgis, and Scott-Ramsay, Respondent super-
visors, that if they had oral permission from a supervisor
they could leave, notwithstanding the memo without punch-
ing out. Moreover, Respondent admits that all three employ-
ees prior took advantage of this oral permission policy. Re-
spondent admitted that Timmins had received such oral per-
mission on May 15 from Sturgis to buy a car battery and
thereafter go to the bank. Similarly, Elliott had received such
oral permission on several occasions to keep doctors appoint-
ments.
Elliott and Timmins credibly testified that on returning
from their visit to the boat, they encountered Sturgis, who
1156 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 The analysis section of this decision sets forth certain testimony,
particularly testimony by Respondent’s officials related to its defense
of the discriminatory discharges alleged, which are not set forth in
the Statement of Facts.
asked them where they were. They told him and added that
they had received permission from Scott-Ramsay. Sturgis
checked with Scott-Ramsay who denied that he had given
such permission. Sturgis confronted the three employees with
Scott-Ramsay’s denial but Watkins insisted that Scott-
Ramsay had given such permission.
Later that day, at about 4 p.m. the three employees were
called into Keyes’ office where they met with Keyes,
Sebestyen, Lengers, Sturgis, and Scott-Ramsay. Keyes asked
the employees where they went, and the employees re-
sponded that they had left the premises with Scott-Ramsay’s
permission to see Timmins’ boat. Keyes then informed them
that they were suspended until June 12 for leaving the prem-
ises without punching out.
Keyes thereafter conducted an investigation. He checked
the employee timecards and ascertained that they had not
punched out. He spoke to Scott-Ramsay who told him that
the three employees encountered him and told him of their
intention to see Timmins’ boat and he told them to ‘‘have
a nice day,’’ but that he thought the men were joking. Keyes
told him to memorialize this conversation. Keyes then spoke
with Pearl who told him that the three employees told her
they were going to see Timmins’ boat and that she told them
they would get in trouble if they left without punching out,
but they took the position that at most they would get a writ-
ten warning. Keyes then testified that he asked Gerard Da-
vidson, a unit employee, but presently working for Respond-
ent as a supervisor, whether Respondent had a practice
whereby employees could leave the premises without punch-
ing out if they obtained oral permission. However, Davidson
denied such conversation.
On June 12 the three employees reported to Respondent’s
facility and were summoned into Keyes’ office one by one
and notified by Keyes that they were being terminated for
failing to punch out. Both Timmins and Elliott told Keyes
that Respondent had an oral policy of not requiring employ-
ees to punch out for personal leave if they got oral permis-
sion, and that they had followed such policy in the recent
past without any problem. Keyes told the employees to get
him that information and he would reinvestigate. Both Tim-
mins and Elliott subsequently set forth the instances de-
scribed above where they were permitted to leave Respond-
ent’s premises on obtaining permission and without having
to punch out. Several days later the three employees received
separate termination notices.
I found Keyes not to be a credible witness. The record es-
tablished that although Keyes denied making promises to
employees after Carver arrived, on March 22, Keyes prom-
ised to remedy problems (which he knew existed when he
sent Respondent’s employees a memo that Respondent was
committed to competitive wages and benefits and wanted to
know if things were wrong so they could be corrected (G.C.
Exh. 7). Further, during cross-examination Keyes was asked
what reasons Elliott gave at his unemployment hearing for
being terminated and Keyes replied that Elliott said ‘‘he left
the property without permission’’ when in fact, as Keyes
later admitted that Elliott testified that leaving without per-
mission was the reason Respondent gave as the reason for
his discharge. Significantly, Keyes denied he was aware of
the Union’s organization campaign on March 1, the date
when Respondent first began its systematic commission of
unfair labor practices, notwithstanding that his affidavit indi-
cated he was aware of the Union’s campaign on this date.
Further, Davidson, a supervisory employee, contradicted
Keyes’ testimony that he had been asked by Keyes about
practice of permitting employees to leave the plant with oral
permission only.
On June 15, pursuant to Respondent’s ‘‘guarantee of fair
treatment’’ the three employees met with Sebestyen and Ellis
to appeal their termination. Timmins testified that at the
meeting he said that it seemed they were fired because of
their union activities. Watkins stated that they were wrong-
fully terminated and that at most they should have received
a 1-day suspension and a warning letter. Both employees re-
stated that they had been given permission by Scott-Ramsay
to leave without punching out and that if they were wrong,
he should take the blame. Ellis and Sebestyen decided that
the termination should stand, although they had the authority
to rescind it.
Analysis and Conclusion5
A. Solicitation of Grievances and Promises of Benefits
‘‘It is . . . well established that a solicitation of grievances
during an organizational campaign is not, per se, a violation.
It is only when the there is a promise to remedy those griev-
ances that the violations occur.’’ Mariposa Press, 273 NLRB
528, 529 (1984), citing Uarco, Inc., 216 NLRB 1, 2 (1974).
There is no question that the Union’s organizational cam-
paign had begun prior to March 1, the date of the first solici-
tation of grievances. The first union meeting had already
been held and Catellitto, Keyes’ predecessor, had been called
by someone who asked for union recognition stating 15
union cards were signed.
The testimony of Respondent’s witnesses indicates that
Respondent’s meetings with its employees on March 1 and
2 were classic cases of violations. On March 1, when Re-
spondent officials told employees that management was try-
ing to understand employees’ problems and then enumerated
those problems, a clear solicitation of grievances took place.
That employees understood it as such is shown by their
speaking up and confirming the problems as well as by the
statement of one employee that the wage survey should in-
clude additional facilities. Keyes’ response that he would
take care of employee problems and his giving examples of
how he would do so, i.e., supplementing the wage survey,
sending employees for training, and immediately improving
the food quality, was an overt promise to remedy the griev-
ances.
On March 2, in another clear instance of an unlawful so-
licitation, Keyes stated what he believed employee problems
to be. He then asked employees to verify their concerns and
state what was bothering them. Again, employees responded
to the solicitation and raised their concerns. Keyes’ response
to the employees was another overt promise to remedy the
grievances. He then specifically promised that management
would improve food quality immediately, look into training,
and review the wage survey. Keyes’ solicitations and prom-
1157MARRIOTT CORP.
ises were reinforced by a written memo sent to employees
dated March 22.
During the beginning of April, Keyes engaged in a new
solicitation. He testified he called Timmins, Elliott, and Wat-
kins into his office one at a time and asked each of them
if the food was better. He then said he hoped they’d see he
was a man of his word and followed through on things he
said he would do. It can be reasonably inferred that Keyes
asking if past grievances had been resolved was an attempt
to have employees come forward with new grievances and
his statement that he hoped they would see he was a man
of his word was a promise to remedy any new grievances
they might bring up.
Based on the above, I conclude that on March 1, 2, and
in early April, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by soliciting grievances and promising to remedy them. I
also conclude that on March 2 when Keyes specifically
promised that Respondent would improve food quality imme-
diately, would look into training, and would review the wage
survey, that Respondent, engaged in an unlawful promise of
benefits in further violation of Section 8(a)(1).
According to the credible testimony of Timmins and Wat-
kins, when Respondent official Carver met with the employ-
ees on March 15, he stated unequivocally that salaries would
be increased, food would get better, and employees would
get more uniforms. Respondent did not deny such credible
testimony.
Carver’s promises at this meeting with employees violates
the law. These promises were made during the Union’s orga-
nizational campaign. In fact, Carver was called to Respond-
ent’s facility to ‘‘educate’’ employees regarding their choice
about the Union. Given the timing of the promises and the
fact that Carver was a high Respondent official called from
Respondent’s headquarters, it is evident that his promises
were calculated to interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights
and, thus, under Fast Food, I conclude Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) with regard to Carver’s promises at this
meeting.
Sometime within a few days after Carver came to Pali-
sades, in mid-March, Keyes held a meeting wherein he said
Respondent was working on a wage survey, getting more
clothes, and improving the food. Keyes then stated that if
employees didn’t go with the Union, they’d get more than
a 50-cent-per-hour raise.
The promise of increased wages or benefits to dissuade
employees from supporting the Union is a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, I conclude that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Keyes
stated that if employees went with the Union, they would get
more than a 50-cent-per-hour raise.
Watkins credibly testified without contradiction by Re-
spondent, that right after the April meeting with Keyes,
Scott-Ramsay, and Sturgis approached him and Elliott and
Scott-Ramsay asked them to give Respondent a chance, that
if they went with Respondent things would get better.
In Impact Industries, 285 NLRB 5 (1987), revd. and re-
manded on other grounds 874 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1988),
modified on other grounds 293 NLRB 794 (1989), a super-
visor told employees that if they would vote for the com-
pany, the president of the company would later help them
since employees would help him by their vote for the com-
pany. This statement was found to be a violation of Section
8(a)(1) as it was construed to be a promise of undefined ben-
efits in the future if employees voted against the Union. See
also Central Washington Hospital, 279 NLRB 60 (1986).
Thus, I conclude the above statement by Scott-Ramsay is a
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
B. Unlawful Interrogations
As set forth above in the statement of facts, Timmins,
Watkins, and Elliott were each, individually interrogated by
Keyes in his office concerning their union activities and how
they intended to vote in the upcoming election.
Under Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affd. 760
F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985), the test for determining whether
an interrogation violates the Act is not a per se one, but rath-
er, whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the inter-
rogation restrains, coerces, or interferes with rights under the
Act. Some of the areas one must look to are the background,
the nature of information sought, the identity of the ques-
tioner, and the place and method of interrogation. Sunnyvale
Medical Center, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985).
The background to Keyes’ questioning was one where Re-
spondent had clear union animus as evidenced by the numer-
ous 8(a)(1) violations discussed above. The interrogator,
Keyes, was a high official of Respondent, the general man-
ager of the IBM Palisades facility with final responsibility
for food and beverage service, groundkeeping, engineering,
maintenance, and the front desk. Keyes was the individual
who made decisions on discipline from warnings to termi-
nations. The place and method of interrogation were highly
coercive. Keyes spoke with the employees one at a time in
his office with no one else present. Keyes had no valid rea-
son for questioning the employees and never gave any assur-
ances that no reprisals would be taken against them if they
supported the Union.
The fact that Timmins and Watkins admitted they would
vote for the Union and Elliott said his vote was none of
Keyes’ business does not make the questioning less coercive.
In Impact Industries, supra, questioning of an employee who
admitted he would vote for the Union was found to be viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) as when it occurred in a pervasive at-
mosphere of unlawful conduct. Similarly, in Impact, the
questioning of another employee, a known union sym-
pathizer, who told a supervisor that it was none of his busi-
ness how union meetings were going as found to violate the
Act because of the other events found to have taken place
and the role of the questioner in the antiunion campaign. In
the instant case, too, there was a pervasive atmosphere of un-
lawful conduct. Further, it was clear that Respondent took
the union campaign with the utmost concern as Carver, a
high official from Respondent’s headquarters, was called to
Palisades to lecture the employees about the union campaign.
Finally, the interrogator’s role in the antiunion campaign is
obvious given Keyes’ position, his solicitation of grievances,
and his illegal promises. Thus, I conclude each of the three
interrogations to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
A. Unlawful Grant of Benefits
Respondent admitted in its answer that it improved the
quantity and quality of food served at night on or about
March 1, and it increased the amount of uniforms issued em-
1158 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees in or about mid-March. Respondent denied that food
on weekends and during the day improved.
Keyes admitted that after the March 1 meeting, he spoke
to the food and beverage director about improving the food
in the evening and on weekends.
With regard to the food during the day, Timmins, Watkins,
and Elliott credibly testified that the food at lunch improved
sometime during the period Carver and Keyes were holding
meetings, i.e., before the election. Neither Keyes nor any
other of Respondent’s witnesses ever denied that this oc-
curred.
An increase in benefits timed to turn employees away
from the union by increasing their dependency on the em-
ployer is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3). Ideal Eleva-
tor Corp., 295 NLRB 347 (1989). In Ideal, the employer
granted raises and medical insurance coverage to employees
after a union demanded recognition. These benefits were not
granted in accord with preexisting company policy. Simi-
larly, in the instant case, the improvement in food and the
increase in uniforms were not in accord with preexisting
company policy. These benefits were granted because Re-
spondent realized, as Keyes admitted, that its not acting on
employees’ concerns initiated their seeking union representa-
tion. In fact, as Keyes knew full well, according to his affi-
davit, there was more than talk, and in fact a union rep-
resentative had asked Respondent for recognition. Further,
prior to employees seeking representation, Respondent never
showed any concern about food or uniforms as those topics
were not even covered during a district staff meeting on De-
cember 14, 1989, although employees had complained about
those issues prior to that time.
The granting of improved food and more uniforms, the
very problems that employees complained about, were clear-
ly meant to turn employees away from the Union. Accord-
ingly, I conclude that Respondent’s improvement in food on
weekends, in the evenings, and during the day, as well as the
increase in uniforms given employees constitute an unlawful
grant of benefits in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
Respondent has admitted that it granted wage increases to
its employees in May. These increases ranged from 74 cents
per hour to $2.75 per hour. Respondent’s witnesses also ad-
mitted that the increases were based not on the annual survey
it did in late 1989 but, rather, were based on a new survey
compiled at the employees’ request and which included types
of facilities not included in Respondent’s annual survey. The
timing of the raises establishes that they were not part of pre-
existing Respondent policy, but rather were a singular deci-
sion to show that Respondent was responsive to employee
needs and would act on its numerous illegal promises to bet-
ter employee wages. Further, the timing tends to establish
that such increases were a reward to employees for their neg-
ative vote in the union election.
In NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, 558 F.2d 160, 165
(3d Cir. 1977), affg. 224 NLRB 1529 (1976), the court stated
that a postelection conferral of benefits violates Section
8(a)(1) if it is a reward to employees for rejecting the union
or if it is an inducement to vote against the union in the
event of a second election. Accordingly, I conclude Respond-
ent’s grant of such wage increase was a violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3).
D. The Unlawful Discharges of Timmins, Watkins,
and Elliott
To establish a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, Gen-
eral Counsel must make a prima facie showing that the dis-
charge was based in whole or in part on union animus, or
that the employee’s protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in Respondent’s decision to discharge the
employee. Once General Counsel has made a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the Respondent to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected
conduct. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
Accord: NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 400–403 (1983).
The union sympathies and activities of Elliott, Timmins,
and Watkins are undisputed. Timmins attended three union
meetings and signed a card at the first one. After the first
meeting, he gave out union cards to his coworkers. Among
those signing were Elliott and Watkins. Thereafter, Watkins
and Elliott each attended a union meeting. All three fre-
quently spoke of the Union at work.
The union sympathies of Elliott, Timmins, and Watkins
were also known to Respondent. Keyes admitted he was
aware of Timmins’ avid prounion sentiments and further ad-
mitted that all employees discussed their feelings openly in
front of their supervisors, Scott-Ramsay and Sturgis. Scott-
Ramsay and Sturgis never denied this. Further, according to
the credible testimony of Timmins and Watkins, when inter-
rogated by Keyes just before the election, both Timmins and
Watkins stated they were for the Union.
Respondent’s animus is clearly evidenced by the extensive
and systematic commission of unfair labor practices, de-
scribed above. Respondent’s animus toward the three
discriminatees is evidenced by Keyes’ unlawful and indi-
vidual interrogations of the above three discriminatees. Given
the small size of the unit and nature of the individual interro-
gations, I would conclude Respondent believed the three
discriminatees were the most prominent union supporters.
Given the union activity of Elliott, Timmins, and Watkins,
Respondent’s knowledge of that activity, Respondent’s ani-
mus toward the Union and toward the three discriminatees in
particular, and the timing of the discharges shortly after the
first election, General Counsel has established a prima facie
case that the three discriminatees were suspended and, 5 days
later, fired because of their activity on behalf of the Union.
Respondent’s primary defense to its suspension and dis-
charge of the three discriminatees is that they left the prem-
ises without permission. Keyes, Ellis, and Lengers all testi-
fied that they would not have discharged or recommended
discharge of the discriminatees had the three received per-
mission from, Scott-Ramsay. However despite these asser-
tions, the record conclusively establishes based on both the
credible testimony of the discriminatees, Pearl, and Respond-
ent’s officials admissions that Scott-Ramsay gave the
discriminatees such oral permission.
Scott-Ramsay testified that when the three discriminatees
said to him they were going to see Timmins’ boat, he re-
sponded, ‘‘have a nice day.’’ Such a statement clearly im-
plies permission especially since following Scott-Ramsay’s
statement they walked up the stairs toward the loading dock
with their coats on. Scott-Ramsay’s assertion to Sturgis and
1159MARRIOTT CORP.
Sebestyen that he did not give the men permission to leave
because he felt they were only joking is simply not credible
as Sturgis and Sebestyen must have known this given Re-
spondent’s investigation of the facts, described above, where-
in Pearl corroborated the discriminatees testimony.
Moreover, Scott-Ramsay’s superiors, by their own testi-
mony, were very well aware that such permission was grant-
ed by Scott-Ramsay.
Scott-Ramsay and Keyes both testified that Scott-Ramsay
told Keyes he said to the discriminatees ‘‘have a nice day’’
after they said they were going to see Timmins’ boat. Keyes’
belief that Scott-Ramsay’s statement to the three amounted to
permission is verified by Keyes’ testimony that he believed
the discriminatees and didn’t believe Scott-Ramsay when he
said he didn’t grant permission. Sebestyen, testified that he
was aware that Scott-Ramsay told the employees to have a
nice day. Ellis similarly testified he was aware that Scott-
Ramsay said to Pearl as the three employees were leaving,
that they would be back soon.
Since it is clear that Respondent was aware that Elliott,
Timmins, and Watkins had permission to leave, there must
exist another reason for their discharge. The fact that the
stated motive is false permits the inference of another mo-
tive. More than that, it may be inferred that the motive is
one the employer desires to conceal—an unlawful motive—
where the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference.
Garment Workers, 295 NLRB 411 (1989); Aluminum Tech-
nical Extrusions, 274 NLRB 1414, 1418 (1985). In this case
Respondent stipulated at trial and the evidence established
that Respondent officials were aware of its practice of per-
mitting employees to leave the premises without punching
out if they received oral permission from a supervisor. In this
connection Supervisor Donalson testified that when Keyes
investigated the facts surrounding the subsequent decision to
discharge the three discriminatees, he informed Keyes of Re-
spondent’s oral permission policy.
Moreover, the evidence established, and Respondent’s at-
torneys admitted at trial, that not only was it aware of such
practice but that the discriminatees had taken advantage of
such policy in the past without any discipline. Timmins left
with oral permission by Sturgis to buy a battery and go to
the bank, and Elliott left with oral permission to keep a med-
ical appointment. Respondent’s attorneys admit this, but
argue without any merit, in my opinion, that its one thing to
permit an employee to leave or keep medical appointments
and another to permit employees to leave to see another em-
ployee’s boat. I fail to see a distinction. If Respondent gives
oral permission knowing why the employees want to leave,
it has determined such reason is legitimate and can hardly
justify a discharge when the employees act on such permis-
sion. Under these circumstances it is justified to assume the
decision to discharge was motivated by unlawful consider-
ations. The Board has held that a discharge for conduct toler-
ated in the past is a factor which tends to establish unlawful
motivation. Garrison Valley Center, 277 NLRB 1422 (1985).
The facts also establish that Respondent failed to follow
its usual pattern of progressive discipline. Even assuming,
contrary to the credible facts in this case, that the
discriminatees had left without permission, Respondent en-
gaged in disparate treatment as to its discipline. All three
discriminatees were exemplary workers without any prior
warnings in the personnel record for any reason. Respond-
ent’s disciplinary procedures enumerate these infractions
which allow it to fire employees without warning. One of
these infractions is unauthorized leaving of the work area.
Despite this, Respondent’s records establish that Howard
Diaz, an employee who abandoned his shift without notifying
his supervisor, the identical offense the discriminatees were
alleged to have committed, was given a second written warn-
ing for that offense. This warning notes Diaz previously
committed the same infraction.
The failure to report to work on three consecutive days
without adequate justification is another dischargeable of-
fense, nevertheless, Respondent’s records establish that Rich-
ard Trevorah, an employee who was absent for an entire
week without calling, was only given a final warning. The
warning indicates that Respondent did not quite believe
Trevorah’s excuse, but was willing to waive termination
based on Trevorah’s past performance. When it came to the
discriminatees, however, their excellent record did them no
good.
Another of the 10 infractions which allow immediate dis-
charge is the willful falsification of company records. Never-
theless, Respondent’s records establish that Thomas Grant,
an employee who falsified his worksheet, was given a pun-
ishment of coaching and counseling, the mildest discipline
possible. Thus, the record is clear that, although Respondent
could summarily discharge employees for certain offenses, in
the past it did not do so but, rather, adhered to its policy of
progressive discipline. That practice suddenly changed when
the discriminatees were the one alleged to have committed
a dischargeable offense.
The fact that a discharge is for conduct tolerated in the
past is a factor in showing that union activity is the moti-
vating factor. Garrison Valley Center, supra.
During the course of this trial, Respondent counsel con-
tended that permission would not have been granted to the
discriminatee to see a boat, although permission was granted
in the past for the discriminatees to go to the bank or to keep
medical appointments. During the trial, before all the evi-
dence was in I stated that there was a difference in giving
such permission for need, as against recreation purposes.
However, after all the evidence was in, and after reviewing
the entire record and briefs, it is clear that Respondent,
through Scott-Ramsay did give such permission, and that Re-
spondent’s highest officials were aware of such permission
prior to Respondent’s decision to discharge the employees.
Moreover, a careful examination of the violations that were
condoned by Respondent does indeed establish disparate
treatment by Respondent.
Finally, during the course of this trial, Respondent’s high-
est officials when pressed about the apparent inconsistencies
as to the reasons for the discharges, testified incredibly that
notwithstanding the discriminatees obtaining permission, Re-
spondent’s past practice of permitting employees to leave the
premises with oral permission, including the discriminatees,
on other occasions, prior to their union activity and its dis-
parate treatment directed to the discriminatees concerning
Respondent’s written policy relating to dischargeable of-
fenses, that the discriminatees were discharged because they
had intended to leave without asking permission. In other
words, Respondent contends that the discriminatees were dis-
charged because Respondent speculatively concluded that the
employees would have left without permission if Scott-
1160 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ramsay had not given them permission. In this connection
when asked why Respondent took drastic action of firing
three good workers, Keyes said it was because the three were
blatantly planning to leave the premises. Sebestyen testified
that when he reviewed the discharge, he did not do his nor-
mal review of the employees’ personnel records because of
the blatancy of the discriminatees’ intention. Ellis, too, said
that part of his decision was based on the three discussing
leaving prior to doing so, and discussing the kind of punish-
ment they might get.
Respondent’s stress on the employees’ alleged discussion
with Pearl prior to leaving amounts to punishment based on
intent. Even assuming, arguendo, that the employees were
‘‘talking big’’ to Pearl about what they would do, the Re-
spondent’s stress on intent, rather than actuality, points to-
ward the conclusion that Respondent discharged them for a
discriminatory motive. To allow such a defense would lead
to an Orwellian world where people are punished for what
they think rather than what they do. Where an employer is
unable to settle on a reason for discharge but vacillates
among several asserted reasons, there is an inference that the
real reason for the discharge is a discriminatory reason. Ste-
ven Aloi Ford, 179 NLRB 229 (1969).
In my opinion, Respondent has utterly failed to satisfy its
Wright Line burden. Rather, Respondent’s defense conclu-
sively establishes General Counsel’s case. Accordingly, I
conclude that Timmins, Elliott, and Watkins were terminated
by Respondent entirely for their union activities and such
discharge was in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
Respondent’s 10(b) Contention
Respondent contends that the amendments filed on No-
vember 21, 1990, to the initial charges filed on August 3,
1990, by the individual discriminatees are barred by Section
10(b). The initial charges filed by the discriminatees on Au-
gust 3 alleged only the unlawful suspensions. Following the
investigation of these charges, the discriminatees, on Novem-
ber 21, 1990, filed amended charges which alleged the
8(a)(1) and (3) violations which took place in March and
April 1990 and are set forth and discussed above. It is clear
that the amended charges involve the Respondent’s animus
toward the Union generally, and toward discriminatee spe-
cifically, as the most active union employees. The individual
acts which establish Respondent’s animus, its promises of
benefits, grant of benefits, unlawful interrogations, also con-
stitute individual acts in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
as set forth and discussed above.
Nickles Bakery of Indiana, 296 NLRB 927 (1989), holds
that 8(a)(1) complaint allegations must be closely related to
the allegations or subject matter set forth as the basis for the
underlying charge. Nickles set forth several areas of inquiry
in order to determine if allegations are closely related. These
areas are: (1) whether the allegations involve the same legal
theory; (2) whether they arise from the same factual cir-
cumstances or sequence of events; and (3) whether respond-
ent would raise similar defenses to the allegations.
Regarding the first area of inquiry noted above, the legal
theory regarding the discharges and that regarding the other
violations alleged is the same, i.e., an illegal response by Re-
spondent to a unionization campaign and an attempt to pre-
clude any postelection union activity. Where the complaint
and charges involve acts that are part of the employer’s over-
all plan to resist employees’ unionization, the allegations in
the complaint have been found not to be barred by Section
10(b) though they were not alleged in the charge. Jennie-O
Foods, 301 NLRB 305 (1991). With regard to the second cri-
terion set forth in Nickles, all violations arise out of the same
factual circumstances, i.e., the union campaign. All violations
enabled Respondent to undermine union support in the first
and any subsequent elections and were part of the same se-
quence of events. Where the same course of conduct is in-
volved in the charge and in the complaint, the matters al-
leged in the complaint have been found to be timely. Helnick
Corp., 301 NLRB 128 (1991). Finally, Respondent either of-
fered no defenses to the 8(a)(1) and (3) allegations or stated
that they did not occur.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is, and has been, at all times material, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is, and has been, at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By soliciting employee grievances and promising to
remedy such grievances, to discourage union activity and
support Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By promising improved wages and other benefits to dis-
courage employee support for the Union, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By interrogating their employees concerning their union
activities and sympathies, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. By increasing employees wages, food benefits, and uni-
form allowance in order to discourage such employees union
activities or support for the Union, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
7. By discharging its employees Robert Elliott, Earle Tim-
mins, and Keith Watkins, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
REMEDY
It having heen found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since I have found that Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged its employees Elliott, Timmins, and Watkins, I shall
recommend Respondent make whole said employees together
with interest as set forth below, from the date of their termi-
nation until their reinstatement or valid offer of reinstate-
ment.
Backpay for the above employees shall be computed in ac-
cordance with the formula approved in F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Interest on and after January 9,
1990, shall be computed at the ‘‘short-term Federal rate’’ for
the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amendment
26 U.S.C. § 6621 in accordance with New Horizons for the
Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Interest on amounts ac-
crued prior to January 1, 1987 (the effective date of the 1986
amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621, shall be computed as set
forth in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977)).
1161MARRIOTT CORP.
I shall also recommend that Respondent expunge from its
records any reference to the discharges of the above-named
employees, and to provide written notice of such expunction
to those employees, and to inform them that Respondent’s
unlawful conduct will not be used as personnel action con-
cerning them. Sterling Sugars, 261 NLRB 472 (1982).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]