Mark A. Haines, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 16, 1999
01974634_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 16, 1999)

01974634_r

03-16-1999

Mark A. Haines, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Mark A. Haines, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01974634

) Agency No. 4C-150-1093-94

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely filed an appeal with this Commission from the agency's

failure to respond to his request for implementation of the agency's

February 10, 1997 final decision (FAD) concerning his complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly calculated the amount

of backpay, benefits and interest due appellant.

BACKGROUND

The record indicates that on December 7, 1994, appellant filed a formal

complaint, alleging that he was the victim of unlawful employment

discrimination on the basis of physical disability (Carpal Tunnel

Syndrome) when he was terminated from his employment on September

13, 1994. A hearing was conducted before an Administrative Judge

(AJ), who ultimately found in appellant's favor. On February 10,

1997, the agency issued a FAD adopting the AJ's recommended decision

and awarding appellant, inter alia, �back pay calculated in accordance

with 5 C.F.R. Section 550.805, retroactive to the date of [appellant's]

termination at issue.�

On or about November 18, 1997, appellant received a check for $45,717.47

in net back pay, and on or about November 25, 1997, appellant received a

second check in the amount of $7,005.57 in interest on the back pay, for

a total of $52,723.04. On December 22, 1997, appellant filed a Request

for Specific Implementation of the agency's February 10, 1997 FAD.

Therein, appellant contended that the agency erred in its calculation

of back pay due appellant when:

The agency deducted $1,344.72 earned by appellant from weekend reserve

duty. Appellant asserted that 5 C.F.R. �550.805(e) provides only for

deductions from amounts earned from other employment engaged in by the

employee to take the place of employment from which the employee has

been separated by the unjustified or unwarranted personnel action.

As the money earned from appellant's weekend reserve duty was money

that he would have earned regardless of whether he was employed by the

agency, appellant contended that it should not have been deducted from

the back pay due him.

The agency deducted unemployment compensation in the amount of $3,458.00,

in contradiction to the holding of Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721

F.2d 77, 82-85 (3d Cir. 1983), which prohibits such a deduction.

The agency failed to use the correct interest rates authorized by 5

C.F.R. �550.806(d) and 26 U.S.C. �6621(a)(1).

The agency calculated the interest on the back pay after taxes rather

than on the pre-tax back pay.

The agency calculated only simple interest on the back pay due, rather

than interest compounded in accordance with 5 C.F.R. �550.806(e).

In response to appellant's appeal, the agency asserts that appellant's

military reserve wages were not deducted from his back pay, but were

actually deducted from his outside earnings, in effect increasing

appellant's back pay and interest payments. Additionally, the agency

contends that under the applicable state law, repayment of unemployment

compensation is required when an employee later receives back pay for

that period. Finally, the agency argues that it properly calculated the

amount of interest on appellant's back pay in accordance with its standard

procedures and the Memorandum of Understanding with the Postal Unions

of 1990. Specifically, the agency asserted that appellant improperly

used the IRS Overpayment Interest Rate, rather than the Federal Judgement

Interest Rate used by the agency.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(b)(ii) provides that back pay is to

be computed in the manner prescribed by 5 C.F.R. �550.805. Office of

Personnel Management Regulation 5 C.F.R. �550.805(e)(1), in turn,

provides for the deduction of any amounts earned by an employee from

other employment undertaken to replace the employment from which the

employee had been separated by the unjustified or unwarranted personnel

action during the period covered by the corrective action, but not

including additional employment the employee may have engaged in both

while federally employed and erroneously separated.

In the instant case, the record discloses that appellant would have

obtained income from his military reserve duty even had he not been

improperly discharged. Accordingly, this income should not have been

deducted from the back pay he was due. The agency asserts that this

income was not deducted from his back pay, but instead was deducted from

the total of his outside employment income for that period, thereby

increasing the net amount of back pay due him. However, the record

contains neither a clear representation of the agency's computation

of appellant's back pay, nor a clear identification of the specific

deductions made therein. Absent this information the Commission is unable

to determine whether appellant's military reserve pay was deducted from

his back pay.

The Commission has determined that certain interim earnings may

be deducted from gross wages. See 29 C.F.R. Part 1613, App. A,

Policy Statement of Remedies and Relief for Individual Cases of

Unlawful Discrimination. However, the Commission has also held that

unemployment compensation may not be deducted from a back pay award.

See Scott v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01921641 (June 11, 1993); Collick-Brown

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01910904 (March 26, 1991).

In reaching this conclusion, the Commission relied on the Third

U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc.,

721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983), which held that although the legislative

history of Title VII did not specifically address whether unemployment

compensation is to be regarded as deductible "interim earnings," guidance

could be found in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) practice

of awarding back pay. The Court held that since the NLRB's refusal to

deduct unemployment benefits has been upheld by the United States Supreme

Court, and the Title VII back pay provision was based on the NLRA's back

pay provision, employers in Title VII cases could not deduct unemployment

compensation as an offset from back pay awards. Craig, 721 F.2d at 82-85.

See also Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Financial Corp., 17 F.3d 1104 (8th

Cir. 1994). Based on the foregoing, we find that the agency incorrectly

deducted unemployment compensation from appellant's back pay.

Office of Personnel Management Regulation 5 C.F.R. �550.806(d) provides

that the rate or rates used to compute the interest payment on a back

pay award shall be the annual percentage rate or rates established by

the Secretary of the Treasury as the overpayment rate under Internal

Revenue Service Regulation 26 U.S.C. �6621(a), for the period or periods

of time for which interest is payable. Further, 5 C.F.R. �550.806(e)

provides that the interest rate shall be compounded daily.

The agency acknowledged that it utilized the Federal Judgement Interest

rate instead of the rate established under Internal Revenue Service

Regulation 26 U.S.C. �6621(a), for the period or periods of time for which

interest was payable. Consequently, we find that the agency was in error.

In contention (4), appellant also claimed that the agency erroneously

calculated interest owed to him on the basis back pay due after taxes.

Appellant asserted that the agency should have calculated interest on

the basis of the pre-tax back pay due him. However, the Commission has

previously held that interest should be computed on all net back pay due.

See Wrigley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04950005

(February 15, 1996), citing Williams v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01933156 (May 4, 1994), request for reconsideration

denied EEOC Request No. 05940680 (February 17, 1995). Accordingly, the

Commission finds that the agency properly determined that the interest

due appellant was to be on the basis of back pay after taxes, rather

than back pay before taxes.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's determination concerning contention (4) was

proper, and is AFFIRMED for the reasons set forth herein. The agency's

determination concerning contention (1) is hereby VACATED. The agency's

determination concerning contentions (2), (3), and (5) was improper,

and is hereby REVERSED. This matter is REMANDED to the agency for

further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following actions:

(1) Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall calculate the amount of back pay due appellant

pursuant to 5 C.F.R. �550.805, and using the following guidelines:

Appellant's military reserve pay shall not be deducted from the gross

back pay;

Unemployment compensation shall not be deducted from the gross back pay;

In determining the interest owed appellant, the interest rate identified

in 5 C.F.R. �550.806(d) (and 26 U.S.C. �6621(a)(1)) shall be used,

it shall be compounded daily in accordance with 5 C.F.R. �550.806(e),

and it shall be applied to the back pay due appellant after deductions,

including taxes.

(2) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, the agency shall pay appellant the difference between

the amount he received on or about November 18 and 25, 1997, and the

amount calculated pursuant to section (1) of this Order, plus interest

on the difference as calculated pursuant to 5 C.F.R. �550.806.

A copy of the agency's calculations and copy of the check issued to

appellant must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.

The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 16, 1999

____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations