Mariottini, Giorgio et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 23, 2019

15684054 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/684,054 08/23/2017 Giorgio Mariottini 010829-9140.US01 7571
46844 7590 12/23/2019
PERKINS COIE LLP - Micron
PATENT-SEA
PO BOX 1247
SEATTLE, WA 98111-1247
EXAMINER
TRAN, DZUNG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2829
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/23/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentprocurement@perkinscoie.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GIORGIO MARIOTTINI, SAMEER VADHAVKAR,
WAYNE HUANG, ANILKUMAR CHANDOLU, and MARK BOSSLER
____________

Appeal 2019-002806
Application 15/684,054
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, and
BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to finally reject claims 1–12, which are all of the claims pending in
this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 In this Decision, we refer to the Specification filed Aug. 23, 2017
(“Spec.”); Final Office Action dated Apr. 16, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Advisory
Action dated July 3, 2018 (“1st Advisory Act.”); Appeal Brief filed Sept. 17,
2018 (“Br.”); Advisory Action dated Oct. 17, 2018 (“2nd Advisory Act.”);
and Examiner’s Answer dated Dec. 20, 2018 (“Ans.”). There is no reply
brief.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Micron Technology, Inc. as the
real party in interest. Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure relates to semiconductor devices, and in
particular, to under-bump metal (UBM) structures for die-to-die and/or
package-to-package interconnects, and methods for manufacturing such
devices. Spec. ¶ 2; Abstract. Claim 1, the sole independent claim, illustrates
the claimed subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below from the
Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief:
1. A method comprising:
forming a collar from an anti-wetting material, wherein the
collar surrounds at least a portion of a sidewall of an
under-bump metal (UBM) structure without covering a
top surface of the UBM structure, wherein the UBM
structure comprises a first conductive material and a
second conductive material disposed over the first
conductive material, and wherein the collar surrounds at
least a portion of the first conductive material and a
portion of the second conductive material; and
disposing a solder material on the top surface of the UBM
structure, wherein the solder material does not readily wet
to the anti-wetting material when the solder material is in
liquid phase.
Br. 8 (key disputed claim language italicized and bolded).
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references as evidence
in rejecting the claims on appeal:
Name Reference Date
Akram US 5,736,456 Apr. 7, 1998
Ho et al. (“Ho”) US 2010/0109159 A1 May 6, 2010
Hwang et al. (“Hwang”) US 2014/0363970 A1 Dec. 11, 2014
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REJECTIONS
On appeal, the Examiner maintains (Ans. 3) the following rejections:
1. Claims 1–5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Hwang in view of Ho (“Rejection 1”). Final Act. 3–5.
2. Claims 6–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Hwang in view of Ho as applied to claim 1 above, and
further in view of Akram (“Rejection 2”). Id. at 6–8.
OPINION
Having considered the respective positions advanced by the Examiner
and Appellant in light of this appeal record, we affirm the Examiner’s
rejections based on the fact-finding and reasoning set forth in the Answer,
Final Office Action, and Advisory Actions, which we adopt as our own. We
add the following primarily for emphasis.
Rejection 1
The Examiner rejects claims 1–5 under § 103 as obvious over the
combination of Hwang and Ho (Final Act. 3–5), which we refer to as
Rejection 1. In response to the Examiner’s rejection, Appellant presents
argument for the patentability of claim 1 but does not present separate
argument for the patentability of remaining claims 2–5. Br. 5–6. We select
claim 1 as representative and claims 2–5 stand or fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner determines that the combination of Hwang and Ho
suggests a method satisfying all of the limitations of claim 1 and concludes
the combination would have rendered the claim obvious. Final Act. 3–4
(citing Hwang ¶¶ 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, Figs. 1E, 1F; Ho ¶¶ 25, 29, 53, Fig. 1).
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Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 should be
reversed because the cited art does not teach or suggest the “wherein the
collar surrounds at least a portion of a sidewall of an under-bump metal
(UBM) structure without covering a top surface of the UBM structure” and
“wherein the collar surrounds at least a portion of the first conductive
material” recitations of the claim. Br. 5. In particular, Appellant contends
Hwang does not disclose a collar that “surrounds at least a portion of the
first conductive material.” Id. at 5. Appellant further contends that because
Ho discloses a layer 140 that fully encapsulates the bump 130 and the UBM
layer 120 without any surfaces exposed to the atmosphere, it does not teach
or suggest a collar which “surrounds at least a portion of a sidewall of an
under-bump metal (UBM) structure without covering a top surface of the
UBM structure,” as recited in the claim. Id. at 5.
Appellant also contends the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 should be
reversed because the combination of Hwang and Ho does not disclose or
suggest “a molded material formed on the substrate and having substantially
vertical surfaces defining a cavity.” Id. at 6.
We do not find Appellant’s contentions persuasive of reversible error
in the Examiner’s rejection. Rather, on the record before us, we find a
preponderance of the evidence and sound technical reasoning support the
Examiner’s findings and determination that the combination of Hwang and
Ho suggests a method satisfying all of the limitations of claim 1 and
conclusion that the combination would have rendered the claim obvious.
Hwang ¶¶ 21, 22, 25, 26, 29, Figs. 1E, 1F; Ho ¶¶ 25, 29, 45, 53, Fig. 1.
Regarding the recitation “wherein the collar surrounds at least a
portion of a sidewall of an under-bump metal (UBM) structure without
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covering a top surface of the UBM structure,” as the Examiner finds (Ans. 4;
Final Act. 3), Hwang discloses UBM structures having multiple layers,
including a first UBM layer 14, a second UBM layer 16, and a protection
layer 22, and forming a collar 22a, which surrounds the sidewall of the
second UBM layer 16 without covering the top surface of the UBM
structure. Hwang ¶¶ 21, 22, 24, Figs. 1E, 1F.
Regarding the recitation “wherein the collar surrounds at least a
portion of the first conductive material,” as the Examiner finds (Ans. 5;
Final Act. 3), Ho discloses a UBM structure having multiple layers,
including a bump 130, a UBM layer 120, and a collar 140, which surrounds
at least a portion of the first conductive material 121 and the second
conductive material 122. Ho ¶¶ 25, 29, 45, Fig. 1. As the Examiner also
finds (Ans. 5–7), although Ho describes a preferred embodiment wherein the
collar 140 fully encapsulates the UBM structure, including the bump 130
and the UBM layer 120 without any surfaces exposed to the atmosphere (Ho
¶ 29, Fig. 1), the reference also teaches that the collar 140 may or may not
cover the top surface of the bump 130 (Ho ¶ 45).
Appellant’s arguments do not reveal reversible error in the
Examiner’s factual findings and analysis in this regard. Appellant’s
contentions at page 5 of the Appeal Brief are not persuasive because
Appellant attacks the references individually rather than the combined
teachings of the prior art as a whole. One cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where the rejection is based on a
combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Appellant’s contentions are premised on what Appellant contends Hwang
and Ho each teaches individually, and not the combined teachings of the
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references as a whole and what the combined teachings would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art.
As the Examiner finds and explains (Ans. 4–7), Hwang is relied upon
in the rejection for teaching or suggesting the recitation “wherein the collar
surrounds at least a portion of a sidewall of an under-bump metal (UBM)
structure without covering a top surface of the UBM structure” (Hwang ¶¶
21, 22, 24, Figs. 1E, 1F), while Ho is relied upon in the rejection for
teaching or suggesting the “wherein the collar surrounds at least a portion of
the first conductive material” recitation of the claim (Ho ¶¶ 25, 29, 45,
Fig. 1).
Appellant’s contentions at page 5 of the Appeal Brief regarding the
Ho reference are also misplaced because Ho’s teachings are not limited to
the disclosures in its preferred embodiments. See In re Mills, 470 F.2d 649,
651 (CCPA 1972) (“[A] reference is not limited to the disclosure of specific
working examples.”); see also In re Susi, 440 F.2d 442, 445-46 (CCPA
1971) (explaining that disclosure of particular preferred embodiments does
not teach away from a prior art reference’s broader disclosure).
As the Examiner finds (Ans. 5), Ho explicitly teaches that the layer
140 may or may cover the top surface of the UBM structure. See Ho ¶ 45
(disclosing that “layer 140 may or may not cover the top surface 131 of the
Ag bump 130”). Although paragraph 29 of Ho discusses an embodiment
wherein the layer 140 “[p]referably” fully encapsulates the UBM structure
without any surfaces exposed to the atmosphere, such disclosure is merely a
preferred embodiment and, without more, does not negate or take away from
Ho’s additional disclosure that the layer 140 may or may not cover the top
surface of UBM structure in paragraph 45 of the reference. See In re Preda,
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401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (explaining that a prior art reference’s
disclosure must be considered for all that it teaches, including “the
inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom”).
Appellant’s contentions that “the combination of Hwang and Ho fails
to disclose or suggest all of the features of claim 1” (Br. 6) and a person
skilled in the art would not have been “motivated to modify the combination
of Hwang and Ho” (id. at 6) are not persuasive because they are conclusory
and, without more, do not reveal reversible error in the Examiner’s factual
findings and analysis in this regard. Attorney argument is not evidence. In
re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that a “naked assertion” that
the references fail to disclose or suggest a claim limitation is not an
argument in support of separate patentability).
Appellant’s contention that the combination of Hwang and Ho fails to
disclose or suggest “a molded material formed on the substrate and having
substantially vertical surfaces defining a cavity” (Br. 6) is equally
unpersuasive because it too is conclusory and, as the Examiner points out
(Ans. 4), based on limitations not recited in the claims. See In re Van
Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]imitations are not to
be read into the claims from the specification.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–5 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combination of Hwang and Ho.
Rejection 2
In response to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6–12 under § 103 as
obvious over the combination of Hwang, Ho, and Akram (Final Act. 6–8),
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which we refer to as Rejection 2, Appellant does not present any new or
additional substantive arguments in the Appeal Brief, and apparently intends
to rely on the same arguments previously presented above in response to the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Accordingly, based on the fact-finding and reasoning provided by the
Examiner at pages 3–7 of the Answer and pages 3–8 of the Final Office
Action, and for principally the same reasons discussed above for affirming
the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 6–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combination of
Hwang, Ho, and Akram.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5 103 Hwang, Ho 1–5
6–12 103 Hwang, Ho, Akram 6–12
Overall
Outcome
1–12

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1)(iv).
AFFIRMED