Maria SINGSON

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 22, 2020

2020001440 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/483,754 05/30/2012 Maria SINGSON 384.9109USU/384 3714
27623 7590 09/22/2020
OHLANDT, GREELEY, RUGGIERO & PERLE, LLP
ONE LANDMARK SQUARE, 10TH FLOOR
STAMFORD, CT 06901
EXAMINER
GREGG, MARY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/22/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MARIA SINGSON
____________________

Appeal 2020-001440
Application 13/483,754
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JUSTIN BUSCH, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 3, 4, 21, 23, 24, 41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65. Appellant has canceled
claims 2, 5–20, 22, 25–40, 42, 45–60, 62, 64, and 66. See Resp. After
Final 2–7 (filed March 13, 2019). We have jurisdiction over the remaining
pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to “a
credit behavior network mapping procedure.” Spec. ¶ 1. In a disclosed
embodiment, a credit behavior network map is based on a data structure that
defines paths (i.e., relationships) between a plurality of entities. Spec. ¶ 9.
According to the Specification, constructing a credit behavior network map
for an entity, “provides a globally accurate financial model that can, for
example, identify disruptions of credit at varying points of a credit supply
chain and associate those disruptions to an ultimate affect [sic] on the
operations of the company of interest.” Spec. ¶ 27.
Claims 1, 21, and 41 are independent claims. Claim 1 is
representative of the subject matter on appeal (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) and is reproduced below:
1. A computer implemented method that creates a credit
behavior network map between a plurality of entities, said
method comprising:
using a processor of said computer in accordance with
instructions read from a memory of said computer associated
with said processor for:
receiving an identifier of a first entity;
performing a first search of at least one database that
returns an identifier of a second entity having a business
relationship with said first entity, wherein said second entity is a
creditor of said first entity, said first search also returning an
identifier of an entity hierarchically related to said first entity;
performing a second search of said at least one database
that returns an identifier of a third entity, wherein said third entity
is a creditor of said second entity, and an identifier of a fourth
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entity that is one of a creditor or a maker of a credit inquiry of
said entity hierarchically related to said first entity;
constructing said credit behavior network map in a storage
device defined by a data structure based on said identifier of said
first entity, said identifier of said second entity, said identifier of
said third entity, said identifier of said fourth entity, and an
identifier of said entity hierarchically related to said first entity,
wherein said credit behavior network map comprises a path
between said first entity and said third entity via said second
entity, and a path between said first entity and said fourth entity
via said entity hierarchically related to said first entity, so that
said credit behavior network map is a two dimensional credit
behavior network map formed in said storage device;
said data structure being representative of cash flow
signals and trends for suppliers and suppliers' suppliers of a said
first entity;
printing or displaying the two dimensional credit behavior
network map on a printer or on a display, respectively, associated
with a user terminal, so that a user can view and act upon
information displayed by using said two dimensional credit
behavior network map to determine a risk of disruption of a
global supply chain of said first entity at varying points of a credit
supply chain, and to associate the disruption with an ultimate
effect on the operations of the first entity.

The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1, 3, 4, 21, 23, 24, 41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Final Act. 8–26.2

2 We note that the statement of rejection does not include claim 21, but that
the body of the rejection does include a detailed rejection of claim 21. See
Final Act. 8, 14–20. Appellant does not assert prejudice due to the omission
of claim 21 in the statement of rejection. Accordingly, we treat the
Examiner’s omission of claim 21 in the statement of rejection as a harmless
typographical error.
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2. Claims 1, 4, 21, 24, 41, 44, 61, 63, and 65 stand rejected under
pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Psota et al. (US
2011/0173093 A1; July 14, 2011) (“Psota”); Pollin (US 5,504,677; Apr. 2,
1996); Baer et al. (US 7,043,488 B1; May 9, 2006) (“Baer”); and Martin
Neil, Using “Risk Maps” to visually model & communicate risk 1 (2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/20070918030942/http://www.agenarisk.com/res
ources/Using_Risk_Maps.pdf (“Neil”). Final Act. 27–42, 47–62, 69–84.
3. Claims 3, 23, and 43 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Psota, Pollin, Baer, Neil, and Ito et al.
(US 2005/0240483 A1; Oct. 27, 2005) (“Ito”). Final Act. 42–47, 62–69, 84–
88.

ANALYSIS3
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 6–12; Reply
Br. 2–4. In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in failing to
consider a Declaration by Dr. Xin Yuan (executed version filed October 4,
2018) (“Yuan Decl.”) in which Dr. Yuan asserts the claims provide a
technical solution to the technological problem faced by credit managers in
determining whether to extend credit to a particular entity. See Appeal
Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 2; see also Yuan Decl. 5. In addition, Appellant

3 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
July 8, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed December 11, 2019
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed October 11, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and the Final Office Action, mailed November 13, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken.
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challenges the Examiner’s determination that the claims set forth a mental
process and asserts, even if they did, the claims provide a technological
improvement by providing a two-dimensional credit behavior map. See
Reply Br. 4; Appeal Br. 8–12; see also Yuan Decl. 5. Moreover, Appellant
argues the Examiner failed to conduct an analysis of whether any additional
elements (beyond those that recite the alleged judicial exception) or
combination of elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities in the field, consistent with the requirements under the Office’s
Berkheimer Memorandum.4 Appeal Br. 6, 12; Reply Br. 2; see also Yuan
Decl. 6–7 (declaring that various steps recited by the independent claims are
not considered routine, conventional, and well-understood).
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance
for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically
with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office

4 On April 19, 2018, the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy issued a memorandum entitled: Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (i.e., “the Berkheimer Memorandum”)
(discussing the Berkheimer decision) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF). Support
for a finding that an element was well-understood, routine, or conventional
may be shown, for example, by citation to one or more court decisions
noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the element(s).
See Berkheimer Memorandum 3–4.

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Guidance”).5 If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially
recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look
at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the
claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Per the Office Guidance, this first inquiry (“Step 2A”) has two
prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite (i.e., set forth or describe) a
judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea such as a mental process), and (ii) if
so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. Office
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). Under the
Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. Office
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d). If the claim
is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does
not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step (“Step
2B”) is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements,
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at
217; Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05.

5 The Office Guidance, as well as guidance set forth in the Berkheimer
Memorandum, have been incorporated into the latest revision of the Manual
of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2103–2106.07(c) (9th ed.,
Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
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Here, we conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea. More
specifically, Appellant’s claims generally describe constructing a two
dimensional credit behavior network map for an identified entity. This is
consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Spec.
¶¶ 1 (describing the present disclosure relates to a “credit behavior network
mapping procedure), 8 (describing the disclosed invention as a credit
behavior mapping procedure that evaluates cash flow), 27 (describing a
method and system for “provid[ing] a forward looking credit network map
that provides financial data for a company of interest”); see also Appeal
Br. 4 (describing the claimed invention as a “method that creates a credit
behavior network map between a plurality of entities”). Moreover, it is
consistent with the Examiner’s characterization of the claims as a whole. Cf.
Final Act. 9–10 (identifying that the claims describe mental processes of
collecting data, recognizing data and creating a credit map from the data and
that “the focus of the invention is to use a credit behavior network map in
order to determine risk,” a fundamental economic practice).6

6 Although we describe the abstract idea slightly differently than the
Examiner, the Examiner’s characterization of the idea is not erroneous. “An
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
level of abstraction an examiner uses to describe an abstract idea need not
“impact the patentability analysis.” Apple, 842 F.3d at 1241. That is true
here. Regardless of the level of generality used to describe the abstract idea
recited, the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Accenture Glob.
Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the district court’s abstract idea of
organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract concept.”).
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Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that
the concept of constructing a two dimensional credit behavior network map
for an identified entity is a certain method of organizing human activity
(e.g., a commercial or legal interaction, including business relations)—i.e.,
an abstract idea.7 See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B); see also Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that “processing an application for financing a purchase” falls
within certain methods of organizing human activities and is, therefore, an

7 Additionally constructing a two dimensional credit behavior network map
for an identified entity may be considered a mental process that is applied
and performed in a computing environment. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 66–72
(describing the disclosed process of receiving an identifier of an entity for
which a credit behavior network map is to be created, searching databases
for related entities and entities that are creditors of the received entity and
related entities, searching databases for entities that are creditors to the
entities that are creditors of the identified entity and its related entities, and
constructing a data structure defining paths between the entities); see also
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(concluding that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their
minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, a[re] essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category”); Content Extraction &
Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (concluding that claims drawn to collecting data, recognizing certain
data within the collected set, and storing the recognized data were patent
ineligible, noting that “humans have always performed these functions”);
Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “the collection, storage, and recognition of
data” to be abstract); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elec. for Imaging, Inc.,
758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding “a process of organizing
information through mathematical correlations and . . . not tied to a specific
structure or machine” to be abstract); Evolutionary Intelligence LLC v.
Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F. App’x 679, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(affirming the District Court’s determination that “searching and processing
[stored] data” was a patent-ineligible mental process).
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abstract idea); In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(concluding the pending claims “directed to organizing business or legal
relationships in the structuring of a sales force” were patent ineligible);
Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (concluding that gathering financial information is
abstract—“a method for collection, analysis, and generation of information
reports, where the claims are not limited to how the collected information is
analyzed or reformed, is the height of abstraction”); Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(concluding that tracking financial transactions to determine whether they
exceed a pre-set spending limit was “not meaningfully different” from other
ideas found to be abstract involving certain methods of organizing human
activity).
Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that describe (i.e., recite) the concept of constructing a two
dimensional credit behavior network map for an identified entity,
emphasized in italics:
1. A computer implemented method that creates a credit
behavior network map between a plurality of entities, said
method comprising:
using a processor of said computer in accordance with
instructions read from a memory of said computer associated
with said processor for:
receiving an identifier of a first entity;
performing a first search of at least one database that
returns an identifier of a second entity having a business
relationship with said first entity, wherein said second entity is a
creditor of said first entity, said first search also returning an
identifier of an entity hierarchically related to said first entity;
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performing a second search of said at least one database
that returns an identifier of a third entity, wherein said third
entity is a creditor of said second entity, and an identifier of a
fourth entity that is one of a creditor or a maker of a credit
inquiry of said entity hierarchically related to said first entity;
constructing said credit behavior network map in a
storage device defined by a data structure based on said
identifier of said first entity, said identifier of said second entity,
said identifier of said third entity, said identifier of said fourth
entity, and an identifier of said entity hierarchically related to
said first entity, wherein said credit behavior network map
comprises a path between said first entity and said third entity
via said second entity, and a path between said first entity and
said fourth entity via said entity hierarchically related to said first
entity, so that said credit behavior network map is a two
dimensional credit behavior network map formed in said storage
device;
said data structure being representative of cash flow
signals and trends for suppliers and suppliers' suppliers of a said
first entity;
printing or displaying the two dimensional credit behavior
network map on a printer or on a display, respectively, associated
with a user terminal, so that a user can view and act upon
information displayed by using said two dimensional credit
behavior network map to determine a risk of disruption of a
global supply chain of said first entity at varying points of a credit
supply chain, and to associate the disruption with an ultimate
effect on the operations of the first entity.
More specifically, the concept of constructing a two dimensional
credit behavior network map for an identified entity comprises
(i) identifying the entity for which the credit behavior map is to be created
(i.e., the claimed step of receiving an identifier of a first entity);
(ii) conducting a search to identify (in a first dimension) a creditor entity
(and its creditor) of the first entity (i.e., the claimed steps of performing a
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search of at least one database to return an identifier of a second entity that is
a creditor of the first entity and performing a second search of at least one
database to return an identifier of a third entity that is a creditor of the
second entity); (iii) conducting a search to identify (in a second dimension)
an entity (and its creditor) related to the first entity (i.e., the claimed steps of
performing a search of at least one database to return an identifier of an
entity that is hierarchically related to the first entity and performing a second
search of at least one database to return an identifier of a fourth entity that is
a creditor of the hierarchically related entity); and (iv) constructing for the
identified first entity a two dimensional credit behavior network map defined
by the relationships of the identified entities (i.e., the claimed step of
constructing said credit behavior network map in a storage device defined by
a data structure based on said identifier of said first entity, said identifier of
said second entity, said identifier of said third entity, said identifier of said
fourth entity, and an identifier of said entity hierarchically related to said
first entity).
Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP
§ 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional
elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate
those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception
into a recognized practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
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Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state
(see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation
(see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Rather, the additional elements recite, inter alia, that the abstract idea
is performed by a computer using a processor to execute instructions stored
in computer memory. In addition, the limitations describing the credit
behavior network map and data structure do not impart patent eligibility but
instead merely refine the judicial exception of creating a two dimensional
credit behavior network map. Still further, the claimed step of printing or
displaying the generated credit behavior network map for a user to make a
risk assessment is the type of extra-solution activity (i.e., in addition to the
judicial exception) the courts have determined insufficient to transform
judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See
MPEP § 2106.05(g); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)
(explaining “[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process exalts form over substance”); Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recognizing “that
merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and
analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for
presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
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analysis”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.),
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’g 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065
(E.D. Mo. 2011) (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . .
are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”);
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and
analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection
and analysis”) (quotations omitted).
We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 8–11) and Dr. Yuan (see
Yuan Decl. 3–5)8 that the additional elements integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application by providing an improvement to the
functioning of a computer or other technology.
“To be a patent-eligible improvement to computer functionality, we
have required the claims to be directed to an improvement in the
functionality of the computer or network platform itself.” Customedia
Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(discussing the claims in cases such as Enfish,9 Visual Memory,10 Gemalto,11

8 As set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a), it is appropriate and relevant to
consider a declaration under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 regarding “how one of
ordinary skill in the art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.”
9 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F3d 1327, 1337–39 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
10 Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
11 Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1151 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
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Ancora,12 Finjan,13 and Data Engine14 were all directed to improvements in
computer functionality). As discussed above, the claims are not directed to
an improvement in computer functionality, but rather are directed to
constructing a two dimensional credit behavior network map for an
identified entity that is facilitated by a generically claimed and generically
described computer system.
Moreover, “claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent with
applying the abstract idea on a computer [is] insufficient to render the claims
patent eligible as an improvement to computer functionality.” Customedia,
951 F.3d at 1364 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also In re
Rosenberg, 813 F. App’x 594, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (unpublished)
(determining “[t]he ability to make assessments more quickly to provide
instructions on whether to modify a clinical trial is at best an improvement
on an abstract process itself and not a technical improvement”); Interval
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is
well-settled that placing an abstract idea in the context of a computer does
not ‘improve’ the computer or convert the idea into a patent-eligible
application of that idea.”) (internal citation omitted).
Dr. Yuan declares that the results achieved by the claimed method are
“not achievable by manual efforts in a consistent and efficient manner.”
Yuan Decl. 4. This purported improvement, however, relates to the abstract

12 Ancora Techs. Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
13 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
14 Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1007–08 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
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idea, and does not improve a computer, technology, or a technical field. See
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We . . . look to whether the claims in these patents focus
on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are
instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely
invoke generic processes and machinery.”) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)
(“the judicial exception alone cannot provide the improvement”). “[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.” Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278; see also OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F. 3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that
“relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible”) (citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 224 (“use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple
transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive
concept)); Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36 (distinguishing between claims
wherein the focus of the claims is on an improvement in computer
capabilities and those that invoke a computer as a tool); Two-Way Media Ltd
v. Comcast Cable Comms., LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(explaining that the pending claims failed to describe how the claimed
architecture led to an improvement in the functioning of the system).
In addition, as provided for in the October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October Update”), the
“specification should be evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides
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sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
the claimed invention as providing the improvement.” October Update at
12; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d)(1). “[I]f the specification explicitly sets
forth an improvement but in a conclusory manner (i.e., a bare assertion of an
improvement without the detail necessary to be apparent to a person of
ordinary skill in the art), the examiner should not determine the claim
improves technology.” October Update at 12; see also MPEP
§ 2106.04(d)(1). We do not find that the Specification sets forth the
requisite details of an alleged technological improvement.
As the court in Enfish explained, “the first step in the Alice inquiry . . .
asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement
in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335–36. As discussed above, the focus of the pending claims is
on constructing a two dimensional credit behavior network map for an
identified entity and the recited computing elements are invoked merely as a
tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
Further, the claimed computer, processor, memory, storage device,
and databases are generically recited and described in the Specification at a
high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 29–40, Fig. 1. As such, the claims do
not apply or use a particular machine in the context of a method claim. See
Versata Dev. Group v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must
“play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed,
rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a
solution to be achieved more quickly”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b).
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Appellant’s reliance (see Appeal Br. 7–8) on a non-binding, non-
precedential decision of the Board in Ex Parte Tavares, Appeal No. 2017-
009694, 2019 WL 645861 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) is unavailing. As the
Examiner explains (see Ans. 4), in Tavares, the Board determined the
pending claims were patent eligible because they integrated the judicial
exception (i.e., a mental process) into a practical application because, in part,
the claims further recited generating an interactive formatted graphical
report using auto-graphics zones and comprised a plurality of selectable
views. See Tavares, 2019 WL 645861, at *6. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertions (see Appeal Br. 8), the generated credit behavior network maps
are not interactive formatted graphical reports.
For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or
combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice
(i.e., step 2B of the Office Guidance) to determine if there are additional
limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims
amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–79). As stated in the Office Guidance,
many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to
“significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already
considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been
integrated into a practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56;
see also MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I). Thus, at this point of our analysis, we
determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of
limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
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field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a
high level of generality. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP
§ 2106.05(II). “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369.
Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (alone or
when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well-understood,
routine, and conventional. Appellant describes the components (i.e., a
computer, processor, memory, storage device, database) and functions
performed by the components (i.e., receiving data, performing a search of a
database, processing data (e.g., constructing the credit behavior network map
using the relationships between the various entities), and printing or
displaying the results) at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 29–40, 66–
72, Figs. 1, 6.
We disagree with Dr. Yuan (see Yuan Decl. 6–7) that the recited
functions are not routine, conventional, and well-understood. Conventional
computer components operating to collect, manipulate, and display data are
well understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan. See Mortg.
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (generic computer components, such as an “interface,”
“network,” and “database,” fail to satisfy the inventive concept
requirement); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a
‘communications controller’ and [a] ‘data storage unit’ capable of
performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions
required by the method claims.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem.
Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that receiving a
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request to execute a database search and delivering records are routine
computer functions that can only be described as generic or conventional);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That
a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming.”).
To the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek to tie-up (i.e.,
preempt) an abstract idea (see Appeal Br. 12), we are unpersuaded of
Examiner error. “‘[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.’” FairWarning IP LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., 788 F. 3d at 1362–
63 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”). Further, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to
disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they
are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”
Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4,
21, 23, 24, 41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
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Rejections under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant argues the Examiner erred by relying on a proposed
combination of references that require a level of extraordinary skill beyond
that of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Appeal Br. 13–14.
Although it is always preferable for the factfinder to specify the level
of skill it has found to apply to the invention at issue, the absence of specific
findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error
where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for
testimony is not shown. Okajima v. Bourdeau 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (Citing Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755
F.2d 158, 163 (Fed.Cir.1985)).
We note, as does the Examiner (see Ans. 11), that Appellant has not
identified what specifically would require extraordinary skill in the art.
Appellant’s conclusory statement that extraordinary skill would be required
to achieve the claimed invention from the Examiner’s proposed combination
of references is not persuasively supported by argument or evidence.
It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is
not evidence).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the proposed combination
requires extraordinary skill in the art.
Appellant also asserts the Examiner erred in relying on Neil because
Neil is in a non-analogous field of endeavor and its teachings are not
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applicable to the specific problem of constructing two-dimensional credit
behavior network maps. Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 5–6.
The correct inquiry for whether a reference is analogous art to the
claimed invention is if (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor
as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the
reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even
if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). In re
Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In order for a reference to be
“reasonably pertinent” to the problem, it “logically would have commended
itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Icon
Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Neil is analogous art. See
Ans. 15. As recited in Appellant’s claim 1, a two-dimensional credit
behavior network map is constructed for an identified entity “so that a user
can view and act upon information displayed . . . to determine a risk of
disruption of a global supply chain of said first entity at varying points of a
credit supply chain . . ..” (Emphasis added.) As the Examiner explains, Neil
teaches that risk data networking is applicable in various fields of use
including determining the operational risk in financial institutions. Ans. 15
(citing Neil, slide 39). Thus, Neil is (at least) reasonably pertinent to the
problem faced by Appellant and is, therefore analogous art.
Appellant asserts that the Examiner failed to consider the declaration
of Dr. Yuan regarding the Examiner’s rejection of the pending claims under
pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 5.
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Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, Dr. Yuan’s declaration was
submitted to rebut the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
Yuan Decl. 3 (“I understand that in the Office Action, claims 1, 3, 4, 21, 23,
24, 41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because
they are directed to a judicial exception (abstract idea) without significantly
more. I believe that the Office Action contains at least two errors in the
substance of the rejection stated above.”) (emphasis added).
Appellant also asserts that “rejecting the claims on the basis of four
and five references represents the use of impermissible hindsight.” Appeal
Br. 15.
“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into
account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the
time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge
gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”
In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313–14 (CCPA 1971). The U.S.
Supreme Court has held the relevant inquiry in an obviousness analysis is
whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
As an initial matter, we disagree with Appellant’s underlying premise
that an obviousness rejection that relies on four or five references
impermissibly incorporates hindsight reconstruction by the Examiner.
Reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without
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more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. In re
Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Moreover, as set forth in both the Final Rejection and Answer, the
Examiner sets forth articulated reasoning with rational underpinning for the
proposed combinations of references. See Final Act. 35–41; Ans. 16–17; see
also Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988.
Appellant also recites a number of limitations from the claims and
asserts that none of the references teaches the recited limitations. See
Appeal Br. 15–18.
We do not find Appellant’s conclusory assertions persuasive of
Examiner error because 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) requires more
substantive arguments in an Appeal Brief than a mere recitation of the claim
elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not
found in the prior art. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2011). Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the Examiner makes
comprehensive findings for the recited claim limitations (see, e.g., Final
Act. 27–41). Appellant does not persuasively rebut these findings.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For similar reasons, we also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 21 and 41, which
recite commensurate limitations and were not argued separately. See Appeal
Br. 18; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Additionally, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 3, 4, 23, 24, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65, which
depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not argued separately with
particularity. See Appeal Br. 18–19; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 21, 23, 24,
41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 21, 23, 24,
41, 43, 44, 61, 63, and 65 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 21,
23, 24, 41,
43, 44, 61,
63, 65
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 4, 21,
23, 24, 41,
43, 44, 61,
63, 65

1, 4, 21, 24,
41, 44, 61,
63, 65
103(a) Psota, Pollin, Baer,
Neil
1, 4, 21,
24, 41, 44,
61, 63, 65

3, 23, 43 103(a) Psota, Pollin, Baer,
Neil, Ito
3, 23, 43
Overall
Outcome
1, 3, 4, 21,
23, 24, 41,
43, 44, 61,
63, 65

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED