Maremont Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 18, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 746 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Maremont Corporation and International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case 10-CA- 11583
May 18, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND
WALTHER
On June 22, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Ivar
H. Peterson issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding in which he found that Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act. Thereafter, the Respondenf filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
By order dated November 1, 1976, the National
Labor Relations Board remanded the instant pro-
ceeding to the Administrative Law Judge for the
purpose of preparing and issuing a supplemental
decision setting forth resolutions of the credibility of
witnesses and specific findings of fact with respect to
several alleged incidents of discriminatory enforce-
ment of Respondent's no-solicitation rule. On No-
vember 17, 1976, the Administrative Law Judge
issued his Supplemental Decision, also attached
hereto, in which he resolved the credibility of
witnesses and reaffirmed the findings of fact made in
his June 22, 1976, Decision. Thereafter, the Respon-
dent filed exceptions to the Administrative Law
Judge's Supplemental Decision and a brief in support
of its exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision and Supplemental Decision in
light of all the exceptions and briefs and has decided
to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
In his initial Decision, the Administrative Law Judge stated that his
findings of fact were based on his observation of the witnesses as they
testified. The Board remanded the proceeding to the Administrative Law
Judge for more specific findings of fact and credibility resolutions. We did
not require further explication of the reasons behind his credibility
resolutions. In his Supplemental Decision, the Administrative Law Judge
complied precisely with our remand Order and credited certain testimony
with respect to all the instances set forth in our Order. It is improper to read
the Supplemental Decision in isolation, for that Decision supplements
rather than replaces the original Decision. Thus, a careful reading of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision as a whole, as well as the entire
record, clearly establishes that the Administrative Law Judge's findings of
fact are based on proper considerations, and we can perceive of no rational
229 NLRB No. 114
the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Maremont
Corporation, Loudon, Tennessee, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
MEMBER WALTHER, dissenting:
I cannot join my colleagues in their adoption of the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision, Supplemental
Decision, and recommended Order. In my view, the
Administrative Law Judge's composite decision fails
to comply with the requirements of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and the Board's own Rules and
Regulations.
This case has been here once before on appeal
from the Administrative Law Judge's original Deci-
sion. At that time we concluded that the Administra-
tive Law Judge had failed to discuss and resolve
conflicts in the record testimony critical to the
determination of the case. We accordingly returned
the case to the Administrative Law Judge with
instructions to prepare a supplemental decision
resolving these critical testimonial conflicts and
setting forth findings of fact incident thereto.2
In response to our request, the Administrative Law
Judge has prepared a Supplemental Decision in
which he mechanically and without explanation
credits the version of the testimony most favorable to
the General Counsel. No reasons are provided for
crediting the General Counsel's witnesses over those
of Respondent, nor is the discredited evidence
discussed. I do not see how, in the absence of some
statement of reasons, my colleagues can find that the
basis for an additional remand of this proceeding. The case cited by our
dissenting colleague, Funkhouser Mills, Division of The Ruberoid Company,
132 NLRB 245 (1961), has no relevance to this case.
2 The complaint alleged that Respondent discriminatorily discharged
employee Charles Anderson in violation of Sec. 8(aX3) of the Act.
Respondent readily admitted that the proximate cause of Anderson's
discharge was his solicitation for the Union during working time.
Respondent defended its action, however, by arguing that Anderson's
solicitation was in violation of the Company's facially valid no-solicitation
rule. The 8(aX3) violation thus turned on General Counsel's ability to show
that Respondent's no-solicitation rule had been disparately enforced. To
this end, General Counsel called several witnesses who testified to numerous
occasions on which Respondent had failed to enforce the rule. Since this
testimony was contradicted by testimony from Respondent's witnesses,
however, and since the Administrative Law Judge failed to resolve the
resulting credibility conflicts, we culled from the record all of the incidents
of alleged disparate enforcement which we thought were relevant and asked
the Administrative Law Judge to address himself to these and make the
necessary credibility resolutions.
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MAREMONT CORPORATION
Administrative Law Judge's credibility resolutions,
though admirably succinct, fulfill the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Administrative Procedure Act, at 5 U.S.C.
Section 557 (c)(3), provides that "All decisions,
including initial, recommended, and tentative deci-
sions, are a part of the record and shall include a
statement of (A) findings and conclusions, and the
reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record." The
Board's Rules and Regulations and Statements of
Procedure, Series 8, as amended, contain an identical
rule.3 Since a material credibility finding is undoubt-
edly a "finding" within the meaning of the terms of
the above provisions, it should be accompanied by a
"reason or basis therefor." Anything less than this
fails to satisfy the procedural requirements imposed
by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Board's
regulations.
The purpose of the requirement that credibility
findings be accompanied by reasons is to enable the
Board and the reviewing courts to rationally review
the Administrative Law Judge's findings and to
insure that the Administrative Law Judge is not
acting out of pure whim. Even a slight statement of
reasons will suffice. Without any guidance from the
Administrative Law Judge on the reasons for
preferring one person's testimony over that of
another, however, the Board and the courts are in
effect put in the uncomfortable position of reviewing
the record de novo. 4
Consequently, although I understand my col-
leagues' reluctance to delay processing of this case
any longer, I think the Board has no other recourse
than to return the case to the Administrative Law
Judge to secure a reasoned explanation of his
findings. 5
3 Sec. 102.45, Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Series
8, as amended.
4There is no merit to my colleagues' contention that the generalized
reasons advanced by the Administrative Law Judge for his credibility
resolutions in the original Decision "carry over" to the Supplemental
Decision and supply us with adequate reasons for his credibility resolutions
there. The original Decision was found wanting precisely because the
Administrative Law Judge gave no indication that he even recognized the
existence of numerous critical testimonial conflicts, much less that he
recognized the need for resolving them. Many of the factual incidents dealt
with by the Supplemental Decision are not referred to in the original
Decision. Consequently, I regard as highly questionable the majority's
inference that the reasons articulated in the original Decision were meant to
or do in fact apply to the Supplemental Decision.
5 See Funkhouser Mills. Division of The Ruberoid Company, 132 NLRB
245 (1961).
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IvAR H. PETERSON, Administrative Law Judge: The
hearing in this case was held in Loudon, Tennessee, on 5
days beginning on January 29 and ending on February 7,
1976, based on the complaint issued by the Regional
Director for Region 10 on December I 1, which in turn was
based on a charge filed by International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, on October 20, 1975. The Union's charge
alleged that the Respondent, on or about September 2,
questioned its employees concerning their interest in the
Union and, on or about October 16, unlawfully discharged
Charles E. Anderson and thereafter failed and refused to
reinstate him. In its answer, dated December 20, the
Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint, although averring that it was a Tennessee and
not a Delaware corporation; however, it denied the
allegations concerning unfair labor practices.
Upon the basis of my observation of the witnesses as
they testified and a careful consideration of the briefs filed
with me on March 29, I1 make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of automobile exhaust systems at its
place of business located at Loudon, Tennessee, employing
some 800 employees. Admittedly, it is engaged in com-
merce and comes within the jurisdictional requirements of
the Board. It is also admitted that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
and that Foreman Sam Thompson, at all material times,
has been a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11)
of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The issues in this case are, primarily, two: (a) the legality
of the Respondent's no-solicitation and no-distribution
rule and (b) the termination of Anderson. It is the
contention of counsel for the General Counsel that the
Respondent's no-solicitation rule was not observed in
respect to many activities carried on in the plant by
employees, on occasion during working time. He further
contends that Anderson was unlawfully terminated, for
violating this rule.
According to counsel for the General Counsel, Anderson
took the initiative in the Union's organizational activities,
on May 17, 1975, and thereafter was the Union's principal
organizer within the plant. Evidence that the Government
presented is to the effect that Anderson made calls at the
homes of employees, attended meetings, was in substantial
part a principal actor in the plant organizing committee,
and obtained some 80 to 100 authorization cards, by far
more than the number obtained by any other employee. In
addition, Anderson testified that during the summer of
1974 he had engaged in activities on behalf of the United
Steelworkers of America and, during the weeks before a
Board election on August 16, 1974, in which the Steelwork-
ers was defeated, Anderson had signed a card for that
union, attended union meetings, solicited support among
employees, and had worn union insignia on his clothing for
some weeks prior to August 16. Indeed, Anderson testified
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that during the 1974 campaign he had become active about
"six weeks before the election," that he wore "two or three
badges on my shirt or wherever I could get one stuck," and
attended meetings of the Union. A fellow employee of
Anderson's, William Humphreys, testified that during the
period in question he observed Anderson wearing union
insignia "on his sleeve, shirt pockets, and I believe there
was one on the back of the collar of his shirt." According to
Humphreys, Anderson stated he was active in support of
the Union for a period of approximately 6 weeks.
Counsel for the Respondent, in his brief, asserts that
these accounts of Anderson's 1974 activity "are clearly a
fabricated house of cards which toppled before document-
ed facts about Anderson's employment during the summer
of 1974." There is no dispute that the Steelworkers election
was held on August 15 and 16, 1974. Relying on
documentary evidence, the Respondent points out that,
from June 23, 1974, until the date of the election, Anderson
worked only a total of 8 days; he was not at work from
June 23 to July 15 because of an operation, being
hospitalized for a period of time and drawing total
disability insurance compensation. Following the medical
leave of absence, Anderson spent the last 2 weeks of July
1974 at summer camp, on military leave; the records of the
Respondent show that Anderson worked 5 days commenc-
ing July 29 and ending on August 1, and then took a week's
vacation from August 5 to 9; he then worked 3 days,
August 12, 13, and 14, prior to the election. Counsel for the
Respondent states that the sinister purpose behind the
proffer of this false testimony of Anderson's involvement in
union activities in 1974 "is too obvious to belabor," and
submits that it "sheds considerable light on the general
credibility" of Anderson and his corroborating witnesses.
B. The No-Solicitation No-Distribution Rule
The Respondent's most recent edition of its employee
handbook, issued in 1975, contains the following provi-
sions concerning solicitation and distribution, for violation
of which an employee could be disciplined or discharged:
a. Solicitation and distribution of literature by
nonemployees on company property is prohibited.
b. Solicitation of any type of employees on compa-
ny property during working time is prohibited.
c. Distribution of literature by employees on
company property in nonworking areas during working
time is prohibited.
d. Distribution of literature by employees on
company property in working areas is prohibited.
e. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfer-
ing with employees or supervision at any time is
prohibited.
These handbooks were distributed to employees and the
pertinent rule was also posted on the Respondent's bulletin
board.
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that, while the
rule appears to be valid on its face, it was selectively
enforced and, in consequence, was invalid. He presented a
great deal of evidence to the effect that the employees of
the Respondent engaged in a vast number of solicitations
within the plant, some of which allegedly occurred during
working time; eight employee witnesses testified to that
effect. It is his view that the testimony of these witnesses
established that this was the case at least during 1974 and
for the following year until approximately the time that
Anderson was discharged in mid-October. Government
counsel submits that, by his estimate, the witnesses he
presented "related perhaps 30 or 40 separate examples or
instances of in-plant solicitation among employees during
their working time." On the other hand, counsel for the
Respondent, in his brief, asserts that, in the main, "This
virtual flood of related incidents of solicitation is irrelevant
because the alleged solicitation admittedly occurred either
in non-working time or out of the presence of supervision."
I think it quite unnecessary to relate in complete detail
the testimony concerning the incidents of solicitation that
occurred within the plant, some on working time, as
detailed by the testimony. There is no question, in my
mind, that employees solicited for a variety of matters,
such as the sale of merchandise, collections for flowers or
gifts, sales of chances on raffle tickets, and on "football
boards." There is also testimony that supervisory employ-
ees were involved in or present at some of these occurrenc-
es.
In my view, it seems entirely incredible that this
widespread solicitation occurred without the knowledge of
the Respondent's supervisory officials. Indeed, it seems
fairly plain to me that the Respondent, until shortly after
my colleague, Administrative Law Judge Charles W.
Schneider, issued his decision under date of August 6,
1975, relating to the discharge of one Philip Lemons,
which, in part, involved the alleged violation of the
Respondent's rule forbidding gambling on its premises at
any time, tolerated such practices. He found that the
Respondent did not enforce the rule literally but only for
such gambling, in the sense of play for money, where "the
outcome can be influenced by the participants, such as
card games, shooting dice, pitching coins, etc., and to
prohibit other types only where engaged in on working
time."
To illustrate the situation that prevailed, it seems
advisable to relate several typical examples. Connie
Russell, an employee, testified that Foreman Sam Thomp-
son, about August 1975, displayed a box of 8-track tapes at
his desk in the working area and suggested that she "go
through them and pick out what you want and pay me for
them." She also related that about 2 months before the
hearing a fellow employee, Larry Lankford, showed her a
tool set and stated, in the presence of Foreman Thompson,
that he had won it off the football board. She later heard
Thompson telling Bob Borff, the employee who had in fact
won the tool set, to "watch it, that he better be careful."
Mrs. Russell also related that before Anderson was
discharged she had not heard any supervisor make any
statements about solicitation in the plant but 2 or 3 days
after Anderson's termination Foreman Thompson told a
group of employees, shortly before worktime, "that we had
better watch our football boards and selling stuff on
company time." He added that "they were really cracking
down." Mrs. Russell also testified that she took up
collections for Christmas and birthday gifts during working
748
MAREMONT CORPORATION
time. During December 1975, Borff, after Russell had
taken up a collection for Foreman Thompson's Christmas
gift, clocked out and with Thompson's permission drove
into town where he purchased the gift. Following Ander-
son's termination, according to Russell, Foreman Thomp-
son, in connection with a flower collection for an employee
who had lost his son in the Army, stated that the flower
collection should be accomplished during breaktime.
Concerning clocking out to leave the plant for a meal, a
factor in Anderson's termination, Russell testified that she
several times failed to clock out but, following Anderson's
termination, she made it a point "to clock out every day
now."
Lloyd Robinson, an employee, testified that during 1975
he assisted in taking up a collection for flowers around 10
o'clock in the morning during working time and that
Foreman Thompson was aware of it and, in fact,
contributed. Thompson admitted this incident but claimed
it occurred in March rather than August, as Robinson
testified.
Patricia Millsaps, an employee, testified that in Novem-
ber 1975 she took up a collection for an employee's
husband who was in the hospital and that she did so on
working time with the knowledge of her foreman, Ray
King, and that Foreman King contributed, but that King
told another employee that he wished they had taken up
the collection on breaktime. Millsaps also related that she
also collected money during working time in 1975 on
behalf of a female employee who had injured her hand
while at work. Millsaps also testified that about Thanksgiv-
ing Plant Manager Mohney gave permission for a solicita-
tion during working time. In a memorandum dated
November 26, Mohney stated that Foreman King had
approached him at or about 10 o'clock in the morning,
stating that some employees had asked him if they could
take up a collection for flowers for an employee's father
who had passed away. He stated that the employees
"realized that such solicitation was to be done on breaks or
at lunch time but because of the Thanksgiving program
that had been planned for today they would not have any
other break or lunch time today. Therefore, they were
asking for permission to collect for flowers during the
shift." Mohney went on to relate that he gave permission,
but told King that they should proceed as discreetly as
possible and stated he gave permission because of the fact
that the plant would be shut down Thursday and Friday
and thus, "it was apparent to me that they would not be
able to collect for flowers and send them because of these
circumstances."
It is the testimony of employee Robinson that Foreman
Thompson questioned him about September 2, concerning
his attitude toward the Union. According to Robinson,
Thompson stated that he "just wanted to ask me one
question," and then inquired, "why were you so strong
against the Union last year, and you're for it this year."
Robinson told Thompson that the reason was that he
wanted more job security and better benefits. Foreman
Thompson acknowledged that he had such a conversation
with Robinson and, after Robinson explained why he was
in favor of the Union, Thompson said he was glad it was
not something he or the Respondent had done to make him
change his mind, and the subject was then dropped.
Thompson further stated that it was not necessary for him
to discuss the Union with Robinson in order to ascertain
whether he supported it, inasmuch as Robinson "was
wearing a couple of badges at the time of the talk."
Employee William Humphreys testified that about
September 17 he was summoned into a conference room
where he had an extended talk with Plant Manager
Mohney. Humphreys related that Mohney assured him
that he had no pencil, paper, or tape recorder and that "so
what's said is said in here," and added that "I'm going to
just ask you right off if you are union or anti-union." To
this, Humphreys replied that he was somewhat on the fence
and "could fall to either side." Plant Manager Mohney
admitted that he had asked Humphreys to come to the
conference room and had engaged him in a conversation
that lasted some 45 minutes to an hour. According to
Mohney, most of the conversation concerned matters
relating to Humphreys' bidding for a better job and
Humphreys' morale. Mohney conceded that Foreman
King, Humphreys' immediate superior, had not, to his
knowledge, had any discussions with Humphreys concern-
ing his morale, and Mohney admitted that it was not
customary for him to call a rank-and-file employee into his
office for a private interview. While Mohney denied that he
referred to the Union in this conversation, counsel for the
General Counsel "earnestly submits that the inferences to
be drawn from all the circumstances of this situation, and
the obvious straightforward honesty of employee Hum-
phreys," require a finding of violation of Section 8(aX 1) of
the Act.
In his brief, counsel for the Respondent lists 33 alleged
instances of solicitation which he states "were either
admittedly unknown to management or conducted within
the permissible scope of the Maremont rule." He states that
"this virtual flood of related incidents of solicitation is
irrelevant because the alleged solicitation admittedly
occurred either in non-working time or out of the presence
of supervision" and that, despite "the irrelevance of these
incidents, counsel for the General Counsel chose to clutter
and confuse the record with them in an unsuccessful
attempt to imply that Maremont management freely
permits solicitation, other than union solicitation during
working time in violation of its stated rule."
In my opinion, it strains credulity to believe that such
widespread solicitation as is revealed by this record, both
during working and nonworking time, could have taken
place without the knowledge and tacit consent of responsi-
ble officials of the Respondent. Indeed, as has been set
forth above, supervisors of the Respondent engaged in
solicitation. However, counsel for the Respondent, in his
brief, states that the Respondent, immediately following
the conclusion of the May 1975 hearing, "having recog-
nized the fact that violations of the no-solicitation rule
(none of which were related to union activity) had
occurred, set out on a legitimate course to reemphasize and
uniformly enforce the admittedly valid policy." In support,
he points out that, in a meeting of department managers
about May 16, Black reviewed the rule and directed that
they communicate the renewed enforcement policy to all
foremen. The following week, on May 23, a notice was
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
posted on the bulletin board which informed all employees
as follows:
I have received reports that some employees are
violating our "No Solicitation - Distribution Rules."
This appears to be an appropriate time to review these
rules again. The following are the rules as they appear
in your Employee Handbooks.
I. Solicitation and distribution of literature by non-
employees on company property is prohibited.
2. Solicitation of any type by employees on company
property during working time is prohibited.
3. Distribution of literature by employees on compa-
ny property in non-working areas during working
time is prohibited.
4. Distribution of literature by employees on compa-
ny property in working areas is prohibited.
5. Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering
with employees or supervision at any time is
prohibited.
Violation of the "No Solicitation - Distribution
Rules" is very serious and an employee not complying
will be disciplined or discharged.
In August 1975, a new edition of the employee handbook
was published which contained the same rule as set forth
above and the Respondent gave a copy to each employee,
including Anderson. Thereafter, on August 29, the Respon-
dent posted another notice to employees concerning the
rule, stating that questions had risen concerning it. This
memorandum repeated the rules as stated above and added
the following:
"Non-working time" is an employee's "free time" -
when he is not required to be working such as breaks,
lunch, before and after working hours, and etc.
"Non-working areas" are non-production areas such
as cafeterias, parking lots and company grounds.
Violation of the "No Solicitation - Distribution
Rules" is very serious and an employee not complying
will be disciplined or discharged.
Counsel for the Respondent, in his brief, states: "In
candor, Respondent submits that warnings issued for
union solicitation prior to May 23, 1975, would have been
tainted by the lack of uniform enforcement of the rule prior
to that date." He submits, however, "that violations of the
rule which occurred prior to May 23, 1975, when the rule
was dramatically brought to the attention of all Maremont
Employees ... do not affect the subsequent enforceability
of the rule. Any position to the contrary taken by the
Board would be preposterous." He states that the Respon-
dent "cannot conceive that even the Board would espouse
such as unsound position. Accordingly, General Counsel's
proof of violations which occurred prior to May 23, 1975
(and three months or more prior to Anderson's August 15
warning), are irrelevant." Indeed, he takes the position that
witnesses produced by counsel for the General Counsel "in
I In support, counsel cites a number of incidents, among them the
following: (a) Russell's testimony that she solicited money for birthday and
Christmas gifts for Leadman Ronny Hughes in 1974; (b) Millsaps'
testimony that she solicited Supervisor King for flower money for an injured
a tacit admission of the weakness of their case and their
recognition of the uniform enforcement of the no-solicita-
tion rule subsequent to May 1975, repeatedly tried to
manipulate events that occurred prior to May of 1975 and
to the post-May period."
C. The Termination of Anderson
Anderson was employed by the Respondent early in
May 1972, and worked at the main plant until sometime in
April 1974, when he was transferred to the Duralite plant.
At the Duralite plant he worked as a quality control
inspector in Department 769, under the immediate supervi-
sion of Foreman Ben Williams who, in turn, was under the
supervision of Quality Control Manager Bob McBride,
who was in charge of the inspection functions at both
plants. Anderson was transferred back to the main plant
about the first of September 1975, where he continued to
work in quality control under William Harris and
McBride, until he was discharged on October 16.
The extent of Anderson's union activity has been
summarized in a preceding section of this Decision.
According to Anderson, at the time he was interviewed for
employment, he was told by either Rachel Huff, a secretary
in the personnel department, or Personnel Director Black,
that the Respondent was opposed to unions and that, if he
observed anyone "handing out union cards or talking
about the union to come and report it to personnel." Black
denied that he had such a conversation with Anderson;
however, prospective employees were issued a statement
which, at the outset, stated that the Respondent did not
have a union in the plant and did not want one because
"we firmly believe a union has nothing constructive to
offer. We believe that all of us can make greater progress
and provide greater security for ourselves and our families
by working together without the disruptive influences of
outside unions." An instruction on the document stated
that it was "for use in induction or orientation programs
for new employees. It should be presented orally and
should not be distributed in writing." Miss Huff did not
testify.
The Respondent introduced evidence, both through
witnesses and documents, about incidents and activities
relating to Anderson. Thus, under date of December 18,
1973, McBride made a written report concerning his work
performance, stating that Anderson was leaving his work
area and talking to production operators too much and
that his attendance needed improvement. The report stated
that Harris and McBride had talked to Anderson "with
warning that work performance must improve" and if it
did not "a final warning will be given." On October 21,
1974, McBride wrote a file memorandum stating that
Foreman Williams had warned Anderson on October 18
for violating the Respondent's rules relating to "solicitation
on company property during working time." The report
continued that the violation consisted of "running off a
football board on production floor" and that Anderson
had been talked to about the same matter the previous
female employee, which occurred "mostly last summer"; (c) Humphreys'
testimony that Foreman Thompson sold doughnuts in April or May 1975
when in fact the sales occurred in March.
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MAREMONT CORPORATION
week. The memorandum concluded by stating that Wil-
liams had advised Anderson "that if this matter came up
again he would be discharged." On October 24, 1974,
Williams wrote a memorandum stating that he had asked
Anderson to stay in his own area and that "he had not
been performing his work as an inspector." On December
18, Supervisor Williams wrote that he had had a talk with
Anderson about his job and had told him that "he was not
performing his job as an inspector" and that he "was
wandering around on the floor too much and not staying
on his job." He added that he told Anderson that he would
be given 2 weeks to improve his work or he would have to
take action about replacing him. On August 15, 1975,
McBride wrote a memorandum to Black stating that
because of "complaints by hourly workers at Duralite that
Charles Anderson has been interfering with their work by
harassment and solicitation, Charles was given a final
warning." He continued by stating that it was emphasized
to Anderson "that any further complaint of these rule
violations would result in his termination upon verification
of the complaint." Supervisor Harris wrote a memorandum
to McBride, on September 29, in which he stated that he
had talked to Anderson about "write ups" and that
Anderson stated that Harris was not "treating him fairly"
and wished to speak to the personnel department. Accord-
ing to Harris, Anderson stated that he did not "remember
whether he clocked out or not Friday" and that he felt that
"since he has clocked out some of the time that I should
not put write up in file." At the bottom of Harris'
memorandum McBride wrote that he had advised Ander-
son "that he knew the rule, he violated the rule and the
write up will go into his file." A memorandum dated
September 29, written by Supervisor Harris and initialed
by McBride, states that Anderson "was seen by two
salaried employees leaving the plant on Friday, 9/26/75, at
lunch time without clocking out." The memorandum
continued by stating that Harris spoke to Anderson about
company policy concerning leaving the plant at lunchtime
and that Anderson said that sometimes he clocked out
upon leaving the plant and sometimes he did not and that
on occasions he went to his automobile in the parking lot
and did not leave the plant. Harris' memorandum contin-
ued by stating that Anderson said that he did not
remember whether or not he left the plant on Friday,
September 26, and that Harris had noticed that on
occasions the time reports prior to September 26 indicated
that Anderson did clock out. The memorandum concluded
by stating that Harris told Anderson that he "must clock
out whenever he leaves the plant for any reason. Any
further violations of this rule would mean termination."
Under date of October 16, McBride wrote a memoran-
dum to the personnel file concerning Anderson's termina-
tion. In it, McBride stated that Anderson was terminated
on October 16, at approximately 9:15 a.m., "for continuing
to violate company rules"; noting that the specific rule
violation that brought about the termination "is the same
violation that Charles was given a final warning for on
August 15, 1975, interfering with other hourly employees'
work by harassment and solicitation." McBride continued
by stating that Anderson had said that he felt that he was
being singled out and treated unfairly, to which McBride
responded that Anderson was told that "he was not being
singled out and had been given adequate warnings
concerning his violation of company rules of conduct." He
then listed seven prior warnings contained in Anderson's
record commencing December 18, 1973, and concluding
September 29, 1975. Anderson asked if superior officials
knew about his termination and McBride stated that he
had discussed the matter with Black and, at the request of
Anderson, Black was called into the office where Anderson
made an appeal. According to McBride's memorandum,
initialed by Black, Black "explained to Charles that he felt
like he had been adequately warned and just did not heed
the warnings." In the termination report issued concerning
Anderson's discharge, the reason given for his termination
was repeated violations of company rules on a continuing
basis. He was rated as fair in all categories except he was
given an excellent rating in safety record and a poor rating
in attitude. The document continued by indicating that
Foreman Harris would not recommend him for reemploy-
ment and this assessment was approved by McBride as well
as by Black.
Concering Anderson's solicitation activities, a memoran-
dum, dated October 15 and signed by employees Lee and
Millsaps, stated that at or about 1:30 on the afternoon of
Monday, October 13, Lee was at work when "Charlie
Anderson came up to me and asked me if I would sign a
union card." Lee replied that he would not and Anderson
asked if he had thought about it and if he thought that the
employees needed a union. Lee replied in the negative and
Anderson responded, according to Lee, that he thought
they did, asked him to take a union card and, if he changed
his mind, to fill it out and return it to him. Lee further
stated that employee Arthur McCallie told him that
Anderson had asked him to sign a union card during
working hours. Lee concluded by stating that after he had
thought about the matter for a few days he decided to
report it to his supervisor, Millsaps, and that he made this
decision of his own accord. McCallie wrote a memoran-
dum, under date of October 15, stating that Anderson
came up to him on Monday, October 13, and "asked me if
I wanted to sign a union card" and that he responded by
stating that he had really not thought about wanting a
union at the Respondent's plant. On October 15, according
to McCallie, Anderson came to him during the first break
and asked if he had signed a card and, when he responded
that he "had not really planned on signing one," Anderson
"told me that if he could not get me to sign one he would
get someone else who could get me to sign one." McCallie
testified that he took this remark as a threat.
Foreman King testified that it was Green, not McCallie,
who came to him and complained about Anderson's
"threat." According to him, Green "was almost crying that
he had been approached on the floor" and stated that
Anderson "had threatened him and had been bothering
him about signing union cards." In his brief, counsel for
the General Counsel submits that King's "vivid recollec-
tion of Ronnie Green coming in, 'almost crying' and 'very
upset' over having been threatened, represents a damaging
breakdown in the Respondent's story line." As a rebuttal
witness, Anderson denied that he had threatened anyone.
751
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employees Lee and McCallie, whose reports on October
15 were, according to the Respondent, the immediate cause
of Anderson's termination, testified that Anderson con-
versed with them on only one occasion, for a moment or
two, about the Union. Moreover, Humphreys had been a
party to this conversation and, so McCallie testified, "more
or less" had something to say about the Union when
Anderson asked McCallie if he wished to sign a card and
then added that Humphreys said that he was for the
Union. McCallie admitted that he did not report this to
management. Counsel for the General Counsel argues that
the failure to mention this matter in the memorandum
"with which the Respondent was laying the basis for
Anderson's discharge," was due to the fact that "at this
point in time [it] was obviously driving toward the
elimination of Anderson only, and it was not overly
concerned with the facts extraneous to its objective, such as
the fact another employee was party to the solicitation."
He contends that this is just one example, "among many
too numerous to mention, of the discretionary selectivity
with which Respondent administered its solicitation rules
to accomplish its objectives." In addition, counsel for the
General Counsel observes that Green, in his testimony,
exhibited "personal bias and prejudice against the discrimi-
natee, and against labor unions in general," and points to
his testimony that he was harassed "time after time" and as
much as "25 or 30 times." Counsel for the General Counsel
submits that this "went to excess, as did his cocky, positive
assurance that Anderson's work deteriorated after he
started soliciting for the union." He submits that Green's
distaste for unions "colored his judgment, if not compro-
mised his veracity in order to please his Employer."
Counsel also points to the testimony of employee Lee, in
particular in his account of how he came to lodge a
complaint with Foreman Millsaps regarding Anderson's
solicitation "became patently incredible." Finally, counsel
for the General Counsel points out that, considering the
fact that McCallie weighs about 200 pounds and stands 6
feet tall, in contrast to Anderson, who is considerably
slighter, "being threatened by Charlie Anderson becomes,
under the circumstances, somewhat unbelievable, if not
ludicrous."
Foreman Harris, in response to questions put to him by
counsel for the General Counsel, testified that about the
first of October, shortly after Anderson had been written
up for not clocking out, he observed Anderson leaving the
plant after work with a muffler shell. Harris related that he
then went to the muffler line foreman and asked if he had
given Anderson permission to take the muffler, and
received a negative answer. Harris continued by stating
that he then "went to personnel and asked if he had,
indeed, purchased a muffler, and they told me he had."
Government counsel contends that this testimony raises "a
strong inference that Respondent, already committed to
Anderson's early elimination, was watching him like a
hawk, and the supervision was going to any length to nail
him with something."
It appears fair to say that management had very little
quarrel with the quality of Anderson's work. In the view of
2 These rules had been posted on bulletin boards and near the timeclocks
since 1973. In addition, employees were issued copies of the handbook.
counsel for the General Counsel, "strident criticism of
Anderson's work actually came from only two sources";
namely, employee Green and the final rating given
Anderson at the time of his termination.
Counsel for the Respondent, referring in his brief to the
alleged threat made to McCallie, states that "Anderson's
propensity for threats pervades his own testimony where he
threatened Respondent's counsel from the stand while
answering a question he preferred not to answer." In this
regard, Anderson was asked to name employees that he
talked to on the job about the Union and, after naming
three, Anderson stated that he did not "like to give you
names, really" and, after he mentioned seven more, he
stated he probably talked to them more than once and that
"everybody that was for the union just always talked about
it." He then gave the following testimony: "And so,
nothing will happen to those people that you got their
names, right? Better not." Counsel states that this "testimo-
ny speaks for itself. Threats are part of the vernacular of
Charlie Anderson."
Concerning the application of the Respondent's rules
relating to solicitation and clocking out, counsel argues
that I do not have to determine whether these violations in
fact occurred but that "the only question to be resolved is
whether, in light of the record evidence, those rules were
disparately applied to Anderson." In his view, the "over-
whelming weight of record evidence refutes Anderson's
contentions of disparate treatment and supports instead a
laudable record of uniform application of valid rules of
conduct by the Company."
The Respondent's employee handbook contains, among
others, the following rules: 2
RULES RELATING TO ADMISSION TO THE PLANT
ATTENDANCE AND TIME ON THE JOB FOR WHICH
EMPLOYEE NOT COMPLYING WILL BE DISCIPLINED
DISCHARGED
AN
OR
a. Failure to notify company of expected absence
or tardiness.
b. Failure to properly record own timecard.
c. Recording the timecard of another employee.
d. Wasting time or loitering on any company
property during working hours; roaming or visiting in
other departments.
e. Interfering with work of other employees.
f. Leaving the company premises during working
hours without permission of foreman.
g. Entering or leaving the company premises
without recording your timecard except when autho-
rized by your foreman.
h. Absences and/or tardiness without reasonable
cause considered excessive by the company.
i. Absence of three (3) working days without
properly notifying the company.
Several employees testified to the effect that the Respon-
dent was somewhat lax in the enforcement of the timeclock
rule. Thus, Russell testified that she went to lunch or
supper "several times without clocking out." According to
752
MAREMONT CORPORATION
her, after Anderson was terminated she was careful to
clock out. Employee Cook testified that on "many a day,"
between April and October 1975, he and some eight named
employees as well as "mostly everybody" failed to clock
out when going to lunch, even though Supervisor Kiser was
stationed near the timeclock. However, the Respondent's
"Exception Reports," which is a computerized printout
rendered on a daily basis for each department, shows any
clocking irregularities. According to the Respondent,
"irregularity" is any clocking other than clocking at the
beginning of the shift and at the end of the shift. If an
employee is absent, punches in early, punches in late,
leaves for lunch or other personal reasons, leaves prior to
the end of the shift, or works overtime and in these
instances properly uses the timeclock, his name will appear
on the "Exception Report," and his paid hours for the
workweek will be increased or diminished accordingly.
However, if an employee leaves for lunch or other personal
reasons without using the timeclock to punch out and back
in, there is no way for the Respondent to know how long he
was away.
A review of the exception reports for Cook's department
shows that Cook clocked out for lunch regularly between
May 19 and October 18, 1975, which indicates, according
to the brief of Respondent's counsel, that Cook was "a
calculating liar." The documents show that during this
period, consisting of 119 working days, Cook was absent a
total of 26 days because of vacation, guard duty, and other
reasons. On II of the remaining 93 days, he worked
overtime, and without exception did not clock out for
lunch. On the remaining 82 days when he worked but
performed no overtime, he clocked out for lunch on 75
days, or 91 percent of the time. Counsel suggests that on
the days that Cook worked overtime and did not clock out
it apparently was Cook's practice to remain on the
premises and utilize vending machine services or when,
because of maintenance problems, it was necessary for him
to work into his regular breaks and lunch periods. He also
points out that on the remaining 7 days when he did not
clock out there is no way of telling whether he actually left
for lunch without clocking out or remained on the plant
premises. Counsel concludes that Cook's "untruthfulness
was proved through uncontradictable documentary evi-
dence and his perjurious testimony should be rejected."
Other employees testified to the alleged laxity in their
utilization of the timeclock and the lack of discipline for so
doing. I find such testimony either inaccurate or exaggerat-
ed. In this connection, I note that Administrative Law
Judge Schneider, in his decision of August 1975, found that
the "undisputed record evidence indicates that the rule is
uniformly enforced," and that testimony did indicate that
two named employees, as well as others, "despite the rule,"
did "leave or have left the plant during the noon hour
without clocking out. There is, however, no evidence
suggesting that the Respondent has failed to take action
against any employee who, to its knowled-., violated the
rule." On the record before me, I am disposed to agree with
Administrative Law Judge Schneider.
D. Discussion and Conclusions
Concerning the Respondent's rule against solicitation
and distribution, the record here demonstrates that it was
widely disregarded by employees and, on occasion, not
observed by supervisors, at least until the issuance of
Administrative Law Judge Schneider's decision in the
Lemons case early in August 1975. Employees engaged in
selling a variety of items both on working and nonworking
time; the interest in football boards was extensive and
supervisory employees participated therein.
As we have seen, the Respondent introduced consider-
able evidence concerning the application and enforcement
of its clocking-out rule. Thus, it presented a collection of
written warnings and documentation relating to that rule.
Out of a total of 22 warnings included in the exhibit, 16
appear to contain "final warning" language or documenta-
tion indicating that they were final in nature. Three of the
warnings in fact resulted in terminations. On the whole, I
think it fair to say that, on the basis of the evidence
previously set forth concerning the application of the
Respondent's timeclock rule, it was fairly and uniformly
enforced.
Concerning interrogation, I credit the testimony of
employee Robinson that he was questioned by Foreman
Thompson as to why he supported the Union in 1975,
whereas he had been against the Union the preceding year.
I also credit the testimony of employee Humphreys
concerning the rather extensive interrogation to which he
was subjected by Plant Manager Mohney, in which
Humphreys was asked whether he was antiunion or
prounion. By such questioning, I conclude and find that
the Respondent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
Turning finally to the termination of Anderson, I find
that the record demonstrates that he was one of the leading
proponents of the Union, even though I am of the view that
he and other employees exaggerated the extent of his union
activity. As has been recited above, Anderson testified that
when he was interviewed for employment he was told by
either Rachel Huff, a secretary in the personnel depart-
ment, or Personnel Director Black, that the Respondent
was opposed to unions and that if he observed anyone
"handing out union cards or talking about the Union" to
report that fact to the personnel department. Black denied
that he had had such a conversation with Anderson, and
Miss Huff did not testify. Inasmuch as Anderson was not
clear which of these individuals made the comment to him,
and Black convincingly denied that it was he who did so,
and considering that Black impressed me favorably as a
witness who, it would seem, would not be apt to make such
a statement, I make no finding on this matter, particularly
inasmuch as, even assuming Miss Huff made the remarks,
the record does not show that she had the requisite
authority to bind the Respondent.
The question remains whether the Respondent's rules
against solicitation were disparately or discriminatorily
applied to Anderson because of his union activity. Counsel
for the General Counsel submits that, "taking a general
overview of the whole sequence of events, their character
and their timing, it appears reasonably clear that Respon-
dent built a case against Anderson for the purpose of
753
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ridding itself of the most active and prominent union
adherent in its midst." Considering the fact that employees,
so far as the record discloses, appear to have been free to
talk to other employees, and the prevalence of solicitation
for various causes and affairs, as well as the widespread
interest in football boards, it appears to me that Anderson
was, in fact, the recipient of special attention by the
Respondent. Relatively little fault was found with his work
performance. The October 15 memorandum signed by
employees Lee and Millsaps is somewhat suspect, as is the
memorandum of the same date signed by employee
McCallie. Both written statements conclude with the words
that each was made "on my own accord without any
encouragement from any members of supervision." Having
seen and heard both Lee and McCallie testify, I am very
doubtful that they phrased their written reports on their
own. On the contrary, I am inclined to agree with the
comment of counsel for the General Counsel in his brief
that the Respondent, having had "previous and successful"
experience before the National Labor Relations Board and
its hearing processes, "knew well the value of thorough and
extensive documentation" and "If it could somehow catch
Charles Anderson engaged in conduct which was literally
prohibited by written rules, and this conduct was docu-
mented in memoranda and written reprimands, it would be
'home free.' "
While the reasons for Anderson's termination are not
free from doubt, on balance, and considering the entire
record, as well as the impressions the witnesses made upon
me as they testified, I come to the conclusion that the
weight of the evidence supports the position urged by
counsel for the General Counsel. Accordingly, I find that
the Respondent, by terminating Anderson on October 16,
1975, violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Maremont Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act and International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By making threats to and questioning its employees
concerning their activities in behalf of the Union, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)( I) of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily enforcing its no-solicitation rule
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discharging Charles E. Anderson, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Repondent set forth above have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Inasmuch as it has been found that the Respondent
discriminatorily discharged Charles Anderson on October
16, 1975, it will be recommended that he be offered
immediate and full reinstatement and, in addition, be made
whole for any loss of wages suffered by reason of the
Respondent's unlawful conduct, in accordance with the
Board's formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon at the rate of 6
percent per annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I issue the following recommended:
ORDER3
The Respondent, Maremont Corporation, Loudon,
Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening or questioning employees concerning
their union membership, sympathies, or activities, or
discriminatorily enforcing its no-solicitation rule.
(b) Discriminatorily discharging any of its employees, or
in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Charles Anderson immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if not available, to a substantially
equivalent position.
(b) Make Charles Anderson whole for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered by reason of the Respon-
dent's unlawful discrimination against him in the manner
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
754
MAREMONT CORPORATION
(d) Post at its office and place of business in Loudon,
Tennessee, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees and members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
4 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten or question employees
concerning their union membership, sympathies, or
activities or enforce our no-solicitation rule in a
discriminatory manner.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discharge or otherwise
discriminate against any employee because of member-
ship in or activity on behalf of International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
or any other labor organization, or for engaging in
protected union activity or exercising rights guaranteed
by the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Charles Anderson immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if not available, to a
substantially equivalent position, and WE WILL make
him whole for any wages lost as a result of our
discrimination against him, plus interest.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refuse
to become or remain members of said Union or any other
labor organization.
MAREMONT CORPORATION
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
IVAR H. PETERSON, Administrative Law Judge: My
Decision in this case was issued on June 22, 1976, in which
I found that the Respondent herein had violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by discharging employee Charles Anderson.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a support-
ing brief. On November 1, the Board issued an Order
remanding the proceeding to me for the purpose of
preparing and issuing a Supplemental Decision setting
forth resolutions of the credibility of witnesses and specific
findings of fact with respect to some 12 alleged incidents of
discriminatory enforcement by the Respondent of its no-
solicitation rule.
After having reviewed my Decision and the testimony at
the hearing, it seems fairly plain to me that I did, in fact,
make the necessary resolutions of credibility. However, in
order to satisfy the terms of the remand and, hopefully, to
make clear to the Board my findings upon the matters that
are the subject of the remand, I make the supplemental
findings that follow.
I stated, in my Decision, that I thought it "quite
unnecessary to relate in complete detail the testimony
concerning the incidents of solicitation that occurred
within the plant, some on working time, as detailed by the
testimony. There is no question, in my mind, that
employees solicited for a variety of matters, such as the sale
of merchandise, collections for flowers or gifts, sales of
chances on raffle tickets, and on football boards." There is
also testimony that supervisory employees were involved in
or present at some of these occurrences. I further stated
that it was my view that it appeared "entirely incredible
that this widespread solicitation occurred without the
knowledge of the Respondent's supervisory officials." I
then went on to illustrate the situation that prevailed by
relating several typical examples, which are the subject of
the Board's remand. In the interest of shortening my
discussion, I credit the testimony of Connie Russell relating
to her testimony concerning the sale of 8-track tapes during
working time by Supervisor Thompson; I further credit the
testimony of employee Lloyd Robinson concerning the
solicitation of Amway products by Supervisor Thompson
during working time in August 1975; I further credit the
testimony of employee Robinson with respect to the
acquiescence of Supervisor Thompson in a collection
during working time for the brother of employee Louder-
milk; I also credit the testimony of employee Marvin Cook
concerning the acquiescence of Supervisor McDaniels in a
flower fund collection during working time; I also credit
the testimony of employee Cook with respect to the
purchase by Supervisor McDaniels of a heater from
employee Glade Watts during working time; I also credit
the testimony of employee Cook concerning the sale of
eggs during working time by former employee Shubert as
acquiesced in by Supervisors McDaniels, Mohney, and
King; I also credit the testimony of employee Millsaps
concerning solicitation of the sale of a ring by her to
Supervisor King during working time; I also credit
Millsaps' testimony that Supervisor King acquiesced in a
flower fund collection during working time for the husband
of employee Bea White; I also credit the testimony of
employee Humphreys that Supervisor McDaniels sub-
scribed to a football board during working time in the fall
of 1975; 1 further credit the testimony of employee
Humphreys that Supervisor Ben Williams participated in a
tool set raffle during working time; I also credit the
testimony of employee Dailey that Supervisor Richard
Hensley sold chances on toys during working time; and,
finally, I credit Dailey's testimony that he solicited
participation in a football board during working time from
Supervisor Hensley.
In my Decision, as previously stated, I stated that it
seemed unnecessary to relate in complete detail the
755
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testimony concerning the incidents of solicitation that
occurred within the plant, some on working time, as
detailed by the testimony. I further stated that I had no
question that employees solicited for a variety of matters
and that supervisory employees were involved in or present
at some of these occurrences. While I did not, in my
Decision, specifically state that I credited or discredited
certain named witnesses, it seems perfectly plain to me that
a reading of my Decision, the conclusions, and the
recommended Order, could only lead to the conclusion
that I did in fact credit the testimony presented by counsel
for the General Counsel. In order that there be no
misunderstanding, I credit the testimony of the witnesses
presented by counsel for the General Counsel concerning
the incidents related above and, accordingly, reaffirm the
findings I made.
756