Mammoth of California, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 9, 1981

253 N.L.R.B. 1168 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Mammoth of California, Inc. and Brotherhood of
Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local 70, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
Case 32-CA-1984
January 9, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
Upon a charge filed on July 30, 1979, by Broth-
erhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local
70, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
herein called the Union, and duly served on Mam-
moth of California, Inc., herein called Respondent,
the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, by the Acting Regional Director for
Region 32, issued a complaint on September 27,
1979, against Respondent, alleging that Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Copies of the charge and complaint and notice of
hearing before an administrative law judge were
duly served on the parties to this proceeding.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the
complaint alleges in substance that on June 13,
1978, following a Board election in Case 32-RC-
322, the Union was duly certified as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of Respond-
ent's employees in the unit found appropriate;' and
that, commencing on or about July 25, 1979, and
specifically on August 16, 1979, and at all times
thereafter, Respondent has failed and refused, and
continues to date to fail and refuse, to bargain col-
lectively with the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, although the
Union has requested and is requesting it to do so.
On October 8, 1979, Respondent filed its answer to
the complaint admitting in part, and denying in
part, the allegations in the complaint.
On March 10, 1980, counsel for the General
Counsel filed directly with the Board a Motion for
Summary Judgment and memorandum in support
thereof. The Union subsequently joined in the Gen-
eral Counsel's motion. On March 12, 1980, the
I Official notice is taken of the record in the representation proceed-
ing, Case 32-RC-322, as the term "record" is defined in Secs. 102.68 and
102.6 9(g) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. See
LTV Electrosystems. Inc., 166 NLRB 938 (1967), enfd. 388 F.2d 683 (4th
Cir. 1968); Golden Age Beverage Co., 167 NLRB 151 (1967), enfd. 415
F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969); Inlertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F.Supp. 573
(D.C.Va. 1967); Follet Corp., 164 NLRB 378 (1967), enfd. 397 F.2d 91
(7th Cir. 1968); Sec. 9(d) of the NLRA, as amended.
253 NLRB No. 144
Board issued an order transferring the proceeding
to the Board and a Notice To Show Cause why
the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment should not be granted. Respondent thereafter
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a
memorandum in opposition to the General Coun-
sel's motion and in support of its cross-motion.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
In its answer to the complaint Respondent, while
admitting all other allegations, denies that at all
times since June 13, 1978, the Union has been the
exclusive representative of the employees for pur-
poses of collective bargaining, and denies that on
or about April 13, 1979, the Regional Director ap-
proved an informal settlement agreement in Cases
32-CA-1128 and 32-CA-1272 which resolved alle-
gations that Respondent had engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5), (3),
and (1) of the Act. Finally, Respondent denies the
legal conclusion in the complaint that Respondent's
conduct violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
As affirmative defenses, Respondent asserts that the
instant complaint fails to state sufficient facts upon
which relief can be granted, that Respondent's re-
fusal to bargain is based upon the fact that it re-
ceived objective considerations which reasonably
caused it to believe the Union lost its majority
status, and that the April 13, 1979, settlement
agreement did not contain any provision requiring
bargaining. The General Counsel submits that Re-
spondent has raised no material issue of fact requir-
ing a hearing. In essence, he asserts that the only
issue here is whether the settlement agreement en-
tered into by Respondent and the Union on April
13, 1979, is a valid settlement agreement which ex-
tended the certification year which began on June
13, 1978, beyond June 13, 1979, so that Respond-
ent's withdrawal of recognition on or about July
25, 1979, was unlawful despite its asserted good-
faith defense.
Review of the record herein, including that in
the representation proceeding (Case 32-RC-322),
establishes that the Union won the election con-
ducted on June 5, 1978. On June 13, 1978, the
Union was certified as the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative in an appropriate unit of Re-
spondent's employees. On December 29, 1978, the
Regional Director for Region 32 issued an order
consolidating and a consolidated amended com-
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MAMMOTH OF CALIFORNIA, INC.
plaint and notice of hearing in Cases 32-CA-1128
and 32-CA-1272 which alleged in substance that
Respondent had engaged in violations of Section
8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act. On April 13, 1979,
the Acting Regional Director for Region 32 ap-
proved a settlement agreement and notice to em-
ployees in Cases 32-CA-1128 and 32-CA-1272
which addressed the allegations of the complaint
and in which Respondent agreed to take certain re-
medial actions. Although that agreement itself con-
tains no reference to bargaining, the notice clearly
states that Respondent has committed itself to bar-
gain with the Union upon request.
The last meeting for collective-bargaining pur-
poses took place on February 21, 1979. Thereafter
the parties engaged in an exchange of correspond-
ence only.
On July 19, 1979, a representation petition seek-
ing decertification of the Union was filed in Case
32-RD-171. The petition was dismissed on Sep-
tember 24, 1979. No exceptions were filed.
Meanwhile, by letter dated July 25, 1979, Re-
spondent notified the Union that it was withdraw-
ing recognition. The charge resulting in the instant
complaint was filed on July 30, 1979. Thereafter,
Respondent filed an answer to the complaint deny-
ing that it had refused to bargain with the Union in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In
its answer, Respondent argues basically that the
circumstances herein do not warrant an extension
of the certification year and that it had objective
considerations for believing the Union had lost its
majority.
It is clear, and we find, that the parties' April 13,
1979, settlement agreement operated as a settlement
of the unfair labor practice charges in Cases 32-
CA-1128 and 32-CA-1272. The facts show that
the compelling consideration for the withdrawal of
the charges, i.e., the quid pro quo for the withdraw-
al, was the concessions made by Respondent in the
settlement agreement as well as its attendant com-
mitment to bargain. Thus, the settlement agreement
taken as a whole settled to the satisfaction of Re-
spondent and the Union the outstanding complaint.
The settlement therefore is a typical settlement
agreement warranting application of the Poole
Foundry test of determining whether "a reasonable
time has elapsed between the execution of the set-
tlement agreement and the refusal to bargain," 2 in
which the parties may bargain free from any ques-
tion of the union's majority status.
It is well settled that "a bargaining relationship
once rightfully established must be permitted to
exist and function for a reasonable period in which
2 Poole Foundry and Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, 37 (1951), enfd.
192 F.2d 740 (4th Cir 1951), cert denied 342 LI S 954 (1952)
it can be given a fair chance to succeed."3 In situa-
tions such as the instant one, where the union has
been certified on the basis of a Board-conducted
election, the Board consistently has defined this
period as year from the date of certification,
during which challenges to the union's majority
status are precluded, and any refusal to bargain
based on such a challenge is unlawful per se.4
Where, however, the certification year is interrupt-
ed by litigation of 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice
charges, the company "is obligated to bargain . . .
for a reasonable period of time exclusive of the
period during which the bargaining relationship
was suspended by litigation of the . . . unfair labor
practices." 5 Once the litigation is resolved, wheth-
er by a Board order or a non-Board settlement
agreement,6 the certification year will be extended
"to embrace that time in which the employer has
engaged in its unlawful refusal to bargain."7
In its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Re-
spondent relies heavily on the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision to deny enforcement of the Board's Decision
and Order in Vantran Electric Corporation.8 There,
the court denied enforcement of the Board's Older
because "the Board exceeded its remedial powers"
by ordering the employer to bargain for an ex-
tended certification year on the basis of an out-of-
Board settlement. Although the court stated that it
is "willing to approve an extension of the Board's
remedial powers to enforce bargaining provisions
of totally separate, out-of-Board settlements," it
also stated that it would require the General Coun-
sel to introduce evidence relating to the factual
basis of the withdrawn charge settled in an out-of-
Board as opposed to a Board-approved settlement.9
In reaching its decision, the court found that the
Board had applied the extended certification year
"solely on the basis of the fact that Section 8(a)(5)
charges were filed against the company during the
certification year and subsequently withdrawn pur-
Franks Bros. Co. v N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944)
4 Brooks v .VL.R.B., 348 U S. 96 (1954).
5 N.L.R.B. v John S. Swift Company. Inc.. 302 F2d 342, 346 (7th Cir
1962).
6 Iantran Electric Corporarion, 231 NLRB 1014 (1977), enforcement
denied 580 F2d 921 (7th Cir 1978); Mid-Citv Foundry Co., 167 NLRB
795, 799 (1967)
? Pride Refining Inc.. 224 NLRB 1353 at 1354-55 (1976); se, eg.
Haymarket Bookbinders. Inc.. 183 NLRB 121 (1970).
8231 NLRB 1014, enforcement denied 580 F.2d 921
9 The court relied principally on its view that:
In out-of-Board settlements . . . the Board has had no opportunity
to determine whether any remedial action is appropriate. It merely
acquiesces in the request of the charging party to withdraw charges
and may do so without knowledge of the settlement agreement or all
pertinent background facts. Moreover. if the Board is involved in the
settlement. which includes a bargaining provision in exchange for
withdrawal of a § 8(a)(5) charge, the parties are more likely to have
intended the scope of that bargaining duty to) satisfy Board stand-
ards [580 F 2d at 924]
1169
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
suant to a private non-Board agreement." The
court went on to find that the General Counsel
made no effort to introduce any evidence relating
to the factual basis of the withdrawn charge, i.e.,
"no supporting evidentiary basis for the Board's
finding that the agreement provision for bargaining
settled the outstanding charges and thereby consti-
tuted a 'typical settlement agreement' as to that
issue." In addition, the court accepted the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's factual findings that the union
"was primarily interested in the dismissal of [a state
court] damage suit," and that "[u]nder these cir-
cumstances . . . the. . . non-Board settlement be-
tween the Company and the Union did not operate
as a settlement of the pending Board cases." 580
F.2d at 925.
The facts in the instant case are in marked con-
trast to the facts that appear to have influenced the
court in Vantran. Here, the settlement agreement
on its face states that it "disposes of all allegations
in Case Nos. 32-CA-1128 and 32-CA-1272,"
which include allegations that Respondent refused
to bargain with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Furthermore, the settle-
ment agreement here states that Respondent "will
comply with all the terms and provisions of [the]
Notice." And the notice, which Respondent agreed
to post as a term of the settlement agreement, spe-
cifically states:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with Brother-
hood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers,
Local 70, International Brotherhood of Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all employees in the appropriate unit, with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
In addition, the settlement agreement here covers
only the Board charges. No outside matters are
covered in the settlement agreement. These facts
are materially different from the Administrative
Law Judge's findings relied on by the court in
Vantran. ' o
'O In its brief, Respondent contends that the reinstatement and backpay
for certain individuals discharged because of the elimination of Respond-
ent's LTL operations was the primary quid pro quo for the withdrawal of
the Union's charges. This contention finds no support on the face of the
settlement agreement. Thus, it would be necessary to go beyond the four
corners of the settlement agreement to find support for Respondent's
contention. But we reaffirmed our established position in Vantrun that we
would restrict our determination of the quid pmro quo for agreement of the
parties to the four corners of the settlement agremeent and would not at-
tempt to ferret out which of the various concessions was the real reason
for the parties' entering into a settlement agreement. To find merit in Re-
spondent's contention would fly in the face of Respondent's agreement to
It is plain from the record here that the parties'
settlement agreement settled the Board charges to
the parties' satisfaction, that Respondent's agree-
ment to bargain was part of the quid pro quo for
the Union's agreement to withdraw its charges,I
and that it constitutes a typical settlement agree-
ment. In these circumstances, we see no reason to
require the General Counsel to introduce support-
ing evidence to confirm that which is clear on the
face of the settlement agreement.
In any event, we continue to adhere to the views
expressed in our Vantran Decision. Thus, when an
employer "agrees as one of its concessions to bar-
gain with a union and that union, based on that
concession, thereupon withdraws unfair labor prac-
tice charges against the employer, alleging an un-
lawful refusal to bargain, we will construe the
agreement as a typical settlement agreement war-
ranting application of Poole Foundry rules." Such
circumstances are present here. Hence we see no
reason to permit Respondent to bargain for an un-
defined lesser period of time. To do so would be to
allow Respondent to "take advantage of its own
failure to carry out its statutory obligation, con-
trary to the very reasons for the establishment of
the rule that a certification requires bargaining for
at least 1 year."
Consistent with these principles, we conclude
that the parties' April 13, 1979, settlement agree-
ment was a settlement agreement which extended
the certification year. As a result of the settlement
agreement and Respondent's commitment to bar-
gain, the Union withdrew its charges which had al-
leged, inter alia, a refusal to bargain by Respondent
commencing on or about July 28, 1978. Thus, from
the time of the settlement agreement, the parties
were entitled to and required to bargain for that
portion of the certification year to which the
Union was entitled free of any encumbrances. Be-
cause Respondent withdrew recognition from the
Union during the certification year, as extended, it
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.' 2 Ac-
"comply with all the terms and provisions of [the] Notice." (Emphasis
supplied.) Moreover, the effect of finding merit in Respondent's conten-
tion would be to allow Respondent to renege on part of the settlement
agreement after the Union has completely satisfied its part.
"i We note that the court in Vantran found that:
If [the employer's agreement to bargain was a quid pro quo for the
union's agreement to withdraw its 8(a)(5) charge] the parties prob-
ably intended that the employer fulfill a bargaining obligation that it
allegedly violated, which would, for example, justify bargaining for
an extended certification year. [580 F.2d at 925.1
12 Respondent's objective considerations for withdrawing recognition
at the time it did are unavailable, for, with the extension of the certifica-
tion year, by operation of law the Union was free from challenge to its
majority status during the extended certification year. See, e.g., Mar-Jac
Poultry Company. Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962) In view of our findings
herein, we hereby deny Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judg-
ment.
1170
MAMMOTH OF CALIFORNIA, INC.
cordingly, we grant the General Counsel's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
On the basis of the entire record, the Board
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is now, and has been at all times ma-
terial herein, a corporation duly organized under
and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of
California, with an office and principal place of
business located in Fresno, California, and with a
terminal facility in San Leandro, California, where
it is engaged in the trucking business as a common
carrier. During the past 12 months, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations,
sold and provided services valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the
State of California.
We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Re-
spondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Driv-
ers, Local 70, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Representation Proceeding
1. The unit
The following employees of Respondent consti-
tute a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining
purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All local pickup and delivery drivers em-
ployed by Respondent at its 555-143rd
Avenue, San Leandro, California, line drivers,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. The certification
On June 5, 1978, a majority of the employees of
Respondent in said unit, in a secret-ballot election
conducted under the supervision of the Regional
Director for Region 32, designated the Union as
their representative for the purpose of collective
bargaining with Respondent. The Union was certi-
fied as the collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in said unit on June 13, 1978, and
the Union continues to be such exclusive repre-
sentative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act.
B. The Request To Bargain and Respondent's
Refusal
Commencing on or about April 13, 1979, and at
all times thereafter, the Union has requested Re-
spondent to bargain collectively with it as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of all
the employees in the above-described unit. Com-
mencing on or about July 25, 1979, and specifically
on August 16, 1979,13 and continuing at all times
thereafter to date, Respondent has refused, and
continues to refuse, to recognize and bargain with
the Union as the exclusive representative for col-
lective bargaining of all employees in said unit.
Accordingly, we find that Respondent has, since
August 16, 1979, and at all times thereafter, refused
to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in the appro-
priate unit, and that, by such refusal, Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its oper-
ations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traf-
fic, and commerce among the several States and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, when it
withdrew recognition from and refused to meet
and bargain with the Union commencing August
16, 1979, we shall order that it cease and desist
therefrom, and, upon request, bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
There should have been bargaining for at least 1
year following the certification and for a reason-
able time after the settlement agreement. The rea-
'i A letter from Respondent to the Union dated August I, 1979. es-
tahlished that as of that date Respondent nquetionahly refused to "con-
tintu negoll.ning uith the lUnilon %'e therefore find that from August
It, 19'79. Rspondint rcftiicd to hbargain 'with the nlon
1171
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sonable period of time should compensate for the
failure to bargain during any period of the certifi-
cation year. The certification was issued by the
Board on June 13, 1978, and there was no refusal
to bargain prior to July 28, 1978, when the unfair
labor practices commenced. The record shows that
the certification year was interrupted by unfair
labor practice charges, alleging that commencing
on or about July 28, 1978, Respondent refused to
bargain with the Union and that, following the
April 13, 1979, agreement settling these charges,
the parties engaged only in correspondence until
August 16, 1979, when Respondent unquestionably
withdrew recognition from the Union. Therefore,
inasmuch as the Union was not accorded a full cer-
tification year, we shall extend the certification
year "to embrace that time in which the Employer
has engaged in its unlawful refusal to bargain,"' 4
and we shall require Respondent to bargain for
that period commencing on the date on which Re-
spondent and the Union resume bargaining and, if
an agreement is reached, to embody it in a signed
agreement. See Commerce Company d/b/a Lamar
Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d
600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817; Bur-
nett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421
(1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
The Board, upon the basis of the foregoing facts
and the entire record, makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Mammoth of California, Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Brotherhood of Teamtsers & Auto Truck
Drivers, Local 70, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All local pickup and delivery drivers em-
ployed by Respondent at its 555-143rd Avenue,
San Leandro, California, location; excluding office
clericals, over-the-road line drivers, guards and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit ap-
propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since June 13, 1978, the above-named labor
organization has been and now is the certified and
exclusive representative of all employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
5. By withdrawing recognition from and by re-
fusing on August 16, 1979, and at all times thereaf-
ter, to bargain collectively with the above-named
'4 Pride Refining. Inc.. supra.
labor organization as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of all the employees of Respondent in
the appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respond-
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced,
and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing,
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Mammoth of California, Inc., San Leandro, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing
to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with Brotherhood of Teamsters &
Auto Truck Drivers, Local 70, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of its employees in the following
appropriate unit:
All local pickup and delivery drivers em-
ployed by Respondent at its 555-143rd
Avenue, San Leandro, California, location; ex-
cluding office clericals, over-the-road line
drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named
labor organization as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, and, if
an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its 555-143rd Avenue, San Leandro,
California, location copies of the attached notice
1172
MAMMOTH OF CALIFORNIA, INC.
marked "Appendix." 1 5 Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 32, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment
with Brotherhood of Teamsters, & Auto
Truck Drivers, Local 70, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit described below.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from
and refuse to meet and bargain with the Union
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union, as the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described below, with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, and, if an understanding
is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All local pickup and delivery drivers em-
ployed by the Employer at its 555--143rd
Avenue, San Leandro, California, location;
excluding office clericals, over-the-road line
drivers, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
MAMMOTH OF CAI.IFORNIA, INC.
1173