Machinists, Local No. 697

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 9, 1976

223 N.L.R.B. 832 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, Local Union No. 697 , AFL-CIO
(The H. O. Canfield Rubber Company of Virginia,
Inc.) and Ronnie G . Carroll . Case 5-CB-1644
April 9, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
Upon a charge filed by Ronnie G. Carroll on De-
cember 20, 1974, the General Counsel of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director
for Region 5, issued a complaint and notice of hear-
ing on April 9, 1975, against International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local
Union No. 697, AFL-CIO, alleging that the Respon-
dent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 2(6) and (7) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, as amended. Respondent
filed an answer to the complaint, denying the com-
mission of unfair labor practices.
On June 27, 1975, the parties to this proceeding
entered into a stipulation in which they agreed that
the formal papers filed in this proceeding and the
facts contained in the stipulation, together with the
exhibits attached thereto, constitute the entire record
in this case. They waived their right to a hearing be-
fore an Administrative Law Judge, the making of
findings of fact and conclusions of law by an Admin-
istrative Law Judge and the issuance of an Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision and recommended Or-
der. They asked that the case be transferred directly
to the Board for decision. The stipulation also pro-
vided for the filing of briefs with the Board.
On June 30, 1975, the Board issued an order ap-
proving the stipulation and transferring this proceed-
ing to the Board. Thereafter, the General Counsel
and the Respondent each filed a brief with the
Board.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Having accepted transfer of this proceeding to it,
the Board, upon the entire record herein, makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The H. O. Canfield Rubber Company of Virginia,
Inc., is a Virginia corporation engaged in the manu-
facture of mechanical rubber products at its Clifton
Forge, Virginia, location. During the past 12 months,
a representative period, the Company purchased and
received materials and supplies valued in excess of
$50,000 from points located outside the Common-
wealth of Virginia. We find that the Company is
now, and has been at all material times herein, an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The parties agree, and we find, that the Respon-
dent is, and has been at all times material, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
As indicated above, the facts are not in dispute
and are fully set out in the stipulation and appended
exhibits. Respondent is the exclusive collective-bar-
gaining representative for the Company's production
and maintenance employees. The current collective-
bargaining agreement provides a three-step grievance
procedure culminating in final and binding arbitra-
tion; it does not contain a union-shop, agency-shop,
or other compulsory union membership provision.
Virginia, wherein the Company is located, is a right-
to-work state.
Ronnie G. Carroll, the Charging Party herein, has
been employed by the Company since 1968. He is
not a member of the Respondent. In 1974, Carroll
was involved in a number of grievances, none of
which is directly involved in this proceeding. Carroll
was verbally warned about his production in Febru-
ary 1974 and filed a grievance. After reaching the
third step, the grievance was withdrawn. In May
1974, he filed a grievance concerning overtime, and
the grievance was settled. In June 1974, the Respon-
dent filed a grievance over a written warning con-
cerning Carroll's job performance. Respondent told
Carroll that it did not view the warning as warranting
arbitration, and the grievance was withdrawn.
Later in 1974, Carroll was involved in additional
grievances which gave rise to this proceeding. On
September 10, 1974, Carroll was given a 3-day sus-
223 NLRB No. 119
MACHINISTS , LOCAL NO. 697 833
pension for failure to maintain an acceptable level of
production. Subsequently, Respondent filed a griev-
ance. The Company denied the grievance at the first
step, and it was not further processed. On November
1, 1974, Carroll was told he was going to be transfer-
red from his molding job to a compounder classifica-
tion. Carroll filed a grievance on November 5. On
November 21, 1974, Carroll was told he would be
given a 5-day layoff for failure to meet production
standards. Carroll filed a grievance on November 25.
At the meeting in which Carroll was told he would
be transferred, Frankie Lavannis, a union steward,
said that he did not think the grievance would go far
or reach arbitration unless Carroll paid costs. The
next day, November 2, Carroll talked to James Cash,
a union committeeman, about the transfer. In the
course of the conversation, Cash said the Union
would handle the grievance initially, but that any
costs after the first step would have to be borne by
the nonmember employee. Subsequently, during the
second-step grievance meeting, Cash said the Union
would not carry the matter to the third step or to
arbitration unless the nonmember employee agreed
to pay the costs incurred by the Union for further
processing the grievance.
During the meeting in which Carroll was told of
his 5-day layoff, Robert Byers, a union grievance
committeeman, told Carroll that the Union would
not arbitrate nonmember grievances unless the em-
ployee paid the costs but that it would file and han-
dle the grievance at the first step. Later that day,
Carroll discussed his grievances with Robert Church,
another union grievance committeeman. Church told
Carroll that the grievances probably would have
been processed through arbitration had Carroll been
a member. Church said that the Respondent had de-
cided that it would only process the grievances to the
first step for nonmember employees, absent an agree-
ment to pay for all costs incurred. Church told Car-
roll that he should have paid for processing the job
transfer grievance through the second step but to let
the matter slide. Church said that from this point on,
however, Carroll would have to pay for all costs in-
curred after the first step.
Under the grievance procedure, the Company pays
for lost time for stewards processing first-step griev-
ances. It costs Respondent approximately $15 to $20
to process second-step grievances and $25 to $30 to
process third-step grievances. It costs Respondent
approximately $175 for lost time in arbitration, plus
the arbitrator's share of $350 to $400 per case.
B. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends that the Respon-
dent, as exclusive collective bargaining representa-
tive, must act fairly and impartially on behalf of all
unit employees, whether or not they are members,
and must process nonmember grievances in a fair
and impartial manner. The General Counsel further
contends that an employee request to have the Union
process a grievance is a Section 7 right "to bargain
collectively" since a grievance procedure is vital to
the effectuation of a collective-bargaining agreement.
The General Counsel argues that a union's refusal to
process nonmember grievances for refusal to pay
costs is unreasonable since nonmembers are entitled
as a matter of right to the same grievance representa-
tion as are members. Accordingly, the General
Counsel contends that the Respondent's refusal to
further process Carroll's grievances unless Carroll
paid costs violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The Respondent, citing N.L.R.B. v. Miranda Fuel
Company, Inc., 326 F.2d 172 (C.A. 2, 1963), first con-
tends that the unfair labor practice provisions of the
Act are not violated because of a breach of the duty
of fair representation under Section 9 of the Act. Sec-
ond, the Respondent contends that charging a fee to
nonmembers for handling grievances is not discrimi-
natory and does not violate the Union's duty of fair
representation. Respondent cites Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 194, fn. 16 (1967), "Thus, even if the jury
believed Owen's controverted testimony [that the lo-
cal demanded $300 to take a grievance to arbitra-
tion], we do not think that this incident would estab-
lish a breach of duty by the Union," for its conten-
tion that the Supreme Court has held that a union
may charge nonmembers for processing grievances.'
The Respondent further argues that its action was
not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith since it
was merely assessing a nonmember for the actual
costs Respondent would incur for services it would
render. Respondent contends that it is making an
honest effort to fairly serve all unit employees and
that to provide grievance and arbitration services
free to nonmembers would be unfair to members
who have paid dues.
C. Conclusions
The complaint alleges that Respondent, by the ac-
1 The full footnote reads: "Owens did allege and testify that petitioner
Vaca, President of the Kansas City local, demanded $300 in expenses before
the Union would take the grievance to arbitration , a charge which all the
petitioners vigorously denied at trial. Under the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the local union had no power to invoke arbitration .' See n. 3, supra.
Moreover , the Union 's decision to send Owens to another doctor at Union
expense occurred after Vaca 's alleged demand, and the ultimate decision
not to invoke arbitration came later still. Thus, even if the jury believed
Owen's controverted testimony, we do not think that this incident would
establish a breach of duty by the Union."
834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions set forth above, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act. That section makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act gives
employees the right to self-organization to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for
their mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from
the above. It is undisputed that Respondent refused
to process Carroll's grievances beyond the first step
unless he agreed to pay Respondent the costs it
would incur in pursuing his grievances. It also is clear
that Respondent took this position because Carroll
was not a member of the Union. Since Respondent
does not condition the processing of grievances by
dues-paying members on their paying costs, Respon-
dent has drawn a distinction between members and
nonmembers, and to this extent has discriminated
against Carroll. Since Respondent has treated non-
members differently from members, resolution of
this proceeding does not turn upon the duty of fair
representation in Section 9 of the Act. Thus, we find
it unnecessary to consider Respondent's argument
that Section 8 does not encompass the duty of fair
representation? The issue here is whether
Respondent's discrimination against nonmembers is
such that it restrains or coerces them in the exercise
of Section 7 rights, as contended by the General
Counsel, or whether the discrimination is merely a
lawful exercise of reasonable discretion, as contend-
ed by the Respondent.
In The Wallace Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S.
248, 255-256 (1944), the Supreme Court stated, "The
duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms
of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of
the interests of its own group members. By its selec-
tion as bargaining representative it has become the
agent of all the employees, charged with the responsi-
bility of representing their interests fairly and impar-
tially." Similarly, the Board has long held that an
exclusive bargaining agent has taken on the responsi-
bility to act as a genuine representative of all the
employees in the bargaining unit, "irrespective of
union membership or the existence of a union securi-
ty contract." Peerless Tool and Engineering Co., 111
NLRB 853, 858 (1955), enfd. sub nom. N.L.R.B. v.
Die and Tool Makers Lodge No. 113, International As-
sociation of Machinists, AFL, 231 F.2d 298 (C.A. 7,
1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 833. Involved here is a
quid pro quo which Congress made basic to the Act.
The Act requires an employer to bargain in good
faith with a duly selected exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, despite the fact that a substantial minority
in the unit may not want to be represented by that
particular union or any union at all. In exchange for
the protection of the Act, the bargaining representa-
tive must represent all unit employees.
A grievance and arbitration procedure is a primary
tool in the implementation of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement and is, therefore, a vital part of collec-
tive bargaining. The Supreme Court in Conley v. Gib-
son, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957), stated, "The bargaining
representative's duty . . . does not come to an abrupt
end . . . with the making of an agreement between
union and employer. Collective bargaining is a con-
tinuing process. Among other things, it involves day-
to-day adjustments in the contract and other working
rules, resolution of new problems not covered by ex-
isting agreements, and the protection of employee
rights already secured by contract. The bargaining
representative can no more unfairly discriminate in
carrying out these functions than it can in negotiat-
ing a collective agreement." In Peerless, supra, the
Board stated that a union's "[denial of] assistance in
prosecuting grievances is a grave matter." (111
NLRB at 857.) The Board has repeatedly held that,
although a union is permitted wide discretion in its
handling of grievances, a union cannot lawfully re-
fuse to process a grievance of an employee in the unit
because he is a nonmember. Port Drum Company,
supra; International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space & Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, and its Local No. 1303 (Jervis Corp., Bolivar
Division), 192 NLRB 966 (1971); United Steelworkers
of America, Local No. 937, AFL-CIO-CLC (Magma
Copper Company), 200 NLRB 40 (1972); Local Union
Nos. 186, 381, 396, et al., affiliates of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America (United Parcel Service), 203
NLRB 799 (1973); International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, Local Union 1504 (Western Electric
Company, Inc.), 211 NLRB 580 (1974).
Respondent herein, of course, has not refused out-
right to process Carroll's grievance but has refused to
do so unless he will pay the costs.' Respondent is
thus attempting to collect from nonmembers for
costs it incurs in processing their grievances. Respon-
dent argues that doing so is reasonable and necessary
to protect the dues paid by its members from being
eroded by expenditures to protect nonmembers. Re-
spondent in essence is arguing that it must be able to
protect itself from "free riders." The Board has dealt
with that question in Hughes Tool Company, 104
NLRB 318 (1953), a case with obvious parallels to
y
3 The stipulation shows that Respondent will process Carroll's grievances
through the first step. However , Respondent incurs no out-of -pocket ex-
2 See, e .g., Port Drum Company, 170 NLRB 555, 556, In . 4 (1968). pense for the first step.
MACHINISTS , LOCAL NO. 697
the instant case. In Hughes, the independent union
had announced that nonmembers seeking its assis-
tance would be charged $15 for processing griev-
ances and $400 for arbitration. The Board essentially
adopted the position taken therein by the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and held that a
union engaging in such activity may have its certifi-
cation revoked. In rejecting the contention that the
fees were only a justifiable measure to control free
riders, the Board stated:
The Independent is barred, by the law of the
State of Texas, from obtaining compulsory
membership. We do not believe that, in the al-
ternative, it may require a fee from nonmember
employees for services which are due the latter
as a matter of right. By adopting such a proce-
dure, the Independent has, in effect, taken the
position that it will only represent its members
in the important area of contract administration.
[104 NLRB at 329.]
The Board's holding in Hughes, that grievance repre-
sentation is due a nonmember as a matter of right, is
clearly applicable to the instant proceeding.
Respondent's reliance on Vaca v. Sipes, supra, for
the contention that the Supreme Court has held that
a union may charge fees for arbitrating grievances is
misplaced. Before deciding whether to prosecute the
grievance, the union therein sent the grievant to an-
other doctor at the union's expense. It is clear that
first the local and then the national vigorously prose-
cuted the grievance and that the national's decision
not to arbitrate was made on its view of the merits. In
addition, the remark was said to have been made by
an officer of the local union when the decision to
arbitrate could be made only by the national. In the
instant proceeding, Respondent clearly did not base
its actions on its view of the merits of Carroll's griev-
ances.
In conclusion, we find that Respondent, by charg-
ing only nonmembers for grievance representation,
has discriminated against nonmembers. We further
find that a grievance procedure is vital to collective
bargaining and that grievance representation is due
employees as a matter of right. To discriminate
against nonmembers by charging them for what is
due them by right restrains them in the exercise of
their statutory rights.4 Accordingly, we find that Re-
In justifying her proposal to require nonunion members to tender the
equivalent of dues, Chairman Murphy analogizes it to requiring the pay-
ment of a fee by a nonunion member for the use of an exclusive hiring hall.
That analogy fails to take into account the significant difference between
the operation of a hiring hall and the administration of a collective-bargain-
ing agreement . Thus, the nonunion applicant for employment, who utilizes
the hiring hall , is clearly not an employee in the unit which is represented by
the Union and is therefore not entitled as a matter of right to the uncondi-
835
spondent has violated Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act
and shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
L to take further appropriate action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. H. O. Canfield Rubber Company of Virginia,
Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce and in
activities affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent at all times material acted as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Employer's
production and maintenance employees, including
Ronnie G. Carroll, the Charging Party.
4. By refusing to process grievances against the
Employer on behalf of Ronnie G. Carroll with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other terms and conditions of employment, beyond
the first step of the grievance procedure unless he
agreed to pay the costs involved, and by requiring
the payment of such costs because he was not a
member, Respondent has restrained and coerced
said employee in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, and said conduct is an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair
labor practice affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, In-
ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Local Union No. 697, AFL-CIO, Clifton
Forge, Virginia, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing, unless costs are paid by the employ-
ee, to process grievances against the Employer on
behalf of Ronnie G. Carroll, or any other nonmem-
ber unit employee, because of his nonmembership in
Respondent.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees of H. O. Canfield Rubber Com-
pany of Virginia, Inc., in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary
tionai provision of services that the Union must make available to all unit
employees without imposition of special fees on those who are not among its
members.
836 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to effecuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, handle grievances filed by Ron-
nie G. Carroll, or any other member of the bargain-
ing unit , without regard to union membership of the
grievant and without requirement that nonmembers
pay the costs involved.
(b) Post at its offices and at all other places where
it customarily posts notices to its members, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 5, after being duly signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Sign and deliver sufficient copies of said no-
tices to the Regional Director for Region 5 for post-
ing by the Employer, at all locations where notices to
its employees are customarily posted, if said Employ-
er is willing to so post.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in
writing , within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
CHAIRMAN MURPHY, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part:
I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) for the reasons fully and
ably set forth by them. I, too, do not believe a collec-
tive-bargaining representative may require that a
nonmember pay the total costs of processing any
grievance beyond the first step unless members also
pay such fees , and I agree that the imposition of a fee
beyond that required of any member is definitely a
form of discrimination based on nonmembership.
However, I would permit a union to require that
any nonmember pay the equivalent of dues for the
remaining life of the contract in order to have the
grievance processed. I would see nothing improper or
unlawful in this. While the Union has obligations,
there should be some concomitant responsibility on
the part of the employee. The payment equal to dues
would be only what is required of any member and
could not be said to distinguish between individuals
based on their membership or nonmembership sta-
tus. Nor could the payment of such sums be said to
5 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
be the equivalent of requiring membership in the
Union in contradiction of the right-to-work law of
the State. Rather, I would view this as analogous to
payment for the use of an exclusive hiring hall of fees
reasonably related to the services performed.'
My colleagues attempt to distinguish an individual
nonmember seeking referral through an exclusive
hiring hall from the nonmember involved herein-
and argue that the former may be charged a fee
whereas the latter may not-because the former is
not an "employee within the unit" and is "not enti-
tled as a matter of right to the unconditional provision
of services that the Union must make available to all
unit employees without imposition of special fees on
those who are not among its members." (Emphasis in
original.) But this statement confuses the statutory
rights of such nonmember applicants and the deci-
sional holding that the Union may charge appropri-
ate fees. Contrary to the majority herein, a nonmem-
ber applicant at an exclusive hiring hall is entitled as
a matter of right to the services of a union without
discrimination based on nonunion status. N.L.R.B. v.
Lummus Co., 210 F.2d 377, 381 (C.A. 5, 1954). The
right of a union to charge a reasonable fee for the use
of such a hiring hall was the result of Board decision
and was based on comparison with the fees paid by
members. I know of no rule, by statute or decision,
prior to the instant case, and my colleagues cite
none, that a union is obligated to furnish to all em-
ployees in a unit every service without charge.
None of the cases of which I am aware requires a
finding that it would be unlawful to charge nonmem-
bers any fee whatsoever. Hughes Tool Company, cited
and discussed extensively in the main opinion, is fac-
tually analogous to the instant situation and is not
inconsistent with this approach. For there, as here,
the fees imposed on nonmembers-$15 for each
grievance and $400 for each arbitration proceeding-
were far above those paid by members, $1 per month
regular dues. In fact, the Board there held:'
. .. all employees in an appropriate unit are en-
titled, upon their request, to the impartial assis-
tance of the . . . representative in the filing and
adjustment of grievances. The duty of the . . .
representative to render such impartial assis-
tance is clearly evaded where some employees
[emphasis supplied] are forced to pay a price for
such help or to forego it entirely. . . . [Emphasis
in original.]
... By demanding the payment of a $15 or
$400 fee by nonmembers as a prerequisite to
their obtaining the assistance they are entitled to
6 Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (H.
John Homan Company), 137 NLRB 1043 (1962).
' 104 NLRB at 327-328.
MACHINISTS , LOCAL NO. 697
[as compared to regular dues of $1 a month paid
by members] as employees in the unit and refus-
ing the representation if not paid, the Indepen-
dent has abused the privileged status it occupies
as certified representative by using that status as
a license to grant or deny representation accord-
ing to its own arbitrary standards. [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
However, the Board went on to state that it did
"not consider that the measures placed in effect by
the [Union] present a permissible solution" for the
historic and troublesome problem of employees who
accept representation without sharing in its expen-
ses.' The Board thus did not indicate that no sharing
of costs was possible but said only that there "the
record affords some justification for doubting the as-
sertion that the . . . fees amount to a `fair and equi-
table' sharing of costs." 9
Under these principles, a bargaining repre-
sentative's requiring payment of a reasonable fee
by all employees for processing a grievance, im-
posed upon members and nonmembers alike, cannot
be discriminatory treatment of either group, and
such a fee to be paid by nonmembers on the same
basis as members cannot be unlawful. The only obli-
gation imposed on a labor organization by the duty
of fair representation is that it accord equal nondis-
criminatory treatment to all those whom it represents
without regard to membership. The obligation of a
labor organization in operating an exclusive hiring
hall is to accord equal nondiscriminatory treatment
without regard to membership to all who seek refer-
ral, and this is at least analogous to the obligation
under the duty of fair representation. Both are statu-
tory rights and of equal stature under the Act.
Accordingly, I find the violation to the extent the
fees exceed those paid by members. And for the
above reasons I would issue a remedial order requir-
ing that Respondent cease and desist from refusing
837
to process grievances for nonmembers unless they
pay fees in excess of those paid by members and,
affirmatively, that it handle such grievances upon re-
quest and upon the offer by any grieving nonmem-
bers to pay an amount equal to the monthly dues
paid by members for the remainder of the contract.
' Id. at 328.
9 Id. at In. 25. Although the Board in that footnote thereafter observed
that the monthly dues "presumably covers the costs of not only grievance
and arbitration proceedings but all other facets of union business and bene-
fits." nonmembers also enjoy the fruits of most if not all of the union's
activities as their bargaining representative; hence the payment of an
amount equal to dues would not result in any substantial overpayment for
benefits in which they would not share.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discriminate against nonmem-
ber employees in the bargaining unit at the
H. O. Canfield Rubber Company of Virginia,
Inc., in processing their grievances.
WE WILL NOT condition the processing of the
grievances of Ronnie G. Carroll, or any other
nonmember employee, on the payment of costs
incurred by us after the first step of the griev-
ance procedure.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees of the H. O. Can-
field Rubber Company of Virginia, Inc., in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, LOCAL UNION
No. 697, AFL-CIO