Louis J. Bruno et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 18, 2019

13305941 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/305,941 11/29/2011 Louis J. Bruno 58221US03;
67010-397PUS2
9043
26096 7590 09/18/2019
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
400 WEST MAPLE ROAD
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
FABULA, MICHAEL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3647
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LOUIS J. BRUNO, MASSOUD VAZIRI, MICHAEL KRENZ,
ADAM M. FINNEY, CHARLES BEECROFT, THOMAS M. ZYWIAK,
DONALD E. ARMY JR., SCOTT F. KASLUSKY,
JEFFREY T. WAVERING, and BRANDON M. GRELL
____________

Appeal 2018-001542
Application 13/305,9411
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 The Appellants identify United Technologies Corp. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1. (Citations to the Appeal Brief refer to the Corrected
Appeal Brief dated July 17, 2017).
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ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
1. An aircraft power distribution architecture
comprising:
an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) coupled to an electric
power distributor, and operable to provide power to said electric
power distributor;
a pressure bleed system connected to said APU, said
pressure bleed system being operable to bleed air from said
APU and from an aircraft engine, and operable to provide bleed
air to a plurality of pneumatic aircraft systems including at least
one environmental control system, wherein air provided from
said pressure bleed system to an environmental control system
inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi) above an
ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin;
an electric generator system coupled to said electric
power distributor and operable to provide electric power to said
electric power distributor, wherein said electric power
distributor is further coupled to a plurality of aircraft systems
that use electric power; and
wherein a magnitude of the bleed air bled by said
pressure bleed system is limited to a magnitude of air pressure
required to operate the plurality of pneumatic aircraft systems.
CITED REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Atkey et al. US 2007/0284480 A1 Dec. 13, 2007
(hereinafter “Atkey”)
Derouineau et al. US 2009/0326737 A1 Dec. 31, 2009
(hereinafter “Derouineau”)
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning
Engineers, Inc., 2007 ASHRAE Handbook, Heating, Ventilating, and
Air-Conditioning Applications, ch. 10, Aircraft (2007) (hereinafter
“ASHRAE”).
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REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement.2
II. Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter regarded as the
invention.
III. Claims 1, 4–6, 13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(pre-AIA) as unpatentable over Atkey and ASHRAE.
IV. Claims 1, 4–6, 13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(pre-AIA) as unpatentable over Atkey, ASHRAE, and Derouineau.
V. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (pre-AIA) as
unpatentable over Atkey, ASHRAE, and Derouineau.
VI. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (pre-AIA) as
unpatentable over Atkey, ASHRAE, and Derouineau.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact relied upon, which are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, appear in the following Analysis.

2 The Final Office Action (pages 2, 8) bases the written-description and
indefiniteness rejections upon either the pre-AIA or the AIA version of
35 U.S.C. § 112. In view of the filing date of the application at issue in this
Appeal, the pre-AIA version of § 112 applies.
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ANALYSIS
Written Description
Pursuant to the written-description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112
(pre-AIA), first paragraph, “the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure
of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art
that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing
date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co, 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (citations omitted). However, “the level of detail required
to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature
and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the
relevant technology.” Id. (citation omitted).
The written-description rejection of independent claim 1 (the sole
independent claim in this Appeal) concerns the following limitations of the
claimed “aircraft power distribution architecture”:
a pressure bleed system connected to said APU, said
pressure bleed system being operable to bleed air from said
APU and from an aircraft engine, and operable to provide bleed
air to a plurality of pneumatic aircraft systems including at least
one environmental control system, wherein air provided from
said pressure bleed system to an environmental control system
inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi) above an
ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin; [and]
wherein a magnitude of the bleed air bled by said
pressure bleed system is limited to a magnitude of air pressure
required to operate the plurality of pneumatic aircraft systems.
See Final Action 2–7. According to the Examiner, claim 1 does not satisfy
the written-description requirement, because the Specification provides “no
recitation with respect to the structural limitations of the low pressure bleed,
how the air pressure is limited, or the magnitudes of the pressures provided
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by the bleed system to the other pneumatic systems is ever provided.” Id. at
3. Instead, in the Specification, “the pressure bleed system is essentially a
‘black box.’” Id. at 6. The Examiner further states:
No explanation of what the “black box” of the bleed system
comprises is ever made in the disclosure or claims. Applicant
also fails to describe whether the magnitude of air pressure
supplied via the bleed system is variable in response to only
some of the pneumatic systems being operated, whether the
quantity is based upon all the systems operating simultaneously,
and/or if the quantity of air is variable in response to changes in
altitude and/or flight conditions (e.g. taxiing, high altitude
cruise, descent, low speeds) which would appear to affect the
ambient cabin pressure during the operation of the aircraft.
Id. In addition, the Examiner states: “[M]erely reciting a single pressure
measurement for the bleed system in the present application does not
demonstrate that the Applicant was in possession of the invention at the time
of filing.” Id.
In response, the Appellants argue: “[T]he level of detail presented by
Appellant with regards to the ‘black box’ pressure system is commensurate
in scope with the level of detail provided by numerous existing references in
the analogous art, including both references cited by the examiner.” Appeal
Br. 4. According to the Appellants:
The reference to the amount of disclosure provided in other
applications is an indication of the level of technical detail one
of skill in the art would understand to be required to adequately
describe the invention and to demonstrate possession. The
existing art establishes, that one of skill in the art would have
considered a black box description of the bleed structure, and
the related physical structures, to be sufficient writing to
demonstrate possession of the claimed structure.
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Id. The Appellants regard these prior art references as “first hand evidence
of what multiple distinct individuals of skill in the art, including both patent
examiners and inventors, consider to be sufficient disclosure to demonstrate
possession of a claimed invention similar in scope to the instantly claimed
invention.” Reply Br. 2.
Yet, as the Examiner points out, “the prior art references are not
currently being examined”; accordingly, the references “have no bearing on
whether the present application meets the requirements of the statutes.”
Answer 3. Moreover, even if the prior art references might “arguably
contain the same specificity as the present application relating to similar
features, they do not claim the same subject matter in the functional manner
as the present application and rely upon said matter for patentability.” Id. at
4. This is not to say that the cited prior art references, or other documents,
could never play a role in demonstrating the adequacy of the Specification,
with regard to the written-description requirement. But the Appellants have
not established the factual basis — through the mechanism of 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 or otherwise — needed to support a determination that the
Specification would have conveyed possession of the claimed subject
matter, when viewed through the eyes of a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Although the Appellants purport
to offer “first hand evidence” of such facts (Reply Br. 2), the Appellants
actually rely upon attorney argument as support for the asserted position.
See In re Cole, 326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964) (“Statements by counsel in
the brief cannot take the place of evidence.”)
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The Appellants also argue that the claimed subject matter was present
in the originally filed application; as such, it should be presumed to satisfy
the written-description requirement. Appeal Br. 5 (citation omitted).
Yet, we agree with the Examiner’s position, to the effect that, “[w]hile
some details may have been originally claimed, the manner of amendment
and the newly added limitations have altered the scope of the claim such that
it can no longer be argued as” being subject to such a presumption. Answer
5 (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (CCPA 1976)). Specifically, the
Examiner points out:
[O]nly the “10 psi” limitation was supported in original claims
7 and 8. The limitation regarding the total magnitude being
only that required by the pneumatic systems was not original in
combination with the 10 psi limitation. Furthermore, claims 7
and 8 were notably dependent upon claims 4, 5, and 6, whereas
those limitations are no longer required.
Id.
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection
of independent claim 1, such that we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and
dependent claims 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA),
first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
Indefiniteness
The indefiniteness rejection focuses on the limitation of independent
claim 1 reciting: “air provided from said pressure bleed system to an
environmental control system inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi)
above an ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin.” See Final Action 8–9.
The Examiner states:
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It is known in the art that the ambient cabin pressure inside a
cabin (also referred to as the “equivalent effective cabin
altitude” or more commonly “cabin altitude”) of an aircraft
sized to comprise both aircraft engines and an APU (e.g. a
commercial passenger jet) is generally programmed to rise
gradually from the altitude of the airport of origin to a
regulatory maximum of 8,000 feet. As the term “ambient cabin
pressure” has not been defined in the originally filed disclosure
contrary to the accepted definition, it is unclear whether the
magnitude of air pressure supplied to the pneumatic systems is
variable in response to changes in altitude and/or flight
conditions (e.g. taxiing, high altitude cruise, descent, low
speeds), which affect the cabin pressure during the operation of
the aircraft, or if the air pressure remains constant. If the cabin
air pressure is variable, it is unclear how the pressure bleed
system is constructed/operated in order to adjust the pressures
accordingly as only a “black box” is presented as outlined
above. On the other hand, if the magnitude of air pressure
required by the systems is constant, it is unclear at which point
in the aircraft operation (e.g., cruising altitude with all systems
turned on simultaneously) the magnitude of all pneumatic
devices is determined. As it is unclear what the metes and
bounds of the claim encompassed by the last limitation are,
Applicant has failed to particularly point out and distinctly
claim what they regard to be their invention.
Id.
The Appellants “agree[ ] with the examiner that one of skill in the art
would understand that the ambient pressure inside a cabin is programmed to
rise gradually, dependent upon altitude.” Appeal Br. 5. Yet, the Appellants
contend, this circumstance does not inject any uncertainty into the identified
claim limitation; rather, one of skill in the art reading the claim limitation at
issue (concerning the parameter of “at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi)
above an ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin”) “would understand
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that the air provided is at most 10 psi above the ambient pressure for a
current operating condition of the aircraft.” Id. at 6.
With respect to the Examiner’s position that “[i]f the cabin air
pressure is variable, it is unclear how the pressure bleed system is
constructed/operated in order to adjust the pressures accordingly” (Final
Action 8), the Appellants contend that “[o]ne of skill in the art would fully
understand that any of the multiple known techniques for controlling air
pressure within a pressure bleed system could be utilized and still fall within
the claim scope” (Appeal Br. 6). Even so, the Appellants assert:
The specific valve structures, sensor configurations, and
so on, within a pressure bleed system required to provide air
from the pressure bleed system and to an environmental control
system at a given pressure are conventional and need not be
described by Appellant in order to define the metes and bounds
of the claim.
Id.
We agree with the Appellants. “[A] claim is indefinite when it
contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear,” i.e., “ambiguous,
vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining
the claimed invention.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310–13 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also In re McAward, No. 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *3
(PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential). Even though the claimed “ambient
cabin pressure” might vary (e.g., resulting from a change in altitude), this
circumstance — although indicative of the breadth of the claim language
(see Appeal Br. 6) — would not render the claim language unclear. Nor
would the clarity of the claim language be impaired by any of the
Examiner’s concerns about how such a claimed device might be constructed.
See Final Action 8–9.
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Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1,
and dependent claims 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-
AIA), second paragraph.
Obviousness
The Examiner advances two distinct obviousness rejections for claims
1, 4–6, 13, and 15. First, the Examiner determines these claims to be
obvious over the combination of Atkey and ASHRAE (Rejection III). Final
Action 10–13. Second, the Examiner determines these claims also to be
obvious over the combination of Atkey, ASHRAE, and Derouineau
(Rejection IV). Id. at 13–17. With respect to these rejections, the
Appellants’ arguments concern claim 1’s limitation of “wherein air provided
from said pressure bleed system to an environmental control system inlet is
at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi) above an ambient cabin pressure of
an aircraft cabin.” See Appeal Br. 7–9.
For the reasons provided below, we do not sustain Rejection III, but
we do sustain Rejection IV.
The Examiner also rejects claims 2 and 12 as obvious over the
combination of Atkey, ASHRAE, and Derouineau (Rejections V and VI).
Final Action 17–19. The Appellants do not provide any separate arguments
for these claims, relying instead upon the arguments presented in response to
Rejection IV. See Appeal Br. 9. Accordingly, we also sustain Rejections V
and VI.
Therefore, for the reasons provided in the separate sections below, we
sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
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1. Rejection III Based Upon Atkey and Aircraft
In rejecting claims 1, 4–6, 13, and 15 as obvious over Atkey and
ASHRAE, the Examiner takes the position that a person of ordinary skill in
the art, at the time of the invention, would have implemented claim 1’s
limitation “wherein air provided from said pressure bleed system to an
environmental control system inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi)
above an ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin,” as “an obvious matter
of design choice”:
At the time the invention was made, it would have been
an obvious matter of design choice to a person of ordinary skill
in the art to limit the air pressure at an inlet to an ECS
[“environmental control system”] to be at most ten psi above an
ambient cabin pressure at the ECS outlet because Applicant has
not disclosed that limiting the low air pressure to no more than
10 psi above an ambient air pressure provides an advantage, is
used for a particular purpose, or solves a stated problem. One
of ordinary skill in the art furthermore, would have expected
Applicant’s invention to perform equally well with an air
pressure of 11 to 20 psi above cabin air pressure because air
pressure at the ECS inlet can further be modified by the ECS
itself to supply a desired output pressure into the cabin at an
ECS outlet and/or the total pressure of the bleed system can be
supplemented by the APU without any change to the magnitude
(i.e. total volume) of air bled from the APU and/or aircraft
engine. Therefore, it would have been an obvious matter of
design choice to modify Atkey et al. to obtain the invention as
specified in claim 1.
Final Action 12.
In disputing the rejection, the Appellants (see Appeal Br. 8) argue that
the cited prior art references do not support the Examiner’s premise that
“[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art furthermore, would have expected
Applicant’s invention to perform equally well with an air pressure of 11 to
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20 psi above cabin air pressure” (Final Action 12). The Appellants
emphasize that the Examiner’s finding includes the proviso that, if needed,
“air pressure at the ECS inlet can be further modified by the ECS itself.”
Appeal Br. 8 (quoting Final Action 12). Yet, the Appellants point out, if
“additional features are required to be added to the ECS in order to further
condition air provided at 11–20 psi, then 11–20 psi does not work equally as
well, and the examiner's statement is incorrect.” Id. Further, the Appellants
argue:
[E]ven if 11–20 Psi would work “equally well” there is no
indication that the manifold of Atkey is 11–20 psi above
ambient. Indeed, the 11–20 number is a number arbitrarily
selected by the examiner, and has no basis in the disclosure or
teaching of either Atkey or ASHARE.
Id. Consequently, according the Appellants, the Examiner’s obviousness
rationale is based upon “pure speculation and is incorrect.” Id.
The Examiner agrees with the Appellants’ assertion, to the effect that
the choice of the hypothetical environmental control system (ECS) inlet
pressure of 11–20 psi above ambient cabin pressure is “arbitrary.” Answer
10. Yet, according to the Examiner, this arbitrary range in the hypothetical
example was presented in response to claim 1’s recitation of an arbitrary
limit (i.e., “at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi) above an ambient cabin
pressure”): “While the value range selected by the Examiner may be
arbitrarily selected, there is nothing on the record to establish that the
Appellant’s value range was not also arbitrarily selected.” Id. at 11. Indeed,
according to the Examiner, the Appellants have “continuously failed to
provide any explanation as to why or how [the claimed] value range has
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[any] criticality whatsoever so Examiner maintains that the value range is
completely arbitrary and an obvious design choice.” Id. at 9.
A so-called “design choice” rationale, such as the Examiner relies
upon (see Final Action 12), has been deemed appropriate where one prior art
element or property is proposed to be substituted for another that achieves
the same purpose. See ACCO Brands Corp. v. Fellowes, Inc., 813 F.3d
1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The prior art consistently locates the two
sensors at issue in the shredder’s feed, and no party disputes that an ordinary
artisan would have found this the obvious location for the combination of
sensors. The ordinary artisan would then be left with two design choices.”)
Cf. In re Gal, 980 F.2d 717, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The Board held that Gal
had simply made an obvious design choice. However, the different
structures of Gal and Matsumura achieve different purposes.”) Our
reviewing court has cautioned that “[m]erely stating that a particular
[limitation] is a design choice does not make it obvious.” Polaris Indus.,
Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1069 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 636 F. App’x 575, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(nonprecedential)).
Consistent with the foregoing principles, the Examiner acknowledges
that an obviousness rationale based upon a design choice requires a showing
“that the prior art would have performed equally as well as the claimed
invention.” Answer 8. Yet, the Examiner does not identify, in the prior art
of record, a disclosure of an element that operates sufficiently, in regard to
the very claim limitation stated to be a matter of design choice (i.e., claim
1’s “wherein air provided from said pressure bleed system to an
environmental control system inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi)
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above an ambient cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin”). Instead, the
Examiner’s hypothetical example, which the Examiner concedes to be an
“arbitrary” choice (id. at 10), supplies the essential predicate for the
rejection.
Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 and
dependent claims 4–6, 13, and 15 as obvious over Atkey and ASHRAE,
based upon the design-choice rationale.
2. Rejections IV–VI Based Upon Atkey, ASHRAE, and
Derouineau
The Examiner also rejects the claims as obvious over Atkey,
ASHRAE, and Derouineau, relying upon Derouineau for claim 1’s limitation
of “air provided from said pressure bleed system to an environmental control
system inlet is at most 10 pounds per square inch (psi) above an ambient
cabin pressure of an aircraft cabin.” See Final Action 15–16 (citing
Derouineau ¶¶ 2, 17–18, 38).
The Appellants argue that this rejection is erroneous, because it
improperly combines two distinct and mutually exclusive examples of
Derouineau. Appeal Br. 8–9. According to the Appellants, ¶¶ 17–18 of
Derouineau describe an example in which the pressure at the bleed port is
“at or below cabin pressure,” but the Appellants contend that this
circumstance applies where the bleed is used “for only ECS (in other words,
not for wing anti icing (WAI) or other bleed loads).” Id. at 9 (quoting
Derouineau ¶ 18). The Appellants contend that such low bleed pressure
does not exist in Derouineau’s disclosures in ¶ 38 and Figure 4, wherein the
bleed supplies pressurized air to the ECS and at least one other application
(such as the wing anti-icing mechanism). Id. According to the Appellants,
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“[t]hese two examples are distinct, mutually exclusive embodiments, and the
explicit teaching of Derouineau is that the low pressure bleed can only be
used in a system that exclusively provides bleed pressure to the ECS.” Id.
However, the Appellants misunderstand Derouineau’s teachings and
the Examiner’s application of the reference in this rejection.
Derouineau addresses the problem of the engine compressor
delivering air at a “pressure above what is required for ECS,” such that using
that source to supply the ECS mandated the “pressure to be throttled
(wasted).” Derouineau ¶ 17. By contrast, Derouineau’s “invention is
designed to use an engine bleed system capable of normally providing bleed
air above (but not generally more than 5 psi above in cruise to avoid waste),
at or below cabin pressure, and thus, it may be the most efficient solution
for pressurization.” Id. (emphasis added).
In regard to the disclosure of Derouineau’s ¶ 18 — i.e., “using engine
bleed for only ECS” — “[t]he present invention recognizes that a very
simple bleed system may be realized, relying on a low pressure bleed port
which may be sized to be at or below required cabin pressure for standard
cruise altitude, speed and temperature.” Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
In regard to ¶ 38 (and Figure 4, described therein) of Derouineau, the
reference discloses supplying “low pressure bleed air” in order to pressurize
an aircraft cabin and to supply other pneumatic systems. Id. ¶ 38, Fig. 4.
Yet, there is no indication that the disclosure of Derouineau’s ¶ 38
embodiment negates the general condition described in ¶ 17 — i.e.,
providing bleed air to the ECS that is “above (but not generally more than 5
psi above in cruise to avoid waste), at or below cabin pressure” —
notwithstanding that ¶ 38 does not state the still more narrowly proscribed
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condition of ¶ 18, in which the “low pressure bleed port” is “at or below
required cabin pressure.” Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 38 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the Examiner’s rejection does not rely upon “mutually
exclusive” embodiments of Derouineau that “cannot have their features
combined,” as the Appellants contend. Reply Br. 3. Nor do the Appellants
sufficiently articulate any other reason why the cited prior art disclosures
may not be combined, as set forth in the rejection, to meet the requirements
of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejections of independent claim 1 and
dependent claims 2, 4–6, 12, 13, and 15 (none of which is argued separately)
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), based upon the combination of Atkey, ASHRAE,
and Derouineau.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12,
13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12,
13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–6, 12,
13, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (pre-AIA).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED