Locker, Howard et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 29, 2020

2019002429 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/149,040 05/31/2011 Howard Locker RPS920110016USNP(710.162) 1693 58127 7590 07/29/2020 FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC 409 BROAD STREET PITTSBURGH, PA 15143 EXAMINER LEE, PHILIP C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2454 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/29/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte HOWARD LOCKER, JAY WESLEY JOHNSON, and MASAYUKI KUMAGAI ____________________ Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before JAMES R. HUGHES, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, and 31. Appellant has canceled claims 2, 3, 6–10, 12, 13, 16–19, 23, and 25–30. Appeal Br. 16. We have jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to an information handling device running an audio aggregation application. Spec. ¶ 3. The audio aggregation application is configured to obtain audio transmitted from one or more secondary (i.e., not the information handling device) audio devices and generate a composite audio stream. Spec. ¶¶ 3, 17. In a disclosed embodiment, the information handling device may stream the aggregated audio data to another remote device. Spec. ¶¶ 17–19. Claims 1, 11, and 20 are independent claims. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) and is reproduced below: 1. A system comprising: an information handling device of an end-user having: a processor; and computer readable program code executable by the processor, the computer readable program code comprising: host audio aggregation code running on the information handling device that obtains, using short range wireless communication, audio transmitted by at least one mobile user device located in proximity to the information handling device; the host audio aggregation code generating at least one central audio stream by mixing the audio obtained from the at least one mobile user device with an audio stream obtained from at least one other audio device selected from the group consisting of another mobile user device located in proximity to the information handling device and an Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 3 audio input device of the information handling device; the information handling device sending the at least one central audio stream to at least one other device remotely located with respect to the information handling device and the at least one mobile user device; wherein the audio obtained from the at least one mobile user device has not been aggregated with audio from any other device. The Examiner’s Rejection Claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, and 31 stand rejected under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Garcia, Jr. et al. (US 2012/0069134 A1; Mar. 22, 2012) (“Garcia”) and Jones et al. (US 7,277,692 B1; Oct. 2, 2007) (“Jones”). Final Act. 3–12. ANALYSIS2 In rejecting, inter alia, independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on the combined teachings and suggestions of Garcia and Jones. Final Act. 3– 5. We begin our analysis with a brief review of these prior art references. Garcia generally relates to an audio processing computing device that receives audio signals from other devices, generates a composite audio signal, and distributes the composite audio signal to the devices. Garcia ¶¶ 2, 4. 2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed August 6, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed January 28, 2019 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 28, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Final Office Action, mailed February 5, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from which this Appeal is taken. Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 4 Figure 1 of Garcia is illustrative and is reproduced below: Figure 1 of Garcia shows the exchange of audio information to the audio processing device (i.e., Focus Device (110)) from the other participant devices (i.e., Non-Focus Devices (115, 120, 125, 130)). Garcia ¶ 4. Focus Device (110) receives the audio signals (135, 140, 145, 150) from the Non- Focus Devices (115, 120, 125, 130), composites the received signals, and distributes the composite audio (155, 160, 165, 170) to the Non-Focus Devices (115, 120, 125, 130). Garcia ¶ 4; see also Garcia ¶¶ 31–32, 37. In addition, Garcia describes the Focus Device (110) may comprise a capture module to locally capture audio (e.g., from the user of the Focus Device) and may also capture audio via a network interface (e.g., from Non-Focus Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 5 Device users). Garcia ¶¶ 70, 73; see also Garcia, Fig. 6. Garcia also describes the devices may comprise wireless communication subsystems “to facilitate communication functions.” Garcia ¶ 219. Garcia discloses the wireless communication systems may include a cellular transceiver, a Bluetooth transceiver, and a Wi-Fi transceiver. Garcia ¶ 219. Jones generally relates to collecting audio data to create an audio recording such as for surround sound. Jones, Abstract. In a disclosed embodiment, Jones describes an architecture wherein audio data is collected from a plurality of mobile client terminals using Bluetooth connectivity. Jones, col. 6, ll. 14–28, Fig. 3; see also Jones, col. 6, l. 64–col. 7, l. 3. Jones describes an embodiment comprising a plurality of location zones with each location zone comprising a plurality of mobile terminals to capture audio data. Jones, col. 6, ll. 19–28, Fig. 3. Jones further describes that within a location zone, one of the mobile terminals is designated as the master device, responsible for communicating with the other (slave) terminals in the zone and also for communicating over a network to a central server. Jones, col. 6, ll. 29–63; see also Jones, col. 7, ll. 35–53 (describing the slave terminals sending the audio data to the master terminal that sends the collected audio to the central server). Appellant argues the Examiner’s reason to combine Garcia and Jones is unsupported and conclusory. Appeal Br. 16–20; Reply Br. 18–22. In particular, Appellant asserts that although an ordinarily skilled artisan might be able to combine the references, the Examiner has not provided a rationale as to why (or how) one of ordinary skill in the art would make the proposed combination. Appeal Br. 18–20. Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 6 The Examiner finds it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to incorporate Jones’s method of a master device collecting audio data via Bluetooth and send the collected audio to a remote device with the audio aggregation system of Garcia “in order to enable some of the participants to connect and communicate via Bluetooth wherein others are using different communication mediums, thereby increasing the flexibility in Garcia’s system.” Final Act. 5. In addition, the Examiner explains one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Garcia’s devices already have Bluetooth capability and it would have been obvious to apply Jones’s teaching of collecting the audio using Bluetooth and send the collected audio (as aggregated by Garcia) to a remote user (i.e., a network server) to expand the flexibility of Garcia—i.e., to send the audio to a participant not within Bluetooth or Wi-Fi range. Ans. 6. The Examiner further explains the proposed combination merely applies a known technique (i.e., collecting audio signals over Bluetooth) to a known device (Garcia’s devices) to yield predictable results. Ans. 6. The U.S. Supreme Court has held the relevant inquiry in an obviousness analysis is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). In addition, an obviousness analysis can “take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. As described above, Garcia teaches a system of aggregating audio signals received from non-focus Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 7 devices and sending the composite audio signal. Garcia also describes the focus device for collecting and aggregating the audio signals may use a wireless communication subsystem comprising of various different technologies. See Garcia ¶ 219. Moreover, Garcia contemplates the devices connecting to a plurality of networks at the same time. Garcia ¶ 219 (“the Wi-Fi transceiver can be used in some embodiments to connect to mesh network while the cellular radio transceiver can be used in some embodiments to connect to the focus point network”). Jones also teaches using a plurality of transceiver technologies to collect signals locally and transmit the collected signals to a remote user (i.e., central network server). See Jones, col. 6, ll. 19–21, col. 6, ll. 53–59, col. 7, ll. 35–53. As such, we agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Jones’ teaching of collecting audio samples using Bluetooth and sending the aggregated audio signal (as taught by Garcia) to a remote user in order to expand further Garcia’s system to include a mix of local and remote users (i.e., those within the focus network, and those outside of the focus network) during an audio conference. See, e.g., Garcia ¶¶ 2, 4–5, 219. Thus, the Examiner provides “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. Moreover, Appellant has not provided persuasive argument or evidence that the proposed combination uses the elements of the references in a way other than their established functions to achieve predictable results. “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Further, Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence or reasoning that the proposed Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 8 combination would be “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19). Appellant also asserts that the prior art fails to teach an information handling device receiving at least one audio stream from at least one mobile user device located in proximity to the information handling device. Appeal Br. 20–23; Reply Br. 22–25. In particular, Appellant argues Garcia describes the non-focus devices as being remote from the focus device and, therefore, are not located in proximity to the focus device and the focus device cannot obtain the audio streams using short range wireless communication. Appeal Br. 20–23. Appellant argues that Garcia instead teaches the non-focus devices connect to a network using Bluetooth and use the network to send their audio signals to the focus device. Appeal Br. 21– 22. When construing claim terminology during prosecution before the Office, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, reading claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We are mindful, however, that limitations are not to be read into the claims from the Specification. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 9 We note the claim language recites that the information handling device obtains the audio signals from the mobile user device(s) “using short range wireless communication.” Even if we were to accept Appellant’s characterization that Garcia only teaches or suggests the focus device obtains the audio signals from the non-focus devices after connecting to a network (using Bluetooth, a short range wireless communication approach), Appellant’s claim is broadly, but reasonably construed to include such an approach. Moreover, we note the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Garcia and Jones and particularly finds that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use the approach of Jones wherein the master device obtains the audio signals from the slave devices using a Bluetooth connection. Final Act. 5; Ans. 7; see also In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining the test for obviousness is whether the combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art). To the extent Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Jones’ master terminal teaches the claimed information handling device because Jones does not aggregate the audio signals from the slave terminals (see Appeal Br. 23; Reply Br. 25), we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. As discussed above, the Examiner relies on Garcia for this teaching. See Final Act. 3–4 (citing Garcia ¶¶ 4, 31–43, Figs. 1, 2). Appellant also asserts “Jones has nothing to do with remote conferencing and teaches nothing related to transmission of conference audio to remote devices.” Appeal Br. 22–23; Reply Br. 24–25. As such, Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 10 Appellant argues an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine Jones with Garcia. Appeal Br. 23. As discussed above, we find the Examiner has set forth articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the proposed combination. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988. In addition, to the extent Appellant is asserting that Jones is non-analogous art, we disagree. The correct inquiry for whether a reference is analogous art to the claimed invention is if (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In order for a reference to be “reasonably pertinent” to the problem, it “logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Jones is analogous art. See Ans. 8. Both Jones and Appellant’s invention relate to the collection of audio signals and the transmission of the collected audio signal(s) to a remote location. Thus, Jones is (at least) reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by Appellant and is, therefore analogous art. For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 11, and 20. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 5, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24, and 31, Appeal 2019-002429 Application 13/149,040 11 which depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 16; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20–22, 24, and 31 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20– 22, 24, 31 103(a) Garcia, Jones 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 20– 22, 24, 31 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED