Local Joint Executive Board, Etc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 27, 1964146 N.L.R.B. 1094 (N.L.R.B. 1964) Copy Citation 1094 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In sum, for the reasons stated , the picketing in issue here has not violated Section 8(b)(7)(C), and I shall, therefore , recommend dismissal of the complaint. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Sullivan Electric Company is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Building and Construction Trades Council of Santa Barbara County, AFL-CIO, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 413, AFL-CIO, and Inter- national Union of Operating Engineers , Local No. 12, AFL-CIO, respectively are, and have been at all material times, labor organizations within the meaning of Sec- tion 2 (5) of the Act. 3. By picketing a construction project of Sullivan Electric Company, as found above, the Respondents have not violated Section 8 (b) (7) (C) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding , I recommend that the National Labor Relations Board enter an order dismissing the complaint. Local Joint Executive Board , Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Locals 19, 266, 420, 503, and 655 of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union and Nationwide Downtowner Motor Inns, Inc., d/b/a Downtowner and Downtowner Motor Inn. Cases Nos. 17-CB-354 and 17-CP-26. April 27, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On August 26, 1963, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in any unfair labor practices requiring the issuance of a remedial order, and reconunending dismissal of the complaint in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. Thereafter the Charging Party and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.' The Respondent filed certain exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's recommended dismissal of the complaint. The Board 2'has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner. made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The Member Fanning notes that Cartage and Terminal Management Corporation, 130 NLRB 558 , cited by the General Counsel and the Charging Party in support of their allega- tion that a violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C ) exists here , is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike his colleagues in Cartage, Member Fanning based his finding of a violation in that case on his :belief that the picketing there "had as its objects recognition as majority rep= resentative of applicants [ Riss ' drivers ] for employment with Cartage at a time when Cartage had no employees ." See 130 NLRB 559, footnote 2. Accordingly , Member Fanning's conclusion in Cartage is not applicable to the present case. 2Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act , the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Brown]. 146 NLRB No. 139. LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD, ETC. 1095 rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] 3 We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the sole object of the Respondent's instant picketing was to compel the Employer to comply with its existing collective- bargaining agreement. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint Insofar as it alleges a violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) of the Act. See Building and Construction Trades Council of Santa Barbara County, et at. (Sullivan Electric Company), 146 NLRB 1086. In these circumstances we find It unnecessary to consider or adopt the Trial Examiner's alternative findings at footnote 12 of the Intermediate Report. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon separate charges duly filed on January 25, 1963, by Nationwide Downtowner Motor Inns, Inc., d/b/a Downtowner and Downtowner Motor Inn, by Don T. Baker, its vice president-operations, hereinafter referred to as Downtowner or Charging Party, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter called the General Counsel 1 and the Board respectively, by the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region (Kansas City, Missouri), issued its complaint dated March 15, 1963, against Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Locals 19, 266, 420, 503, and 655• of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, hereinafter called Re- spondent or Union. The complaint alleged that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(C) and 8(b)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, herein called the Act. Copies of the charges, the complaint, and notice of hearing thereon were duly served upon Respondent and Downtowner. Respondent duly filed its answer admitting certain allegations of the complaint but denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing thereon was held in Kansas City, Missouri on June 25, 1963, before Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson. All parties appeared at the hearing, were represented by counsel and afforded full opportunity to be heard, to produce, examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence material and pertinent to the issues, and were advised of their rights to argue orally upon the record and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions or both. Oral argument was waived. Briefs were received from General Counsel, Downtowner, and Respondent on July 22, 1963. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING PARTY The Charging Party, whose principal office is in Memphis, Tennessee, owns and operates a chain of 19 motor hotels in 13 States, including the Downtowner Motor Inn at Kansas City, Missouri, the only facility here involved and hereinafter called the Motor Inn. More than 25 percent of the guests at the Charging Party's motels, including the Motor Inn, remain for less than a month. The Charging Party receives more than $500,000 gross revenue annually at Motor Inn. The Charging Party receives at Motor Inn goods, products, and materials from outside the State of Missouri valued in excess of $10,000 annually. I find that the Charging Party is engaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce. II. THE RESPONDENT Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Inter- national Union, Locals 19, 266, 420, 503, and 655 of the Hotel & Restaurant 'This term specifically includes the counsel appearing for the General Counsel at the hearing. 1096 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Employees and Bartenders International Union is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Charging Party. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The facts On April 29, 1962, the newly constructed Downtowner Motor Inn in Kansas City, Missouri, was opened to the public. Its general manager was John Nichols , Jr., an experienced hotelman. It was staffed with employees referred to it by Respondent, employees recruited from other hotels in Kansas City, and through newspaper advertising. There was at this time a labor agreement in effect between the Greater Kansas City Hotel Association on behalf of a large number of the Kansas City hotels and Respondent which covered the hours, wages, and working conditions of the employees of the member hotels. This agreement was by its terms to remain in effect until June 16, 1963, and contained a wage reopener clause effective June 16, 1962. The agreement also contained a recognition clause as well as clauses providing for union security, on health and welfare contributions, a no-strike clause, and wage rates including overtime pay. John Nichols was hired by the Charging Party in March 1962. He was made general manager of the Kansas City Motor Inn by Don T. Baker, Charging Party's vice president-operations, with instructions to'pay his staff union wages and to get the Motor Inn operating. Fred Jorgensen, organizer for Respondent, began securing signed authorization cards from Downtowner employees which from time to time he would show Nichols. On or about April 20, Jorgensen inquired of Nichols if the Motor Inn was to be a union house. Nichols stated that he would find out. At or before this time Nichols requested permission of Baker for the Motor Inn to join the Greater Kansas City Hotel Association arguing that the Motor Inn would benefit from the joint negotiations with Respondent and in the Association 's joint effort to prevent the imposition of a 5-percent city. tax on hotel rooms. On or about May 1,2 Jorgensen again approached Nichols at the Motor Inn with a Hotel Association contract, a stack of 40 or 50 signed authorization cards, a claim that Respondent represented the majority of the Downtowner employees, and a re- quest that Downtowner execute the Association contract. Nichols showed Jorgensen a letter from Downtowner headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee, authorizing him to join the Hotel Association, which Nichols had thereupon done. He thumbed through a number of the authorization cards handed to him by Jorgensen briefly and with little, if any, study thereof announced that, as it was obvious Respondent had the majority of the employees signed, there was only one thing to do and that was to execute the Association agreement which he proceeded to do on behalf of the Charging Party by himself as general manager? Sometime about June, Downtowner headquarters in Memphis requested and received from Nichols a copy of the Kansas City Hotel Association contract signed by him for use in another Downtowner dispute in Little Rock, Arkansas. - Following the execution of this contract by Nichols, Respondent handled one grievance on behalf of the Downtowner employees which was promptly and in- formally settled by Nichols. Otherwise, except that the Downtowner abided by the contract wage scale with the possible exception of time and a half pay for over- time, the agreement appears to have lain dormant : there was no checkoff of dues, no contributions to the health and welfare fund , and no attempt to enforce the union shot) clause so far as the Motor Inn was concerned. The Hotel Association contract was reopened for wages on or before June 16, 1962. Sometime during these rather protracted negotiations which lasted until Octo- ber 17, 1962, when the new wage scale was adopted, the Hotel Association invited Nichols, as manager of the Motor Inn, to participate therein. However, under date of September 14. 1962. Baker, as vice president, addressed the following letter to the president of the Hotel Association: This letter is directed to you for the purpose of confirming the status of the Downtowner Motor Inn in Kansas City, with respect to our membership in the Hotel Association of Greater Kansas City. Pursuant to our usual practice, 2 All dates herein are in the year 1962, unless otherwise noted. 8 Nichols execute(] two of the printed FJotel Association-Respondent agreements which also contained the printed names of the other parties signatory thereto. One such copy was retained by Nichols and the other by Jorgensen. LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD, ETC. 1097 we joined the Hotel Association when we began operations in Kansas City, but it was made clear at that time that membership in the Association did not con- stitute a designation of the Association as our bargaining representative for negotiations with any unions representing Hotel employees .4 I wish to reaffirm our position that we do not now, nor have we in the past, designated or given authority to the Association to represent the Downtowner Motor Inn of Kansas City, Missouri, in collective-bargaining negotiations with any labor organization. It has always been our practice to handle these matters individually and we have, and expect to continue this practice in Kansas City. Also on that same day, September 14, 1962, Baker, as vice president, addressed a letter to Respondent reading.as follows: This is to advise you that the Hotel Association of Greater Kansas City does not now, nor has it in the past, been given authority to represent the Down- towner Motor Inn of Kansas City, Missouri, in dealing with your union or with any other labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. Such matters will be handled by us exclusively .5 Nichols refused to participate in the negotiation of the new wage agreement be- tween the Hotel Association and Respondent. The new wage rates agreed upon by the Hotel Association and Respondent went into effect on. October 17, 1962. On October 18, Don Baker was in Kansas City. He instructed Nichols to reduce the maid force even though that might mean working the maids 10 hours per day 6 days a week without overtime pay and that thereafter the maids and hall porters were to work at least a full 8-hour day exclusive of meal breaks. As ordered, Nichols conveyed these instructions to the maids and the hall porters. The employees were unhappy.6 By 1:30 p.m. of that day these employees, led by employee Bruce Masters, had demanded and received an audience with Baker during which the threat of a walkout was made. By telephone Baker ordered Nichols to "straighten out" the employees and "get them off his back." Nichols again talked to the employees in the linenroom and asked them to resolve the matter by talk rather than by walkout. The evidence also shows that twice on the day of October 18, the Downtowner employees went to union headquarters and on both occasions were told to go back to work. The employees returned to the Motor Inn. Later that day Baker refused a request to meet with the employees on the matter. Subsequently that afternoon the employees went out on strike. Baker candidly admitted in his testimony that the strike was caused by his own unilateral change in the working conditions and wages of the maids and porters. This change would have required the presence of the maids and porters on the premises for an extra hour or two per day. On October 19, the 25-35 employees who had walked out the previous day began picketing the Motor Inn on all four sides, including that area where supplies were delivered. The pickets wore signs reading as follows: ' Employees of the Downtowner Motel are not being paid the wages or getting the working' conditions that has been [sic] established in this area by the Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Nos. 19, 266, 420, 503, and 655. There is no dispute but that this picketing resulted in obstructing deliveries and the performances of services to the Motor Inn. Sometime in December, the picket signs were changed to read that the Down- towner employees were "on strike." Under date of October 19, 1962, Baker advised Respondent by letter as follows: You have asserted that this Company, the Downtowner' Motor Inn, is under contract with your labor organization. If this assertion be true (which we deny) we wish to advise you that effective immediately the Company is rescind- ing and abrogating the alleged contract because of a material violation. * No evidence of such limitation on the Downtowner membership was presented at this hearing. s This was the first, and only, such notification Respondent ever received. 6 At the hearing Baker maintained that.. Nichols "misconveyed" these instructions by so informing the maids in addition to the hall, porters. In view of the fact that it is un- denied that Baker's instructions to Nichols involved both maids and porters, this explana- tion has all the earmarks of an alibi. 1098 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD That was the last communication between the parties hereto until January 4, 1963, when Baker telephoned Respondent and arranged for a meeting with them at the Muehlebach Hotel Coffee Shop that morning. As arranged, Baker, accompanied by Nichols and Assistant Manager George English, met with Union Representatives Fitzgerald, LeVan, and Prentice at the Muehlebach Coffee Shop. Baker opened the meeting by asking what the Down- towner "had to do to get the pickets removed." According to Baker and General Counsel's witnesses, Fitzgerald answered, "Sign the contract" and reinstate the strikers. According to Respondent's witnesses, the answer was "Abide by the con- tract" and reinstate the strikers. There was at this, as at the subsequent meetings, considerable talk about,the validity of the contract Nichols had signed with Respond- ent maintaining that it had a valid agreement and Baker maintaining that it had no contract but, if the agreement were valid, it had been breached by the strike in derogation of the "no strike" clause included in the Hotel Association contract. Baker also stated -that he had never seen the contract and asked for one. Thus, Baker's position appears somewhat inconsistent. Respondent agreed to furnish him a copy within the hour and did so. "By mistake" Respondent furnished Baker with a copy of the contract containing the new October 17, 1962, wage scale. Further meetings between the parties were held on January 7 and 11. Only Baker and English attended these meetings as Nichols' employment with the Down- towner ceased on January 5. These meetings were very similar to the one on January 4. However, on January 7, Respondent did raise the question of three bartenders at the Downtowner who had continued their employment by crossing Respondent's picket line. Respondent suggested that these three could no longer work for the Downtowner. Also at the meeting on January 11, Respondent brought in their signed authorization cards for Baker's inspection but Baker refused on the ground that ".the proper way" would be to hold an election among the employees. It was again pointed out that the Charging Party had already recognized Respondent when it signed the Hotel Association contract. The meetings were fruitless. Under date of January 8, 1963, Baker advised Fitzgerald by letter as follows: We have considered your request that we recognize your Union and sign the existing contract. This is to advise you that we cannot do this unless an election is first held among our employees. On February 27, 1963, Respondent wrote Baker as follows: This is to advise you that if you have inferred from any of our conversations that the picketing at your Kansas City operation is for the purpose of compelling you or inducing you to terminate employees because they are not members of. any one of the local unions affiliated with the International Union of Hotel & Restaurant Employees and -Bartenders, or because they worked during the strike or behind the picket lines, that such is not the case. If any such sugges- tion was made, it is hereby withdrawn. As we have informed. you many times, our picketing has been solely to secure compliance with the existing contract which was signed by your local manager, Mr. John Nichols. Respondent brought suit to enforce the May 1 contract. On April 12, 1963, Respondent's picketing of the Downtowner Motor Inn was enjoined at the instance of the Board by the Federal District Court. Picketing thereupon ceased. Respondent has never_ filed a petition for.certification covering the employees of the Downtowner Motor Inn. B. Conclusions Although all parties managed to get a citation of authority or two into their briefs, yet there is not a citation which is actually in point here. The reason for this is, of course, twofold: (1) admittedly,. the Downtowner about May 1, 1962, had joined .the Greater Kansas City Hotel Association which bargained on behalf of its members with Respondent; and (2) on or about May 1, 1962, the Downtowner's General Manager John Nichols actually executed the existing Hotel Association contract with Respondent. These two facts tend to complicate the instant case. The gravamen of General Counsel's complaint is a violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) which provides: . It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (7) to picket or cause to be picketed . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD, ETC. 1099 labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or.re- quiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organ- ization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as a representative of such employees: (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing . . . . General Counsel's brief appears to find the above two facts to be immaterial because he finds that "an object" of the strike of October 19, was "to bargain" over the unilateral changes in working conditions and wages which Baker had admittedly ordered the day before. Even Baker acknowledges that the strike of October 19. was caused by, and in protest of, the changed working conditions which he had instructed his General Manager Nichols to make on October 18. In the light of the legislative history of this section of the Act, General Counsel's argument appears considerably oversimplified. This is the section of the Act Con- gress designed to eliminate "blackmail" and "extortion" picketing. Neither appears present in the instant matter, as General Counsel appears to concede when he elimi- nates both "recognition" and "organization" as objects of the picketing. On the other hand, Respondent and the Charging Party discuss the validity or in- validity of the May 1 contract at considerable length. The Charging Party maintains that the agreement was invalid because (1) General Manager Nichols was without authority to negotiate or execute a labor agreement; and (2) the agreement, if valid, was voided by the October 19 strike which was in derogation of the "no strike" clause of the agreement? It was also suggested that the contract of May I with its recognition clause of Respondent may have been invalid on the ground that Respondent was not at the time of its signing the representative of the majority of the Downtowner employees. However, there is no proof one way or the other on that issue. No effort was made to prove Respondent was only a minority representative. However, Downtowner General Manager John Nichols was satisfied that Re- spondent did in fact represent a majority of the Downtowner employees. Nichols knew the number of employees in the appropriate unit. He knew the number of union employees referred to the Downtowner by Respondent. He knew the number of union members recruited from other Kansas City hotels. And he knew the number of employees who had applied for employment as a result of newspaper ad- vertising, and thus assumed to be nonunion. Even before seeing the signed authoriza- tion cards handed him by Jorgensen, Nichols knew the answer to the representation question. As the Downtowner representative Nichols was satisfied that Respondent represented a majority of the Downtowner employees. Being satisfied on that score, Nichols signed the Hotel Association contract on- behalf of Downtowner. From a legal point of view, with this contract appearing fair on its face and constituting a defense to the allegations of Section 8(b)(7)(C), at least, the burden of going forward to prove the invalidity of the agreement fell to the General Counsel. He did not disprove the majority representative status of Respondent. The main attack of the Charging Party upon the validity of this agreement was its contention that Nichols in signing the agreement had acted without authority. This attack rested upon the testimony of Baker-denied by Nichols-that prior to April 1, Baker had told Nichols that- all labor agreements had to be negotiated and ex- ecuted by the Memphis headquarters and- upon the September 14 letters signed by Baker. informing the Hotel Association and Respondent that the Hotel Association did not have in the past, nor would it have in the future, any authority to bargain on behalf of the Charging•Party.8 However, the facts show that prior to May 1 Nichols had requested and was granted by Baker the right to join the Hotel Association in part, at least, because of Nichols' representation that joint bargaining through the Association would be ad- vantageous to the Charging Party. 4 This second contention; made by Baker in his letter of October 18, may he eliminated from consideration if we assume the validity of the May 1 agreement. In that case, Baker, having breached the agreement first thereby causing the strike as he himself ad- mitted. can hardly claim the resulting protest as: justifying Downtowner's "voiding and abrogating" the agreement. That is not good law. - e-Significantly these letters do not mention Nichols' alleged lack of authority. 1100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Certainly, the general manager of a hotel has apparent authority to negotiate and execute contracts on behalf of his hotel, at least in the absence of some expressed limitation upon such authority publicly known. Surely secret limitations upon a general manager's authority will not exculpate his principle in circumstances similar to those existing in the instant case, where the Charging Party admits having seen the contract executed by its general manager at least by the end of June and stilt allowed Respondent to continue to believe that it had a binding agreement until September 14. The time element alone raises the question of an estoppel here.. Furthermore, both Baker and Nichols agree that Nichols had been instructed to pay the union scale at least.9 Under all these circumstances I must credit the testimony of Nichols as against that of Baker that there were no limitations upon Nichols' right to negotiate and execute contracts with labor organizations. The Downtowner's. claim of no authority appears to have been a legal afterthought. Accordingly, I must find that the Downtowner was bound by the Hotel Associa- tion contract signed by it on May 1 along with the recognition of Respondent con- tained therein.10 "An object" of the picketing is a question of fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances. In the instant case even Baker admitted that the change in working conditions which he instructed Nichols to relay to the employees on Octo- ber 18 caused the strike. Obviously, therefore, the object of the employees" in walking out and picketing was to force the Downtowner to abandon these new work- ing conditions and to return to the conditions as they were prior to October 18, i.e.,. for the Downtowner to comply with the terms and conditions of its May 1 agreement. which Downtowner Representative Nichols had signed with Respondent. Neither the employees who forced the strike nor the Union which reluctantly went along with the employees was striking or picketing for recognition, for bar- gaining, or for organization as each of these things had been successfully accom- plished upon the execution of the contract on May 1. None of these things was, or could be, "an object" of the October 19 picketing. The only thing the Union wanted was a return to the conditions as they existed prior to Baker's unilateral change thereof on- October 18. Therefore "the," and the only, object of this picket line was to force the Downtowner to comply with its signed agreement. I so find. But General Counsel and the Downtowner rely upon one alleged answer by Re- spondent's agent to Baker's question on January 4, 1963, as to what the Charging Party had to do in order to get rid of the pickets. The answer, according to Baker, was,. "Sign the contract." 12 The answer, according to Respondent, was, "Abide by the contract." As Baker himself candidly admitted that the unilateral change in working conditions caused the strike, the latter answer seems the more realistic. Regardless of the word which may have been used by these nonlawyers, it is clear that the meaning intended was "abide." If the Downtowner had abided by those agreed-upon wages and working conditions in the first place, there would have been no strike. I am not prepared to find a violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) upon the disputed use of one word, especially when the intent is so obvious. It must also be clear that the object of the picketing which began October 19 was not changed in any manner by the answer given by a.union representative in the Muehlebach Hotel Coffee Shop to a loaded question asked by Baker. The fact Re- spondent. sought enforcement of this contract in court seems much more cogent evi- dence. In this regard it is interesting to. note that even the Charging Party could find no illegal object in the picketing until Baker's question at the January 4 meeting. Clearly the object of the picketing, and the only object of the picketing which be- gan October 19 and ended when it was enjoined on April 12, 1963, was to force Re- spondent to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement which had been in D .The record indicates .that the Downtowner had not even been living up to the union wage scale as far as overtime pay was concerned. 10 Downtowner also maintains that this May 1 agreement was not binding because it was not signed by Respondent. As the master agreement had in fact been signed by Respondent, this point is without merit. "As Respondent sent the employees back to work twice on October 18. It appears clear that Respondent did not want the strike. Nor did Nichols who pleaded with the employees to talk and not to walk out. '-"If it be assumed that this answer was given and, as Downtowner and General Counsel contend, referred to the new October 17 wage scale , even then Respondent appears to be on sound legal ground because Downtowner 's attempted withdrawal from the Hotel Association joint negotiations on September 14 was so belated as to appear to be in- effectual. See Town & Country Dairy, 136 NLRB 517. N.Y. PAPER CUTTERS' & BOOKBINDERS ' UNION NO. 119 1101 effect on October 18. I so find, and shall recommend dismissal of the complaint so far as the Section 8(b) (7) (C) allegation is concerned. That leaves for consideration the Section 8(b)(2) allegation that Respondent at- tempted to cause the discharge of three bartenders for their failure to observe Re- spondent's picket line. I believe that on January 4, 1963, Respondent did in fact mention the removal of the bartenders as a condition for the end of picketing and thus, technically, violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. However, the facts show that by letter dated February 27, 1963, Respondent effectively withdrew any such request, if made. The matter thus has become purely academic at the worst. In view of this disclaimer, I do not believe it necessary for any order to issue against Respondent here in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. I will, accordingly, recommend that this allegation be dismissed also. Accordingly, I will recommend dismissal of this complaint in toto. Upon the basis of foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Locals 19, 266, 420, 503, and 655 of the Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Nationwide Downtowner Motor Inns, Inc., d/b/a Downtowner and Down- towner Motor Inn, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act. 3. It would not effectuate the policies of the Act to issue an order against Respond- ent herein. I recommend that this complaint be dismissed in its entirety. New York Paper Cutters' & Bookbinders ' Union No. 119, Inter- national Brotherhood of Bookbinders , AFL-CIO and The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. New York Press Assistants ' Union No. 23 , International Print- ing Pressmen and Assistants ' Union of North America, AFL- CIO and The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. International Printing Pressmen and Assistants ' Union, AFL- CIO and Printers League Section, Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York , Inc. Cases Nos. 2-C,D-267-1, 2-CD- 267-3, and 2-CD-267-4. April °27, 1964 DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTES This is a proceeding under Section 10(k) of the Act following charges filed by, or on behalf of, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc.,' herein called Employer, alleging violations of Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act, by the New York Paper Cutters' & Book- binders' Union No. 119, International Brotherhood of Bookbinders, AFL-CIO, herein called Local 119 or Paper Cutters, by the New York Press Assistants' Union No. 23, International Printing Press- men and Assistants' Union of North America, AFL-CIO, herein called 'The charge in Case No. 2-CD-267-4 was filed on behalf of the Employer by the Printers League Section, Printing Industries of Metropolitan New York, Inc., herein called League. 146 NLRB No. 121. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation