Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 27, 1961

130 N.L.R.B. 1551 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1551 Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union of Long Beach and Orange County; Culinary Alliance Local No. 681 [Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, a co- partnership ] and M. J. Diederich . Case No. 21-CB-1384. March 27, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On February 4, 1960, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that the Respondent Unions had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Re- spondent Unions filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report to- gether with a supporting brief. The Board has, reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In- termediate Report and the entire record in this case, including the exceptions and the brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, only insofar as consist- ent with our decision herein.' 1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondents violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act by peacefully picketing for recognition at a time when they did not represent a majority of the employees at. Crown's Long Beach cafeteria. The Intermediate Report in this case was issued prior to the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639 etc. (Curtis Brothers),2 in which the Court held that peaceful picketing by a union which does not represent a majority of the employees, to com- pel immediate recognition as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent, is not an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b) (1) (A). In view of the controlling decision of the Supreme Court in the Curtis case, we shall , in compliance therewith , dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleges that the Respondent's peaceful picketing for recognition is violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. 2. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondents violated Sec- tion 8(b) (2) of the Act by peacefully picketing for a union-security clause at a time when they did not represent a majority of the em- Respondent's argument that the complaint in this case should be dismissed on the ground that issuance of the complaint in Case No . 21-CP-4 constituted a merger of this case and that case is without merit. The violation of Section 8(b) (2) found in this case is independent of the. violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) found in Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union of Long, Beach and Orange County, at at. (Crown Cafeteria), 130 NLRB 570. 2 362 U.S. 274. 130 NLRB No. 160. 1552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployees at the Long Beach cafeteria. We agree that peaceful picket- ing by a minority union for a contract containing a union-security clause is violative of Section 8 (b) (2). Between the time Section 8 (b) (2) was added to the Act in 1947 and the time the Board's Curtis doctrine was enunciated in 1957, the Board held on several occasions that economic and other pressures in- ,eluding picketing, which had as their objective compelling an em- ployer to sign an illegal union-security agreement, violated Section :8(b) (2) as an "attempt to cause" discrimination.' During the Curtis period, the Board continued to adhere to this interpretation of Sec- tion 8 (b) (2), which was independent of, and unaffected by, the con- siderations that led the Board to find under the Curtis rule that minority picketing for recognition was violative of Section 8(b) (1) (A).' The legislative history of Section 8(b) (2) indicates that that sec- tion was intended to prohibit "all attempts" to cause an employer to discriminate 5 whether by means of peaceful picketing or other types ,of pressure. Therefore, it is clear that picketing to obtain a union- ;security clause that would violate Section 8(a) (3) is an "attempt to ,cause" discrimination and is violative of Section 8(b) (2).e Accordingly, we conclude that the Respondent Unions violated ,Section 8(b) (2) of the Act by peacefully picketing for the objective of a union-security clause at a time when they did not represent a ma- jority of the employees at Crown's Long Beach cafeteria. 3. Although the complaint alleged that Respondents' picketing for a union-security clause violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) as well as Sec- tion 8(b) (2), the Supreme Court's Curtis decision makes it clear that peaceful picketing for any purpose does not restrain and coerce em- ployees in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A). Therefore, we shall dis- miss the allegation in the complaint that Respondents' picketing for a union-security clause constituted a derivative violation of Section .8(b) (1) (A). ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of The National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union ? See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, etc., Local No. 421 (The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company), 81 NLRB 1052; Denver Building and Construction Trades Council; International Union of Operating Engineers (Henry Shore), ,90 NLRB 1768 enfd. 192 F. 2d 577; Medford Building and Construction Trades Council of 'the: American Federation of Labor, et at. (Kogap Lumber Industries ), 96 NLRB 165. 4 See, e.g., Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , et at. ( Sierra Furniture Company ), 125 NLRB 159. - H. Conf. Rept. No. 510, on H.R. 3020, p. 44 (1947). e The Board has long held that it is a violation of Section 8(b) (2) for a union to -execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a union-security clause at a time when the union does not represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Bryan Manufacturing Company, 119 NLRB 502, reversed on other grounds 362 U.S. 411 ( 1960). LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD. , HOTEL & 'RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1553 of Long Beach and Orange County; Culinary Alliance Local No. 681, and their officers, representatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from attempting to cause Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria to discriminate against employees by entering into a contract which requires membership in Respondents, at a time when Respondents do not represent a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at their business offices at Long Beach, California, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, shall, after being signed by Respondents' representative, be posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by them for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail to the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region signed copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix" for posting at the premises of the Company, the latter willing, for a period of 60 consecutive days, at all locations where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice shall be furnished by the aforesaid Regional Director. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, in writing, within, 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps they have taken to comply herewith. IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 7In the event that this Order Is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UN- ION OF LONG BEACH AND ORANGE COUNTY; AND CULINARY ALLIANCE LOCAL No. 681, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF LEONARD SMITLEY AND JOSEPH W. DROWN D/B/A CROWN CAFETERIA Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that : 597254-61-vol. 130-99 1554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT attempt to cause Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, by entering into a.contract which requires membership in our labor organizations, at a time when we do not represent a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit. LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD OF HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EXPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS IN- TERNATIONAL UNION OF LONG BEACH AND ORANGE COUNTY; AND CULINARY ALLIANCE LOCAL No. 681, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was heard at Los Angeles, California, on November 18, 1959, pursuant to a complaint of the General Counsel against Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees-and Bartenders International Union of Long Beach and Orange County and against Culinary Alliance Local No. 681, both herein called Respondent. The issue litigated was whether Respondent, commencing on May 5, 1959, engaged in minority picketing for recognition and a union-shop con- tract at the premises of Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafe- teria, herein called the Company, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) of the Act. Respondent's answer admitted the fact of the picketing; denied that the picketing was unlawful; and con- tended that the picketing actually constituted an advertising picket line. Oral argu- ment was waived at the close of the hearing and briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, operate two cafe- terias at Pasadena and Long Beach, California, where they sell and serve food to the general public. The instant proceeding involves only the Long Beach operation. During the period from July 1958 through June 1959, total sales of both cafeterias were in excess of $600,000; of these, $521,000 represented sales at Pasadena and $90,000 represented sales at Long Beach from May 5, 1959, the date of its opening, through June 30, 1959. Also, from July 1958 to June 1959, both operations pur- chased goods and equipment valued in excess of $100,000 which originated outside the State of California. While the record warrants the finding that both operations are centrally controlled and that the figures. of both may properly be considered herein, a projection of the Long Beach figures on an annual basis discloses that this operation considered alone meets the jurisdictional standards of the Board, I find therefore that the operations of the Company affect commerce. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union of Long Beach and Orange County, and Culinary Alliance Local No. 681, are labor organizations admitting to membership the employees of the Company. LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL &RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES - 1555 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction Early in 1959 , the Company purchased the Long Beach premises and the doors were opened to the public on May 5, 1959 . These premises have been picketed by Respondent continuously thereafter with the exception of a period of several weeks when a State court temporary restraining order was in effect . While the General Counsel does rely herein on Respondent 's conduct preceding the picketing , it is the picketing activity allegedly in support of an illegal objective which is attacked. The complaint , literally read , does encompass the prepicketing activity as an unfair labor practice , but the brief of the General Counsel makes clear that the thrust of the complaint is directed only to the picketing. B. Sequence of events The Joint Executive Board is the spokesman for two local unions, one of which is Culinary Alliance Local No. 681. Clayton Smith is president and secretary of the latter and is also director of organization for the culinary workers section of the Joint Excutive Board. During the period between April 15 and 17 , 1959, Smith made a visit to the premises of the Company which were undergoing alterations . He handed a copy of a complete collective-bargaining contract containing a union -security clause to one, Etchepare , then the assistant manager, and asked Etchepare to deliver this to partner Leonard Smitley. This document was a 20-page labor contract entitled "WAGE SCALE AND WORKING AGREEMENT" as well as "CONTRACT." It states that it is an "Agreement" between the Joint Executive Board and an employer whose name is left blank . The agreement has a hiring clause which includes a union -security clause requiring employees to join Respondent within 31 days from the date of employment or the signing of the contract , whichever is the later . Etchepare duly turned this document over to Smitley , according to the latter and I so find , on April 15, 16, or 17.1 Smith returned to the Long Beach cafeteria and spoke with Smitley on a date which Smitley placed, and I so find, on May 2 or 3, and probably the former.2 Ac- cording to Smitley, Smith asked where the Company was obtaining employees, and Smitley replied that it was doing so locally. Smith asked if the Company planned to operate a union house and Smitley replied in the negative , stating that the employees would receive good wages and would be covered by a good health and welfare plan. Smith again asked if the Company would operate a union house ; Smitley replied that it was not up to him and that it was a choice for the employees to make by having an election . Smith replied, "That is not the way we do it nowadays." The contract previously left by Smith , or an identical copy thereof obtained by Smitley from the local restaurant association , was on the desk. Smith commented, "I see you have got the stuff I left for you . Have you read it yet?" Smitley replied that he had not. It is undisputed that Smith made no claim to represent a majority, made no demand that employees be hired from the union hiring hall, and did not ask that the contract be signed.3 1 Smith's testimony as to the date of this visit as well as subsequent visits was con- fused. He originally testified that he left the contract during April . He later testified that this occasion was 3 weeks to 1 month before the cafeteria opened ; that it was 3 weeks before he first visited Smitley, as is discussed below ; and that it was 2 or 3 weeks before the visit. He later claimed that this was but 2 days before he first saw Smitley, an occasion which I find below to have been May 2 . I credit the testimony of Smitley, a clear and meticulous witness, that he received this contract from Etchepare approxi- mately 10 days or 2 weeks before the first visit from Smith , which Smitley placed on May 2 , and, further, that Smitley received the contract from Etchepare on April 15, 16, or 17. 2 Smith originally testified that this visit took place on May 5 ( the date the cafeteria opened ) ; thereafter , after purportedly being refreshed by his affidavit , he placed this as but 2 days after the original visit when he had left the contract . Still later , he placed it as 2 or 3 weeks thereafter and then readopted his testimony that it was but 2 days later. Smitley 's testimony is corroborated by that of Chef Abejon who placed Smith on the scene 3 or 4 days before the opening when, as both Smitley and Abejon testified, Abejon served coffee to the two men. In view of Smith's confusion on the subject, Smitley's corroborated testimony is credited herein. . s These findings are based on testimony of Smitley which Is largely undenied and in part corroborated by that of Smith . Smith also testified that he told Smitley Respondent 1556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On May 4, Smith returned to the cafeteria and again spoke with Smitley who was occupied with various tasks prior to opening on the next day. According to Smitley, Smith asked if he had "read the stuff yet ." Smitley replied that he had not , where- upon Smith approached Manager Walter Kelting who was familiar with Smith 's posi- tion with Respondent . Kelting uncontrovertedly testified , and I find , that Smith asked him "if I had any influence with Mr . Smitley in regard to union activities so to speak. . That I should do so . . . if we don't he will have to throw a picket line around the place tomorrow morning, the morning of the opening." 4 On the morning of May 5, the cafeteria opened to the public at 10 a.m. and seven pickets were present, according to Smitley . Five paraded before the front entrance of the premises which is the only one available to the public. Another picketed at an alley on one side which provides access to the parking lot and an employee and delivery entrance to the rear of the premises, although it appears that only one employee, an early morning cook, uses this rear entrance . Another picket was sta- tioned near a second alley on the other side or the premises which provides access to the above-mentioned parking lot and delivery entrance , and also to another parking lot. It appears that the number of pickets diminished and, according to Smith , the number was not in excess of four at any time. I find that the number was smaller subsequent to the first day. It is conceded that the picketing was under the control and direction of Respondent and, as noted , it has continued since then except for the brief period when it was halted by a temporary restraining order . At other times , however, pickets have not been present at the alleys at times when pickets were stationed at the front entrance. As of the date of the hearing , the technique of the pickets is to arrive at 11 a.m. and leave at 7 p .m.; the cafeteria is open from 7 a.m. until 8:30 p .m. It is Respondent's express position that this was not a picket line for recognition and further , that it was not an organizational picket line. Respondent contends expressly that this was an "advertising" picket line which named Respondent as the aggrieved sponsor thereof. The original sign carried by the pickets stated , as Respondent contends: Notice to members of organized labor and their friends. This establishment is non-union . Please do not patronize. A week or two later another sign was used which stated: Notice to members of organized labor and their friends. This establishment is unfair . We are picketing because this establishment is attempting to break down our standard of wages, vacaitons , health and welfare, workday, work week con- tracts as paid by over 600 union establishments . Please do not patronize. Both signs have the name of the secretary of Respondent at the bottom thereof. C. Analysis and conclusions Respondent's position is that its picket line was solely on advertising picket line and, in support thereof , Respondent demonstrated herein that there was no literal demand made upon the Company is such words for union recognition or for the sign- ing of the contract and further that the signs carried by the pickets did not refer to these topics. While these contentions of Respondent as to the facts are supported by the record , the Board has regularly and realistically inspected all the circum- stances surrounding picketing in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the true purpose thereof. I believe that a preponderance of the evidence supports the position of the General Counsel herein that an objective of the picketing was to achieve recognition and a contract. While Smith did not use the literal terms of recognition and signing of a contract , he did present a contract to the Company and twice asked a company official if he had read it. Smith admittedly sought to have employees hired through the union employment hall; and , after the second occasion when he asked if Smitley would like to supply him with employees "through our union office" and that they had a number of "good" employees available. * Smith was not questioned about Kelting ' s testimony . He admitted that he possibly asked Smitley if the latter had read the contract . He further testified that he asked Smitley to reconsider hiring people through the union employment service ; that he spoke to Smitley about the hiring hall ; that he stated he could supply Smitley with all the efficient help he needed ; that he did refer to the prevailing wage scale in the contract; and that there was no mention of union membership . I have credited Smitley's version because , even on Smith ' s testimony , it is apparent that he referred to the context of the contract , viz, the wage scale and to the hiring list specifically provided for in this contract. LOCAL JOINT EXEC. BD., HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 1557 had read the contract, he conveyed a threat of picketing to Manager Kelting. More- over, in his statement to Kelting, he made specific reference to Kelting having influ- ence with his employer "in regard to union activities." This can hardly be correlated to an interest in wage rates and fringe benefits divorced from union recognition and a contract. When Smitley stated to Smith that it was not his decision whether the shop be unionized and that he thought an eleciton was the proper procedure, Smith merely replied that things were not done that way. I deem it significant that at no time during these crucial talks did Smith disavow any desire for recognition and the sign- ing of the contract, despite the fact that one would logically conclude from the con- tract presentation and his references to the contract that these were among his objec- tives. Surely, the context was such on May 2, when Smith said that no election was necessary, that Smith would have indicated disinterest in union recognition and the contract, were such his position. Smith displayed but perfunctory interest in the proposed conditions of employment at the Company. And while the evidence on the topic disclosed that the Company's standards variously met, perhaps exceeded, or may not have met union standards, there is no evidence that this was a matter of knowledge to Smith and the union officials prior to the onset of the picketing. Even on May 4, the day before the start of the picketing, on Smith's version of the conversation with Smitley, he made reference to employment of personnel at the wage scales provided in the contract and sought use of the hiring hall. Yet this hir- ing hall was contained in the same section of the contract as the union-security lan- guage. This too warrants the inference that a primary, if not the exclusive objective of the picketing, was recognition and signature by the Company of the union-security contract and that this objective represented the alleged unfairness attacked by the placards of the pickets. I so find. The Board has regarded picketing by a minority union for recognition as an at- tempt to compel an employer to commit an unfair labor practice by foisting a minority union on its employees in derogation of their statutory rights. It has held that this economic pressure perforce affects the employees, since their livelihood depends upon the successful operation of the business, and that it consequently tends to coerce them in their union activities. I find that by engaging in such conduct Respondent has restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed by Section 7 of the Act, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1) (A) of the Act. Paint Varnish & Lacquer Makers Union, Local 1232 AFL-CIO et al. (Andrew Brown Company), 120 NLRB 1425; Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers Local No. 420 etc. (Fisk and Mason), 120 NLRB 135; United Transports, Inc., 123 NLRB 668; Local 1922, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Mid- Island Electrical Sales Corp.), 122 NLRB 850; United Hatters Cap & Millinery Workers etc. (Louisville Cap Company), 123 NLRB 572; and Local 208, Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehouses & Helpers of America, et al. (Sierra Furniture Company), 125 NLRB 159. As the contract sought by Respondent contained a union-security clause, it follows that this picketing constituted an attempt to cause discrimination by an employer against nonunion employees under circumstances not permitted under the Act. Alloy Manufacturing Company, 119 NLRB 307. While in N.L.R.B v. International Asso- ciation of Machinists, Lodge 942, AFL-CIO (Alloy Mfg. Co.), 263 F. 2d 796. the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a portion of a Board Order finding a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by promulgating a "We do not patronize" list, the remainder of the decision is significant . The labor organization in that case conceded that its picketing under circumstances similar to the present case was vio- lative of Section 8(b)(2) and the court, in view of this concession, did not pass upon whether the picketing, as such, was violative of Section 8(b)(1) (A) of the Act. That question is therefore deemed to be open in this circuit. See also Local 420 (Fisk and Mason), supra and Local 208 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sierra Furniture Co.), supra.5 c Respondent has cited Radio Broadca ' t Technicians. Local Union No. 1264 , etc., 123 NLRB 507. In support of its position herein. In that case. the Board found. on the facts therein, that minority picketing was for the purpose of inducing a. boycott by the nubile and by the advertisers of the employer's broadcasting station and not for the object of recognition and signing a contract. That decision therefore turned on tie facts in the case. While the present case is not an exceedingly strong one, I believe that the present factual situation is stronger in support of the General Counsel's position than that found in the cited case. 1558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec- tion with the operations of the Company set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall re- commend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case , I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local Joint Executive Board of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Barten- ders International Union of Long Beach and Orange County and Culinary Alliance Local No. 681 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Leonard Smitley and Joseph W. Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria are an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 3. By picketing the premises of Leonard Smitley and Joseph W . Drown d/b/a Crown Cafeteria, as found above, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. 4. By picketing for a union -shop contract, as found above, Respondent has en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act. - 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation and East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO and United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO. Case No. 20-CA-1682. March 27, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On November 27, 1959, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the allegations of the complaint were not supported by substantial evidence and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the 'Respondent, the Union, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and briefs in support thereof. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In- termediate Report, the parties' exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following modi- fications and additions. 130 NLRB No. 161.