Local 742, Electrical, Radio and Machine Wkrs.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 3, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 824 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 742, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and Randall Bearings, Inc. Case 8-CB-2171 October 3, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On May 16, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Charles W. Schneider issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions z of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 742, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Lima, Ohio, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. 1 While the Respondent admitted in its answer to the complaint that its motive in withholding overtime was to "support ... certain economic bar- gaining demands," it contends in its exceptions and brief that the record provided no basis for the Administrative Law Judge 's finding that its motive was "to terminate or modify the collective -bargaining contract." For purpos- es of applying Sec. 8(dX4) of the Act, we see no meaningful distinction between the two quoted descriptions of the Respondent's motive, and we therefore find that the Respondent 's answer by itself provided sufficient basis for the Administrative Law Judge 's finding. 2 In the last paragraph of the part of his Decision entitled "Section 8(d)(4)," the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently misstated that the collective- bargaining contract's expiration date for purposes of applying Sec. 8(d)(4) was July 31 , 1973. We hereby correct his nonprejudicial error : the correct expiration date was October I, 1973. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE CHARLES W. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Law Judge: On August 27, 1973, Randall Bearings , Inc., the Charging Par- ty, filed an unfair labor practice charge against Local 742, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, the Respondent, pursuant to the Na- tional Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 151, et seq). On March 14, 1974, the Regional Director issued a complaint, subsequently amended, and notice of hearing upon the charge, alleging in substance that the Respondent commit- ted unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. Service was duly made on the parties. The Respon- dent thereafter filed its answer, subsequently amended, de- nying the commission of unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held before me at Lima, Ohio, on April 11, 1974. All parties appeared, were repre- sented by counsel, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to introduce material evidence, to present oral argu- ment and to file briefs. Briefs , which have been considered, were filed by the Respondent and by the Charging Party on May 6, 1974, and by the General Counsel on May 7, 1974. Upon consideration of the entire record I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT At all times material herein, Randall Bearings, Inc., has been a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal office, place of business and plants located at Lima, Ohio, where it is engaged in the manufacture of bronze bearings and bushings. Annually, in the course and conduct of its operations, it ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its Lima, Ohio, plants directly to points located outside the State of Ohio. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED At all times material herein Local 742, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL- CIO, has been, and is now, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to work overtime for the purpose of compelling the Charging Party to agree to con- tract modifications during the term of a collective-bargain- ing contract between the parties, without complying with the strike deferral requirements of Section 8(d)(4) of the Act. Specifically involved are (1) a factual question as to whether the contract authorizes such action and (2) a legal question as to whether the action is permissible under Sec- tion 8(d) of the Act, even if authorized by the contract. Also involved is the question as to whether the proceeding should be deferred, in accordance with the principle in the case of Collyer Insulated Wire, a Gulf and Western System Co., 192 NLRB 837 (1971), for arbitration under the con- 213 NLRB No. 119 LOCAL 742, ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WKRS. tract. However, that issue I decided adversely to the Re- spondent at the hearing, holding, in sum, that the nature of the dominant issue was not such as to make deferral appro- priate.' B. The Contract For a period of 14 or more years the Respondent has been the collective-bargaining representative of the Charging Party's employees, and during this period of time contractu- al relations have been continuously maintained. The latest basic contract is effective from October 1, 1971, to October 1, 1974. On December 6, 1973 , as a result of negotiations held pursuant to a reopener clause, the basic contract was supplemented by changes in various economic provisions and extended through September 30, 1976. It is this re- opening which provides the setting for the instant contro- versy. The reopening clause, contained in article XXVIII of the contract, provides as follows: This Agreement may be reopened by either party effec- tive October 1, 1973, for the purpose of conducting further negotiations concerning economic matters only (i.e., wages, health and welfare, holidays, vacations and retirement) by notice given to the other party not less than sixty (60) days nor more than seventy (70) days prior to October 1, 1973. In the event that such notice is given, and agreement is not reached prior to October 1, 1973, the parties may support their respective posi- tions with lawful economic action, the provisions of Article XIX to the contrary notwithstanding. Article XIX of the contract contains a no-strike , no-lock- out provision: It is understood that the grievance and arbitration pro- cedure herein [Article XVII] provides the means for settling any possible dispute between the parties. In recognition of that fact the Union agrees that it will not authorize, sanction or condone a strike, slow-down or stoppage of work, and the Company agrees it will not lock out any of its employees. Article XVII of the contract established a grievance pro- cedure, terminating in final and binding arbitration, for the disposition of grievances filed by employees. There is no specific provision in article XVII authorizing the filing of grievances by the Company. I find it unnecessary to decide whether articles XVII and XIX permit the Company to do so. Overtime by employees appears to be on a voluntary basis. In 1966 an arbitrator interpreted the then effective collective-bargaining contract to require overtime by em- ployees on an optional basis, at the election of the employee. t That ruling appears to be in accord with the Board 's decision in the case of Communication Workers of America AFL-CIO and New York Local No. 1190, Communication Workers ofAmerica, AFL-CIO (Western Electric Com- pany, Inc.), 204 NLRB 782 (1973), where the Board declined to defer to arbitration in what I deem to be similar circumstances. 825 Since that time the Company has unsuccessfully sought to insert a provision in succeeding contracts making overtime compulsory. For the purposes of this proceeding I find that overtime is wholly voluntary. C. The Refusals To Work Overtime On or about July 30, 1973, pursuant to the reopener clause in article XXVIII of the 1971-74 agreement, the Re- spondent gave notice to the Federal Mediation and Concili- ation Service, and to the Ohio Industrial Commission, of its desire to terminate or modify the agreement , and on or about July 31, 1973, it gave the Company the same notice. On August 15, 1973, the parties exchanged proposals as to the subjects of reopening, and on August 23, 1973, began negotiations . No agreement having been reached by Octo- ber 1, 1973, the Respondent commenced a strike on that date, which continued until December 6, 1973, at which time the parties executed a new agreement supplementing the basic contract, and extending it through September 30, 1976. In addition to the October 1, 1973, strike, the validity of which is not contested, the Respondent also sponsored, sup- ported, and engaged in a program of concerted refusals by employees to perform overtime work, the purpose of which was to influence the Company to accept the Respondent's demands for contract modification. This program was suc- cessfully maintained during the entire period from July 23, 1973, to October 1, 1973. It is this action by the Union which is alleged as the unfair labor practice. Contentions The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that the refusals to work overtime for the purpose of sup- porting the contract demands, without a 60-day waiting period, are prohibited by Section 8(d)(4) of the Act and constitute a refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(bX3) of the Act. The Respondent's defense is that the refusals to work overtime were not unlawful within the meaning of the con- tract, or of the statute, because overtime is voluntary. Section 8(dX4) So far as material here , Section 8 (d) of the statute defines the duty to bargain collectively to forbid a party to a collec- tive-bargaining contract to terminate or modify that con- tract unless a notice is served on other parties, and on Federal and State mediation agencies, of the intent to so terminate or modify. In addition the section requires that the contract be maintained in full force and effect for the following 60 days. Thus Section 8(d)(4) states that the noti- fying party must: (4) continue[s] in full force and effect, without re- sorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later. 826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In the instant situation the phrase "expiration date" in Section 8(d)(4) is to be considered the date the Respondent gave notice of modification to the Company-July 31, 1973. Conclusions The case resolves itself into the resolution of 2 questions: (1) whether the refusal to work overtime constituted a strike in violation of Section 8(d), and (2) if so, whether such a violation may constitute a violation of Section 8(b)(3). These questions will be considered in reverse order. D. Whether a Violation of Section 8(d) May Be a Violation of Section 8(b)(3) Section 8(d) of the statute, as we have seen, defines the duty to bargain collectively as including compliance with the requirements of the section. Manifestly, then, any viola- tion of Section 8(d) constitutes noncompliance with the obligation to bargain collectively. Section 8(b)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain collectively. It follows that a violation of Section 8(d) by a union constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(3).2 E. Whether There Was a Strike In Violation of Section 8(d) Section 501 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, contains a partial definition of the term "strike," Sec- tion 501 states, in part, (2) The term "strike" includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) and any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by em- ployees. The term "strike" in Section 8(d)(4) of the Act is to be interpreted accordingly. The definition in Section 501 is broadly enough phrased to include the concerted refusal of employees to work overtime engaged in by the employees here pursuant to the Respondent's sponsorship, regardless of whether it be characterized as a "stoppage of work" or a "concerted interruption of operations." Section 501 contains no reference to motivation as a fac- tor in determining whether a strike exists. If literally inter- preted as containing a complete and inclusive definition of "strike," any conduct of the kind described in Section 501 would constitute a strike, including any refusals to work overtime, regardless of the motivation for the refusals. I do not find that Section 501 and (consequently) Section 8(d)(4) are to be so interpreted. For if the word "strike," or the phrase "stoppage of work," in article XIX of the contract is to be similarly interpreted (as, in ordinary circumstances, we would expect them to be), any concerted refusal by the Charging Party's employees to work overtime would be a 2 Accord: Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey, Local 827 , International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (New Jersey Bell Company), 189 NLRB 726 (1971); Communications Workers of America AFL-CIO (New York Telephone Company), 186 NLRB 625 (1970). violation of the contract, regardless of the employees' moti- vation. This is directly contrary to the interpretation given the contract by the arbitrator-the correctness of which I have assumed for the purposes of this case. The contractual authorization to refuse to work overtime would thus be a mere fiction, for any concerted exercise by employees of the right would be a "strike," and thus automatically a violation of the contract and the statute. Obviously neither the con- tract nor the statute intend or embody so absurd a result. Both the contractual and statutory definitions must there- fore include an unarticulated premise: the motive for the conduct. Thus, if a contract contains a no-strike clause, and also provides that overtime shall be on a voluntary basis, and employees decline to work overtime because they wish to attend a picnic, their action cannot constitute a strike in violation of the contract or of Section 8(d). On the other hand, the contractual and statutory right to decline to work overtime may not be utilized to procure a result contrary to law. An employer is free to exercise his power and right to discharge employees for proper business reasons; he may not, however, use the power, either overtly or pretextually, to terminate an employee for the purpose of discouraging union membership. Similarly, a union may not utilize em- ployee power to refuse to work overtime so as to evade compliance with the requirements of Section 8(d)(4). The touchstone as to the legality of the conduct, whether it be the discharge or the refusal to work overtime, is the purpose and motivation for it. As to that question, there is no issue here. The Respon- dent admits that the purpose was to influence the Charging Party to accede to the Respondent's bargaining demands. The refusals thus constituted a strike within the meaning of article XIX of the contract and Section 8(d)(4) of the Act. Since the strike occurred before the expiration of the hiatus period required by the contract and by Section 8(d)(4), it was thus violative of the contract and of the statute. These conclusions seem consistent with the precedents. In the case of Local No. P-575 Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL)-CIO (Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.), 188 NLRB 5 (1971), a collective-bar- gaining contract made overtime before 7 a.m. voluntary. The contracting union induced employees not to work over- time before 7 a.m., for the purpose of compelling the em- ployer to cease purchasing meat from a supplier with whom the union had a dispute. Reversing the Trial Examiner, who had held that since overtime before 7 a.m. was voluntary the motive for the union's action was irrelevant, the Board found the inducement, and the resulting refusals to work overtime before 7 a.m., unlawful. The refusals were found by the Board to constitute a strike. The Board, in language seemingly apposite here, said at page 6: We disagree with the Trial Examiner's view that be- cause these stoppages of work occurred largely during overtime periods which were voluntary under the con- tract the motive therefore was irrelevant. The Board has held with court approval that a concerted refusal to work overtime is a strike, and Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act prohibits strikes for a secondary object. That the overtime was designated as voluntary in the con- tract does not, in our view, render the concerted refusal LOCAL 742, ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WKRS. 827 to perform it any the less a strike, or less coercive, particularly where, as here, the uncontradicted evi- dence shows it had been the employees' practice to work overtime during these hours for 5 months at New York, and for 5 years at Kelly. The Board has also held refusals to work overtime to constitute action violative of Section 8(d) of the Act. See, for example, Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey, Local 827, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (New Jersey Bell Company), 189 NLRB 726 (1971); Commu- nications Workers of America AFL-CIO (New York Tele- phone Company), 186 NLRB 625 (1970). See also Avco Corporation v. Local Union # 787 of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), 459 F.2d 968 (C.A. 3, 1972).3 The Respondent cites Section 13 of the Act and several cases as supportive of its position that its conduct was law- ful: The Dow Chemical Company, 152 NLRB 1150 (1965); N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL- CIO (Prudential Insurance Co.), 361 U.S. 477 (1960); and International Union, UA W, Local 232, et al v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, et a!, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). I find none of these references significantly applicable. Section 13 of the Act provides that: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. The answer to this contention of the Respondent is that Section 8(d)(4) specifically diminishes the right of a union to strike. The Dow Chemical case is inapposite and distinguishable. That case involved conduct by employees, not conduct by a union. The question involved was whether concerted re- fusals by employees to work overtime constituted protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the Act. The instant case involves the question of whether refusals by a union to work overtime constitutes action prohibited by Section 3 The Avco case was an injunction action grounded in a union's refusal to work overtime for the purpose of compelling the employer to rehire laid-off employees. An arbitrator had previously held that overtime was voluntary. In reversing the district court's refusal to issue an injunction, the court of appeals said at page 974: III. Finally, the Union claims that the order of the district court was proper because there was no strike to enjoin. The Union points out that employees are obligated to work only five consecutive eight-hour days, that there was no allegation that they did not do so, and that since the prior arbitration held that employees could refuse overtime , there has been no strike or work stoppage as contemplated under the terms of the "no-strike" clause. We believe that the Union construes this provision of the agreement too restrictively. In the contract, the Union agreed "that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, sitdowns, production retard- ings , or similar interruptions of, or interferences with , work during the term of this agreement for any reason . . . " Whatever may be the effect of individual decisions not to work overtime, in light of Avco's past reliance on overtime to meet its production demands, the resolution discouraging such overtime work is clearly an attempt by the Union to retard production, or to interrupt or interfere with work. As such, the Union's conduct falls within the proscriptions of the collective bargain- ing agreement, and is therefore proper subject matter for injunctive relief. 8(d)(4) of the Act. No recognized collective-bargaining rep- resentative or collective bargaining contract was involved in the Dow Chemical case. Individual or concerted action by employees is not unlawful under Section 8 of the Act, unless attributable to a union. The Dow Chemical case does not therefore bear on the problem here. The Insurance Agents' case is also inapposite. The issue there was whether union-sponsored on-the-job tactics of a harassing nature, designed to compel an employer to accept the union's contract proposals were inconsistent with good faith bargaining. Among these tactics were refusals to per- form customary duties at the office, refusing to work sched- uled hours, and leaving work early. In the instant case the determinative issue is whether the tactics used are inconsis- tent with the requirements of Section 8(d)(4) of the Act. The fact that both cases involve an ultimate determination as to whether Section 8(b)(3) has been violated does not make the dismissal of the complaint in Insurance Agents' controlling here. As in the Dow Chemical case , Insurance Agents' did not involve the existence of a contract containing a no-strike clause , nor the legality of a strike in violation of the require- ments of Section 8(d)(4). As the Court said in the Insurance Agents' opinion (p. 483): the issue was whether "tactics which the Act does not specifically forbid" violate Section 8(b)(3). In the instant case the tactic used-a strike-is specifically forbidden by Section 8(d) and made a refusal to bargain. The economic pressure which the Respondent em- ployed here, and which, because it has "never been specifi- cally outlawed by Congress" (Insurance Agents' at p. 498), arguably does not reflect an avoidance of the obligation to bargain, is nevertheless, if a strike, very specifically out- lawed by Section 8(d)(4) during the 60-day hiatus period. I do not read the Insurance Agents' opinion, as apparently the Respondent does, as holding that Section 8(d) may not be read into Section 8(b)(3). (Respondent's brief, p. 20). Section 8(d) plainly states that the duty to bargain collec- tively includes performance of the obligations therein stat- ed, among which is the duty to continue in force, "without resorting to strike or lockout," all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of 60 days after the proposed termination or modification. Section 8(b)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer. I do not construe the Insurance Agents' case as qualifying either of those duties. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board case involved a preemption issue : the authority of the State of Wisconsin to declare unlawful and prohibit harassing tactics by a union similar to those used in the Insurance Agents' case, for the purpose of compelling the employer to accept the union's bargaining demands. However the union action in the Wisconsin case also involved considerable injury to property and intimidation of employees (366 U.S. at 253). In holding that State authority in this respect was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, the U.S. Supreme Court found the controlling question to be wheth- er "Congress has clearly manifested an exclusion of State power sought to be executed in this case ." (366 U.S. at 249). The Court found no such manifestation. The gist of the Court's disposition in Wisconsin, to the extent material here, is in the Court's statement that the "obvious purpose of the Labor Management Amendments 828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was not to grant a dispensation for the strike but to outlaw strikes when undertaken to enforce what the Act calls unfair labor practices, an end which would be defeated if we sus- tain the Union's claim [of preemption]" (at 261-262). The Wisconsin case is therefore also inapplicable.4 The Respondent also contends that the Company has waived its right to protection under the Act by permitting employees to choose whether to work overtime. I find this contention not sustained. First, I do not construe the con- tract as authorizing the Respondent to sponsor a concerted refusal of employees to work overtime for the purpose of compelling the Company to accede to the Respondent's bargaining demands , where the refusals constitute a strike violative of article XIX of the contract. I find no evidence to support such a construction. Secondly, the Company is without authority to waive the government's right to insist upon compliance with the obligations of Section 8(d). The latter duty is not the Company's to excuse. At least in the absence of a showing of detrimental reliance upon the Company's asserted acquiescence, of which there is none here , such a waiver is not a cognizable defense. But even if the contract were interpreted to permit the action engaged in by the Respondent, I would nevertheless find the action violative of the statute, since it fits the defini- tion of conduct outlawed by the Act. For the statute enacts a public policy forbidding engagement in a strike under the circumstances prohibited by Section 8(d). This public policy may not be overridden by private contract. The permissible area of activity by unions and employers in the termination or modification of collective-bargaining agreements is stat- ed by the statute. While that area may be circumscribed by private agreement of parties, if consistent with the statute or other law, it may not be extended or broadened by them. The Respondent's conduct being prohibited by the Act, it follows that any contrary interpretation of the contract may not be given effect for the purposes of a proceeding under Section 8 of the Act and in this context. It is therefore found that by refusing to work overtime from July 23, 1973, to October 1, 1973, for the purpose of compelling the Company to accept the Respondent's bar- gaining demands, the Respondent engaged in a strike with- out complying with the requirements of Section 8(d)(4) of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(d)(4) and refusing to bargain collectively within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. The Respondent refers to certain statements in the Wisconsin opinion as establishing the legality of the Respondent's conduct here . Thus the Court said at p. 253: ... the conduct here described is not forbidden by this Act [the N.L.R. A.] and no proceeding is authorized by which the Federal Board may deal with it in any manner. And at page 264 the Court said: We think that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work was neither forbidden by federal statute nor was it legalized and approved thereby. It is clear from the context of these statements that the Court was referring to the existence of a general police power in the National Labor Relations Board to forbid specific conduct unstated in the statute , and not to the Board 's authority to find such conduct violative of particular subsections of Section 8 of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDERS Local 742, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and rep- resentatives , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Engaging in, sponsoring or supporting, refusals by employees to work overtime, strikes, work stoppages, con- certed interruptions of operations, or concerted refusals to perform work, with an object of compelling or inducing Randall Bearings , Inc., or any other employer, to terminate or modify a collective-bargaining contract with Local 742, without complying with the provisions of Section 8(d)(4) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by the Respondent's rep- resentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consec- utive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 8 signed copies of said notice for posting by Randall Bearings, Inc., if the Company is willing, in places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. 5In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall , as provided in Sec . 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 6 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." LOCAL 742, ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WKRS. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government We hereby notify employees of Randall Bearings, Inc., and our members that: WE WILL NOT engage in, sponsor or support, refusals by employees to work overtime, strikes, work stoppag- es, concerted interruptions of operations , or concerted refusals to perform work, with an object of compelling or inducing Randall Bearings , Inc., or any other em- ployer, to terminate or modify a collective-bargaining contract with us, without complying with the require- ments of Section 8(d)(4) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. Dated By 829 LOCAL 742, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL. RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL- CIO (Labor Organization) (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, Suite 1695-Anthony J. Celebrezze Federal Building, 1240 E. 9th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-522-3715.