Local 4012, CWA

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1970

184 N.L.R.B. 166 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 4012 , Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (Michigan Bell Telephone Co.) and
Kenneth R. Crawley
Communications Workers of America , AFL-CIO
and its District No. 4 (Michigan Bell Telephone
Co.) and Kenneth R. Crawley. Case 7-CB-2029
and 7-CB-2029(2)
June 30, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, MCCULLOCH, AND JENKINS
On March 19 , 1970, Trial Examiner Benjamin K.
Blackburn issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent Local
4012, Communications Workers of . America,
AFL-CIO, had engaged in and was engaging in cer-
tain unfair labor practices , and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir-
mative action , as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer 's Decision . He also found that the Respon-
dents had not engaged in other unfair labor prac-
tices alleged in the complaint and recommended
that such allegations be dismissed . Thereafter, the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer 's Decision and a supporting brief ; and the
Respondent filed cross-exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings ,' conclusions ,2 and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Local 4012, Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Pontiac, Michigan, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it
alleges violations of the Act not found herein.
' Although the issue was irrelevant to his ultimate determination, the
Trial Examiner found in passing that Respondents did not depart from their
uniform procedure for the administration of the maintenance -of-member-
ship provision of the collective-bargaining agreement , since , according to
the Trial Examiner , Crawley was "more than 30 days delinquent in his dues
obligation when he was discharged " However, if we were to assume the
relevance of the uniform procedure, the amount of time Crawley was in ar-
rears on the date he was discharged would not be the critical time period,
since the uniform procedure clearly provides that a discharge will not be
requested until an employee is 30 days in arrears, and then a 15-day grace
period is provided Here, as found by the Trial Examiner, Crawley was only
22 days in arrears when his discharge was requested However, this minor
error by the Trial Examiner had no bearing upon his ultimate finding that
Respondents did not violate Section 8(b)(I)(A) and ( 2) by requesting
Crawley's discharge, since we agree with the Trial Examiner that Respon-
dents have no legal obligation to follow the uniform procedure in the situa-
tion where an employee , like Crawley, has once been accorded such
procedure after he cancels his dues checkoff authorization and then
becomes current in his dues obligation for a time but becomes delinquent
again thereafter
' We adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Respondent Local 4012
violated Section 8(b)(1 )(A) by adopting a resolution requiring that all
members pay their dues by checkoff authorizations Without passing on the
Local's right to require employee Crawley to pay his dues in this manner,]
the resolution clearly was improper , applying as it did not only to Crawley
but to all members Since the remedy would not be affected by findings
with regard to the July 10 and 29 letters to Crawley, we shall dismiss the
Trial Examiner's findings relative thereto The Examiner's conclusions of
law are amended accordingly
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K . BLACKBURN , Trial Examiner: On
September 5, 1969 ,t Kenneth R Crawley filed an
unfair labor practice charge against Local 4012,
Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
referred to herein as Respondent Local. On Oc-
tober 16 he filed an amended charge in Case
7-CB-2029 and an original charge, Case
7-CB-2029 (2), against Communications Workers
of America , AFL-CIO , and its District No. 4,
referred to collectively herein as Respondent Inter-
national . The General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board , by the Regional Director
for Region 7 (Detroit, Michigan ), issued a con-
solidated complaint on October 23 in which he al-
leged that Respondents violated Section
8(b)(I )(A) and (2) of the Act by causing Michigan
Bell Telephone Company, referred to herein as
Michigan Bell or the Company , to discharge
Crawley on August 29 and that Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(b)( I )(A) by various other conduct.
Respondents ' answer , duly filed , admitted certain
allegations of the complaint and denied others, in-
cluding the allegations that they had committed un-
fair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice , hearing
was held before me in Detroit on December 8 and
9 and on January 6, 7, 8, and 9 , 1970. The prin-
cipal issue litigated was whether Respondents
requested Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley pur-
suant to the maintenance -of-membership clause in
their contract or because Crawley had canceled his
dues checkoff authorization.
' Dates are 1969, unless otherwise specified
184 NLRB No. 20
LOCAL 4012, CWA 167
All parties appeared at the hearing and were
given full opportunity to participate, to adduce
relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Upon
the entire record, including briefs filed by Respon-
dents and the General Counsel,' and from my ob-
servation of the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying under oath, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF MICHIGAN BELL
Michigan Bell is a Michigan corporation engaged
in the operation of a telephone system. During
1968 it grossed more than $500,000 and purchased
goods valued at more than $50,000 which were
shipped directly to it in Michigan from points out-
side that State. On the basis of these facts, admitted
by Respondents, I find that Michigan Bell is en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ll. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I
find that Respondents are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
IIi. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
1. Background
In 1968 Communication Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, staged a national telephone strike. Pat-
tern-setting negotiations were conducted with
Western Electric Company. When agreement was
reached, CWA ordered its members to return to
work prior to their ratification of the terms.
CWA is organized on a district basis District 4
comprises the States of Ohio and Michigan, headed
by an international vice president. At the time of
the 1968 strike, the Michigan segment of District 4
was comprised of 36 local unions, headed by a dis-
trict director. When the order to return to work
was received, 34 of the locals complied. Locals
4000 and 4016, both located in the metropolitan
Detroit area in southeast Michigan, did not.
Respondent Local, located in Pontiac, did. Pontiac
is approximately 35 miles northwest of Detroit.
Michigan initially rejected the national agreement.
However, nationally the vote was in favor of the
agreement. Michigan contracts were open at that
time under a wage reopener provision, thus giving
rise to the local issues which prolonged the dispute
in that State. CWA conducted a second vote in
Michigan, this time by mail ballots sent directly to
the homes of the members. The result favored the
national agreement.
As a result of these events, Locals 4000 and 4016
remained on strike without the authorization of
Respondent International for 2 weeks after the
other 34 Michigan locals had returned to work.
Pursuant to its contracts, Michigan Bell abrogated
checkoff for Locals 4000 and 4016.
Michigan Bell remits checked off dues directly to
CWA's office in Washington, D C. CWA then
returns to each local that portion of the amounts it
receives which represents the local's share. In-
cluded with the Company remittal each month is a
so-called "reconciliation sheet." On it are listed
employees added to or dropped from checkoff each
month. CWA in turn sends this information back to
the Michigan director. However, there is a delay of
approximately 4 months between the time an em-
ployee cancels his checkoff authorization and
receipt of the reconciliation sheet by the Michigan
director. Michigan Bell informs the Michigan
director directly each month which employees have
canceled their checkoff authorizations in the
preceding month. Both reports indicate how many
weeks the employee was on checkoff and how
many he was off in the month in which he canceled.
Locals 4000 and 4016, on the one hand, and
Respondent International, on the other, fell out as a
result of the unauthorized continuation of the
strike. Dues money was a sore point between them.
Since Michigan Bell was no longer checking off
dues, Local 4000 sought to institute a plan in which
employees would authorize payment through their
credit union. To this end it solicited its members to
cancel their dues checkoff authorizations and sub-
stitute for them authorizations for the Company to
deduct amounts equal to their weekly dues from
their pay and send them to the credit union. It
publicized this scheme extensively. One of the
media it used was recorded telephone messages.
Employees were urged to call a certain number and
listen to instructions on how to go about supporting
the local in its fight with Respondent International
in this manner Respondent International obtained
an injunction. Litigation, the details of which are
not germane to this case, followed. However, as of
the fall of 1968, more than a thousand employees
in the metropolitan Detroit area had canceled their
dues checkoff authorizations and were delinquent
in their dues. In August 1969, when Kenneth
Crawley was discharged by Michigan Bell, the
number was approximately the same By January
1970, when this case was heard, it had dwindled to
something over 500. Contracts between Respon-
dent International and the Company contained
checkoff provisions prior to 1966. However, the
contract which was effective October 2, 1966, was
Y The General Counsel 's motion to strike Respondents ' Exhibits 49, 50,
and 51, police records pertaining to Crawley , is hereby granted Other mo-
tions contained in the General Counsel 's brief to strike other portions of
the record, including Respondents ' Exhibits 56 and 57, Michigan Bell's
personnel records pertaining to Crawley, are hereby denied
168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the first to contain a maintenance-of-dues clause. It
reads, in pertinent part:
Each employee who is a member of the Union:
2. on or after the effective date of this Agree-
ment, or
whichever is later, shall, as a condition of em-
ployment pay or tender to the Union an
amount equal to the periodic Union dues ....
In April 1967 Respondent International's execu-
tive board adopted a uniform procedure for ad-
ministration of this clause. It provides for the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Notification of the local by Respondent Inter-
national that a member has canceled his checkoff
authorization.
2. Personal contact of the member by the local
to check on the situation and explain his obligations
to him.
3. Certification by the local to its district vice
president that the member is 30 days in arrears,
with copy to the delinquent member.
4. Request by Respondent International to em-
ployer for discharge of the delinquent employee,
with notice to him. Following receipt of the request
for discharge, Michigan Bell, with Respondent In-
ternational's concurrence, provides the employee a
15-day grace period in which to pay up before
discharging him. Following this uniform procedure,
Respondent sought the discharge of all employees
who were in violation of this provision of the con-
tracts. Michigan Bell refused. At the time of the
hearing in this case, that issue had reached arbitra-
tion but no hearing had been held.
The fight between Local 4000 and Respondent
International took other forms than the litigation
over money Prior to the 1968 strike, both plant
and switching department employees in Michigan
were included in one bargaining unit and were
covered by one contract between Respondent In-
ternational and Michigan Bell Effective July 30,
1968, Respondent International transferred Detroit
plant employees to a newly formed Local 4001. In
late August 1968 it entered into a separate contract
with the Company covering a separate unit of
switching department employees in Detroit. Plant
employees in Detroit continued under the statewide
contract covering plant and switching employees.
During the period in 1968 relevant to this case
Local 4001 was the loyal local in Detroit, Local
4000, the dissident.
In 1969 the dissident ex-leaders of Local 4000
began a campaign to unseat Respondent Interna-
tional in Michigan. To that end they formed an or-
ganization called United Telephone Workers on
July I and called a meeting in Detroit July 7. At
this meeting they launched a statewide campaign to
get a sufficient showing of interest to be able to
petition for Labor Board representation elections in
the various bargaining units in the State. A second
rally was held in Detroit on July 21 Show-of-in-
terest cards were distributed at these rallies. A
deadline of August 1 was set for return of the cards.
The campaign did not succeed in eliciting enough
interest to permit the new labor organization to
challenge Respondent International in the statewide
unit. However, UTW was able to file Case
7-RC-9542 for an election in the Detroit switching
department unit covered by the contract Respon-
dent International and Michigan Bell executed in
late August 1968. That petition was pending at the
time of the hearing in this case.
In August UTW launched a campaign to per-
suade more employees to cancel their checkoff
authorizations as part of its drive to topple Respon-
dent International.' In its propaganda it stressed the
fact that hundreds of employees who had canceled
their authorizations the year before and been
delinquent ever since had not lost their jobs despite
Respondent International's best efforts to get them
fired pursuant to the maintenance-of-dues provision
of its contract. Local 4001, the loyal local, con-
ducted a countercampaign in which it resorted to
taped telephone messages, dust as Local 4000 had
done the year before when it urged employees to
cancel their checkoff authorizations as part of its
drive to switch to the credit union plan. Upshot of
this phase of the Battle of Detroit is Case 7-UD-82,
a petition for a deauthorization election in one
Michigan Bell plant. It, too, was pending at the time
of the hearing in this case.
2. The Kenneth Crawley story
Kenneth Crawley, a Michigan Bell station in-
staller, transferred to Pontiac in 1956. He became a
member of Respondent Local. He authorized
checkoff in 1962. He ran for the presidency of the
local in 1964, 1966, and 1968. Each time he was
defeated by Joseph Veresh. After the 1966 and
1968 elections he protested, without success, that
Veresh or his supporters had engaged in objec-
tionable conduct affecting the outcome. In 1966,
when all other Michigan locals obeyed an order to
return to work at the end of a statewide strike, he
led a wildcat extension by Respondent Local. The
strike collapsed when Veresh ordered the members
Michigan Bell had resumed checkoff in Locals 4000 and 4016 in the in-
terim between summer 1968 and summer 1969
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 169
back to work. Crawley was the last employee to
drift back He was censured by a trial board of the
local for bringing it into disrepute by letters to the
editor of a Pontiac newspaper in which he criticized
Veresh for ordering members of the local back to
work against their will. In 1968 he filed Case
7-CB-1833 in which he charged that Respondent
Local had violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act
by failing to represent him properly. Gravamen of
this charge was a grievance which Crawley claimed
Veresh had allowed to die by failing to take the
necessary action to carry it to the next step of the
grievance procedure in the time allowed even
though the grievance had merit. The Regional
Director found no merit to Crawley's charge. As a
result of all these experiences Crawley was not an
admirer of Joseph Veresh. By March 1969 he was,
to put it mildly, a dissident member of Respondent
Local.
On March 21 Crawley wrote Michigan Bell, as
follows:
Pay-Roll Accounting Mgr:
Effective as soon as possible, from this day
forward, please stop deducting union dues
from my pay checks
He did so because he was aware of the situation in
Detroit and wanted to create a similar test case of
the maintenance-of-dues provision of the contract
in Pontiac.' The Company obliged him. It deducted
weekly dues of $1.15 from the check which he
received on Tuesday, March 25 The wages were
earned in the week ending Saturday, March 15.
Crawley's name was included among five on a
notice of employees who had canceled checkoff
which the Company sent to Respondent Interna-
tional's Michigan director, Herman Shelton, on
April 24. Shelton implemented Rspondent Interna-
tional's uniform procedure for administration of the
maintenance-of-dues clause in Crawley's case by
notifying Respondent Local under date of May 2.
Soon after receipt of Shelton's letter, Veresh went
to the garage out of which Crawley worked in order
to talk to Crawley, the next step in Respondent in-
ternational's uniform procedure. He asked William
Osborne to accompany him as a witness.' Veresh
said he understood Crawley had canceled his
checkoff authorization. Crawley replied that he
had. Veresh said he thought Crawley should pay his
dues. Veresh said he would hate to see anything
happen to Crawley if he did not. Crawley said he
was not going to pay them. Veresh said he had
known Crawley for a long time and he would be
better off if he paid up. Crawley repeated that he
was not going to pay. Veresh asked Crawley if he
was sure that was the way he wanted it. Crawley
said it was not the way he wanted it, but it was the
way it was going to be. At no time did Veresh say
that he would get Crawley discharged if he did not
reinstate his checkoff authorization. The only impli-
cation of what Veresh did say was that Crawley was
putting his job in jeopardy if he insisted on not pay-
ing in the face of the maintenance-of-dues clause in
the contract.
On May 12 Respondent Local sent the requisite
certificate to Shelton, with copy to Crawley, that
Crawley was more than 30 days in arrears. It stated
that he owed $9.20 as of that date, or eight times
the $1 15 set by Respondent Local as its weekly
dues. On May 15 Shelton requested Michigan Bell
to discharge Crawley pursuant to the contract
Under the heading "Date of Delinquency" on the
form letter Shelton used was filled in "March,
1969, Monthly Ded $5.75, Uncollected $2.30." On
the same day Shelton sent Crawley a letter which
read.
This is to advise you that, on the above date,
the Michigan Bell Telephone Company has
been requested to terminate your employment
because of your failure to pay or to tender
periodic Union Dues or equivalent as provided
in the current contract with CWA.
On May 28 D. E. Blank, supervising foreman of
the garage out of which Crawley worked, took
Crawley to the office of Blank's boss, H. W. Hart-
son. Crawley was handed a typed letter signed by
Blank which reviewed the situation and warned
Crawley that ". . . if you should decide to continue
in your present status and not abide by ... the cur-
rent agreement the Company will be forced to ac-
cept your resignation." He was told he had until 5
p.m. on Monday, June 2, to pay his dues. Crawley
asked Hartson to put it in writing. Hartson wrote on
a memo pad, "Should you not abide by . . the
working agreement by paying your dues delinquen-
cy before the close of business on June 2, 1969,
your resignation will be considered accepted."
Hartson signed the paper and handed it to Crawley.
Crawley contacted the Detroit office of the
Labor Board. He was informed that he could be
discharged for failure to pay union dues when a
proper collective-bargaining agreement provided
for such a condition of employment. Crawley next
This finding is based on the testimony of William Osborne, a fellow em-
ployee, that Crawley "wasn't too happy with a clause in the contract and he
said he would quit taking out dues to see whether it was valid or not " I do
not credit Crawley's explanation that he canceled his checkoff authoriza-
tion because he "was in hopes this would bong to the attention of higher
people in my union, would come to me and approach me why I done this,
outside of my local, where I could tell them exactly what was going on I
didn't intend to quit the union but I thought this would get action outside of
Pontiac local and have somebody come down into Pontiac [i e , from
Lansing, headquarters of the Michigan director] and see what in the heck
was going on " Crawley spent the better part of 3 days on the witness stand
in this protracted hearing He was so evasive on cross -examination that his
testimony is worthless John Livingstone, one of the leaders of UTW, di-
vided dissident employees into three categories His third category struck
me as a particularly apt description of Crawley as of March 1969, viz, "
and there were others who were paying dues, who if it was safe not to pay
dues, they wouldn 't pay dues , because they hated the CWA "
" The General Counsel, relying on Crawley 's version of this conversation,
has alleged a violation of Section 8(b)(I)(A) in that Respondents " .
coercively threatened [Crawley they ] would have [ him] discharged if he
did not reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card " My findings are
based on the testimony of Osborne, as corroborated by Veresh I do not
credit Crawley for the reason already stated
170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contacted his friend, Michael Shelley, chief steward
for Respondent Local He asked Shelley to find out
how much he owed so that he could pay up Shelley
contacted Robert Parker, treasurer of Respondent
Local. Parker told Shelley that Crawley owed
$12.65, or 1 1 times Respondent Local's weekly
dues.
On May 29 Crawley met Shelley at Salfi's Bar, a
hangout for telephone men not far from the garage
where Crawley worked. Crawley gave Shelley
$12.65 in cash. Shelley gave Crawley a receipt "for
Union Dues up to 6-2-69." Crawley wrote on the
bottom of the receipt, "In protest of this transac-
tion I remain Ken Crawley." Shelley immediately
called the Company to inform it that Crawley had
paid his dues. Shelley turned the $12.65 in to
Parker. On June 2 Daniel Carr, the international
representative employed by Respondent Interna-
tional to service Respondent Local as well as
several other locals in the Detroit area, informed
Shelton by telephone that Crawley had paid his
dues. Shelton instructed Carr to keep him posted
on whether Crawley continued to keep his dues
current.
On July 7 Crawley attended the first rally held by
UTW in Detroit. He asked and was informed about
the situation in Detroit with respect to the hundreds
of Michigan Bell employees who had stopped pay-
ing dues without being discharged. That same day
Crawley met Shelley again in Salfi's Bar and paid
him $5, or 40 cents more than four times Respon-
dent Local's weekly dues. Again Shelley gave
Crawley a receipt. This time Crawley wrote on it,
"Due to the NAZI procedure I had to pay Ken
Crawley " Shelley turned this $5 in to Parker also
Respondent Local's executive board held its
'regular monthly meeting on July 10. Parker, a
member of the board, was annoyed that Crawley
was harassing Respondent Local and, especially,
him by canceling his checkoff authorization and
paying his dues belatedly and irregularly in cash
He moved that "... no more cash dues be collected
and ... all dues be by payroll deduction . . also,
that anyone not complying be referred to the inter-
national." The motion carried unanimously. The
secretary was directed to send notices ". . . to those
involved," namely, Crawley. On July 19, pursuant
to the new policy, Shirley Reeve, Respondent Lo-
cal's secretary, wrote Crawley, ". . . All dues col-
lected by this Local in the future must be by payroll
deduction. In order for you to comply with this
decision, a signed dues-deduction authorization
card must be in my hands no later than August 11,
1969."
When Carr learned of the motion and the letter a
day or two later, he told Veresh he thought that
refusing to accept cash dues was contrary to
Respondent International's policy and probably il-
legal. He said he would check with Shelton. He did.
Shelton confirmed his first impression. Carr told
Veresh that Shelton said Respondent Local should
not carry out its new policy. Veresh instructed Mrs.
Reeve to undo her first letter to Crawley with a
second. Mrs. Reeve missed the point On July 29
she wrote Crawley, "This is to insure that you
received my letter of July 19, 1969, concerning
cash dues. Enclosed is a copy of that letter, and a
Dues Deduction Authorization card. I may also add
that until dues deductions have been resumed to
comply with the Executive Board decision, dues
must be kept up to date by cash payment."
In the meantime, on July 21, Crawley had at-
tended the second UTW rally in Detroit. Again he
brought up the subject of fighting CWA by cancel-
ing checkoff authorizations. On July 30 Crawley
paid Shelley $1.15, or I week's dues, in cash at Sal-
fi's Bar Once again Shelley gave Crawley a receipt.
This time, however, Crawley merely added his
signature. Shelley forgot to turn this payment in to
Parker. On August 7 Crawley mailed Respondent
Local a check for $2.30, or two times his weekly
dues. Respondent Local received it on August 8. It
did not deposit the check until September 9.6
Pursuant to his instructions, Carr reported
Crawley's $5 payment of July 7 to Shelton shortly
after it was received. Carr did not report the $1.15
payment because no one connected with Respon-
dent Local, other than Shelley, knew anything
about it at the time. Carr reported the $2.30 pay-
ment shortly after August 8. Whether this was be-
fore or after August 12 is uncertain in the record.
In any event, on August 12, Shelton again
requested Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley for
failure to pay his dues. He used the same form
letter he had employed on May 15. This time,
under "Date of Delinquency" he entered "Can-
celled payroll deduction authorization March,
1969." He sent a copy of this notice to Crawley the
same day, rather than a separate letter as he had
done on May 15. On the morning of August 29
Blank told Crawley that, unless Crawley could show
him a receipt for dues up to that moment, he would
not let Crawley go to work. Crawley replied that he
had no receipt but that he was only 2 or 3 weeks in
arrears. Blank discharged Crawley as requested by
Respondent International. Crawley asked Blank to
put the reason for his discharge in writing. Blank
refused.
The Kenneth Crawley story immediately became
a cause celebre in the Battle of Detroit Local 4001,
the loyal local, publicized Crawley's discharge in its
recorded telephone messages as proof that failing
to pay CWA dues could, indeed, cost dissident em-
ployees their jobs. UTW countered with leaflets in-
' This finding is based on a dated endorsement on the canceled check,
which is in evidence Veresh and Parker testified that the check lay around
Respondent Local's office a few days because of the nature of their opera-
tions Both are full-time employees of Michigan Bell and carry out their du-
ties as union officers at odd hours The General Counsel sought to elicit ad-
mission that Veresh wanted to tear the check up rather than accept it,
without success I make no such finding I attach no significance to the fact
that Respondent Local held the check for a month before depositing it
LOCAL 4012, CWA
tended to reassure its supporters. One such, dated
September 18, read, in pertinent part:
Here are the facts on the Pontiac splicer'
referred to on the tape who was allegedly fired
for non payment of dues.
1- He was not thirty days delinquent as
required (and he has the receipts to prove it).
2- The procedure outlined above was not in-
itiated or carried out.
3- The company would not give this employee
a written statement as to why he was being ter-
minated.
4- This man has filed charges with the National
Labor Relations Board against MBT and
CWA. The NLRB is presently investigating the
charges.
5- Legal opinion is that he has a perfect case
and we are confident that he will be returned
to the payroll with back pay.
Shelley did not remember receiving $1 . 15 from
Crawley on July 30 until he read a copy of
Crawley's affidavit to the Labor Board in connec-
tion with this case sometime after September 5.
Osborne also read the same affidavit . Officials of
Respondent International and officials of Respon-
dent Local other than Chief Steward Shelley did
not become aware of the $ 1.15 until Osborne told
them what he had read at a trial preparation con-
ference a few weeks before this hearing opened on
December 8. As of the time of the hearing Shelley
had still not turned in the $1.15.
B. Analysis and Conclusion
1. The amount of Crawley's delinquency
A threshhold issue, since both the General Coun-
sel and Respondents predicate their arguments, in
part, on their own calculations, is just how far
Crawley was behind in his dues on August 12, when
Shelton asked Michigan Bell to discharge him, and
on August 29, when it did. The General Counsel
contends that Crawley's $12.65 payment on May
29 put Crawley 2 weeks ahead; Respondents con-
tend that it left him nearly 2 weeks behind. I find
that it brought him just up to date.
The General Counsel bases his calculation on a
position that the last weekly deduction made by the
Company paid Crawley's dues for the week ending
Saturday, March 29, the week in which he received
his paycheck, and not for the week ending Satur-
day, March 15, the week in which he earned the
money. He relies on the fact that Crawley was on
checkoff at the time maintenance of dues became a
171
condition of employment in early October 1966,
and argues that, since Crawley's contractual obliga-
tion began in that week, the money withheld from
his wages in that week met his obligation for that
week. There is no evidence of what week Crawley's
first payroll deduction back in 1962 was credited
to. All witnesses who were queried on the point
agreed that the question of whether dues deducted
from wages meet an employee's obligation for work
week or pay week has never come up before.
I think the General Counsel is wrong for a
number of reasons. First, it is more logical that the
$1.15 taken out of the check Crawley received on
Tuesday, March 25, was, as part of a continuing
pattern, intended to cover the week for which, not
in which, he was being paid. I would find it difficult
to believe that, when Crawley went on checkoff in
1962, he continued to pay his weekly dues in cash
for 2 weeks after he signed the authorization
because the first deduction was not made until 2
weeks later. Such precision in meeting this kind of
obligation does not comport with normal human
behavior Therefore, it seems more reasonable to
infer that Crawley's first payroll deduction went to
pay his dues for the week he was being paid for and
this pattern continued without interruption until
March 1969. More important, however, is the fact
that Crawley, Company, and Respondents all
treated his obligation as if this were so March 1,
1969, fell on Saturday. There were five Saturdays
that month, but only four Tuesdays. When
Michigan Bell told Respondent International that
Crawley had canceled his authorization in that
month, it did not report that it had last taken dues
out of his wages on Tuesday, March 25. Rather, it
reported that it had deducted for only 3 of the 5
dues weeks which fell in that month. Thus it was, in
effect, reporting that Crawley, through payroll
deductions, had met his obligations for the weeks
ending March 1, 8, and 15, but not for the weeks
ending March 22 and 29. Similarly, Crawley acted
as though he understood his obligation, if any, to
keep his dues current though cash payments began
with the week ending March 22. I was singularly
unimpressed with Crawley's efforts to persuade me
that calculation of how much he owed was a task
beyond his skill and that he was constantly asking
his friend, the chief steward, to find out how much
so that he could pay up. Multiplying $1.15 by the
number of weeks which have elapsed since a par-
ticular date in the past is within the capability of
fifth graders. Crawley is better educated and more
intelligent than that. There are 11 Saturdays from
March 22 to May 31. When Shelley inquired of
Parker how much Crawley owed in the week end-
ing May 31, Parker told him $12.65, the precise
amount of 11 weeks' dues. Crawley paid that
amount without haggling. Shelley gave Crawley a
receipt which specified that he was now paid up to
' Crawley went to Pontiac as a splicer 's helper However , in 1959 he was
demoted to station installer
172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
June 2; i.e., to the beginning of the week ending
Saturday, June 7. Crawley only protested the fact
that he had to pay union dues to keep his job, not
the amount he was told he owed or the period the
receipt indicated it covered. He knew full well that
the period he was in arrears on May 29 was I I
weeks, the 1 1 weeks beginning with the week end-
ing March 22 and ending with the week ending
May 31.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the
last payroll deduction did not pay Crawley's dues
through the week ending March 15 because he
owed an additional $2.05 at that time. It charges
him for 90 cents not paid in the spring of 1965
when, apparently, his earnings were insufficient for
a proper deduction and for I week's dues unpaid in
the spring of 1968. As to the latter, the strike which
took place at that time lasted 4 weeks. When it was
over, Michigan Bell, for a reason unexplained. in
this record, deducted dues for only three of those
weeks from all employees who were on checkoff.
There is no evidence that Respondents have ever
sought to collect that week's dues directly from any
of their members or that they have claimed it as an
obligation due and owing from any member other
than Crawley. Moreover, the manner in which
Respondent Local calculated the amount Crawley
owed as of Saturday, May 3 1, already alluded to,
and the fact that Respondent Local stated in its
May 12 certificate to Shelton that Crawley then
owed $1.15 times eight, the precise number of
weeks from the week ending March 22 to the week
ending May 10, leave no room to believe that
Respondents' effort to tack an extra $2 05 onto
what Crawley owed is anything other than an af-
terthought. I agree with the General Counsel that
Respondents had forgiven Crawley the $2.05 long
before he canceled his checkoff authorization.
Respondent also contends that Crawley should
not receive credit for the $1.15 payment of July 30
which Shelley pocketed on the ground that Shelley
was acting beyond the scope of his authority as
chief steward. However, Respondents accepted the
other payments of $12.65 and $5 which Crawley
made through Shelley. By so doing, Respondents
cloaked Shelley with apparent authority to receive
dues from Crawley. Therefore, Shelley was acting
as Respondents' agent when he took the $1 15 even
though he failed to turn it in, and Crawley's ac-
count must be credited with it.
When Crawley handed Shelley $12.65 on May
29, he paid his dues through Saturday, May 3 1.
With that as a firm starting point, the calculation of
how far behind he was on August 12 and on August
29 is simple. The $5 he paid on July 7 equaled dues
for 4 weeks and, approximately, 2 days. Therefore,
it paid his dues for the weeks ending June 7, 14, 21,
and 28 and for Sunday, June 29, and Monday, June
8 Shelton , of course, had no way of knowing about the $1 15 payment
and may not, in fact , have been told about the $2 30 payment at that time
Therefore, the smallest number of days' delinquency which Respondents
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
30. The $1.15 he paid on July 30 paid his dues for
I week through Monday, July 7. The $2.30 check
he mailed to Respondent Local on August 7 paid
his dues through Monday, July 21. Therefore, as of
August 12, when Shelton wrote to Michigan Bell,
Crawley was 22 days in arrears." On August 29,
when Michigan Bell discharged him, he was 39 days
behind.
2. The August 12 request as violation
I have bothered to figure out Crawley's dues
status on August 12 and 29 with such precision
because "30 days" have such significance in the
minds of the participants in the Battle of Detroit,
Crawley included As point I in the portion of the
UTW leaflet quoted above indicates, UTW's tactics
are predicated on the notion that no employee can
be discharged pursuant to the contract unless and
until he is 30 days delinquent in his dues In fact,
the part of the leaflet just before the section about
Crawley already quoted sets forth UTW's un-
derstanding of the procedure, thus-
Legal counsel has indicated that these steps
must be followed before members can be ter-
minated under the Maintenance of Member-
ship clause:
1- Members must be delinquent at least thirty
day in paying their dues.
2- Local should personally contact member to
determine whether the member plans to pay
his or her dues on a -cash basis (this when
member cancels his or her dues deduction
authorization).
3- If member declines to pay, the Local notifys
International and requests termination of em-
ployee. A copy of the certificate of delinquen-
cy and the request for termination should be
mailed to the member, registered mail, with a
return receipt requested.
4- The International, in writing, notifys the
company by registered mail, return receipt
requested, to terminate the employee A copy
of this request shall be transmitted to the em-
ployee who shall have 15 calender days after
the date of the request to pay up his or her
dues.'
It is apparent from the above that a member has
to be personally contacted , receive two letters, and
then has an additional 15 days to decide if he or she
is going to pay up dues before the company could
terminate an employee.
This idea that he was safe so long as he did not
can be charged with predicating their request on is 29, the largest they may
claim they acted on is 43 As discussed below, I think the point is unimpor-
tant
LOCAL 4012, CWA 173
fall more than 4 weeks behind in his dues and
would always have a chance to escape by paying up
even if he did, and the idea that Michigan Bell
would consider his case the same as the hundreds
of dissidents in Detroit and refuse to honor the con-
tract explain Crawley's rashness in persisting in his
campaign to harass Respondent Local. It also lies at
the heart of the General Counsel's theory.
The precise wording of that part of Respondent
International's uniform procedure which gives rise
to the 30-day syndrome is, "When a member is in
arrears in the payment of his or her periodic Union
dues for a period of 30 days, the Local should certi-
fy to the appropriate Vice President (or National
Bargaining Unit Director) the name of the member,
who has failed to pay or to tender to the Local an
amount equal to the periodic Union dues, the
amount of the delinquency, and a request for ter-
mination of the employment of the member. A
copy of this certificate and request for termination
should be mailed to the member in question, re-
gistered mail, with a return receipt requested."
The General Counsel's theory is two-pronged.
First, he contends that Respondents violated the
Act when they brought about Crawley's discharge
regardless of their motive for doing so because they
did not follow their own procedure, a per se ap-
proach. Alternatively, he contends that they are
guilty because they were motivated not solely by
Crawley's failure to pay his dues but by his dis-
sidence and, especially, his refusal to go back on
checkoff following Respondent Local's executive
board resolution of July 10 and Mrs. Reeve's letters
of July 19 and 29. Respondents deny that they were
motivated by anything other than Crawley's dues
delinquency and argue that, even if they were, such
a motive is legal since they were only trying to pro-
tect themselves from Crawley's efforts to destroy
them.
Under the General Counsel's per se theory, he
calculates Crawley's dues were paid through the
week ending August 2, with 40 cents change left
over. Thus, he argues, Crawley was less than 2
weeks behind when Shelton requested his
discharge, less than 4 weeks behind when Michigan
Bell complied Therefore, he concludes, Crawley
was discharged when he was less than 30 days in ar-
rears, and Respondent International's uniform
procedure was not complied with in that respect.
Since I have found that the General Counsel's cal-
culations are based on an incorrect premise and
that Crawley was, in fact, more than 30 days
delinquent when he was discharged, it follows that
Respondents did not depart from the uniform
procedure in this respect even if the point is now
considered important.
An integral part of the General Counsel's 30-day
position is the additional fact that Crawley did not
receive a copy of a certification from Respondent
Local to Respondent International that, in August,
he was more than 30 days behind. The General
Counsel's position is predicated on a misun-
derstanding of the uniform procedure and the facts
at the time complaint was issued. The complaint al-
leges, and the answer denies, "On a date ... falling
within the first two weeks of August, 1969, Respon-
dent Local, in writing, notified Respondent Interna-
tional that the Respondent Local was requesting
`termination of employment of ... [the Charging
Party] ... who ... [has] ... failed to pay or tender
to the Local an amount equal to the periodic union
dues.' Said written communication further stated
that the Respondent Local was certifying `that the
above members are in arrears in the payment of
Union dues for a period of 30 days or more."' As
found above, this is simply not true. Respondent
Local sent such a certificate, with copy to Crawley,
as required by Respondent International's uniform
procedure in May but not in August. This fact
brings the General Counsel's 30-day theory into the
focus of one simple question. Once Respondents
had accorded Crawley the full due process of the
uniform procedure in May, were they legally bound
to repeat the process in full in August when
Crawley continued his harassing tactics? I find that
they were not.
The procedure worked out by Respondent Inter-
national and Michigan Bell for administering the
maintenance-of-dues provision of their contracts is
eminently fair. An employee who does not meet his
obligations gets two written notices from Respon-
dent International, not to mention a personal con-
tact by an official of his local. The notices are sent
registered mail, return receipt requested, so that
there can be no doubt that the employee has, in
fact, received them. At any time prior to a request
for his discharge the employee can forestall it by
simply paying what he owes, the condition of em-
ployment established by the contract Even after
the request the Company still gives him 15 days in
which to pay, and Respondents have no objection
to his retaining his job if he does meet his obliga-
tions even at that late date. Herman Shelton,
Michigan director for Respondent International,
testified, and I find, that there has been no prior in-
stance in which an employee has, like Crawley, per-
sisted in refusing to pay his dues regularly and on
time after falling behind and then paying up once
within the framework of the uniform procedure."
The hundreds of dissident employees in Detroit are
not like Crawley. In their cases, Respondent Inter-
national has followed its uniform procedure, just as
' The General Counsel stated on the record that he was not relying on a
disparate treatment theory Respondents contend that this concession
precludes any finding against them since , if Crawley has been treated like
everyone else , in that Respondent International requested his discharge for
failing to pay his dues, he cannot have been discriminated against I reject
Respondents ' argument . The General Counsel did not intend to concede,
and 1 do not interpret his remark as reasonably susceptible of being held to
concede, that there are other employees of Michigan Bell who have been
treated as Crawley was treated without an unfair labor practice resulting
The General Counsel was, rather, referring to the fact that Crawley is the
only employee among the hundreds in Michigan who have canceled their
checkoff authorizations and whose discharges have been requested by
Respondent International who has paid up once, fallen behind again, and
had his discharge requested a second time
174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it did in May in Crawley's case, they have refused
to pay up at all, and Michigan Bell has failed to
abide by the contract for reasons unexplained in
this record and having no relevance to this case
The whole procedure is obviously designed to cover
an employee who falls behind once and protect him
if he wants to meet his obligation thereafter. It has
no bearing on employees who, like Crawley and the
Detroit dissidents, are attempting to withhold their
dues as part of a continuing campaign to subvert
CWA as bargaining representative for Michigan
Bell employees A contrary holding would turn
Respondent International's fair and reasonable
uniform procedure into a potent weapon to be used
against it What is important about the August
phase of the Kenneth Crawley story is not whether
Crawley was 29 or 31 days in arrears on August 12
or 29, or whether he had another personal confron-
tation with Joseph Veresh or some other official of
Respondent Local, or whether he received a copy
of a certificate from Respondent Local to Respon-
dent International that he was 30 days behind in his
dues before Shelton requested his discharge in his
August 12 letter to the Company. What is impor-
tant is whether he did receive some reasonable
notice at that time of what was happening to him so
that he was accorded the process due a dissident in
Crawley's unique position. He did get a copy of
Shelton's August 12 request that Michigan Bell
discharge him. He did receive a reasonable grace
period thereafter before the Company discharged
him on August 29 The computation of how much
he owed was not so complicated that he was in-
capable of figuring it out and paying up between
August 12 and 29. When he did not and lost his job
as a result, Crawley had no one to blame but him-
self
The General Counsel's reliance on Krambo Food
Stores, Inc., 114 NLRB 241, and IBT, Local 85
(Pacific Motor Trucking Company), 175 NLRB No.
112, is misplaced. Both are distinguishable on their
facts. In the former, the question was whether dis-
criminatees had paid their dues within the grace
period provided by the union. Here, Crawley was
not discharged until a grace period following
Michigan Bell's receipt of the request for his
discharge had expired. In the latter, the union not
only accepted and retained dues tendered by the
discriminatee but even waived his delinquencies.
The second facet of the General Counsel's
theory, i.e., that Respondents were not motivated
solely by Crawley's dues delinquency when the Au-
gust 12 request was sent, is predicated on the same
misconception as the first. In addition to the
mistaken paragraph already quoted, the complaint
specifically alleges that Respondents requested
Crawley's discharge because of Crawley's "
failure to execute a written authorization permitting
Michigan Bell to check off dues or assessments ...
and activities as a dissident member ...." There
can be no doubt in this record that Respondent
Local was motivated by Crawley's cancellation of
and refusal to renew his checkoff authorization.
Treasurer Robert Parker's frank admission of his
reason for proposing the resolution adopted by the
executive board on July 10 and the still-hostile
wording of Secretary Reeve's second letter to
Crawley on Julyy 29 despite the fact, as Parker so
revealingly phrased it, Respondent Local got its
"fanny chewed no end" by Respondent Inter-
national for acting contrary to CWA policy make
this point crystal clear. In the General Counsel's
theory this motive is the controlling motive. In
the complaint he traces it to Respondent Interna-
tional by assuming that the step which followed
Mrs. Reeve's July 29 letter was an early August
certificate from Respondent Local to Respondent
International that Crawley was 30 days in arrears.
Once again, the key fact is that there was no such
certificate.
The General Counsel's theory falls because he
has failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the motive which animated Respon-
dent Local was the motive which animated Respon-
dent international when the August 12 request for
Crawley's discharge was sent to Michigan Bell.
Shelton was the official responsible for sending that
request. Therefore, his motive for doing so is the
determinative one. The only contact between Shel-
ton and Respondent Local was through Carr, the
international representative, during the period
when the local was so busily engaged in trying to
force Crawley back onto checkoff because it felt it
was being harassed by him. I credit Carr's and Shel-
ton's denials that they had anything at all to do with
or even knowledge of that activity at the local level.
I credit their testimony that the only discussion they
had about Crawley just before August 12 was
Carr's 'informing Shelton, pursuant to Shelton's
standing instructions, that Crawley was behind in
his dues. I credit Shelton's testimony that he acted
on his own initiative in sending the August 12
request and not because Respondent Local had
requested him to do so in any way. I attach no sig-
nificance to the coincidence that Shirley Reeve's
letter of July 19 set August 11 as a deadline by
which Crawley must authorize checkoff while Shel-
ton's request to Michigan Bell to discharge Crawley
is dated August 12. I find that Shelton was
motivated solely by Crawley's dues delinquency
when he caused Michigan Bell to discharge
Crawley
The General Counsel's improper motive theory
falls for a second reason. Even if he had succeeded
in establishing that Shelton acted at Respondent
Local's request, whether express or implied,
because Crawley refused to go back on checkoff,
Respondents would still have been requesting the
discharge solely because of Crawley's delinquency
in dues within the meaning of Board precedent. As
is pointed out in General Motors Corporation,
Packard Electric Division, 134 NLRB 1107, 1117,
"Employees do not have a protected right to refrain
LOCAL 4012,
from paying union dues lawfully required under a
valid union -security contract or to be continually or
willfully delinquent in such respect ." In this case as
in that, checkoff is merely incidental to Respon-
dents' right to timely receipt of dues. Therefore, a
motive growing out of Crawley's efforts to subvert
Respondents ' rights is not one proscribed by the
Act.
Respondents accepted dues tendered by Crawley
after the May request for his discharge. However,
he did not tender any after the August request.
Thus, the exception laid down in Colgate-Palmolive
Company, 138 NLRB 1037, and reiterated in State
Sand and Gravel Company, 155 NLRB 273, to the
general rule of General Motors-Packard, supra, has
no application here. Therefore, since Respondents
requested the discharge of Kenneth Crawley pur-
suant to a valid union -security contract solely
because of his delinquency in dues, they did not
thereby violate Section 8(b)(I )(A) and (2) of the
Act.
3. The ancillary 8(b)(1)(A) allegations
As I have already indicated in footnote 5 above, I
do not credit Crawley's story that ". . Veresh
notified me that [canceling checkoff] was a viola-
tion of the contract, and that if I did not get back
on the payroll deductions I could lose my job. I'm
quite sure he said he would pet my job." Therefore,
I find that Respondents did not violate Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening to have
Crawley " discharged if he did not reinstate his dues
checkoff authorization card."
The complaint also alleges the July 10 resolution
by Respondent Local's executive board and the
secretary 's letters of July 10 and 29 as violations.
Respondents rely on General Motors-Packard,
supra, in which the Board adopted the Trial Ex-
aminer 's finding that , ". . . in the circumstances of
this case, [ a checkoff requirement ] was both
reasonable and necessary to a fair administration of
the contract with due regard for the rights of all
parties concerned, namely, the Company, the [Un-
ion], and the employees." However, the better
view and one more appropriate to the circum-
stances of this case , is that ". . dues checkoff
authorizations must be made `voluntarily ' and ...
an employee has `a right under Section 7 of the Act
to refuse to sign checkoff authorization cards."'
IUE, Local 601 (Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion ), 180 NLRB No . 168. Respondent Local's ac-
tions were directed only against Crawley and were
intended to restrain and coerce him in his right to
fight CWA. While a strong argument can be made
that Rspondent Local had a right to protect itself
against Crawley 's harassment in this manner, thus
bringing this case within the ambit of General Mo-
tors-Packard, I am persuaded to the contrary, first,
by the fact that Respondent International itself con-
sidered Respondent Local's action illegal and,
second , by the fact that Respondent Local, not-
CWA 175
withstanding , has never officially revoked the of-
fending resolution . To the contrary, the last action
it took in this area even after being informed that it
was acting illegally was Mrs. Reeve 's letter of July
29 to Crawley. That letter clearly implies that the
new procedure is still in full force and effect.
Therefore, I find that Respondent Local, but not
Respondent International , violated Section
8(b)( I )(A) of the Act when it adopted a resolution
and informed Kenneth Crawley that dues could
only be paid through checkoff.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Michigan Bell Telephone Company is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, its District 4, and its Local 4012 are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By adopting a resolution and informing Ken-
neth Crawley that dues can only be paid through
checkoff, Local 4012, Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (b)(I )(A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The allegations of the complaint that Commu-
nications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its
District 4 , have engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act have not been sustained.
6. The allegations of the complaint that Local
4012, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act
have not been sustained.
7. The allegation of the complaint that Local
4012, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act by threatening to have Kenneth Crawley
discharged if he did not reinstate his dues checkoff
authorization card has not been sustained.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Local has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices by adopting a
resolution that dues can only be paid through
checkoff , I will recommend that it cease and desist
from giving any force or effect thereto and that its
executive board adopt a new resolution rescinding
the old one . I will not recommend that Respondent
Local officially notify Kenneth Crawley of its return
to its old policy on payment of dues since, in view
of my other findings in this case, such a remedy
would be pointless.
176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in the case,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue
the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Local 4012, Communications Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Giving any force or effect to a resolution
adopted by its executive board on July 10, 1969,
that no more cash dues be collected and all dues be
by payroll deduction
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees of Michigan Bell Telephone
Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Adopt, through its executive board, a resolu-
tion rescinding the said resolution of July 10, 1969.
(b) Post at Respondent Local's office or union
hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix. "10 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly
signed by Respondent Local's representative, shall
be posted by Respondent Local immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to members are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent Local to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 7
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix"
for posting by Michigan Bell Telephone Company
at its places of business in Pontiac, Michigan, in
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted, if the said employer is willing to do so. Co-
pies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director, shall, after being signed by a representa-
tive of Respondent Local, be forthwith returned to
the Regional Director for said posting.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith."
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
be dismissed insofar as it alleges the commission of
any unfair labor practices by Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and/or its District
4, and insofar as it alleges that Local 4012, Com-
munications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, vio-
lated Section 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act by threatening
to have Kenneth Crawley discharged if he did not
reinstate his dues checkoff authorization card.
i" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board -
ii In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director
for Region 7, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT require you to pay your union
dues through payroll deductions. All our mem-
bers are free to pay their dues directly to the
local in cash rather than execute a checkoff
authorization if they so desire.
LOCAL 4012,
COMMUMICATIONS
WORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Region 7, 500 Book Building, 1249
Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan 48226,
Telephone 313-226-3200.