Local 294, Teamsters

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsFeb 14, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 378 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America and Clemence D. Stanton, d/b/a Rexford Sand and Gravel Co. Case 3-CC-604 February 14, 1972 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY On August 19, 1971, Trial Examiner Sidney D. Goldberg issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brier and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re- spondent, Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recom- mended Order. ' The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule a Trial Examiner's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear prepon- derance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C.A 3) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION SIDNEY D. GOLDBERG, Trial Examiner: This case, tried before me at Albany, New York, on June 8, 1971, involves allegations of unlawful secondary activity, as well as primary activity unlawful because conducted for an object forbidden by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act). The complaint' alleges that Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (the union), while engaged in a labor dispute with Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand & Gravel Co. (Stanton) induced work stoppages by employees of Stanton and other employees with whom he was going business , and that the union threatened, coerced, and restrained Stanton and the other employers. Objects of this conduct, it is alleged, were to force or require Stanton to sign ' Issued May 13, 1971, on a charge filed March 19 and an amended charge filed March 31, 1971 a contract containing a clause forbidden by Section 8(e) of the Act and to force the other employers to cease doing business with Stanton. By this conduct the union is alleged to have violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) and (B) of the Act. The union answered, denying the major allegations of the complaint, and the case came on for trial before me as stated. All parties were represented; afforded an opportunity to ad- duce evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to argue upon the facts and the law. Briefs filed by the General Counsel and by counsel for the union have been considered. For the reasons hereinafter set forth in detail, I find that the contract provision involved violates Section 8(e) of the Act and that the union's activities violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) and (B) thereof. Upon the entire record herein,2 and the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Jurisdiction Stanton, the charging party, is engaged in selling sand for use in construction work in the Albany, New York, area. He owns a sand pit and at least two trucks, which are loaded at the sand pit and driven by his employees to the construction sites of his customers where the sand is delivered by being dumped at such places as they direct. Sweet Associates, Inc., a New York corporation engaged in general construction, has the general contract for the con- struction of a mental hygiene facility for the State of New York near Schenectady. The cost of this construction is over $4 million and, in the performance of this contract, Sweet has purchased, from outside the State of New York, goods and materials valued at more than $50,000 for delivery to the site. Some of the excavating work on the site was subcontracted by Sweet to John Witte, Inc., and Sweet arranged with Stan- ton to supply the necessary sand for land fill in connection with the excavating work. Although the record contains no information concerning the interstate commerce of either Stanton or Witte, the an- swer admits the factual allegations concerning Sweet's com- merce in connection with this project and admits the conclu- sionary allegations that Witte and Stanton are "persons engaged in commerce or industries affecting commerce." On the basis of the interstate commerce involved in the project, I find that the dispute herein has a substantial impact upon interstate commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(b)(4) and 2(6) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.' The answer admits, and I find, that the union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. Background Sweet, through its membership in Eastern New York Con- struction Employers, Inc., is a party to the collective-bargain- ing contract with the union covering its truckdrivers. Witte is a direct signatory to the same contract. Relevant portions of the contract are the following: 1.... Vehicles within the jurisdiction of Truck Driv- ers Local 294 shall be manned only by teamsters.All trucks or vehicles employed in the exclusive transporta- tion of materials shall be manned under the terms of this agreement. ' The motion of the General Counsel to correct typographical errors in the transcript of record was not opposed and, by order dated July 16, 1971, it was granted. ' Local 2669, affiliated with Suffolk County District Council ofCarpen- ters, etc. (T & D Roofing Co., Inc.), 173 NLRB 1232 195 NLRB No. 75 LOCAL 294, TEAMSTERS 379 3. In hiring other trucks the Employer shall require hired trucks to be manned by employees covered by agreement with this Union, if available. Chauffeurs on such hired trucks shall receive no less favorable working conditions and wage rates than these set forth in this Agreement. The Employer agrees to set forth the forego- ing provisions in any agreement that it may make for hired trucks with an independent employer. Should such an independent employer of the chauffeurs upon any such hired trucks have a contract with this Union, such contracts shall be a fulfillment of the provisions of this paragraph, but only so far as said independent employer is concerned 9. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses to go through any picket line' 32. Subcontracting. (a) The contractor, subletting any portion of a job or work on a job site, shall, as a condition preceding such subletting, request the subcontractor to meet with the representatives of the Union for the purpose of comply- ing with the provisions of this Agreement for such work. (b) In addition, the contractor shall provide in any subcontract that the subcontractor shall conform to the terms of this Agreement insofar as wages, hours, and working conditions are concerned. (c) If it is found that the subcontractor is not comply- ing with paragraph (b) above, the Union shall give the contractor twenty-four (24) hours' notice. 3 The facts Sweet's first orders of land fill from Stanton were for deliv- ery on March 9, 1971,' and 22 loads were delivered on that day by two of Stanton's trucks without incident. Additional deliveries were requested for March 10 and at 7:30 a.m. on that day the first truckload entered the construction site, dumped its load as directed, and was leaving the site when the driver, Marshall Smith, found his way out blocked by an automobile standing on the road just inside the gate. On the opposite side of that car, and blocked by it from entering the site , was Stanton 's other truck, driven by Robert Christian. Anthony Carusone, a business agent of the union, was talking with Christian as Smith pulled up. Carusone introduced him- self to Smith and asked to see his union book. Smith answered that he had dust started driving the truck and had no book, whereupon Carusone said that if he had no book he would have to stay off the job. Carusone then asked both Smith and Christian for whom they were working. According to Smith, they both said they were working for Stanton but Carusone, claiming that Christian had previously told him the truck was his own,' started for the trailer which served as Sweet's office on the construction site, saying that he would check up on them. Both drivers followed. The only person in the trailer when they entered was Witte. Smith testified that Carusone greeted Witte by saying "what the hell are you doing?" and followed with the statements ' There is another, more elaborate, picket clause in the contract but this is the one set forth in the complaint and alleged to be violative of Section 8(e) of the Act. Respondent 's brief makes no reference to either of the clauses All dates are 1971 Christian did not testify that, while one of the two truckdrivers was union, the other was not, and that their employer had no contract with the union. Witte asked Carusone whether he should call Stanton; Carusone said he didn't care. At this time Donald Reutzel, Sweet's job superintendent, came into the trailer accom- panied by Lloyd DeLuke, the union's steward for Sweet's driver employees, and Reutzel joined in the discussion.' Ac- cording to the testimony of both Smith and Reutzel, Caru- sone told Reutzel that Stanton would have to sign a contract with the union or, if he refused, Sweet would have to put the drivers on its own payroll. Reutzel refused to put Stanton's men on Sweet's payroll, stating that one of the reasons why he had "hired the trucker" was because he did not want those men on his payroll . The suggestion was again made that Stanton be called on the telephone and Witte did so; he told Stanton that there was "a problem at the job which he would have to straighten out with the union" and he handed Caru- sone the telephone. Carusone told Stanton that he would have to sign a contract with the union and Stanton answered that he did not have to sign any contract. Carusone testified that he asked Reutzel and Witte for whom Stanton was subcontracting and that he directed the attention of both of them to certain provisions of their con- tract with the union, stating that he was giving them a "24 hour notice" as provided in it. Reutzel, however, specifically denied that Carusone made any reference to the contract and both Reutzel and Smith testified that there was no reference to subcontracting or a subcontracting clause. Based upon my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and the evidence concerning the course of this conversation, I accept the testimony of Reutzel and Smith and find that theirs was an accurate description of the conversations; that Carusone did not ask about Stanton's subcontract; that he made no reference to their contract with the union; and that he said Stanton would have to sign a contract with the union or Sweet would have to put the men on its payroll. Reutzel asked Carusone whether the second truck, which was still on the premises, might dump its load. Carusone said, according to Reutzel, that it could not; that the load would have to be taken back; and that if they "continued to haul with Stanton, that he would picket the job." With respect to picketing, Carusone testified that he said that, if Stanton would not sign a contract or if Sweet did not put the drivers on its payroll, he would "put an informational picket on the job and follow them any place they deliver." Both Reutzel and Smith testified that Carusone did not use the word "infor- mational" and that he said he would put a picket "on the gate" or "on the job." Carusone's own use, in his testimony, of the words "on the job" reinforces my conclusion that his ' The occurrences to this point are not disputed From this point forward, however, the testimony is in conflict concerning the statements made at this meeting. Reutzel and Smith testified for the General Counsel and Carusone testified for the union , Witte and the union steward, who were the others present, were not called Although Reutzel and Smith were probably in general sympathy with Stanton, they were not directly involved in this case and they appeared to be testifying to the best of their respective recollec- tions Carusone , the union 's business agent and its principal actor in this controversy, is directly interested and his testimony appeared to reflect that interest He was generally aggressive , but evasive when that seemed to suit his interests Although he testified with positiveness, and in detail , concern- ing his statements on March 10, he was unable to recall his testimony before the district court on May 7 and said that he could not even recall when it was that he testified It is also pertinent to note that Carusone was one of the principal actors for the union in the union conduct adjudicated in the Island Dock Lumber case (145 NLRB 484, enfd 342 F 2d 18), which bears several similarities to this one , and it forms part of Carusone's educational background Accordingly, where the resolution of a factual conflict requires assessment of the credibility of the witnesses , I prefer Smith and Reutzel over Carusone 380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD threat of picketing was accurately described in the testimony of Reutzel and Smith and that it did not include the word "informational." This latter word, I am convinced, and the expressed intention to limit any picketing to the immediate vicinity of the trucks, was added by Carusone in his testimony in an effort to describe permissible picketing. On the basis of all the relevant testimony, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses, I find that Carusone threatened to picket the entire project if Stanton continued to supply land fill, and that he did not limit his threat of picketing to times when Stanton's trucks or employees were on the premises. Although Stanton, during his telephone conversation with Carusone, expressed his refusal to sign a contract with the union, Witte, when he went back on the phone, nevertheless convinced Stanton to see Carusone at the union office, stating that he would arrange an appointment for him there at 10 o'clock the same morning. Smith testified that as he left the project office with Carusone and asked him how he might join the union, Carusone told him to come to the union office with Stanton to obtain a membership application. At the same time, Retuzel and Sweet's union steward also left the trailer. In accordance with this arrangement, Stanton and Smith went to the union hall shortly before 10, but only Stanton was admitted into Carusone's office. Carusone, however, had the union's secretary, Howard Bennett, with him, admittedly as a witness. Both Stanton and Carusone testified that Carusone gave Stanton a printed copy of the union's master contract with Eastern New York Construction Employers, Inc., the same contract which covers Sweet and Witte. Stanton tes- tified that he asked some questions about some of its provi- sions but Carusone said that all that was required of him was to sign the contract and thereafter to make the payments described in it, both to his employees and into the pension and other funds. According to Stanton, he answered that he did not wish to sign the contract and Carusone then stated that he would guarantee that Stanton would never work in the area again. Stanton testified that he then asked Carusone how it was that he had been able to work for other companies during the past year and a half without signing a union con- tract, stating that he "was protected as long as Mr. Robilotto' and other members of the union were getting their cut off my trucks." Carusone corroborated Stanton's testimony con- cerning the reference to Robilotto's getting a "cut" and they both testified that at that point Carusone denied the accusa- tion and told Stanton to get out of his office There is no dispute that, when Stanton did not leave, Carusone did. Stan- ton testified that he, however, remained in the office where Bennett explained some of the provisions of the contract to him. Carusone's denial that he made a statement that he would prevent Stanton from working in the area was coupled with his testimony that Stanton wanted to discuss the rental he was receiving for his trucks, while he, Carusone, insisted on confining the discussion to the men's wages and benefits On all of the evidence in this case,' as well as Carusone's demeanor while testifying, I find that Carusone said he would "guarantee" that Stanton would not work in the area. a Nicholas Robilotto is president of tie union ' Bennett, who was present at this interview, was in the courtroom with respondent's counsel during the morning session of the trial of this case when the General Counsel presented his evidence Bennett was not called as a witness , however, and was not present at the afternoon session when Carusone testified as respondent's sole witness Since Carusone testified that he kept Bennett in his office "as a witness," respondent's failure to call Bennett justifies an inference that his testimony would have been in conflict with that of Carusone The following morning , Reutzel testified, Carusone tele- phoned him at the construction site and asked whether Stan- ton was still making deliveries and that he answered that there was nobody hauling for Sweet. He also testified that he said he was looking for someone for that purpose and asked Carusone for suggestions, whereupon Carusone, after men- tioning a couple of names, said that anyone having a contract with the union was acceptable to him. Later that day, after talking to Witte, Stanton returned to the union hall: he was ready, he testified, to sign the union contract. Carusone made him wait a while but finally saw him and Stanton said he would sign the contract if he could have a few questions answered . He testified that he asked Carusone about contract provisions covering the shop steward and the status of men he then had working for him, that Carusone answered that the men in his employ would have to be dis- charged, that the union would assign him two other men, one of whom, the shop steward, would be a permanent employee who, when there was no other work, could wash the trucks.10 Stanton further testified that he told Carusone that under that arrangement he would go bankrupt and that he could not see "laying off two good men to satisfy his (Carusone's) needs" and that Carusone thereupon told him to leave. Carusone admitted that Stanton told him he was there to sign a con- tract. He denied, however, that he discussed anything with Stanton but, on the contrary, testified that he immediately referred Stanton to the union's president, Robilotto. Stan- ton's testimony does not mention any reference by Carusone to the contract provision footnoted immediately above, but its terms make plausible the statement attributed to Carusone by Stanton and I have no reason to question the credibility of Stanton as a witness. Rejecting Carusone' s denial, I find that the conversation occurred as Stanton testified and that it reinforced and reiterated the union's demand that Stanton sign a contract with it. Stanton testified, without objection, that when he left Caru- sone after this second visit to the union office, he told Reutzel that he could not come to terms with the union and asked "in what way" he could continue working on the job; that Reut- zel answered that the job was going "nice and smooth"; that he couldn't "afford any union problems"; and that he "wouldn't be able to use me." Despite the issuance of a temporary injunction by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on May 7, 1971, Stanton has made no further deliveries to the construction site. 4. The issues On the basis of the foregoing facts, the General Counsel contends: (i) The clause of the proposed contract protecting em- ployees' refusal to cross picket lines contravenes Section 8(e) of the Act; the union's conduct (a) in inducing Stanton's employees to refrain from making deliveries, (b) in inducing the employees of Sweet to refuse to han- dle Stanton's sand," and (c) in threatening to picket the construction site if Stanton continued to deliver, had an object of forcing Stanton to sign that contract and, there- fore, it thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (u)(A) of the Act ° Section 10, subsection 4, of the contract provides that Job steward of the prime contractor engaged in the work of teamsters shall remain employed whenever there is work for a teamster on the job While the memorandum of law submitted by the General Counsel does not argue that the record shows inducement of Sweet's employees, the complaint alleges such inducement, and the subject will be treated herein LOCAL 294, TEAMSTERS (ii) The union's inducement of Sweet's employees and its threat to picket the construction site, if Stanton con- tinued to deliver, also had an object of forcing and re- quiring Sweet and Witte to cease doing business with Stanton and the union thereby violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. The union contends that its conduct was not directed at forcing Stanton to sign a contract and that its conduct did not constitute either inducement of employees to refuse to per- form services or coercion to force Sweet and Witte to cease doing business with Stanton. It also contends that its actions with respect to Sweet and Witte were to persuade them to comply with their contract and that the work of Stanton was "on-site" construction work exempted from the provisions of Section 8(e). From these conflicting contentions, it appears that the decision of this case depends upon determination of the fol- lowing questions: i. Does the picket line clause of the contract contravene Section 8(e)7 ii.Was the work of Stanton covered by the "on-site" construction proviso of Section 8(e)? in Did the union's conduct constitute inducement of employees and coercion of employers? iv. If so, did the union have as objects thereof (a) forcing Stanton to sign the contract, and (b) forcing Sweet and Witte to cease doing business with Stanton? 5. Discussion and conclusions a. The picket line provision There is no reference, in respondent's brief, to the picket line provision or its validity under Section 8(e) of the Act, although the complaint sets forth the provision verbatim and alleges it to be unlawful under that section. The union by- passes the point by arguing that the record shows it did not demand the signing of a contract by Stanton and that, in any event, the picket line provision was proper under the "on- site" construction proviso in that section. Accordingly, re- spondent's failure to argue the validity of the provision can- not be regarded as a concession of its invalidity. Since, however, both of these arguments must be rejected on the basis of the resolution of underlying factual questions, the legitimacy of the picket line provision must be determined. It is now beyond dispute that Section 8(e) was enacted in aid of the secondary boycott provisions of Section 8(b)(4) and to close the so-called "Sand Door" loophole that had devel- oped in them.12 In conformity with this legislative purpose, it has been held that contract provisions cast in terms of pro- tecting the rights of employees who refuse to cross picket lines are nevertheless unlawful to the extent that they immu- nize action by employees which is really action designed to support union conduct made unlawful by Section 8(b)(4).'3 It is apparent that the contract provision involved in this case, in immunizing from discipline or discharge "an em- ployee (who) refuses to go through any picket line," would support secondary action and that, therefore, it contravenes Section 8(e) of the Act 14 American Feed Company, 133 NLRB 214 Truck Drivers Union Loca1413, etc (ThePatton Warehouse, Inc), 140 NLRB 1474 Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union No 728, etc (Brown Transport Corp), 140 NLRB 1436, enfd in part 334 F 2d 539 (C A D C), Truck Drivels Local No 696, etc. (Freeto Construction Co., Inc), 149 NLRB 23 " Local 559, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc (Anopolsky & Sons, Inc), 145 NLRB 722 381 b. "The on-site" proviso of Section 8(e) The so-called "on-site" proviso of Section 8(e) reads as follows: Provided, that nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work .... The record shows that Stanton was expected, in delivering land fill to the project, to dump it at the places and in the quantities specified by Sweet or Witte. Smith testified that he and Christian had delivered 22 loads on March 9; that his instructions were to dump it as directed ; and that he dumped the fill, sometimes part loads and sometimes full loads, at five or six different places. On the basis of this evidence the union argues that Stanton was doing "on-site" work which falls within the quoted proviso. The argument must be rejected. In the Island Dock Lumber case," the respondent herein, acting through Caru- sone and Robilotto, prevented the lumber company from delivering ready-mixed concrete to a construction site. The record showed that the drivers left the lumberyard for the 14-mile drive to the site with dry loads of cement, sand, gravel, and aggregate and two tanks of water; that the specifi- cations called for a 3-minute mix and the drivers did not mix the materials with the water during the drive because of a fear of breakdowns but that, on the site, the mixing was accom- plished by the driver setting the mixer agitator in motion by the use of a lever The liquid concrete was then delivered as directed by employees on the site, into forms, into chutes, or into cement buckets. The union argued in that case that the work was "on site" work but the Board rejected the argu- ment, stating, on page 491, that: The pouring of the concrete is the essence of and consti- tutes the actual delivery because liquid concrete, by its very nature, cannot be dumped on the ground at the construction site like other materials. and citing the portion of the legislative history of the 1959 amendment to the Act," crucial to this point, which states that: The proviso does not exempt from section 8(e) agree- ments relating to supplies or other products or materials shipped or otherwise transported to and delivered on the site of the construction. The union, now conceding that there was no "on-site" work being performed in the Island Dock case, nevertheless here contends that Stanton was doing work on the site that others would have done if Stanton had not performed the work. Stan- ton was not a simple supplier who dumped the supplies on the site and left. Witte directed each and every move, and there were many in the only day the job was done. This argument attempts to make much of very little; the record shows that Stanton was, in fact, a "simple supplier" and that the only function performed by employees of Witte or Sweet was to tell Stanton's drivers where to dump part or all of the loads of sand. There is no evidence that any of the fill, once dumped, was again touched by a Stanton employee. As stated by Trial Examiner Myers, in the Reynolds Electric case-11 " International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc, Local 294 (Island Dock Lumber, Inc), 145 NLRB 484, enfd 342 F 2d 18 (CA 2) " H Conf Rept 1147, 86th Cong, p 39, reprinted in I Leg Hist 943 (1959) " Teamsters, etc., Local Union No 631 (Reynolds Electric and Engineer- ing Co., inc), 154 NLRB 67, fn 45 382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The underscored words ["transported to and deliv- ered on" in the House Conference Report footnoted above] indicate that Congress had in mind the total pro- cess of delivering materials . Thus, the fact that some portion of a continuous delivery takes place on the job- site would not qualify that final segment as construction site work. and the Board expressly affirmed his finding by its statement, on page 70, that: ... the Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the work of delivering materials, products, and supplies to the Nevada Test Site is not construction work to be performed at the construction site. Accordingly, I find that Stanton's work at the construction site constituted merely a delivery of materials and supplies and that it was not work at the site of construction exempted from Section 8(e) by the "on-site" proviso. c. The inducement of employees and coercion of employers There is no dispute that the union's first action in this controversy was taken by Carusone on March 10 when he physically prevented Stanton's driver, Christian, from driv- ing his loaded truck onto the construction site. Shortly there- after, Carusone testified he asked Smith whether he had a book and, upon being told by Smith that he did not, said: "If you don't have a book you can't work here " With respect to Stanton's drivers, therefore, it is beyond doubt that Carusone took steps to prevent Christian and to dissuade Smith from performing services for their employer. To say that this conduct did not "induce or encourgae" Smith and Christian to refuse to perform services is to utter a rank absurdity. As the Supreme Court stated, over 20 years ago: The words "induce or encourage" are broad enough to include in them every form of influence and persusaion.1I The action and the participants then moved into the trailer office of Sweet. The record shows that, after Reutzel joined the group with his employee, DeLuke, the union steward, Reutzel asked Carusone whether the second truck, which was still on the site, might dump its load and that Carusone said that it could not, that it would have to be taken back and that, if Stanton continued to haul for Sweet, he would "picket the job." This statement of Carusone, in the presence of Stanton's drivers, particularly Christian who was a member of the un- ion, could not have failed to carry the message that Stanton's drivers were not to perform further services in bringing addi- tional loads to the site. With respect to DeLuke, who was one of Sweet's employees and the union's steward on the job, the statement also constituted inducement, which was directed at him, to refuse to perform services for his employer if Stanton continued to bring land fill to the site." Furthermore, Reutzel brought DeLuke with him because he was the union steward, and there is no doubt that any statement or request by Caru- sone, the union's business agent , was expected and intended by him to be carried by the steward to the other employee members of the union on the job.20 Accordingly, I find that Carusone's direction that Stan- ton's truck be not unloaded but taken back, and his threat to picket the job if Stanton continued to supply land fill, con- stituted inducement of both Stanton's and Sweet's employees to refuse to perform services for their respective employers. " International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v NLRB., 341 U S 694, 701-703 " See Local299, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc (American Motor Lines, Inc), 161 NLRB 672, Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc (Strauss Paper Co, Inc), 149 NLRB 49, 56 '° See N.L R B v Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Van Transport Lines, Inc.), 298 F 2d 105 (C A 2) As found, Carusone threatened both Sweet's superinten- dent and Witte, personally, that the jobsite would be picketed if Stanton continued to supply land fill . Also as found above, when Stanton went to Carusone's office at 10 a.m. the same day to discuss the signing of a contract, Carusone said that he would "guarantee" that Stanton, if he failed to sign the contract, would not work any longer in the area. These state- ments constituted threats and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act. d. The objects of the union 's activities With the rejection of Carusone's testimony that his conver- sation with Reutzel and Witte was concerned solely with calling their attention to the subcontracting clause in the contract and the acceptance of the testimony of Reutzel and Smith that he threatened to picket the job if Stanton con- tinued to bring in land fill, it is clear, and I find, that an object of the union's conduct was to compel Sweet to cease doing business with Stanton. The union contends that Carusone's suggestion that Sweet put Stanton's employees on its own payroll shows that it was not the union's object to compel Stanton to enter into the contract in effect with Eastern New York Construction Em- ployers. It is true, as Reutzel testified, that Carusone made that suggestion and that Reutzel rejected it. It is also true, however, that it was only offered as an alternative to Caruso- ne's first demand that Stanton sign the contract. Further- more, as Stanton testified, both of his interviews at the union hall were devoted to discussions about the contract and Carusone's major contribution consisted of the statement that all Stanton had to do was to sign the contract and make the payments required by it. It clearly appears, and I find, that at least "an" object of the union's activities was to force or require Stanton to enter into the union's form of contract, which contains a clause prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. e. Conclusion With the appropriate issues determined as set forth above, I conclude that the union induced and encouraged employees of Stanton and Sweet to refuse to perform services, and threatened Stanton, Sweet, and Witte. While these actions may have had several objects, including those stated by the union, they did also include (i) forcing Stanton to enter into a contract containing a provision prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act and (ii) forcing Sweet and Witte to cease doing business with Stanton. The presence of these objects rendered the union's activities violative of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) and (B) of the Act. 6. The effect of the unfair labor practices upon commerce The activities of respondent set forth in sections 3 and 5, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Sweet, Witte, and Stanton, described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. 7. The remedy Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) and (B) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de- signed to remedy the unfair labor practices and otherwise effectuate the policies of the Act. LOCAL 294, TEAMSTERS 383 The General Counsel, noting the proclivity of the respond- ent union to commit unfair labor practices like those involved herein, requests a "broad order" but fails to set forth, in detail, the provisions he considers appropriate in such order. There can be no dispute that Local 294, the respondent herein , has been one of the labor organizations most often found, by the Board and the courts, to have violated these provisions of the Act. Furthermore, the facts in the Island Dock Lumber Co. case were almost identical with those herein and the Board , in that case noting respondent 's claims with respect to vehicles coming onto the construction site, issued an order prohibiting respondent from: [T]hreatening, coercing or restraining A. S. Wikstrom . or any other person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce ... where an object ... is either (a) to force or require any person to enter into an agreement which is prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act, or (b) to force or require any person to cease doing business with Island Dock Lumber, Inc., or any other person. [Emphasis supplied.] This order was enforced by the court of appeals. The issuance of a broad order in this case is certainly justified and will be recommended but unless , in the future , measures additional to, and different from, mere issuance of the usual "broad order" are pursued by the Board, the General Counsel, or those affected by respondent's conduct, the union is likely to continue to amass "broad orders " against it without discon- tinuing its exhibitions of disdain for these sections of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record herein, I reach the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen & Helpers of America , is a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5), 8(b )(4), and 8(e) of the Act. 2. Sweet Associates , Inc., John Witte , Inc., and Clemence D. Stanton , doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., are employers or persons engaged in interstate commerce, or in any industry affecting commerce , within the meaning of Sections 2(6), 8(b)(4), and 8(e) of the Act. 3. The provision , which is included in respondent 's form of contract and reads as follows: 9. It shall not be violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses to go through any picket line. is a contract prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. 4. The delivery of land fill by Stanton to the construction site of the mental hygiene facility for the State of New York does not constitute work to be done at the site of construction within the meaning of the first proviso of Section 8(e) of the Act. 5. By inducing or encouraging employees of Stanton and Sweet to engage in strikes, or refusals in the course of their employment to perform services , with an object of forcing or requiring Stanton to enter into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e), respondent has engaged in an unfair labor prac- tice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(A) of the Act. 6. By threatening , coercing, and restraining Stanton, Sweet , and Witte , with an object of forcing or requiring Stan- ton to enter into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e), respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii )(A) of the Act. 7. By inducing and encouraging employees of Sweet to engage in strikes, or refusals in the course of their employ- ment to perform services , with an object of forcing said em- ployer and other persons to cease doing business with Stanton and with each other , respondent has engaged in, and is engag- ing in , an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the Act. 8. By threatening , coercing , and restraining Sweet and Witte with an object of requiring them to cease doing business with each other and with Stanton , respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, an unfair labor practice within the mean- ing of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended.21 ORDER Respondent, Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America , its officers , agents , and representatives , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging individuals employed by Sweet Associates, Inc., Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other employer , to engage in, strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials , or commodities, or to perform any services, where any object thereof is to force or require Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other employer, to enter into a contract or agreement which is prohibited by Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (b) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other employer or person engaged in commerce, with an object of forcing or requiring them, or any of them, to enter into a contract or agreement which is prohibited by Section 8(e) of the said Act. (c) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging individuals employed by Sweet Associates, Inc., or any other employer, to engage in, strikes or refusals in the course of their employ- ment to process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials , or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other person, to cease doing business with Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other per- son. (d) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Sweet Asociates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other employer or person en- gaged in commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other person, to cease doing business with Clemence D. Stanton, or any other person. 2. Take the following affirmative action, hereby found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and cancel any outstanding orders or direc- tions inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this recommended Order. (b) Post at the Respondent's business offices, meeting halls, and other places in the Albany, New York, area where no- tices to numbers are customarily posted, copies of the at- " In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tached notice marked "Appendix."22 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail signed copies of the notice to the Regional Direc- tor for Region 3, for posting by Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., and Clemence D. Stanton, said employers or persons being willing, at all locations where notices to their employees are customarily posted. (d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith.23 " In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" shall be changed to read "POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN OR- DER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD " " In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions read "Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a trial at which all parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argument, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has decided that we violated the law by commit- ting certain unfair labor practices and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend to carry out the order of the Board and abide by the following: WE WILL NOT engage in a strike, or induce or encour- age any employee of Sweet Associates, Inc., Clemence D Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other person engaged in commerce, to en- gage in a strike or to refuse, in the course of his employ- ment, to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other- wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; and WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce; where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or any other employer, to enter into an agreement which is prohibited by Section 8(e) of the Act. WE WILL NOT engage in a strike, or induce or encour- age any employee of Sweet Associates, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce, to engage in a strike or to refuse, in the course of his employment, to use, manufac- ture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials , or commodities or to per- form any services; and WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any person, to cease doing business with Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., or with any other person. WE DO HEREBY withdraw and cancel any orders and directions heretofore issued by us inconsistent with the above commitments and we hereby notify our members that we have no objection to their full performance of their duties regardless of any business arrangement be- tween Clemence D. Stanton, doing business as Rexford Sand and Gravel Co., and Sweet Associates, Inc., John Witte, Inc., or any other person, and regardless of whether said Clemence D. Stanton has entered into a collective-bargaining contract with us. LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA (Labor Organization) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Resident Office, Seventh Floor, Drislane Building, 60 Chapel Street, Albany, New York 12207, Telephone 518-472-2215.