Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 28, 1974

210 N.L.R.B. 943 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

LOCAL 106, GLASS BOTTLE BLOWERS
Local No. 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Association,
AFL-CIO (Owens-Illinois, Inc.) and Local No. 245,
Glass Bottle Blowers Association , AFL-CIO
(Owens-Illinois , Inc.) and Virgie Walters. Cases
9-CB-2143-1 and 9-CB-2143-2
May 28, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 29, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Bernard J. Seff issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, counsel for the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
Respondents filed a brief in support of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decis' on in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
only to the extent consistent herewith.
The complaint alleged that Respondents violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining locals whose
membership is determined solely by sex, and by
refusing employees membership and refusing to
process grievances solely because of sex; and
violated Section 8(b)(2) by attempting to cause the
Employer to discriminate against its employees solely
because of their sex; and their nonmembership in
each of Respondents, respectively.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the
existence of separate locals whose membership is
determined solely by sex is not a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and the failure to process
grievances on the basis of sex is not a violation of
8(b)(1)(A).i We do not agree.
Respondents, Local No. 106 and Local No. 245,
serve as joint bargaining representatives for the
Employer's production and maintenance employees.
Respondents stipulated that Local No. 106 and
Local No. 245 restrict their membership and process-
ing of grievances to male and female unit members,
respectively.
In 1945 Local No. 106 represented all machine
operators (machine operator positions were limited
to men only), Local 245 represented female employ-
ees in miscellaneous job categories, and Local No.
244 represented male employees in miscellaneous job
categories. In 1949 the International Union, the
Glass Bottle Blowers Association, AFL-CIO, was
certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining
I Although the Administrative Law Judge made no specific findings as
to the allegation in the complaint that Respond,-,,ts %tolated Sec 8(b)(2) by
attempting to cause the Employer to disco-moat.' . -1 3 , employees
solely because of their sex and their nonmomb.,:, r in cach of Respon-
dents , he did recommend that the complaint be cosi d in its entirety
2 The parties stipulated that 50 to 60 percent of all job categories are
210 NLRB No. 131
943
representative of a unit consisting of production and
maintenance employees. Later in 1949 Local No. 106
and Local No. 244 were merged into Local No. 106
representing all male employees, and Local No. 245
continued representing all female employees.
In 1968-69 Respondents and the Employer agreed
to eliminate sexual discrimination and open all job
categories to both sexes.2
However, the locals remained segregated by sex
and also continued restricting their handling and
investigation of grievances by sex.
The present collective-bargaining contract was
negotiated by a joint bargaining committee compris-
ing representatives of both Locals and the Interna-
tional and was ratified at anoint membership meeting
of both Locals. The contract, which includes a
union-security clause, does not discriminate and does
not distinguish between male and female or between
members of Local No. 106 and Local No. 245. The
contract's grievance-arbitration machinery is open
equally to members of both Locals and unit members
of both sexes. However, female employees must have
their grievances investigated and handled by Local
No. 245 and male employees must have their
grievances investigated and handled by Local No.
106.3 A grievance affects both female and male
employees regardless of which Local processes the
grievance.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dents' restriction of their memberships on the basis
of sex and refusal to process the grievances of
employees solely because of their sex did not violate
Section 8(b)(1)(A). He found that this conduct did
not result in the kind of invidious treatment and
derogation of employment status that interferes with
the Section 7 rights of employees, because all unit
employees had equal access to a union, the contract
does not distinguish between sexes and was jointly
negotiated and ratified, all jobs are open to both
sexes, and all employees regardless of sex or local
membership have equal access to grievance-arbitra-
tion machinery.
In effect, he found that the male and female
employees received equal, although separate, treat-
ment, and therefore there was no violation.
We cannot accept this reasoning. Separate but
equal treatment on the basis of sex is as self-
contradictory as separate but equal on the basis of
race.4 In both areas separation in and of itself
connotes and creates inequalities. Not only can
separating females from males solely because of sex
filled by both men and women
3 The two Locals have informally adopted this procedure, their
constitutions and the contract do not specify which Local must process a
grievance
4 Cf Bro- v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, in which the Supreme
Court held that c.:regation of children in public schools solely on the basis
of race was "inherently unequal "
944 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
generate a feeling of inferiority among the females as
to their work status, since the policy of separation is
usually interpreted as reflecting the inferiority of the
females, but also it can, as set forth below, adversely
affect the working conditions of both groups solely
because of the difference in sex.
For example, since , as mentioned previously, a
grievance affects both male and female employees
regardless of which Local processes the grievance,
the employees whose Local did not process a
grievance merely because of the grievant's sex are
nonetheless bound by the outcome of the other
Local's processing of the grievance. These employees
have therefore, solely because of sex, been denied a
voice in the resolution of matters affecting their
working conditions.
Indeed, Respondent's sexual discrimination serves
no useful purpose. The collective-bargaining agree-
ment applies equally to all employees and makes no
distinctions based on sex or local memberships. All
jobs are open to both sexes. There are, thus, no
special circumstances to justify the separate process-
ing of grievances or the maintenance of separate
locals.
Accordingly, we find that Respondents by main-
taining locals whose memberships are restricted by
sex and by refusing to process grievances because of
the sex of the employees and their nonmembership in
each of Respondents, respectively, restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.5
General Counsel argues that Respondents by
attempting to cause the Employer to discriminate
against its employees solely because of the sex of the
employees and their nonmembership in each of
Respondents , respectively, have violated Section
8(b)(2) of the Act.
Section 8(b)(2) is violated when a union causes or
attempts to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3).
Respondents' discrimination based on the sex of
the employees did not cause or attempt to cause the
Employer to engage in any activity, much less to
discriminate against its employees, in violation of
Section 8(a)(3). Accordingly, we find that Respon-
dents have not violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local No. 106 and Local No. 245, by maintain-
ing locals whose memberships were determined
solely by sex, restrained and coerced employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 right to be represented
by a representative of their choosing, thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of
Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local No. 106 and Local No. 245, by separate-
ly processing the grievances of male and female unit
members and by refusing to process grievances
because of the unit members' sex, restrained and
coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7
right to be represented by a representative of their
own choosing, thereby engaging in unfair labor
practices in violation of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, they shall be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Accordingly, Respondents shall be ordered to cease
and desist from maintaining locals whose member-
ships are determined solely by sex, from separately
processing the grievances of male and female
employees, and from refusing to process grievances
because of the unit members' sex. Respondents shall
be ordered to merge their respective locals, to admit
into membership any unit employee without regard
to sex, and to process the grievance of any unit
member without regard to sex.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Na.ional Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby orders
that Respondents, Local No. 106, Glass Bottle
Blowers Association, AFL-CIO, and Local No. 245,
Glass Bottle Blowers Association, AFL-CIO, Co-
lumbus, Ohio, their officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act by maintaining locals whose
membership is determined solely by sex, by separate-
ly processing the grievances of male and female unit
members, and by refusing to process grievances
because of the unit members' sex.
5 Chairman Miller would make clear that he views the violation herein as
arising out of Respondent' s failure fairly to represent the employees , in that
separate but allegedly equal representation is not fair representation, as the
Chairman understands the meaning of that term as used in Miranda Fuel
Company, Inc, 140 NLRB 181, and Local No 12, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO ( The Business League of
Gadsden), 150 NLRB 312, enfd 368 F 2d 12 (C A 5, 1966 ), cert denied 389
U S 837 (1967) Although a majority of the Board , including the Chairman,
held, in Jubilee Manufacturing Company, 202 NLRB No 2, that employer
discrimination on account of sex does not per se violate Sec 8(axl), there
was no union respondent and thus no issue of fair representation posed in
that case As his Board said in Miranda, supra, at p 185, " labor
organizations , because they do represent employees , have statutory
obligations to employees which employers do not "
LOCAL 106, GLASS BOTTLE BLOWERS
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Merge their respective locals.
(b) Upon request, allow into membership any unit
member without regard to sex.
(c) Upon request, process the grievance of any unit
member without regard to sex.
(d) Post at their business office and meeting hall
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly
signed by Respondents authorized representatives,
shall be posted by them immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted (including all such places in the Owens-
Illinois plant). Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondents to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to
the Regional Director for Region 9, for posting by
Owens-Illinois, Inc., if willing, at all locations in its
place of business where notices to its employees are
customarily posted.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps they have taken to comply herewith.
MEMBER PENELLO , concurring:
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that
Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
by separately processing the grievances of male and
female unit members and by refusing to process
grievances because of the unit members' sex. I also
concur in their finding that the existence of separate
locals whose membership is determined solely on the
basis of sex, under the particular circumstances of
this case, is a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
However, I base my findings solely on my view that,
unlike the situation in Jubilee Manufacturing Compa-
ny, 202 NLRB No. 2, here there is an actual nexus
between the discriminatory conduct and interference
with, and restraint of, employees in the exercise of
rights protected under the Act. Thus, there is a direct
relationship between the separate processing of
grievances of male unit members and female unit
members and refusing to process grievances because
of the unit members' sex and interference with the
employees' Section 7 right to have a voice in the
processing of grievances whose outcome can ulti-
mately affect employee terms and conditions of
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
945
employment. Similarly, there is a nexus in the
circumstances of this case between the existence of
separate locals whose membership is determined
solely on the basis of sex and interference with
employees' Section 7 rights, for if there were not
separate locals there would have been no separate
processing of grievances in the first place.
Finally, I agree with the majority that Respondents
have not violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act because
the discrimination based on the sex of the employees
did not cause or attempt to cause the Employer to
discriminate against its employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(3).
MEMBER JENKINS, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I join with my colleagues in finding that Respon-
dents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
maintaining locals whose memberships were deter-
mined solely by sex and by separately processing the
grievances of male and female unit members and by
refusing to process grievances because of the unit
members' sex.
However, the majority finds that Respondents have
not violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act because the
discrimination based on the sex of the employees did
not cause or attempt to cause the Employer to
discriminate against its employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(3). I disagree.
In Miranda Fuel Company, Inc.,7 the Board held
that it is a violation of Section 8(b)(2) when, for
arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an
unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or
does cause an employer to derogate the employment
status of an employee, and that "union membership
is encouraged or discouraged whenever a union
causes an employer to affect an individual's employ-
ment status."
It is self-evident that the maintenance of separate
locals discourages union membership and the main-
tenance of "separate but equal" locals is discrimina-
tory because separation for arbitrary and invidious
reasons inherently connotes and creates inequality.8
By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement
with the aforesaid separate locals, the Employer
participates in that discrimination, and Respondents
violated Section 8(b)(2) by causing the Employer to
discriminate against its employees.
Finally, the majority finds that Respondents
refused to process gnevances for discriminatory
reasons. It follows that the Employer, by entering
into the collective-bargaining agreement, which
National Labor Relations Board."
r 140 NLRB 181
8 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483
946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
includes the grievance provisions which discriminate
on the basis of sex, further discriminates against
employees, and therefore the Respondents' failure to
investigate and process grievances in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner also violates Section 8(b)(2).9
MEMBER KENNEDY, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I agree with the conclusion of my colleagues that
Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I
do so only because Respondents separately proc-
essed the grievances of men and women based upon
the sex of the employees.
It is undisputed that the International is the
certified bargaining representative. All grievances
filed on behalf of male employees are handled by
Local No. 106, as the agent of the International, and
all female grievances are handled by Local No. 245.
The settlement of a grievance by either Local No.
106 or Local No. 245 may be applied to both men
and women employees in the bargaining unit. Denial
of a voice to those who may be affected by the
settlement of a grievance is an interference with
Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I agree that the
resolution of employee grievances by the two Locals
based on sex violates 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
I do not agree, however, with my colleagues that
the maintenance of separate locals for men and
women violates either Section 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2) of
our Act. As noted by the majority, the collective-
bargaining agreement applies equally to all employ-
ees and makes no distinction based on sex or local
membership. All jobs are open to both sexes. In
either 1968 or 1969 the Employer, the International
Union, and the two Local Unions eliminated all
distinctions in job assignments based on sex. They
agreed to the merger of seniority lists combining both
sexes on a single list and further agreed that all jobs
would be filled without regard to sex. General
Counsel concedes that since 1969 all job openings
have been filled on the basis of competitive bidding
without regard to the sex of the employees. Article 45
of the most recent collective-bargaining agreement
provides that "There shall be no discrimination by
either the Company or the Union against any
employee because of rack creed, color, sex, or
national origin in the administration and application
of the contract." (Emphasis supplied.) There is no
evidence showing any distinction having been made
in the employment relationship based on sex other
than the grievance handling discussed above.
In Jubilee Manufacturing Company, 202 NLRB No.
2, a majority of this Board ruled that discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
standing alone is not inherently destructive of
employees ' Section 7 rights. We said that there must
be actual evidence , as opposed to speculation, of a
nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct
and the interference with, or restraint of, employees
in the exercise of those rights protected by the Act.
We respectfully disagreed with the views of the
United States Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia in United Packinghouse, Food and Allied
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B.,
416 F.2d 1126 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 903
(1969).
It seems to me that the decision of the majority in
the instant case is contrary to our decision in
Jubilee.10 Contrary to my colleagues , I would not
find that the mere maintenance of separate locals is
per se violative of Section 8(b)(l)(A). Such conduct
may be a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,11 but I do not perceive it to be an unfair
labor practice under our statute.
Therefore, I am not persuaded that the separate
locals for men and women warrant findings of
8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(2) violations of the Act.
9 Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. I (Hughes Tool Company),
147 NLRB 1573 at 1605
10 The majority decision herein also appears to me to be at odds with the
Board's recent decisions in American Mailing Corporation, 197 NLRB No.
33, and Washington Sheraton Corporation 1/a Sheraton Park Hotel & Motor
Inn, 199 NLRB No 104 We rejected the contention in both of those cases
that a local union, segregated on the basis of sex , should not be permitted to
participate in a Board election
i i Sec 703(cX2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , as amended , 42 U.S.C. $
2000e-2(c)(2), provides
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to
limit, segregate or classify its membership . in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee because of such individual's
sex
I believe that Congress has entrusted enforcement of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. While
enforcement of our Act should not conflict with other Federal labor laws or
policies, we should not usurp the functions of other Agencies
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT maintain locals whose member-
ships are determined by sex.
WE WILL NOT refuse to process grievances of
unit employees because of the sex of the employ-
ee.
WE WILL NOT separately process the grievances
of male and female unit employees.
WE WILL merge our respective locals.
WE WILL allow into membership any unit
member without regard to sex.
WE WILL process the grievance of any unit
member without regard to sex.
LOCAL 106, GLASS BOTTLE BLOWERS 947
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees of Owens-Illinois,
Inc., in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL No. 106, GLASS
BOTTLE BLOWERS
ASSOCIATION , AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
LOCAL No. 245 , GLASS
BOTTLE BLOWERS
ASSOCIATION , AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In 1949, the parent international union, the Glass Bottle
Association of the United States and Canada, entered into
a contract with the Owens-Illinois Company. From the
outset of the contractual relationship there have been two
separate Locals which serviced the agreement. Local 106
which confines its membership only to men. Local 245
confines its membership only to women. There are
approximately 800 male employees and approximately 370
female employees.
The successive contracts are negotiated:
... by and between the Glass Bottle Blowers
Association of the United States and Canada, on
behalf of itself as the International Union and as Agent
for and on behalf of Locals 106 and 245 . . . (the
contract) is hereby approved, accepted and signed by
the representative of the International Union, repre-
sentative of Locals 106 and 245. . . .
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 2407,
550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone
513-684-3686.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BERNARD J . SEFF, Administrative Law Judge: This
matter was heard in Columbus, Ohio, on October 18,
1972.1 The consolidated complaint issued on July 26 based
on charges filed on February 7. In sum the charges allege
that both Locals have refused to admit unit employees to
membership or to process their grievances solely because
of the sex of the employees, in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Respondents' answers deny the
commission of any unfair labor practices alleged, but
admit allegations of the complaint sufficient to support the
assertion of jurisdiction under current standards of the
Board (gross outflow volume of business in excess of
$50,000 annually). The answer further admits that the
Union involved is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Upon the entire record in the case, from my observation
of the witnesses , and after due consideration of the briefs
submitted by the parties to this proceeding, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge makes the following:
There is only one unit and it covers all the employees
described in it as "hourly paid employees" regardless of the
sex of the members.
B. The Facts
Respondent Union, in its brief, is at pains to point out
the following salient facts all of which are supported by the
record:
(1) In negotiations for collective bargaining con-
tracts the Union is represented by the International
Union and committees of both locals. The bargaining
sessions are joint affairs equally participated in by both
Locals and the International Union.
(2) There is a single seniority list covering all the job
classifications of all the employees in the unit.
(3) In the event there is a departmental dispute
concerning, for example, an overtime problem, when
the matter is settled all the affected employees (both
men and women) are compensated with the same
amount of pay. This is so whether the grievance is
initiated by a male or female employee.
(4) All employees whatever their sex are equally
entitled and do avail themselves of the full grievance
procedure.
(5) At and after the second step of the grievance
procedure both locals exchange memoranda of the
meetings held on the matter.
(6) The Company's labor relations director testified
that while there is no contractual prohibition prevent-
ing representatives of both Locals to be present at the
processing of grievances as a matter of past practice
such attendance has not occurred. The Employer has
no objection to joint presence it just has not happened.
(7) Both presidents of the locals testified that they
I All events took place in 1972 unless otherwise indicated
948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
frequently consult with each other on problems that
have been brought to their attention.
(8) After a contract has been negotiated ratification
takes place by both Locals in anoint meeting.
Janet Coleman, president of Local 245, testified that the
women do not want to be melded into one huge local for
fear of losing their identity since the men outnumber the
women by more than two to one . As she put it, the women
do not want to lose their "clout."
C. The Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel appears to proceed on the theory
that the mere existence of separate locals whose member-
ship is determined solely on sex is a per se violation of the
Act.
The Respondent Union takes the position that there is
no authority for the General Counsel's theory that the case
is one of first impression and further that absent a showing
of invidious discrimination based on sex there is no
violation of the Act.
The General Counsel argues that the Hughes Tool Case,
147 NLRB 1573, which involved the existence of a white
and black local, is analagous to the case at bar. The
gravamen of that case was that the union failed to process
the grievance of a black man, Ivory Davis.
The facts in Hughes Tool are not the same as the case at
bar and therefore the citation is not apposite.
I am persuaded by the rationale of Respondent Union as
set forth in its brief:
. .. the cases teach us that there must be invidious
treatment and derogation of the employment status of
employees that interferes with the Section 7 rights of
those employees, (see Miranda Fuel Co., 51 LRRM
1584). . . . Nowhere was there any indication that
results of the grievance machinery were invidious. It
mattered not, on the basis of this record , which local
union processed a given grievance.
My research did not reveal a complaint case decided by
the Board in which a union was found to have discriminat-
ed against an employee because of sex. However, in the
recent representation case of Washington Sheraton Corpora-
tion t/a Sheraton Park Hotel & Motor Inn, 199 NLRB No.
104, decided on October 13, 1972, the employer alleges the
intervenor should be denied the opportunity to seek
certification in that it unlawfully engaged in discrimination
because it separately classifies and segregates male and
female members and employees. In that case the Board
held:
In our opinion , the evidence adduced at the hearing
fails to support the Employer's claim that the Interve-
nor engages in unlawful sex discrimination... .
However, it is well established that certification of a
union does not give it license to engage in discriminato-
ry practices. Accordingly, any certification which may
eventuate as a result of this Decision is subject to
revocation upon a showing that the certified represent-
ative has not complied with its statutory duties relative
to equal representation of all employees in the unit.2
While the record in the instant case , contains no
evidence that either local discriminates against employees
in the unit because of sex, if such an event should occur in
the future the Board would revoke the certification of such
a union . Having noted the Board 's assurance of revoking
the certification of the Union in the event of any future
violation based on sex discrimination and the further fact
that the record in the instant case is devoid of any
violations of the Act I recommend that the case be
dismissed.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
2 American Mailing Corporation, 197 NLRB 246