Litton Industrial Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 14, 1975

221 N.L.R.B. 700 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

700 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Litton Dental Products Division of Litton Industrial
Products, Inc. and Warehouse, Industrial & Serv-
ice, Employees Union, Local 752. Cases 8-CA-
8830 and 8-RC-9732
November 14, 1975
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND
PENELLO
On June 16, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Nancy M. Sherman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order, as modified herein.3
Contrary to, our , dissenting colleague, we find that
Respondent ` violated Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting and
remedying employee grievances and promising and
granting employees - coffeebreaks and telephone
privileges 5 days after the Union demanded recogni-
tion. Briefly, the facts show that, in late September
1974, Respondent moved its facilities involved herein
from Cleveland, Ohio, to suburban Brookpark, Ohio.
Between September 8 and October 8 about half of
the employees quit. Sherry, Respondent's manager of
retail distribution, noting the turnover, determined
that it was excessive and was the reason the
Brookpark operation never met company standards.
He attributed these problems to Supervisor Frick and
determined to replace him with Havas. Byram,
Respondent's vice president of employee relations,
who had become aware of the Brookpark turnover,
and Sherry spoke on October 10 about the
"problem" at Brookpark. Sherry told Byram that he
was aware of the problem and planned to hire Havas
subject` to Byram's interviewing him. Sherry asked
Byram to visit Brookpark as soon as possible and to
interview Havas.
1 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It-is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her findings.
2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the
Respondent violated Sec . 8(a)(1) by granting privileges and benefits and
221 NLRB No. 98
Byram visited Brookpark on October 14. At this
time, he interviewed Havas and spoke to employees
to check morale and the supervisory situation.
Employee Reaves told him that the reasons for the
high turnover were poor supervision, wages, and the
absence of coffeebreaks and phone privileges. He
told her that if she would "sit tight. Things will be
better . . . the problems would be taken care of
.... Obviously, I can't do it today or overnight .. .
give me some time ." He did not tell her it was
company policy that employees could take coffee-
breaks or that they could use the phone for personal
calls, nor did he tell her when, if ever, such changes
would take place.
On October 17, upon Sherry's return to Toledo,
Byram told Sherry that he agreed there was a
supervisory problem at Brookpark, and gave a
favorable report about Havas. Byram also said that a
wage survey showed the Company was "out of line in
that area" at Brookpark and related the employees'
comments about telephone use and breaks. There-
after, on October 18, Sherry made a firm offer to
Havas, and, on October 30, Havas underwent
orientation in Toledo. That afternoon, Sherry went
to Brookpark and informed Frick he was being
replaced. The next day, October 31, Havas joined
Sherry in Brookpark and was introduced by Sherry
to the employees. Havas told them a little about his
background, said he would be spending time with
them to learn their jobs, and asked their help in
learning the functions of the Brookpark operation.
Meanwhile, about mid-October, several, of the
employees were planning to walk out because of
working conditions, the absence of breaks and
telephone privileges, and wages which they regarded
as too low. The employees had previously com-
plained to Frick about these matters, but had failed
to receive a satisfactory response. When employee
Wells got in touch with a representative of the
Union, the representative said that "there was
nothing that would protect [the employees] if [they]
walked out on the job," and proposed a union
organizing meeting . This union campaign began after
Byram's October 14 visit to the Brookpark facility.
On November 1, while Sherry was in Brookpark,
Union Business Agent Freeman and Union Organiz-
er Thomas came to Brookpark and made oral and
written demands for recognition and negotiations to
soliciting grievances , we do not adopt her Decision insofar as she indicates
that Respondent 's motive is a critical element of an 8 (a)(1) violation. The
test is whether Respondent engaged in conduct which , it may reasonably be
said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the
Act. The Cooper Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB 502, 503, fn. 2 (1965);
American Freightways Co, Inc., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959)
3 The recommended Order and notice are clanfied to indicate that
benefits granted to employees are not to be rescinded . Accordingly , we shall
modify the Order and notice in this respect.
LITTON DENTAL PRODUCTS
Havas. Havas told them they would have to go
through company headquarters in Toledo. That same
day,- Sherry reported the incident to Byram in
Toledo. The Union had also on November 1 sent
registered letters- to Respondent's Toledo headquar-
ters, demanding recognition, and had filed two
representation petitions with the Board.4
On November 4, employee Adkins told Havas the
employees were complaining about-the lack of breaks
and phone privileges. Thereafter, Havas and Sherry
held a meeting on November 6 and told the
employees that they had two breaks a day, one in the
morning at 10 and one in-the afternoon at 2; but that
someone must cover the phones. The employees also
were told that they could have phone privileges and
any abuse would be dealt with on`an individual basis.
In addition,-,Havas stated that- if any-employee had
any questions or problems his door was always open.
Havas, also told the employees what he expected of
them workwise. Be ^ did not discuss the Union.
However, between November 6 and the December
19 election, Respondent conducted several meetings
urging employees to vote "No." In this regard, it is
noted that -the Administrative Law Judge credited
employee Adkins' ,testimony that after November 7
Havas said , "they didn't think that we needed a
union, that we could get our -things done, without a
union and specified, the fact that they didn't want
one. . . . That we had had some problems, that they
had been taken care of, that anyone that had any
problems that they were free to come in'and talk over
at any time and that anything that could be, done
about them would be done." '
Our dissenting colleague concludes that Respon-
dent 's conduct was not violative of the Act because it
is clear to him that Respondent's conduct in granting
benefits and 'inviting employee complaints was
unrelated to the advent of the Union and would have
occurred in any event : We disagree.
Although we agree that the general-decision to
grant coffeebreaks and phone privileges was made
before the advent of the union campaign and was not
in response to the Union's efforts, in view of- the
evidence , and, for the reasons stated hereafter, we
find that, the timing and nature of the privileges
granted were in response to the union campaign and
therefore were violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
In determining whether solicitation of grievances
and 'granting of benefits is a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board has traditionally looked
to the tuning of knowledge of the union ' campaign
and the granting of benefits .5 When the timing of the
4 An election was subsequently conducted which the Union lost 8-4-withI
challenged ballot. The Union filed objections which involve the same
conduct alleged to be 8(axl) violations herein.'The representation case was
consolidated with this case , and the Administrative Law Judge,'fin ding the
70,1'
granting of benefits coincides with the origination of
employee union activity, -then, absent an affirmative
showing of some legitimate business reason for the
timing, it is not unreasonable to draw the inference of
improper motivation and improper interference with
employee freedom of choice.6 There is no question
that the timing of the granting of the coffeebreaks
and telephone privileges immediately -followed
knowledge of,the.union organizational campaign. In
addition, nothing in the record indicates that prior to
the Union's activities Respondent had contemplated
that these changes were to be made at this particular
time. In fact, when Vice President Byram told
employee Reaves on October 14 that the employees'
complaints would eventually be corrected, he did not
say just when this would be done- or the time of day
when breaks would be allowed. Havas' credited
testimony clearly demonstrates that, although he was
made aware by Byram of the fact that there was a
problem with breaks and telephone privileges at the
Brookpark facility, he did not consider making
changes until after, the union demand on November
1. Thus, Havas stated that Byram, when discussing
Litton's break policy, told Havas "he,might look into
`it' when he got to Brookpark." Havas further
testified that, when he began at, Brookpark, -he did
not realize there was a problem and if there was a
problem it was not one of major proportions. 'In
addition, he said that during the first week following
his October 31 take over at, Brookpark, he paid little
attention to whether employees were taking breaks or
not. Yet, just 5 days after the Union made its
demand and 2 days after Adkins informed Havas of
the employee complaints about breaks and telephone
privileges, Havas changed both situations, invited
employees to present their problems to him, and
implicitly promised to correct them. Both Havas and
his immediate supervisors were aware that there was-
a problem with breaks and telephone privileges, but
only when Respondent -learned that employees were
unhappy enough to go to a union was the situation
rectified.
For these reasons and in these circumstances, we
conclude that Respondent's announcement of and
putting into effect workbreaks arid'telephone privi-
leges, and inviting employees to present their
grievance's with an express or implied company
promise that they would be remedied, interfered-with
the, employees' freedom of choice in violation. 'of
Section 8(a)(1) of the ` Act. In view- of the above
findings, we agree with' the Administrative Law
Judge that the election held -on December 19 should
violations, recommended a second election
5 ,The May Department Stores Company, 191 NLRB 928 (1971); Rotek,
Inca porater4 194 NLRB 453 (1971).
6 'Ibid
702 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be set aside and that a, second election should be
directed.
ORDER
Pursuant ' to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and, hereby orders that Litton Dental
Products Division of Litton Industrial Products, Inc.,
Brookpark , Ohio, its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Add the following sentence at the end of
paragraph 1(a):` "Provided, however , that nothing
herein 'shall be construed as requiring Respondent to
vary or abandon any economic benefit or any term
or condition of employment which it has heretofore
established."
2. 'Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held in
Case 8-RC-9732 on December 19, 1974, be, and it
hereby is, set aside, and that the case be remanded to
the Regional Director- for Region 8 for the purpose of
conducting a new election in the appropriate unit at`
such time as he deems - the circumstances permit the
free choice of a bargaining representative.
[Direction of Second Election and Excelsior foot-
note omitted from publication.]
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting:
I am unable to agree with my colleagues that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by granting
employees coffeebreaks and telephone privileges and-
soliciting , discussion of employee problems with
management after learning of union organizing
efforts at its Brookpark , Ohio, facility. Accordingly, I
would reverse the Administrative Law Judge's
finding,of the violation and certify , the results of the
election.
It is clear to me that Respondent's action in
granting benefits and inviting employee complaints
was unrelated to the advent of the Union and would
have occurred in any event . For this reason, under
well-established principles of Board law , Respon-
dent's conduct was not violative of Section 8(a)(l)_
It is undisputed that Respondent became aware of
a serious supervisory problem at Brookpark before it
had any knowledge of union activity . The Brookpark
facility was opened in September 1974 . Between
September 8 and October 8 about half of its
employees quit . Sherry, Respondent 's manager of
retail distribution , concluded that this turnover was
excessive, resulted from a supervisory problem, and
early in October decided to replace its manager with
Havas, subject to the approval of Byram,, Respon-
dent's vice president in charge of employee relations.
Both Sherry and Bryam were located in . Toledo,
about 100 miles from Brookpark.
Byram was - made aware of the problem in
Brookpark by the receipt by mail of three personnel
notices dated October 8 stating that three Brookpark
employees had quit and by Sherry's advice of his
plans to change supervisors . Byram visited Brook-
park on October 14 to interview Havas and discuss
the morale problem with employees. In his discus-'
sions with employees Byram learned that among
their complaints were , prohibitions against coffee-
breaks and personal telephone' calls. Byram advised
that it was company policy to have coffeebreaks and
permit telephone privileges, promised ,that the prob-
lems were being worked on and-would be corrected,
and urged patience.
After his return to Toledo , Byram on October 17
confirmed to Sherry the 'supervisory problem at
Brookpark, advised him of employee complaints
about telephone use and coffeebreaks , and gave a
favorable report about Havas . Havas was hired on
October 19, started to work on October ; 29, and
underwent orientation at the Toledo headquarters on
October 30 . At this briefing By-ram informed Havas
that the Company's policy was to allow employees
two coffeebreaks a day and to , permit reasonable
personal use of company telephones. He also told
Havas to look into this problem at Brookpark. On
October 31 Havas replaced the manager at Brook-
park , and was expected by Byram to correct the
problems arising from the denial of work breaks and
telephone privileges.
On November 1 union representatives advised
Havas by letter that the Union represented a
majority of Respondent's employees and orally
demanded recognition . There is no evidence that
Respondent had any knowledge of union activity
before November 1. Havas replied that he had no
authority to recognize the Union and would contact
company headquarters in Toledo. On, November 4
an employee, Adkins, spoke to Havas concerning
complaints about lack of breaks and use of tele-
phones , the two matters upon which Havas had been
briefed at Toledo. There is no, evidence that the
Union , was mentioned in this conversation. On
November -6, 1 week after he was installed as
manager at Brookpark, Havas called a meeting of
Brookpark employees, discussed such matters as
starting worktime and housekeeping, and advised
employees that they would have two breaks a day
and the privilege of using the telephone for personal
calls. He also stated that if the employees had any
questions or problems, his door was always open.
There was no mention of the Union at this meeting.
LITTON DENTAL PRODUCTS
There is no evidence linking the announcement of
the coffeebreak,, telephone, and open-door policies to
the advent of the Union. The fact that the announce-
ment came 5 days after the Union's demand for
recognition does not support an inference that it was
prompted by that demand, in the face of the
Employer's manifest prior concern over these matters
and its plain intent to remedy them at an early
moment. Thus the announcement was made in
implementation of a prior determination by manage-
ment to correct employee morale problems which
had resulted in excessive employee turnover . Before
having any knowledge of union activities , manage-
ment had learned of the employee - morale problems
at Brookpark and their causes, promised to remedy
them, replaced the manager, `advised the new
manager of the company policies involved in the
morale problems which were not being followed at
Brookpark, and expected him to correct the prob-
lems. The new manager 's correction of the coffee-
break and telephone problems within a week after his
arrival appears to .be an expected conclusion to these
prior events rather than a response to union activity.
His invitation to employees to discuss any' problems
they might have is' a normal concomitant to the
redress of employee morale problems.
Accordingly, I would find no 8(a)(l) violation and
would not set aside the election.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties had the
opportunity to present their evidence, it has been
decided that we broke the law in certain ways. We
have been ordered to post this notice. We intend to
carry out the order of the Board and abide by the
following:
WE WILL NOT announce or put into effect work
breaks, telephone privileges, or other benefits, or
invite employees to present their grievances with
an express or implied promise by us that they will
be remedied, for the purpose of influencing
employees to reject representation by Warehouse,
Industrial & Service Employees Union, Local
752, or any other union. Provided, however, that
nothing herein requires us -to vary or abandon any
economic benefit or any' term or condition of
employment ' which we have heretofore estab-
lished.
WE WILL NOT in any like or, related manner
interfere with , restrain, or coerce employees in the
703
exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act.
Our employees are free to join or assist the above-
named Union , or any other union , and to:.engage in
other concerted activity for the purposes of collective
bargaining or t other mutual aid or -protection. Our
employees are also free to refrain from any or all
such activities , except to the extent that such rights
may be affected by an agreement requiring union
membership as a condition of continued employment
in accordance with the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
LITTON DENTAL
PRODUCTS
DIVISION OF LITTON
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS,
INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NANCY M . SHERMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The
instant unfair labor practice case (Case 8-CA-8830) was
initiated 'byIa charge filed on December 23, 1974, against
Litton Dental Products Division of Litton Industrial
Products, Inc. (the Company) by Warehouse , Industrial &
Service Employees' Union, Local 752 (the Union). On the
basis of that charge and an amended charge filed on
January 27, 1975, a complaint was issued on January 30,
1975, alleging that during the week of November 4, 1974,
the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act) by soliciting
and remedying employee grievances and by promising and
granting benefits in conditions of employment, in ' each
case to induce employees to refrain from union activity.
Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent
Election executed in the instant representation case (Case
8-RC-9732) by the Company and the Union, and
approved by the Regional Director for Region 8 on
November 22, 1974, an election was conducted among the
Company's employees on December 19, 1974. The tally of
ballots showed that four votes were cast for the Union,
eight were cast ' against it, and one ballot was challenged.
On December 23, 1974, the Union filed five timely
objections , four of which it later withdrew. On February 6,
1975, on the basis of an administrative investigation, the
Regional Director for Region 8 issued his Report on
Objections . The report overruled the specific union
objection which had not, been withdrawn, but-stated that
the postelection investigation had revealed evidence of
objectionable conduct consisting of the conduct attacked
in the unfair labor practice complaint issued on January
30, 1975. The Regional Director recommended' that,
because of this identity of evidence, and because the issues
of fact ,and law raised by the "unnumbered objection"
could not be "resolved ex parte, such issues be set' for
hearing, and that said hearing be consolidated with the
704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unfair labor practice hearing. About February 21, 1975, the
Company filed exceptions to the Regional Director's
report, alleging, inter alia, that the Director, erred in
proceeding on, the "unnumbered objection"' and that the
allegation involved matters too trivial to interfere with
employee rights in an organizing campaign.
About March 25, 1975, the day before the unfair labor
practice hearing, the Regional Office was advised by
telephone that the Board had adopted the Regional
Director's- recommendations in the representation case. At
the outset of the unfair labor practice hearing, counseffor
the General Counsel (the General Counsel) moved to
consolidate the two cases for hearing. I granted the motion
over the Company's objection, and denied the Company's
motion to sever the proceedings.2 Shortly after the opening
of the hearing, which was held in a hearing room attached
to the Regional Office, the General Counsel obtained a
copy of the Board's Decision and Order in the representa-
tion case. That document stated, in part, "IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that a hearing be held for the purpose of
receiving evidence to resolve the issues raised by the
unnumbered objection based on conduct discovered
during the investigation, and that such hearing be
consolidated with any hearing held in [the unfair labor
practice case] by an Administrative Law Judge."
At the consolidated hearing, the General Counsel was
represented by a single attorney, the Company was
represented by counsel, and the Union was represented by
its business agent. Upon the entire record in the, case, 3
including my observation of the witnesses, and the briefs
filed by the Company and the General Counsel; L hereby
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Litton Dental Products is, a, division of Litton Industrial
Products, Inc., a Delaware corporation. Litton Dental
Products operates a business facility at Brookpark, Ohio,
the only, facility involved in this proceeding, where it sells
and distributes dental supplies and, related items. The
Company has a gross volume, of business from its Ohio
operations in excess of $500,000, and ships goods and
products from its various Ohio facilities valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside Ohio. 1 find that, as the
Company admits, it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act, and that assertion of jurisdiction over
its operations, will effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Union is a ,labor organization within'the meaning of
the Act.
i See NLRB v. Fashion Fair, Inc, 399 F.2d 764, 767 (C A _ 6, 1968);
N L.RB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 379 F.2d 172, 179 (C A. 6, 1967) cert
denied 389 U.S . 958 (1967); N.L.R B. v Decoto Aircraft, Inc., 512 F.2d 758
(C.A. 6, 1975),
2 Fashion Fair, supra 766-768, Barrus Construction Company v. N.L R.B.,
483 F.2d 191 , 194-195 (C.A. 4, 1973).
3 Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
4 All dates hereafter are 1974 unless otherwise stated
5 This finding is based on Sherry's testimony , which I accept in view of
the mutually consistent,testimony of all three management witnesses about
the dates regarding the interviewing of Frick's successor. Sherry testified
that his October 8 "final decision" to replace Frick was based on
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND THE
ALLEGED OBJECTIONABLE ' CONDUCT
A. The Company's Hiring of a New Regional
Center Manager
The company facility involved in this case moved from
Cleveland, Ohio, to Brookpark, Ohio (a Cleveland suburb),
in late September 1974.4 At that time, 'and until October
31, the regional center manager of this facility was Bill
Frick. Between September 8 and October 8, about half of
the employees at the facility quit. William Sherry, who is
the Company' s manager of retail distribution and whose
office is in Toledo, Ohio, about 100 miles from Brookpark,
concluded that Bro9kpark's turnover was excessive, result-
ed from a supervisory problem, and was the reason why the
operation had never "met standards." On October 8,
Sherry decided to replace Frick.S On October 9, Sherry
approached William Havas in Cleveland and asked
whether he would be interested 'in Frick'sjob.'Havas, who
had previously worked for Sherry, replied that he might be,
and Sherry interviewed him for that job. Sherry then told
Havas that before being offered the job he would have to
meet with Robert Byram, the Company's vice president in
charge of employee relations, whose office is in Toledo.
On October 9 or 10, , Bryam received in the mall three
personnel notices,- made out on October 8, stating that
three Brookpark employees had quit on October 4 (supra,
fn. 5). Byram then approached Sherry and said that "it
looked like we had a problem in Brookpark." Sherry
replied that he was "also awar' that they were having
problems in other areas, the supervisor failing to make his
work schedules and so forth." Sherry said that he was
making arrangements to change supervisors and, subject to
Byram's interviewing Havas, would hire him. Sherry asked
Byram to visit Brookpark as soon as possible to interview
Havas.
Byram visited the Brookpark facility on October 14. He
interviewed Havas and then 'talked to an undisclosed
number of employees at the 'Brookpark facility in order to
check into the morale problem and "confirm" the existence
of what Byram's testimony described as a supervisory
problem which he "suspected." 6 Among the employees he
interviewed, was office clerk Nellie Reaves. She told him
that she was "under a tremendous amount of nervous
pressure that causes me some lost time. I am almost half
afraid to'come to work." When asked the reasons for the
high turnover, she said that "the biggest problem was
management," and Byram replied, "we had the feeling that
it was." Reaves said that the, employees were quitting
because their wages were too low, Frick was harassing and
"information that I had picked up that we had three people leave us the
preceding Friday," October 4. The written personnel reports of such quits
were not made out until October 8, and Robert Byram, who is the
Company's vice president in charge of 'employee relations, did not learn
about the quits until he received these personnel reports in the mad. The
record fails to explain the source of Sherry's information as of October 8
that two order fillers and a communications clerk had quit on October 4 in
Brookpark. See also infra, fn. 6.
6 Both Byram and Sherry used the word "confirm" in their testimony,
notwithstanding their testimony that Sherry had already decided to replace
Frick. Cf. supra, fn. 5.
LITTON DENTAL PRODUCTS
abusing them, and they were not allowed to take
coffeebreaks or 'to use company telephones for personal
calls. Byram replied, "Just sit tight. Things will be better
because I am here to find out why we have such a high
turnover . . . I'm here for a job and salary review and we
realize that the cost of living is -different in different parts
of the country and we are trying to upgrade things but we
have to have a survey and we are in the process of doing
that right now, so just sit tight and things will get better."
Byram said it was not company policy that employees not
have breaks or use the telephone. He told her, "Sit tight
and things will change, to "be patient," that "the
problems would be taken care of" and "they were working
on it," but "Obviously, I can't do it today or overnight.
You will, have to give me some time." He did not tell her
when the Brookpark employees would _ be given phone
privileges or breaks, or the time of day when breaks would
be allowed.7
On October 17, upon' Sherry's return to Toledo from' a
West Coast trip, Byram told Sherry that he agreed there
was a supervisory problem at Brookpark, gave a favorable
report about Havas, said, that Byram's wage survey had
shown that the Company was "out of line in that area" at
Brookpark, described employee comments about telephone
use and breaks , and said that one employee was "terribly
nervous." On October 18; ,Sherry made a firm offer of
employment to Havas, who, accepted it on the following
day. Havas started to work for the Company on October
29. He accompanied Sherry on visits to various company
facilities and, on October 30, underwent "orientation" at
the Company's Toledo headquarters.
Also on October 30, Sherry went out to, Brookpark and
informed Frick that, effective the morning of October 31,
he would be replaced by Havas. On October 31, about 10
a.m., Sherry called a short employee meeting at Brookpark
to introduce Havas as the employees' new manager. Havas
told-them a little bit about-his background, said he would
be spending time with each of them to learn their jobs, and
asked their help in learning the functions of the Brookpark
operation.
B. The Union's Campaign and its Bargaining
Demand
Meanwhile, about mid-October, several of the employees
were planning to walk rout because of working conditions,
absence of breaks and telephone privileges, and wages
which they regarded as too low. The employees had
previously complained to Frick about these matters, but
had 'failed to receive a satisfactory response. When
employee Sharon Wells got in touch with a representative
of the Union, to which the, Teamsters Union had referred
her, he said that "there was nothing that would protect [the
7 My findings as to the Reaves-Byram conversation are based on a
composite of their mutually consistent testimony.
8 This finding is based on the testimony of employee Elaine Ingle and
Reaves; the evidence is otherwise vague about the sequence Reaves further
testified that when employee Wells and others told her that they were
thinking of taking action about their grievances, she suggested a letter to the
Company's Toledo office and (when they rejected this suggestion) a call to
the Teamsters. Reaves further testified that she told them that Frick was
preventing the employees from having breaks and privileges to which
company policy entitled them. She tacitly admitted that she did not advise
705
employees] if [they] walked out on the job," and proposed
a union organizing meeting. This union campaign began
after Byram's October 14 visit to the Brookpark facility.8
On November 1, 1974, Union Business Agent Terrance
Freeman and union organizer Lonnie Thomas came to the
Brookpark facility with two letters, each of which asserted
that the Union represented a majority of the Company's
employees in a described unit, and demanded a meeting to
begin negotiating a contract. The letters were substantially
the same, except that one, set forth a unit of office
employees and the other a unit of production, mainte-
nance, and warehouse employees. The union representa-
tives gave the letters to Havas, and also made an oral
demand for recognition. Havas replied that he had no
authority to recognize the Union and would have to go
through company headquarters in Toledo. On the same
day, the Union sent a registered letter to the Company
asking for recognition, and filed two representation
petitions with the Board seeking an election in each of the
units set forth in the November 1 letter given to Havas.
The election stipulation eventually agreed to called for a
single unit embracing the entire Brookpark-facility.
C. Events after the Union Sought Recognition
Sherry was in Havas' office when the union representa-
tives asked Havas for recognition, and Havas came in to
report the visit to him. Sherry testified that this was the first
time he found out about the Union's campaign, and there
is no testimony to the contrary. That same day, Sherry
reported' the union visit to Byram by telephone. -Byram
testified that this was the first time he found out about the
Union's campaign, and there is no testimony to the
contrary. -
On November 4, employee Clifford Adkins told Havas
that some of the problems that the people were complain-
ing about were lack of breaks and of telephone privileges.
Havas replied that one of the things he had been "briefed"
on in Toledo was that there were two set breaks during the
day and, since he himself made personal phone calls, he
could not forbid others to make them too.9
On November 6, before Sherry had received the Union's
petitions but after they had been filed and mailed, Havas
and Sherry called the Brookpark employees together for a
meeting. Havas told the employees that they had two
breaks a day, one at 10 a.m. and one at 2 p.m.; but that to
permit continuous coverage of the door and-the phones,
not everyone should take a break at one time?° He further
stated that sometime or other anybody might have to use
the telephone, anyone who got a call would be called down
to the telephone, anyone who had to make a local call was
the employees of Byram's allegedly prior promises to remedy many of their
grievances.
9 This finding is based on Adkins' testimony, to a large extent
corroborated by Havas. On the basis of the witnesses demeanor, I regard
Adkins as a more reliable witness than Havas. -
10 this, finding is based on the testimony of employees Wells, Adkins,
Ingle , Dan Lucas, and Reaves. My finding regarding deviations from the
timing for breaks is based on the testimony of Havas, whom I credit to this
extent, and Wells.
706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
free to use the telephone, and any abuses of telephone
privileges would be dealt with on-an individual basis."
Havas also I said that if the employees had anyquestions or
problems, his door was always open.12 In addition, Havas
said he expected each employee to be at his work station
ready to work at 8 a.m. and to maintain the housekeeping
in this general work area, and that a schedule would be
worked out to keep the rest of the warehouse clean.13
Havas did not discuss the Union: 14 ` '
Havas testified that he told the employees that there was
a company policy of permitting two 10-minute breaks (one
in the morning and one in the afternoon) and that
evidently there'was confusion as to the Company's break
policy. He further testified that he preceded his summary
of the telephone policy by telling the employees -"that my
personal policy on telephones, as well as the Company's
policy was" as he described it, and that he "would like to
clarify some points." I credit Byram's testimony that the
Litton Dental Products Division has a policy of permitting
two 10-minute workbreaks a day, and of permitting
employees reasonable personal use of company telephones.
Further, I believe Havas' testimony that Byram so
informed him before he took over the,Brookpark facility.
However, I do not credit Havas' testimony that he so
advised the employees on November 6. No other witness
so testified, and Havas himself testified that he told the
employees that, the announced telephone policy was "my
personal policy . . . as well as the Company's policy."
Because of the foregoing considerations and Havas'
demeanor, I discredit his testimony that on November 6 he,
ascribed breaks and telephone privileges to company
policy, and his related testimony (likewise uncorroborated)
regarding remarks made at the meeting by employees
Georgia Shade (who did not testify) and Reaves.15
Between November 6 and the December 19 election, the
Company conducted several employee meetings at which
employees were encouraged to vote no. The contents of
these speeches are discussed infra
D. Conclusions as to the Company's Motives for
Announcing Telephone and Break Privileges and
Inviting Employees To Approach Management With
Questions and Problems
Havas testified that, during the first week following his
October 31 takeover at Brookpark, he paid little attention
to whether employees were taking breaks or not; and, in
effect, that his November 4 conversation with employee
Adkins was the incident which led Havas to announce the
11 My findings in this sentence are based rpnmanly on the testimony of
Havas (whom I credit to this extent) and employees Reaves and Lucas.
Their testimony was corroborated by employees Wells, Adkins, and Ingle.
12 My finding in this sentence is based on a composite, of the testimony
of employees Adkins ("I don't know if it was questions or problems or
what", it could have been either problems or questions, "but I don't know
which"), Ingle (who used the term "problems" on direct examination, but
acceded on cross-examination to company counsel's tendering of the term
"questions"), and Lucas ("if there was any questions or anything"). On the
basis'of demeanor, I do not credit Havas' denial that he used the term
"problems" or his testimony (contrary to the testimony of all the employee
witnesses who testified about the matter) that he did not'say that his door
was always open, but, rather, said, "If my door should be closed, feel free to
"knock on it and come in
13 This finding is based on Havas' testimony, which I credit to this
policy on breaks and telephone privileges as early as
November 6. He further testified that thcse,matters were
not "so major that. I had to get clarificationfrom anybody
in my mind"; and did-not testify about any conversations
about the matter with Sherry, either before or after Havas'
conversation with Adkins. However, Sherry, initially
testified that before November, 6 he and Havas had a
conversation about the breaks and telephones during
which Havas mentioned a conversation with Byram
regarding breaks,16 and "the determination [in the, Sherry-
Havas conversation] was that we should follow through
with the breaks and the company policy," Moreover,
Sherry's testimony in this respect is, difficult to reconcile
with his own subsequent testimony that he,could not recall
any conversation with Havas (before the November 6
employee meeting), during which, Havas, told Sherry he was
going to announce a break policy at the Brookpark facility,
and that Sherry never reviewed the telephone, or break
policy with Havas. Furthermore, Sherry explained this last
alleged omission by testifying:, "I considered telephones
and breaks as part of my total problem in, Brookpark . ._ .
[Our?] conclusion was to change supervisors' and in
knowing Bill Havas, I knew that, specific individual
problems, if there were any, would be resolved." Both this
alleged omission and Sherry's explanation therefor seem
somewhat unlikely, particularly in view of, Havas' uncon-
tradicted testimony that Byram regarded such specific
problems as important enough to tell Havas about.
These inconsistencies and improbabilities in manage-
ment's testimony about intramanagement discussions of
breaks and telephones before Havas',November 6 speech
about the matter, together with Sherry's and Havas'
demeanor when testifying, lead me to conclude that they
were trying to conceal, the contents of such conversations.
Moreover, it is undenied that Sherry and,Havas later urged
the employees to vote against the Union, 1_7 and that both of
them are intelligent executives who were well aware of
what the opposing parties were trying to prove-namely,
that Havas' announcement of breaks and telephone
privileges was motivated by a desire to cause employee
disaffection from the Union and (as to the Union)
invalidated the Union's election defeat. Accordingly, I
infer that they were trying to conceal intramanagement
statements showing that such was indeed their motive.is
For these reasons, I conclude that Havas', November 6
announcement of breaks, telephone privileges, and an open
door policy was motivated by a , desire -,to cause the
employees to lose interest in the Union; and I discredit his
testimony to the' contrary. Moreover, Havas admittedly
extent, and to some extent on Reaves' testimony.
14 This finding is based on the testimony of Havas, whom I credit to this
extent, and employee Wells There is no evidence otherwise.
15 The result herein would be the same if I believed his testimony in this
respect. See infra, fn 21.
is Havas credibly testified that, during his October 29-30 orientation in
Toledo, Byram said that Havas should look into the matter of breaks and
telephones
14 In the absence of any evidence otherwise, I infer that the antipathy to
the Union which they displayed during these, meetings about early
December was in existence by early November
15 N.L R B. v Walton Manufacturing Company,, 369 U.S. 404,408 (1962),
Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron King Branch] v. N LR B, 362 F 2d
466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966).
LITTON DENTAL PRODUCTS
made his November 6 announcement about breaks and
telephones in consequence of Adkins' statement that-the
employees had been complaining about the absence of
these privileges, and the evidence shows that other
employees had been fruitlessly complaining to manage-
ment about them. Accordingly, I find that Havas'
statement that if employees had any problems his door was
always open was intended by Havas, and would reason-
ably be interpreted by employees, as a promise to try to
correct any such problems, just as in the same speech he
had announced action to correct employees' previous
complaints about telephones and breaks.
I have reached the foregoing conclusions without regard
to Adkins' testimony that after November 6 Havas said,
"they didn't think that we needed a union, that' we could
get our things done without a union and specified the fact
that they didn't want one. . . . That we had had some
problems, that they had been taken care of, that anyone
that had any problems that they were free to come in and
talk over at any time and that anything that could be done
about them would be done." I credit Adkins' testimony in
this respect. Adkins' demeanor impressed me favorably.
The demeanor of Havas and Sherry, both of whom denied
that Havas made such statements, impressed me unfavor-
ably. Moreover, neither of 'them made' any effort to relate
what Havas did say on this occasion, although it is
undenied that he in fact talked to employees about the
Union and the forthcoming election. Accordingly, and
although Adkins' testimony in this respect is not directly
corroborated, I believe such testimony.19 This testimony
corroborates my finding as to the motives of Havas'
November 6 announcement regarding breaks and tele-
phone privileges, as to the intended meaning of Havas'
November 6 statement about 'his open door policy
regarding employees', problems, and as to how employees
might reasonably be expected to interpret that statement.20
is The Company's brief contends that Adkins' testimony about the
Company's taking care of "problems" was contradicted by employee
Reaves, whose demeanor impressed me less favorably than did Adkins'. The
Company reties on a response interposed by Reaves after I had sustained
company counsel 's objection, on the ground that the question was leading,
to the General Counsel's-question eliciting Reaves' testimony in this respect.
It is clear from the evidence that the Company held at least two meetings
at which management urged employees to vote against the Union. The
substantial difference between Adkins' version of the other remarks at the
meeting he testified about and Reaves' version of what was said at the
meeting she testified about leads me to conclude that they were testifying
about two different meetings Indeed; accepting the company briefs
somewhat unlikely hypothesis that Adkins' testimony about these remarks
did not refer to a general employee meeting at all, Peaves' testimony would
be plainly irrelevant and the absence of direct corroboration for Adkins'
testimony would be less significant Moreover, on this company hypothesis,
the inference of purpose from his credited testimony would be more
persuasive in view of the fact that Adkins himself had told Havas on
November 4 of the very complaints which Havas remedied on November 6
20 'However, I accept the denials of Sherry and Havas, corroborated by
employees Adkins and Reaves, of employee Wells' uncorroborated
testimony that Sherry said in Havas' presence that the Company had no
intention of recognizing the`Uniori. In addition, I accept Sherry's and
Havas' denials , corroborated by employee Reaves, of employee Lucas'
uncorroborated testimony that Sherry and Havas said if the Union came
into the shop and the employees struck the shop would probably close down
because customers would be 'permanently lost. I also discredit Lucas'
uncorroborated and improbable testimony that the employees repeatedly
707
E. Analysis and Ultimate' Conclusions
I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that the
Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by announc-
ing breaks and telephone privileges for the purpose of
causing employees to abandon their interest in the Union.
N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405(1964);
Fashion Fair, Inc., 157 NLRB 1645, 1646, 1651-52, 1655-
56 (1968), enfd. in relevant part 399 F.2d 764, 767-768
(C.A. 6, 1968).21 The evidence that such changes brought
the Brookpark operation in conformity with the practices
of the Litton Dental Products Division does not 'render
them lawful, in view of the uncontradicted evidence that
division policy as to these matters had not previously been
respected by Brookpark management 22 While it is true
that Vice President Byram had told employee Reaves that
the employees' complaints about breaks and telephones
would eventually be corrected, he did not tell her just when
this would be done, and there is no evidence that Havas'
action was motivated by Byram's assurances to Reaves or
that Havas even knew about them.23
In addition, I agree with the General Counsel that the
Company further violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when
Havas invited employees to present their problems to him
and implicitly promised to correct them, for the purpose of
causing employee disaffection from the Union 24 In view of
this implicit promise and its purpose, Havas' action cannot
be viewed as merely a continuation of the Company's prior
practice of periodic visits to various company facilities by
Vice President Byram for the purpose of, inter alia, talking
to the employees to evaluate employee morale.25 In any
event, whatever Toledo-based Byram's prior practice may
have ' been with respect to the 40 locations in the entire
Division, Havas' predecessor as the local -Brookpark
regional center manager had regarded employee com-
plaints as unwelcome, and had failed to remedy them even
with respect to deviations from division policy.
asked management whether the breaks and telephone privileges had
anything to do with the Union, to which management replied no.
21 Cf. Kimmel's Shop Rite, 213 NLRB 440 (1974), and Montgomery Ward
& Co, 198 NLRB 52_(1972), relied on by the Company, where the changes
were not motivated by a desire to discourage employees from union
membership. Moreover, the Montgomery Ward change in practice did not
occur until after the election
22 See Fashion Farr, supra at 1646; Montgomery Ward and Co,
Incorporated, 187 NLRB 956,956,962-%3 (1971); Montgomery Ward shows
that such company action was unlawful accepting Havas' testimony, as I do
not, that he attributed the changes in Brookpark 's break and telephone
practice to Division policy. I see no reason to suppose that the Brookpark
employees would, be pleased by newly enjoyed benefits not attributed to
prior division policy, but would not be pleased,by the same benefits where
they were so attributed. Further, because both division and local
management urged the employees to vote no, employee knowledge that the
new Brookpark practice conformed with division policy would not assure
them that management would never resume the prior Brookpark practice
regardless of whether the employees opted for union representation.
23 See The May Department Stores Company, 191 NLRB 928 (1971); cf.
R. B & W Industrial Plastic Products, Inc., 184 NLRB 966,970 (1970).
24 Reliance Electric Company, Madison Plant Mechanical Drives Division,
191 NLRB-44 (1971), enfd. 457 F.2d 503 (C.A. 6, 1972); Teledyne Dental
Products Corp, 210 NLRB 435, 440 (1974
25 So far as the record shows, Byram paid only' one visit to the
Brookpark facility between its late September move to Brookpark and the
December 19 election.
708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL -LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In addition, ,I agree with the Union,that the Company's
conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) calls for an order
setting aside the election.26 Because, occurring after the
Union filed its petitions, such conduct invalidates the
election , even though occurring before the Company
received them.27
At the hearing, the Company, made certain offers of
proof regarding five employees' subjective reactions to the
company conduct (directed at a 14-employee unit) here at
issue?s I, rejected such offers. So far as the unfair labor
practice aspect of this case is concerned, "The test is
whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it may
reasonably be said, tends to-interfere with the free exercise
of employee rights under the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool
Works, 7"Cir.,,153 F.2d 811, 8'14 ..." N.L.R.B. v. Wilbur
H., Ford d/b/a Ford Brothers, 170 F.2d 735, 738 (C.A. 6,
1948)Moreover, apart from other considerations pres-
ented in the representation case, the Company's offer is
mathematically inadequate. The 'Company sought "to show
at best 'that five'-voters were unaffected; but because the
tally was eight'agamst the Union, and in favor (plus
one unresolved challenged ballot), a different vote by three
of the eight who voted against the Union would have
changed the result.
In any event, the Board makes its determination whether
to set aside an election on an objective- basis - i.e., on
whether ' the. alleged misconduct would reasonably tend to
prevent the holding of a fair and free election - 'rather
than on the subjective statements of the employees as to
whether they were "coerced" or "misled" into voting as
they did,,Pinkertan's-National Detective Agency, Inc., 124
NLRB 1076, 1077, footnote 3 (1959); G H.R. Foundry
Division, The Dayton Malleable Iron Company, 123 NLRB
1797, 1709, ' and cases there cited at footnote 3 (1959);
Orleans, Manufacturing Company, 120 NLRB 630, 631,
footnote 4 (1958).. This approach was approved by the
Sixth Circuit in Harlan #4 Coal Company v. N.L.R.B., 490
F.2d 117, 122-123 (C.A., 6, 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 986,
which pointed out, inter alia, the peculiar pressures which
postelection proceedings impose on employees' testimony
regarding how they voted and why.30 Moreover, even
assuming ,that the employees are trying to tell the truth and
are unaffected 'by the fact that they are revealing the
contents of their secret ballot to representatives of their
employer and of the Union which may become their
exclusive' bargaining representative, the recognition of
26 Reliance Electric, supra, May Department Stores, supra
27 See West 'Tezas Equipment Company, 142 NLRB 1358 (1963), where
the Board entertained on the ments objections based on conduct occurring
before (although on, the same day) the petition was filed and, therefore,
necessarily before the employer received the petition
28 Company counsel stated that employee Wells would testify that
Havas' statements about the breaks and the telephone did not affect her
vote; neither Wells' testimony nor counsel's offer of proof refers to the open
door policy ' Counsel further stated that employee Reaves would testify, and
that employee Adkins would testify if he testified truthfully, that none of
Havas' allegedly improper statements influenced their respective votes
Counsel also stated that employee Ingle would testify, and employee Lucas
would` testify if, he testified truthfully, that none -of Havas' allegedly
improper statementsi influenced their respective votes or coerced or bribed
them Also, counsel stated that employee Adkins "would testify that MT
Havas' clarification of the breaks and telephone privileges, in his opinion
.. was not,done to affect the employees' attitude toward the Union", this
offer by counsel did not refer to the open door policy
constraint remains a subtle thing which may call for a high
degree of introspective perception. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Donnelly
Garment Company, 330 U.S.-219, 231 (1947); The Radio
Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers' Union,
A.FL. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17,51(1954); Darlington Mfg.
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 F.2d 760, 772-773 (C.A. 4, 1968), cert.
denied 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
CONCLUSIONS' OF LAW
1. The Company is-engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a, labor organization within - the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Company has interfered with , restrained, and
coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
4. Such unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. By engaging in 'the aforesaid unlawful conduct, the
Company interfered with the free choice of employees in
the election.
Tim REMEDY
Having found that the Company engaged in certain
unfair labor, practices, I shall - recommend that it be
required to cease and desist therefrom, and from like or
related conduct, and to post appropriate notices,
It will be further recommended that the election held on
December 19, 1974, be set aside and that Case 8-RC-9732
be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 8 for the
purpose' of conducting a new election at such time as he
deems that circumstances permit a free choice of bargain-
ing representative.
Upon the foregoing' findings of fact and conclusions of
law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act and, the Board's March 24, 1975, "Decision and
Order Directing Hearing" in Case 8-RC-9732, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 31 ,
Respondent, Litton Dental Products Division of Litton
Industrial Products, Inc., 'Brookpark, Ohio, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
29 Accord N L.R B v. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc, 287 F 2d 17, 18
(C A. 10, 1961), Local 542, International Umon,ofOperating Engineers, AFL-
CIO (Giles & Ransom), v N LR.B 328 F 2d 850, 852-853 (C A, 3, 1964),
cert. denied 379 U.S 826 (1964)
30 Of the five employees as to whom Company counsel made his offer of
proof, the Company's brief asks me to discredit part-of the testimony of
three (Wells, Adkins, and Lucas) 'Indeed, as to the latter two, counsel's offer
includes the caution "if'he testified truthfully" Further, at the hearing
company counsel objected to my action in forbidding him to ask Reaves
leading questions in connection with matters not'covered by the General
Counsel on direct examination.
31 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
LITTON DENTAL PRODUCTS
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Announcing and putting into effect work breaks,
telephone privileges, or other benefits, and inviting
employees to present their grievances with an express or
implied company promise that they will be remedied, for
the purpose of influencing employees to reject representa-
tion by Warehouse, Industrial & Service Employees'
Union, Local 752, or any other labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Brookpark, Ohio, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."32 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
32 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
709
Region 8, after being duly signed by the Company's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Company has taken to comply herewith.
IT is FURTHER ORDERED that the election in Case 8-RC-
9732 be set aside, and that such case be remanded to the
Regional Director for Region 8 for the purpose of
conducting a new election at such time as he deems
appropriate.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."