L.I.F. Industries a/k/a Long Island Fire Proof Door

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 24, 2018

366 NLRB No. 4 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 4
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
L.I.F. Industries a/k/a Long Island Fire Proof Door
and New York City and Vicinity District Council
of Carpenters. Case 29–CA–181174
January 24, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN KAPLAN AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On May 12, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey
P. Gardner issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Charging Party
submitted a letter adopting the General Counsel’s an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and

1 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to furnish and by delaying in
furnishing the Union with requested information, we find no merit to
the Respondent’s contention that the requested information concerned
employees outside the bargaining unit and therefore was not presump-
tively relevant. Although the Union’s requests generally referenced
“LIF employees,” the record shows that counsel for the Union clarified,
via email to the Respondent, that the Union was seeking information
for “LIF employees in the jurisdiction of the District Council.” Moreo-
ver, counsel for the Union testified that each request paragraph sought
information for “unit employees.” In any event, it is well settled that
where a union’s information request is not limited to bargaining unit
employees and therefore could be construed as requesting information
pertaining to nonunit as well as unit employees, this does not justify an
employer’s blanket refusal to comply with the union’s request. See
DIRECTV U.S. DIRECTV Holdings LLC, 361 NLRB No. 124, slip op.
at 2 (2014), and cases cited therein.
We also find no merit to the Respondent’s contention that the infor-
mation requests were overly burdensome because they sought infor-
mation for a 7-year period. Where requested information is found
relevant, “the onus is on the employer to show that production of the
data would be unduly burdensome.” Mission Foods, 345 NLRB 788,
789 (2005) (citing cases). Here, the Respondent proffered no evidence
to support its assertion that the request for 7 years of information was
unduly burdensome. See Control Services, Inc., 315 NLRB 431, 451,
457 (1994) (respondent’s contention that union’s request for 8 years of
records was unduly burdensome rejected in the absence of any support-
ing evidence).
Finally, in affirming the judge’s findings, we do not rely on his cita-
tion to Alcan Rolled Products, 358 NLRB 37 (2012), which was issued
by a panel subsequently found invalid by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014). We also do not rely on his
citation to Postal Service, 354 NLRB 412 (2009), which was decided
by a two-member Board. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560
U.S. 674 (2010).
to adopt the judge’s recommended Order as modified and
set forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, L.I.F. Industries A/K/A Long Island Fire
Proof Door, Port Washington, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with New York
City and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters (the
Union) by failing and refusing to furnish and/or by un-
reasonably delaying in furnishing it with requested in-
formation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Respondent’s unit employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) To the extent it has not already done so, furnish to
the Union in a timely manner the information requested
by the Union on April 8 and 12, 2016, May 2, 13, and 17,
2016, and June 7, 10, and 28, 2016.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Port Washington, New York facility copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director of Re-
gion 29, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees

Chairman Kaplan notes as follows. The Respondent contends that
the Board should defer to an arbitral ruling narrowing the scope of
information the Respondent was required to furnish the Union in con-
nection with a pending grievance arbitration. The judge rejected the
Respondent’s contention on two grounds: Board precedent holding that
information-request disputes are not deferred to arbitration, and the fact
that the Union requested the information not only in connection with
the grievance arbitration, but also to police the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement. In agreeing with the judge and his colleagues
that deferral to the arbitrator’s ruling is unwarranted, Chairman Kaplan
relies solely on the fact that the Union requested the information at
issue here to police the CBA.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decision in Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997), to
include the dates the Union supplemented and renewed its initial infor-
mation request, and to conform to the Board’s standard remedial lan-
guage. We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as
modified.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since April 8, 2016.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 29 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. January 24, 2018
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
New York City and Vicinity District Council of Carpen-
ters (the Union) by failing and refusing to furnish and/or
by unreasonably delaying in furnishing it with requested
information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s
performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining
representative of our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, to the extent we have not already done so,
furnish to the Union in a timely manner the information
it requested on April 8 and 12, 2016, May 2, 13, and 17,
2016, and June 7, 10, and 28, 2016.
L.I.F. INDUSTRIES A/K/A LONG ISLAND FIRE
PROOF DOOR
The Board’s decision can be found at
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/29–CA–175233 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Kimberly Walters, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Denise Forte, Esq., for the Respondent.
Nicholas Johnson, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JEFFREY P. GARDNER, Administrative Law Judge. The
charge was filed on July 28, 2016, and the complaint was is-
sued on November 30, 2016. The complaint alleges Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and/or refusing to
provide information requested by the Charging Party Union.
The complaint was subsequently amended at trial to
acknowledge the Union’s receipt of certain of the requested
information which was at issue in the complaint, and to add an
allegation of unreasonable delay in furnishing the Union with
that information.
On February 23, 2017, I conducted a trial at the Board’s Re-
gional Office in Brooklyn, New York, at which all parties were
afforded the opportunity to present their evidence. At trial, the
L.I.F. INDUSTRIES A/K/A LONG ISLAND FIRE PROOF DOOR 3
parties entered into a stipulation of certain facts, and submitted
a series of Joint Exhibits as part of that stipulation (Jt. Exh. 1).1
After the trial, the General Counsel and Respondent filed
briefs,2 which I have read and considered.
Upon consideration of the briefs, and the entire record, in-
cluding the testimony of witnesses and my observation of their
demeanor, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a domestic corpora-
tion with an office and place of business at 5 Harbor Park Dr.,
Port Washington, New York, and has been engaged in the
manufacture and nonretail sale of hollow metal doors and
frames. Respondent further admits, and I find, that in conduct-
ing its business operations during the most recent 12-month
period, it sold and shipped from its Port Washington, New
York facility nonretail goods valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly to points outside the state of New York.
Therefore, I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
Respondent is a member of the Hollow Metal Buck and
Door Association Inc. (the Association), which exists for the
purpose, inter alia, of representing its employer members in
negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements
CBAs). Respondent’s employees are represented for purposes
of collective bargaining by the New York City and Vicinity
District Council of Carpenters (herein “the Union”), a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The Union and the Association have been parties to a series of
CBAs, the most recent of which has been in effect since August
1, 2012, and runs through July 31, 2017 (Jt. Exh. 1(C)). It is
undisputed that Respondent is bound by this most recent CBA.
In or about January 2016, a dispute had arisen between Re-
spondent and the Union regarding proper payment for outside
construction work performed by a number of unit employees,
which was referred by the parties to arbitration.
The Union’s Information Requests
The related arbitration was being handled on behalf of the
Union by its attorney, Lydia Sigelakis, who also testified at trial
as the General Counsel’s only witness. I found her testimony
to be consistent with documentary evidence in the parties’ Joint
Exhibits, and found her demeanor to be forthright and honest.
The only other witness at trial was Jonathan Bardavid, also
an attorney, who was primarily handling the arbitration on be-
half of Respondent, and who testified at trial for Respondent.

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for the
Transcript, “GC Exh.” for the General Counsel's exhibits and “R. Exh.”
for Respondent's Exhibits. Specific citations to the transcript and ex-
hibits are included only where appropriate to aid review, and are not
necessarily exclusive or exhaustive.
2 By letter dated April 12, 2017, the Charging Party adopted the
General Counsel’s brief.
Mr. Bardavid also seemed forthright and honest in his testimo-
ny. However, he did not testify to any facts contradictory to
Ms. Sigelakis, other than to his belief as to the Union’s motiva-
tions in making its information requests, which I do not find re
Ms. Sigelakis determined that information was needed from
Respondent on the subject of payment to employees, both for
purposes of pursuing the pending grievances, and in general to
police the parties’ contract. So, on April 8, 2016, Sigelakis sent
a letter3 by email and regular mail to Respondent’s attorney,
Jonathan Bardavid, requesting that Respondent furnish the
Union with the following information:
“For the period February 23, 2009 to the present:
1. Certified payroll and internal payroll reports/records
for all employees performing work for LIF in the District
Council’s jurisdiction.
2. Pay stubs, sign in sheets, time cards, and any and all
other documents indicating names, job title(s), and dates
and hours of work of employees working for LIF in the
District Council’s jurisdiction.
3. Logs or records of outside work assignments or in-
stallation jobs; work orders, job/work tickets, job assign-
ment sheets, time reports, and any other record of outside,
installation or maintenance work performed by LIF, in-
cluding dates and hours of work, employees who per-
formed the work, entity for whom the work was per-
formed, and location of work.
4. Any and all documents indicating names and job ti-
tles of LIF employees who have or had use of a company
van or vehicle and dates of such use.
5. Any and all expense reports or documentation con-
cerning employees’ out of pocket expenses, purpose of the
expense, and reimbursement of such expense (if applica-
ble).”
(Jt. Exh. 1(J).)
Respondent provided no documents nor a written response to
the Union’s April 8, 2016 request. Instead, Sigelakis spoke
with Bardavid by telephone, during which conversation Barda-
vid expressed Respondent’s position that the information re-
quest was overbroad and unduly burdensome. As a result of
that conversation, without formally waiving its right to receive
all the information it originally requested, the Union agreed to
narrow the scope of information that it was seeking from Re-
spondent, at least for purposes of its pending arbitration.
Accordingly, on April 12, 2016, the Union, via email, re-
newed its request for information, but narrowed the scope of its
request for documents from February 23, 2009, to include only
the following six employees: Juan Oyola Oquendo; Carlos
Alvarez; Junior Reyez; Anthony Tirlokhi; Joseph Ecker; and
Danny Dore. For all other unit employees, the Union requested
the information only dating back to January 1, 2015. (Jt. Exh.
1(K).) Notwithstanding the Union’s narrowing of its infor-
mation request, Respondent responded the same day, also via
email, stating that the request was still overbroad, and that Re-

3 All of the Union’s requests and correspondence relevant to this
matter were made through counsel, specifically Sigelakis.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
spondent could not compile the information within the request-
ed time period, nor would it be able to provide the information
prior to the parties’ scheduled arbitration. Respondent suggest-
ed the Union adjourn the pending arbitration. (Jt. Exh. 1(K).)
Later that day, the Union advised Respondent, via email, that
it did not intend to request an adjournment, and inquired when
Respondent would be furnishing the requested information.
Respondent answered, via email, that the information request
was overbroad, irrelevant and very burdensome, and that the
documents would not be provided in advance of the arbitration.
(Jt. Exh. 1(L).)
On May 2, 2016, the Union, via email and first class mail,
renewed its request for the information originally sought in its
April 8, 2016 letter, and additionally requested that Respondent
furnish it with punch cards and time clocks for all employees
performing work in the District Council’s jurisdiction as well as
Daily Reports, Charge Orders, Field Work forms, and Field
Labor Expense Reimbursement Reports for all employees in
the District Council’s jurisdiction. (Jt. Exh. 1(M).)
Having received no response to its May 2 correspondence,
on May 13, 2016, the Union, via email, again renewed its re-
quests for the information it had requested on April 8, 2016,
and May 2, 2016. (Jt. Exh. 1(N).) Four days later, on May 17,
2016, the Union, via email, once again renewed its request for
the information requested on April 8, 2016, and May 2, 2016,
and additionally requested Respondent furnish it with Install-
ers’ Calendars and Job Lists by June 1, 2016. (Jt. Exh. 1(N))
Neither a response nor any documents were forthcoming.
On June 7, 2016, the Union, via email, yet again renewed its
request for the information requested on April 8, 2016 and May
2 and 17, 2016. (Jt. Exh. 1(N).) This time, counsel for Re-
spondent responded by objecting to the requests as over broad,
unduly burdensome, and not relevant, and requested that the
information requests be narrowed. (Jt. Exh. 1(O).)
On June 8, 2016, the Union wrote to the arbitrator assigned
to hear the parties’ grievances, requesting that he order Re-
spondent to produce the documents the Union had requested on
April 8, 2016, and May 2 and 17, 2016. (Jt. Exh. 1(P).) The
arbitration was scheduled for June 14, 2016, and the Union also
requested a conference call with the arbitrator, if necessary.
Respondent opposed the Union’s request regarding the produc-
tion of documents (Jt. Exh. 1(Q)), and a conference call was
held on June 10, 2016, during which the arbitrator ordered Re-
spondent to produce a limited number of documents.
Following the call, on June 10, 2016, the Union, via email,
requested that Respondent provide it with the information or-
dered by the arbitrator to produce, including certain documents
responsive to its April 8, 2016, and May 2 and 17, 2016 re-
quests. The Union included redacted samples of some of the
forms of documents it was seeking.4 (Jt. Exh. 1(R).)
On June 28, 2016, the Union, via email and first class mail,
renewed its assertion that it is entitled to the information it re-
quested on April 8, 2016, May 2 and 17, 2016, and June 8 and

4 Respondent had apparently denied being aware of certain forms of
documents which the Union had identified during the conference call as
having been used by Respondent and provided to the Union by unit
employees.
10, 2016. Nonetheless, it made a narrowed request that Re-
spondent furnish it with the following documents related to
employees Juan Oyola, Junior Reyes, Carlos Alvarez, Anthony
Tirlokhi, and Chandradat Mahaye, by July 1, 2016:
“For the period 8/11/14 to the present:
 Daily reports
 Field labor reimbursement reports
 Charge orders
 Field work forms
 Installers calendars
 Punch/swipe cards
 Timeclock records
 Any and all documents indicating names and
job titles of employees who have or had use
of a company van or vehicle and dates of
such use
 Any and all documents indicating names and
job titles of employees who have or had use
of a corporate credit card and dates of such
use”
(Jt. Exh. 1(T).)
Notwithstanding the Union’s multiple requests, the arbitra-
tor’s order, and its own representations at the June 14, 2016
arbitration hearing, Respondent continued to dispute its obliga-
tion to provide information to the Union, and still had not pro-
vided any documents to the Union at the time the underlying
charge in this case was filed on July 28, 2016.
Finally, on October 6, 2016, the Union served a subpoena
duces tecum on Respondent. Respondent objected to the sub-
poena in its entirety as “over-broad, vague and ambiguous,
unduly burdensome and irrelevant” and “nearly entirely dupli-
cative of prior information requests served by the Union” to
which Respondent had already objected. (Jt. Exh. 1(W).) Nev-
ertheless, Respondent indicated that it would endeavor to pro-
vide certain documents.
Thereafter, on October 13, 2016, over 6 months after the Un-
ion’s initial request for information, Respondent produced a
limited number of documents to the Union, including the fol-
lowing: (1) Charging Orders for Carlos Alvarez from June 11,
2015, through August 31, 2015; and (2) Charging Orders for
Juan Oyola (Oquendo) from January 27, 2016, through April
26, 2016. Later, on February 16, 2017, Respondent also pro-
duced timecards and check view information for Carlos Alva-
rez, Juan Oyola (Oquendo), and Junior Reyes. (Jt. Exh. 1(X and
Y).)
It is undisputed that Respondent did not provide documents
responsive to any of the Union’s information requests which
began on April 8, 2016, until October 13, 2016.
Analysis
The Supreme Court has long held that an employer must
provide a union, on request, with relevant information that is
necessary for the proper performance of its duties as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149, 153 (1956). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that
L.I.F. INDUSTRIES A/K/A LONG ISLAND FIRE PROOF DOOR 5
an employer’s duty to bargain collectively extends beyond
periodic contract negotiations and includes its obligation to
furnish information that allows a union to decide whether to
process a grievance under an existing contract. NLRB v. Acme
Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).5
“A labor organization’s right to information exists not only
for the purpose of negotiating a collective-bargaining agree-
ment, but also for the proper administration of an existing
contract, including the bargaining required to resolve employ-
ee grievances.” Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231,
235 (2005) (citing Hobelmann Port Services, 317 NLRB 279
(1995); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 239 NLRB 106, 107
(1978), enfd. as modified sub som. Electrical Workers v.
NLRB, 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Accordingly, the Board has long held that Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act obligates an employer to furnish requested information
which is potentially relevant to the processing of grievances.
“An actual grievance need not be pending nor must the request-
ed information clearly dispose of the grievance.” United Tech-
nologies Corp., 274 NLRB 504, 506 (1985), supp. 277 NLRB
584 (1985). However, if there does exist a pending grievance,
“an employer’s duty to furnish information relevant to the pro-
cessing of a grievance does not terminate when the grievance is
taken to arbitration.” Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Un-
ion, 355 NLRB 1345, 1353 (2010).
Information requests regarding bargaining unit employees’
terms and conditions of employment are “presumptively rele-
vant” and must be provided. Whitesell Corp., 352 NLRB 1196,
1197 (2008), adopted by a three-member Board, 355 NLRB
649 (2010), enfd. 638 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2011). There is no
burden on the part of the Union to prove the relevance of or
explain the need for this type of presumptively relevant infor-
mation.
By contrast, where the requested information is not directly
related to the bargaining unit, the information is not presump-
tively relevant, and the requesting party does have the burden
of establishing the relevance of the requested material. Disney-
land Park, 350 NLRB 1256, 1257 (2007); Earthgrains Co., 349
NLRB 389 (2007), enfd. in part and denied in part sub nom.
Sara Lee Bakery Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 422 (5th Cir.
2008). Even in those situations where a showing of relevance
is required, whether because the presumption has been rebutted
or because the information requested concerns nonunit matters,
the standard for establishing relevancy is the liberal, “discov-
ery-type standard.” Alcan Rolled Products, 358 NLRB 37, 40
(2012). Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159, 1160 (2006).
1. The information sought by the Union is
presumptively relevant
Based on my review of the Union’s requests, I find that they
all relate directly to terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees and/or employees covered by the CBA and in the
Union’s jurisdiction. Indeed, all of the information sought by
the Union relates specifically to pay, work assignments and
schedules, job titles and duties, and expense reimbursements.

5 This is often referred to as “policing the contract.” See, e.g., Unit-
ed Graphics, Inc., 281 NLRB 463, 465 (1986).
As such, the information is presumptively relevant, and the Act
requires that it be furnished without the need for the Union to
establish relevance.
Respondent does not address the Board’s “presumptively
relevant” standard, but nevertheless argues that the requested
information is not relevant and necessary to the Union’s per-
formance of its duties. It bases its argument on its mistaken
belief that the Union was only entitled to information for pur-
poses of pursuing its pending arbitration. But, that is simply
not true. Ms. Sigelakis credibly testified that her information
requests, though prompted by the pending arbitration, were not
limited to the needs of that arbitration.
Indeed, the extended period for which information was
sought suggests exactly the opposite: that the requested infor-
mation was needed more generally for the Union to effectively
perform its duties as the exclusive representative of the bargain-
ing unit, and to “police the contract.” See United Graphics,
Inc., 281 NLRB 463, 465 (1986) (the Board held that infor-
mation presumptively relevant to the union’s role as bargaining
agent must be provided to the union as it “relates directly to the
policing of contract terms”).
Moreover, in her correspondence repeatedly seeking the re-
quested information, in which she offered to narrow the scope
of her request in a variety of ways, Ms. Sigelakis repeatedly
noted that those offers were without prejudice to the Union’s
position that it continued to be entitled to all the information it
had originally requested, as well as additional information it
requested over the course of over 6 months during which Re-
spondent provided nothing. I find this further bolsters the Un-
ion’s argument that it was seeking information for more than
just the pending arbitration, and I further find that Respondent
has not rebutted the presumption of relevance that attached to
all of the information the Union requested.
2. Deferral is inappropriate in this 8(a)(5) information case
Respondent’s primary argument appears to be that the Board
should defer to the ruling of the Arbitrator with respect to what
is relevant and necessary for the production of documents. This
argument falls short for two reasons.
First, Respondent is essentially arguing that the issue of
whether it was required to provide information to the Union in
the first place should be deferred to the separate arbitration
process. In this regard, the Board has long held that deferral is
not appropriate in 8(a)(5) information request cases. See, e.g.,
United Technologies Corp., 274 NLRB 504, 505 (1985); Daim-
lerChrysler Corp., 331 NLRB 1324, 1324 fn. 3 (2000), enfd.
288 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Chapin Hill at Red Bank, 360
NLRB 116, 116 fn. 2 (2014).
The exception to this non-deferral rule is in cases where the
parties’ contract contains language that acts as a waiver on the
part of the Union to receive information it would otherwise be
entitled to under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Board, which
generally disfavors waivers, requires a waiver of statutory
rights to be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 138 NLRB 15, 16 (1962), enfd. 325 F.2d
746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964). “The
mere existence of a grievance procedure is not sufficient to
constitute a waiver of a union’s statutory right to request infor-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
mation from the employer.” United Technologies Corp., supra
at 505 (citing Timken, supra).
Here, there is no allegation that the parties’ CBA contained
any language regarding the production of information, and
there is no suggestion that the Union waived any right to re-
ceive the information it had repeatedly requested. To the con-
trary, at all times, the Union reserved its rights under the Act to
receive the requested information.
Second, in a situation such as the one herein, where infor-
mation is being sought both for purposes of a specific arbitra-
tion and also generally for policing of the parties’ contract, an
arbitrator’s decision as to what is relevant in the proceeding
before him/her would have no bearing on whether information
was otherwise relevant and necessary for the proper perfor-
mance of the Union’s duties. Indeed, in Postal Service, 332
NLRB 635, 636 (2000), the Board adopted the judge’s recom-
mendation finding that while the underlying grievance was
settled, this does not render the issue (of the request for infor-
mation) moot.
Accordingly, I find no basis for deferring to the arbitrator’s
order regarding what information was required for the limited
purpose of litigating the arbitration before him, and therefore, I
find that deferral would be inappropriate.
Respondent failed and refused to furnish the Union with pre-
sumptively relevant information.
The General Counsel alleges, and I find, that Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when, since about
April 8, 2016, Respondent failed or refused to provide the Un-
ion with presumptively relevant information, which it requested
and is entitled to as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the unit.
The facts are not in dispute. Indeed, Respondent failed to
furnish the Union with any documents at all for over 6 months
from the date of the Union’s initial April 8, 2016 request for
information. The burden is on an employer, once relevance is
established, to provide an adequate explanation or valid defense
to its failure to provide the information in a timely manner.
Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000), Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 311 NLRB 424, 425 (1993). Respondent has not met
that burden.
Therefore, because the information requested was presump-
tively relevant, and that presumption has not been rebutted, I
find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
3. Respondent unreasonably delayed in furnishing the Union
with the requested information
The General Counsel amended its complaint at the hearing to
acknowledge receipt of certain documents from Respondent,
but to allege that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act because the Respondent’s delay in providing the infor-
mation was unreasonable. Respondent counters merely that it
provided documents in response to the arbitrator’s June 10,
2016 ruling, without ever addressing the reasonableness of the
amount of time that had transpired, and maintains that it “re-
sponded” to the Union’s requests with its blanket refusals to
provide information it claimed was “overbroad” and “unduly
burdensome.”
The failure to timely provide relevant information requested is
a separate 8(a)(5) violation of the Act. An employer must time-
ly respond to a union’s request seeking relevant information
even when the employer believes it has grounds for not provid-
ing the information. Regency Service Carts, 345 NLRB 671,
673 (2005) (“When a union makes a request for relevant infor-
mation, the employer has a duty to supply the information in a
timely fashion or to adequately explain why the information
will not be furnished”); Kroger Co., 226 NLRB 512, 513–514
(1976). Absent evidence justifying an employer’s delay in fur-
nishing such information, such a delay is violative of the Act.
Because, I have found that the Union was entitled to all the
information sought at the time it made its initial request, it was
the employer’s duty to furnish it as promptly as possible.
Monmouth Care Center, 354 NLRB 11, 41 (2009), incorpo-
rated by reference in 356 NLRB 152 (2010), enfd. 672 F.3d
1085 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Woodland Clinic, supra. Here, the Un-
ion received no information at all from Respondent until Octo-
ber 13, 2016, when Respondent produced Charge Orders for two
employees for approximately three months each; and later on
February 16, 2017, when Respondent produced timecards and
check view information for those same two employees and one
additional employee. I find that to have been an unreasonable
delay in furnishing such information, which is as much of a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) as a refusal to furnish the infor-
mation at all. Monmouth Care, supra; Woodland Clinic, supra;
Valley Inventory Service, 295 NLRB 1163, 1166 (1989).
In addition, based on the factors that are considered in evalu-
ating whether Respondent exhibited a reasonable good-faith
effort to respond to the information requests, I find that Re-
spondent’s arguments fail. It is clear that Respondent’s actions,
given the totality of the circumstances, do not meet the defini-
tion of reasonable promptness as set forth in West Penn Power
Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003), enfd. in relevant part 394 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 2005) and see Allegheny Power, 339 NLRB 585
(2003) (factors to consider in assessing the promptness of the
response are complexity and extent of the requested infor-
mation, its availability, and difficulty in accessing the infor-
mation.)
Respondent’s witness did not testify, nor is it otherwise ap-
parent, that the Union’s requests for information were overly
complex or voluminous. Its repeated objection was its bare
assertions, without any specific support, that the Union’s re-
quests were “overbroad” and “unduly burdensome,” and that a
response would produce a large number of pages. Nor was
there any evidence presented to establish that information was
unavailable or that it would take more than a minimal amount
of time to access the information.
The limited response that was made came over 6 months af-
ter the Union’s initial request for information. I find that this
clearly constitutes an unreasonable delay. Regency Service
Carts, Inc., supra at 674 (the Board found a 16-weeks delay in
providing information unreasonable); Bundy Corp., 292 NLRB
671, 672 (1989) (the Board found a 6-weeks delay in providing
information unreasonable); Woodland Clinic, supra at 737 (the
Board found a 7-week delay in furnishing information unrea-
sonable); Postal Service, 332 NLRB at 641 (the Board found
that a 5-week delay in furnishing information unreasonable);
Postal Service, 354 NLRB 412 (2009) (the Board found that a
28-day delay in providing information unreasonable).
L.I.F. INDUSTRIES A/K/A LONG ISLAND FIRE PROOF DOOR 7
For the reasons discussed above, Respondent had no reason-
able basis for delaying the furnishing of information pending a
ruling by an arbitrator. I find that the delay was just an exten-
sion of its initial refusal to provide any documents whatsoever
to the Union. Accordingly, I find Respondent’s delay in
providing what limited response it did to the Union’s request
for information was unreasonable and thus violates Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, L.I.F. Industries a/k/a Long Island Fire Proof
Door, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, New York City & Vicinity District Council of
Carpenters, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act and represents a bargaining unit comprised
of workers employed by the Respondent.
3. Since on or about April 8, 2016, Respondent has commit-
ted unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union by failing and refusing to furnish it with information it
requested on April 8 and 12, 2016, May 2, 13, and 17, 2016,
and June 7, 10, and 28, 2016, that is relevant and necessary to
the Union's performance of its functions as the collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent's unit employees.
4. Since on or about April 8, 2016, Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its unreasonable delay in
providing the Union with relevant and necessary information
the Union requested.
5. The Respondent's above-described unfair labor practices
affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in conduct in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recom-
mend that it cease and desist from engaging in such conduct
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
In particular, I shall recommend that, to the extent it has not
already done so, Respondent shall timely furnish the following
information to the Union: all of the information in the Union’s
April 8, 2016, May 2 and 17, 2016, and June 10 and 28, 2016
information requests
I shall also recommend that Respondent be required to notify
its employees that the Union is entitled to request and receive
information related to its role as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, and Respondent will not withhold from, nor unrea-
sonably delay providing to, the Union information which the
Union is lawfully entitled to request and receive.
Therefore, Respondent will be ordered to post and communi-
cate by electronic post to employees the attached Appendix and
notice. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended6

6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ORDER
Respondent, L.I.F. Industries a/k/a Long Island Fire Proof
Door, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, New
York City and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters, by fail-
ing and refusing to and/or unreasonably delaying in providing
the Union information requested that is necessary and relevant
to its role as the exclusive representative of the Respondent’s
unit employees at its Port Washington, New York facility.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes and policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union, in a timely manner, all of the in-
formation in the Union’s April 8, 2016, May 2 and 17, 2016,
and June 10 and 28, 2016 information requests.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Port Washington location copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 29 after being signed by Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicu-
ous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to the physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by Respondent at any time since June 27, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 12, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and

ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively and in good faith
with the Union, New York City and Vicinity District Council of
Carpenters by failing and refusing to furnish it with requested
information in a timely manner that is relevant and necessary to
the Union’s performance of its duties as the collective-
bargaining representative of our unit employees at our Port
Washington facility.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner fail and refuse to
bargain collectively and in good faith with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our employees
in the Unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish to the Union in a timely manner the infor-
mation it requested in its April 8, 2016, May 2 and 17, 2016,
and June 10 and 28, 2016 information requests
L.I.F. INDUSTRIES A/K/A LONG ISLAND FIRE PROOF
DOOR
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/29–CA–181174 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.