Lewis H. Kelly, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Allegheny/Mid-Atl, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 15, 1999
01982387 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 15, 1999)

01982387

03-15-1999

Lewis H. Kelly, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Allegheny/Mid-Atl, Agency.


Lewis H. Kelly v. United States Postal Service

01982387

March 15, 1999

Lewis H. Kelly, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01982387

) Agency No. 1-D-234-0069-97

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Allegheny/Mid-Atl, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Based on a review of the record, we find that the agency properly

dismissed appellant's complaint. Appellant alleged that he was

discriminated against on the bases of race (White), sex (male), and age

(56), when, following an on-the-job accident, he was issued a letter of

warning.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was injured in the course of performing his duties as

mailhandler, tripping and injuring his knee and shoulder. As a result of

the accident, the agency issued a letter of warning to appellant stating

that appellant had been negligent in causing the accident. Appellant

filed a grievance disputing the letter of warning. The grievance

was settled, with the agency agreeing that "the Letter of Warning is

reduced to a discussion . . ." Thereafter, despite the settlement of his

grievance, appellant filed the complaint in the instant matter, alleging

that the letter of warning had been issued for discriminatory reasons.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(e) provides for the dismissal of a

complaint, or portions thereof, when the issues raised therein are moot.

To determine whether the issues raised in appellant's complaint are moot,

the fact finder must ascertain whether (1) it can be said with assurance

that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will

recur; and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably

eradicated the effects of the alleged discrimination. See County of Los

Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). When such circumstances

exist, no relief is available and no need for a determination of the

rights of the parties is presented.

This Commission has consistently applied this rule to cases involving the

situation presented by the matter at hand, holding that the reduction

of a letter of warning to a "discussion" renders the underlying issue

moot because appellant is no longer aggrieved. See Douglas v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950053 (April 18, 1996).

Therefore, the agency reached the correct result in dismissing appellant's

complaint.<1>

Appellant suggests in his appeal statement that he has suffered (or likely

will suffer) compensatory damages as a result of his physical injuries.

He does not contend, however, that those damages were caused by the

allegedly discriminatory action of the agency, i.e., the issuance of

the letter of warning. "To receive an award of compensatory damages,

a complainant must demonstrate that (s)he has been harmed as a result

of the agency's discriminatory action . . . " Rountree v. Department

of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995). Absent any

allegation of a causal relationship, appellant's claim for compensatory

damages cannot be sustained.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the agency properly dismissed

the complaint in this matter. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the final agency

decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(C.F.R.). The grant or denial of the request is within the

sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 15, 1999

____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 The agency purported to dismiss appellant's complaint under 29

C.F.R. �1614.107(a) on the ground that appellant was "not aggrieved."

This Commission has held that dismissals in cases of this nature more

properly come within the ambit of 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(e) which deals

specifically with mootness. See Douglas v. United States Postal Service,

supra.