Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 20, 2022

2020006788 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 20, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/988,857 05/24/2018 Omar Ali Ali RPS920180021- US-NP 18-49 2018 124906 7590 01/20/2022 The Small Patent Law Group LLC 1423 Strassner Dr. Suite 100 Brentwood, MO 63144 EXAMINER MODO, RONALD T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2181 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/20/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@splglaw.com jleclair@splglaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte OMAR ALI ALI, ALAN LADD PAINTER, MARC PAMLEY, BILLY CHEN, and RODRIGO SAMPER ___________ Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20, all of the pending claims. Final Act. 2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2012). Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. Appeal Br. 3. 2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed March 10, 2020); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed October 24, 2019), the Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.,” mailed January 24, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 13, 2020); and the Specification (“Spec.,” filed May 24, 2018). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claimed devices, methods, and cards “relate to methods and devices using dual codecs to transfer digital content signals.” Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification’s Figures 1 and 2 are helpful in understanding the claimed devices, methods and cards. The Specification’s Figure 1, depicting a main circuit board, is reproduced below. Figure 1 depicts main circuit board 100 having first edge 122 and a second edge 124. Id. ¶ 29. Processor 102 is located on main circuit board 100 and manages a transfer of a digital content signal over first and second sets of conductive traces 110 and 112. Id. ¶ 27. Main circuit board 100 includes a ground plane and/or a power plane (not shown) extending parallel to the first Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 3 and second sets of conductive traces 110, 112. Id. ¶ 28. The ground plane extends from first codec 106 to interconnect 108 and to rear audio jack 104. Id. The power plane provides electrical power to processor 102, peripheral controller hub (PCH) 114, peripheral circuit board 200 (depicted in the Specification’s Figure 2), and first audio codec 106 and second audio codec 206 (depicted in the Specification’s Figure 2). Id. The Specification’s Figure 2, depicting a peripheral circuit board, which is connected to main circuit board 100 at second edge 124 via interconnect 108, is reproduced below. Figure 2 depicts peripheral circuit board 200 including socket interface 202 for connection to main circuit board 100 at second edge 124 via interconnect 108. Spec. ¶ 36; see, e.g., Appeal Br. 35 (Claims App.) (claim 6 describing “a peripheral circuit board”). PCH 114 may direct an audio content signal along the second set of conductive traces 112 to second Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 4 codec 206. Spec. ¶ 36. A second analog output may represent audio speaker 208 and/or audio jack 210. Id. As noted above, claims 1-20 are pending. Claims 1, 10, and 18 are independent. Appeal Br. 34 (claim 1), 35 (claim 10), 36 (claim 18) (Claims App.). Claims 2-9 depend directly or indirectly from claim 1, claims 11-17 depend directly or indirectly from claim 10, and claims 19 and 20 depend directly from claim 18. Id. at 34-37. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized, is illustrative. See Final Act. 3 (“using claim 1 as the exemplary claim”). 1. An electronic device, comprising: a main circuit board that includes first and second edges and first and second sets of conductive traces; memory to store program instructions; a processor located on the main circuit board, the processor, responsive to the program instructions, to manage transfer of a digital content signal over the first and second sets of conductive traces; first and second codecs coupled to the first and second edges, respectively, the first and second codecs connected to the first and second sets of conductive traces, respectively, the first and second codecs to convert the digital content signal into an analog content signal; and first and second analog outputs coupled to the first and second codecs, respectively, the first and second analog outputs to output the analog content signal. Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Each of independent claims 10 and 18 recites limitations corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 1. Id. at 35, 36. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 5 REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following references: Name3 Reference Issued/Published Filed Bauer US 5,832,438 Nov. 3, 1998 Feb. 8, 1995 Miller US 2002/0046315 A1 Apr. 18, 2002 Oct. 10, 2001 Shohet US 2010/0157543 A1 June 24, 2010 Dec. 16, 2009 Grinkemeyer US 2011/0001833 A1 Jan. 6, 2011 July 1, 2009 The Examiner rejects: (1) claims 1, 3, 4, 8-10, 12, 13, 17, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller and Grinkemeyer (Final Act. 3-5); (2) claims 2, 5, 11, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Shohet (id. at 5-6); and (3) claims 6, 7, 15, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer (id. at 6). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and contentions, respectively, on claims 1, 6, and 9; so we do as well. See Appeal Br. 11, 19, 21; Ans. 3, 7, 8. Arguments not presented are forfeited.4 3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. 4 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Because Google failed to present these claim construction arguments to the Board, Google forfeited both arguments.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2012) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”). Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 6 Unless otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action, the Advisory Action, and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address the rejections below. ANALYSIS A. Obviousness over Miller and Grinkemeyer 1. Independent Claim 1 As noted above, the Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller and Grinkemeyer. Final Act. 3-4. The Examiner finds Miller teaches or suggests the majority of the limitations of claim 1. Id. (citing Miller ¶¶ 13, 18, 26, 27, Fig. 1). Nevertheless, the Examiner finds Miller does not teach or suggest that the first and second codecs are “coupled to the first and second edges, respectively,” of the main circuit board. Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App.); see Final Act. 7. The Examiner finds, however, that Grinkemeyer teaches or suggests this limitation. Final Act. 4, 7; see Ans. 5. Further, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Miller with those of Grinkemeyer “to provide for better heat dissipation/mitigation in the system” and, thereby, to achieve the methods of claim 1. Final Act. 4; see Grinkemeyer ¶ 86 (“As a heat mitigation measure, the chips can be located near edges of the circuit board and near vents.”). Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 for three reasons. Appeal Br. 15-18; see Ans. 3-5. Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 7 a. Miller Teaches Codecs Implemented in Hardware First, Appellant contends, it is overwhelmingly clear that Miller only discusses the design of codecs implemented as software in the CPU. It is also overwhelmingly clear, in light of Appellant’s claims and specification, that Appellant contemplates two different hardware-type codecs, each coupled to different sets of conductive traces positioned at different physical locations on the main circuit board (a design choice on Appellant’s part). Appeal Br. 16-17 (emphasis added). We disagree with Appellant’s understanding of Miller’s teachings. As the Examiner finds, Miller discloses: As is known to those of skill in the art, the CODEC 114 is typically a software data processing element. However, it is illustrated in the functional block diagram of FIG. 1 because it performs a separate data processing function. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the system 100 may implement a number of different CODECs, one of which is selected as the CODEC 114, based on the type of data to be processed. Miller ¶ 26 (emphases added). Thus, the Examiner finds Miller does not preclude codecs implemented in hardware or require codecs implemented in software. Ans. 3; see Adv. Act. 2 (“Also the examiner noted that Structured Computer Organization, second edition by Tanenbaum5 states that software and hardware are essentially the same and implementing as software or hardware is a design choice to which the applicant agrees on page 11 of the remarks.”). 5 See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 8 Miller’s Figure 1 is reproduced below. Figure 1 depicts a functional block diagram of system 100 that “automatically determines the type of data file, selects the proper data processing component, and configures the user interface and display for proper operation with the selected data file.” Miller ¶¶ 6, 12. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 9 Miller discloses, “[t]he system 100 is intended for portable operation. The various components described above are typically implemented as one or more integrated circuits on a printed circuit (PC) board (not shown).” Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added); see Final Act. 7 (“Figure 1 of Miller shows a CODEC element 114 as being connected to an ‘I2S bus[,]’ which means that it is a physical device because a software implemented device cannot be connected to a bus.”). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Miller teaches or suggests that codecs may be implemented in software or hardware. Therefore, Appellant does not persuaded us of Examiner error by this contention. b. Miller Teaches Multiple Codecs Connected to Multiple Traces Second, Appellant contends, [Miller’s] “codec 114” is connected via the I2S bus to a single amplifier 116 and a single audio output device 118. The different software-based codecs (implemented in the CPU 102) discussed in Miller are unequivocally connected over a single set of conductive traces (e.g., the one I2S bus) to a single amplifier 116 and single audio output device 118. Appeal Br. 16 (emphasis added); see Ans. 4. Further, Appellant contends, even [if] CODEC 114 were a discrete physical component separate from the CPU 102 (to be clear, it is not), Miller would, at best, describe a physical component configured to store/retrieve different software-based codecs depending on the type of audio data file and convert the audio data file and transmit the resultant audio signal to a single audio output device. Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added). Again, we disagree with Appellant’s understanding of Miller’s teachings. The Examiner responds: Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 10 This is clearly not the case since Miller teaches a plurality of CODECs throughout (see for example abstract, claim 1 and paragraphs 16, 26, and 54) and additionally since different CODECs/amplifiers/output devices are required if for example the CODEC is an audio CODEC vs a video CODEC (see Miller paragraph 54)[,] there clearly needs to be more than one CODEC, more than one output device (audio and video require different output device types) and more than one set of traces. Ans. 4-5 (emphases added). In particular, Miller discloses, “the portable digital audio device is fully capable of playing other types of data, such as audio books or even video data. As noted above, different CODECs are designed specifically for data processing of particular data types.” Miller ¶ 54 (emphasis added); see id., Abstr. (“A portable digital audio device is capable of playing a number of different data file types, such as music data files, speech data files, video data files, and the like. Different CODECs are generally used for different data types.”). In addition, Miller’s Figure 1 is merely “a functional block diagram of an exemplary embodiment” of Miller’s system. Miller ¶ 6. Miller discloses: The various components of the system 100 are coupled together by a bus system 138. The bus system 138 may include a data bus, control bus, the I2S bus, a memory bus, and the like. However, for the sake of simplicity, these various buses are illustrated in FIG. 1 as the bus system 138. Id. ¶ 25 (emphases added). We agree with the Examiner that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have understood Miller to teach or suggest that its system may include a plurality of codecs, each supporting a data type and each connected to a conductive trace (e.g., a plurality of I2S buses or the like). Ans. 4 (citing Miller, Abstr., ¶¶ 16, 26, 54, claim 1); see also Miller ¶¶ 18, 25, 64, claims 9 and 11 (discussing a plurality of codecs, each processing Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 11 different data types). Therefore, Appellant does not persuaded us of Examiner error by this contention. c. Grinkemeyer Teaches the Limitations Missing From Miller Third, Appellant contends: Nowhere in Grinkemeyer is there any teaching or suggestion of first and second codecs that are physically distinct in that they are coupled to the first and second edges of a main circuit board and first and second sets of conductive traces, both respectively, as taught and claimed by Appellant. As such, Grinkemeyer fails to cure the defects of Miller noted above. Appeal Br. 18. Appellant, however, misunderstands the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. As the Examiner explains, The examiner didn’t use the Grinkemeyer reference to teach first and second CODECs[,] but used the Miller reference to teach this[,] as noted above and in the final office action. The examiner only used the Grinkemeyer reference to teach placing chips on two different edges of a circuit board with a motivation of providing better heat dissipation/mitigation in the system. Ans. 5 (citing Grinkemeyer ¶ 86); see Adv. Act. 2; Final Act. 4, 7. We agree with the Examiner’s findings. Moreover, Appellant cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is based on combined teachings of the references. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Therefore, Appellant does not persuaded us of Examiner error by this contention. Consequently, Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claim 1. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 12 2. Dependent Claim 9 Claim 9 recites, in the devices of claim 1, “wherein the analog outputs comprise at least one of an audio jack, a video jack, an audio speaker, and an analog video display.” Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller and Grinkemeyer. Final Act. 5. Specifically, the Examiner finds Miller teaches or suggests the additional limitations of claim 9. Id. (citing Miller ¶ 18). Appellant contends, the “codec 114” is connected via the l2S bus to a single amplifier 116 and a single audio output device 118. The different software-based codecs (implemented in the CPU 102) discussed in Miller are unequivocally connected over a single set of conductive traces (e.g., the one l2S bus) to a single amplifier 116 and single audio output device 118. . . . It is also overwhelmingly clear, in light of Appellant’s claims and specification, that Appellant contemplates two different hardware-type codecs, each coupled to different sets of analog outputs (a design choice on Appellant’s part). Accordingly, Miller does not teach first and second codecs coupled to first and second analog outputs, respectively, much less that the analog outputs comprise at least one of an audio jack, a video jack, an audio speaker, and an analog video display as taught and claimed by Appellant and Grinkemeyer fails to cure at least these defects of Miller. Appeal Br. 21 (italics added). The Examiner responds: Paragraph 18 states “The CODEC 114 receives the data on the l.sup.2S bus and converts it from digital data form to analog data. An analog amplifier 116 has an input terminal coupled to the output of the CODEC and receives the analog signal thereon. The amplifier 116 provides the necessary amplification and drive capability to power an audio output device 118, such as a pair of headphones. It should be noted that in a typical implementation, Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 13 the output of the amplifier 116 is coupled to a standard 1/8 inch phone jack (not shown). The headphones 118 plus into the phone jack.” Ans. 8-9 (quoting Miller ¶ 18 (emphasis added)). Thus, we are persuaded the Examiner shows that Miller teaches or suggests this limitation. Therefore, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 9. In summary, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claims 1 and 9 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller and Grinkemeyer, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those claims. Appellant does not challenge the rejection of independent claim 10 or 18 or of the claims 3, 4, 8, 12, 13, 17, and 20 dependent from independent claim 1, 10, or 18, separately, from the challenge to independent claim 1. Reply Br. 3; see Ans. 6. Consequently, we also sustain the rejection of those claims. B. Obviousness over Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Shohet As noted above, the Examiner also rejects claims 2, 5, 11, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Shohet. Final Act. 5-6. Each of claims 2, 5, 11, 14, and 19 depends from one of claims 1, 10, and 18. Appeal Br. 35-37 (Claims App.). Appellant contends that each of these dependent claims is patentable for at least the same reasons as its base claim. E.g., Appeal Br. 18 (“Claim 2 depends from and further defines the subject matter of claim 1, and thus is patentable for at least the reasons set forth above in connection with independent claim 1.”); see also, e.g., Ans. 5 (“Appellant introduces no new arguments as to the patentability of claim 2. The examiner asks that the board use the patentability of claim 1 to determine the patentability of claim Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 14 2.”). Appellant does not otherwise challenge the rejection of these dependent claims separately. Because we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1, 10, or 18 (see supra Section A.1.), on this record, we also are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting dependent claims 2, 5, 11, 14, and 19. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of these dependent claims. C. Obviousness Over Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer As noted above, the Examiner also rejects claims 6, 7, 15, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer. Final Act. 6. Claim 6 recites, in the devices of claim 1, “further comprising a peripheral circuit board having the second codec and second analog output mounted thereon, the peripheral circuit board interconnecting, through a card-edge and socket interface, to the second set of conductive traces at the second edge of the main circuit board.” Appeal Br. 35 (Claims App.) (emphases added). Claim 15 recites a corresponding limitation in the methods of claim 10. Id. at 36. Each of claims 6, 7, 15, and 16 is dependent from one of claims 1 and 10; and claims 7 and 16 depend from claims 6 and 15, respectively. Id. at 35-36. The Examiner finds that Miller and Grinkemeyer together do not teach or suggest the additional limitations recited in claims 6 and 15. Final Act. 6. Nevertheless, the Examiner finds Bauer teaches or suggests these additional limitations. Id. (citing Bauer, 8:49-9:10, Fig. 5). We agree with the Examiner. In particular, Bauer discloses: Second, its audio electronics 49A are on a daughter board 184, rather than being on the system’s motherboard 34A. The electronics on this daughter board are connected to those on the motherboard through a connector. This connector has two mating portions, a portion 186A which is part of the motherboard Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 15 and a portion 186B which is part of the daughter board. The connectors 186A and 186B connect[] the CODEC 77 on the daughter board to the computer’s special I/O controller 48A which is on the motherboard. It also connects the output of the bridge mode amplifier 132 in the daughter board’s single speaker signal path 116A to a connector on the motherboard to which the wires 72A to the speaker 74A are connected. In addition, it connects power lines on the daughter board to those in the motherboard (neither of which are shown in the drawings). Third, since the daughter board’s speaker signal path 116A is monaural instead of stereo, it is connected to the MONO_OUT output of the CODEC chip 77. This output is produced by the CODEC chip through mixing the two analog outputs which the chip’s stereo digital-to-analog converter supplies to LOUTL and LOUTR. The CODEC chip includes within it an analog switch on its MOUT_OUT output which is switched on and off by digital commands supplied to the CODEC chip from the CPU through the special I/O controller 48A. Bauer, 8:49-9:6 (emphases added). Thus, Bauer’s daughter board 184 teaches or suggests the recited, peripheral circuit board, which is connected to motherboard 34A, corresponding to the main circuit board recited in claim 1, via connectors 186A and 186B. Further, Bauer’s daughter board 184 includes CODEC 77 and speaker 74A, i.e., an analog output. Further, the Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Bauer with those of Miller and Grinkemeyer “to improve the user experience by having externally available jacks to connect peripheral devices such as headphones” (Final Act. 6), and, thereby, to achieve the devices of claim 6 and the methods of claim 15. Appellant contends, the extent of modification to [Miller’s] portable digital audio device (which the Office recognizes as already including an audio jack on page 5 of the Final Office Action) with the device Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 16 to test signals on a coaxial home network of Grinkemeyer and further with the multimedia computer having integrated audio- specific components (e.g., equalizers) of Bauer goes well beyond what would have been obvious to a skilled artisan in view of the art. Appeal Br. 19-20. Appellant contends that in the alleged absence of reasons to combine the teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer, the Examiner relies on improper hindsight in combining the teachings of these references. Id. at 20. The Examiner responds: The office is just combining well-known design techniques to solve the problem that the appellant are attempting to claim are new and novel in their application. The Grinkemeyer reference was brought in to teach placing chips on different edges of a board to address heat dissipation in the system which is a well- known problem in the circuit board design arena and has often been solved using the techniques of strategical chip placement on the circuit board. [See Grinkemeyer ¶ 86.] Bauer was added to teach the use of daughter boards to add additional external jacks for interfacing to external devices such as headphones, speakers, microphones or displays. [See also Bauer, 1:12-44 (describing desire for additional audio equipment).] Daughter boards are also used to reduce repair costs by replacing just a failed daughter board instead of the whole main board and when a design may need to be upgraded for various reasons it is easy to swap in a new daughter board to effect the needed change.6 Ans. 7 (emphases added). 6 The Examiner does not cite to evidence supporting this finding regarding reduced repair costs associated with the use of daughter boards. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The presence or absence of a motivation to combine references in an obviousness determination is a pure question of fact.”). However, Appellant does not file a Reply Brief contesting this finding. See supra note 4. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 17 Appellant’s contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error. As the U.S. Supreme Court explains, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Moreover, the Court explains, “[u]nder the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” Id. at 420 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded the Examiner fails to show sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer to achieve the claimed devices and methods. In addition, Appellant contends that each of these dependent claims is patentable for at least the same reasons as its base claim, claim 1 or claim 10. E.g., Appeal Br. 20 (“Additionally, claim 6 depends from and further defines the subject matter of claim 1, and thus is patentable for at least the reasons set forth above in connection with independent claim 1.”); see, e.g., Ans. 7 (“Appellant introduces no new arguments as to the patentability of claim 7. The examiner asks that the board use the patentability of claims 1 and 6 to determine the patentability of claim 7.”). As noted above, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting independent claim 1 or claim 10 (see supra Section A.1.), so we are not persuaded by this additional contention. On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting dependent claims 6, 7, 15, and 16. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of these dependent claims. Appeal 2020-006788 Application 15/988,857 18 DECISION 1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting: a. claims 1, 3, 4, 8-10, 12, 13, 17, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller and Grinkemeyer; b. claims 2, 5, 11, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Shohet; and c. claims 6, 7, 15, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miller, Grinkemeyer, and Bauer. 2. Thus, on this record, claims 1-20 are not patentable. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-20. In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 4, 8-10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20 103 Miller, Grinkemeyer 1, 3, 4, 8- 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20 2, 5, 11, 14, 19 103 Miller, Grinkemeyer, Shohet 2, 5, 11, 14, 19 6, 7, 15, 16 103 Miller, Grinkemeyer, Bauer 6, 7, 15, 16 Overall Outcome 1-20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2013). AFFIRMED