Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 19, 2020

2019002487 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 19, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/311,727 06/23/2014 John Miles Hunt RPS920140078-US-NP 1528
63203 7590 11/19/2020
ROGITZ & ASSOCIATES
4420 Hotel Circle Court
SUITE 230
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108
EXAMINER
LAM, NELSON C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/19/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
John@rogitz.com
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN MILES HUNT,
JOHN WELDON NICHOLSON,
SCOTT EDWARDS KELSO, and
MATTHEW LLOYD HAGENBUCH
Appeal 2019-002487
Application 14/311,727
Technology Center 2600

Before DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, JESSICA C. KAISER, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 12, 19, and 50–60.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Lenovo Singapore
PTE. Ltd. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 1 and 44–49 have been withdrawn; claims 2–11, 13–18, and 20–43
have been cancelled.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to an input device,
e.g., a stylus, which includes an orientation, i.e., motion, sensor; the input
device transmits its motion sensor data to some other device, e.g., a tablet,
causing the other device to execute some function. Spec. 1–2, 10–11.3
Independent claims 12 and 19, reproduced below, are exemplary of the
claimed subject matter:
12. A method, comprising:
determining whether a stylus is moving based at least in
part on data related to input from an accelerometer on the stylus;
enabling execution of one or more functions at a first
device responsive to determining that the stylus is moving;
disabling execution of the one or more functions at the first
device responsive to determining that the stylus is not moving.
19. A computer readable storage medium (CRSM) that
is not a transitory signal, the computer readable storage medium
comprising instructions executable by at least one processor of a
first device to:
receive data pertaining to input from an accelerometer on
an input device;
at least in part based on the data, determine at least one of:
that the input device is moving toward the first device, that the
input device is moving away from the first device; and

3 This Decision refers to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed June 23, 2014
(“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed January 10,
2018; (3) the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed April 9, 2018; (4) the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed January 11, 2019; and (5) the Reply
Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed January 28, 2019.
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responsive to a determination that the input device is
moving toward the first device, execute one or more functions at
the first device.
Appeal Br. 15–16.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Martin US 5,933,135 Aug. 3, 1999
Schiller US 6,577,299 B1 June 10, 2003
Kasai US 2006/0092143 A1 May 4, 2006
Harris US 2013/0120463 A1 May 16, 2013
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 19, 55, 56, 59, and 60 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Harris. Final Act. 3–4.
The Examiner rejects claims 12 and 50–52 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Harris and Martin. Id. at 5–6.
The Examiner rejects claim 53 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Harris, Martin, and Schiller. Id. at 6.
The Examiner rejects claim 54 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Harris, Martin, Schiller, and Kasai. Id. at 6–7.
The Examiner rejects claim 57 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Harris and Schiller. Id. at 7.
The Examiner rejects claim 58 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Harris, Schiller, and Kasai. Id. at 8.
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OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).

Anticipation of Claim 19
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Harris discloses
“receiv[ing] data pertaining to input from an accelerometer on an input
device; [and] at least in part based on the data, determin[ing] . . . that the
input device is moving,” as recited in claim 19. Appeal Br. 6–11; Reply Br.
1–5. Specifically, Appellant argues that Harris’s “stylus accelerometer per
paragraph 63,” i.e., “an accelerometer on an input device,” is “not
necessarily used” to determine that the stylus referenced in “paragraphs 81,
102, and 107” is moving. Reply Br. 4; Appeal Br. 10–11.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Harris
discloses “receiv[ing] data pertaining to input from an accelerometer on an
input device.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 3–4. In particular, the Examiner points out
that Harris’s “‘[s]tylus 140 may include one or more accelerometers 148
and/or other components for sensing movement metrics’” and such “‘motion
information may be communicated to a tablet.’” Ans. 4 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Harris ¶ 63). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, that Harris
discloses “at least in part based on the data, determine . . . that the input
device is moving.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 4–7. In particular, the Examiner
points out that (Ans. 4), Harris’s “[t]ablet 130 may also include an interface
to stylus 836 that is configured to detect the position of, and motion of,
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stylus 140 in relation to tablet 130, for example by receiving input from
stylus 140 via a wireless interface” (Harris ¶ 81). Further, Harris
“determin[es] whether the stylus [has] moved closer to the tablet input
device” or “farther away from the tablet.” Id. ¶¶ 102, 107.
Appellant’s argument that the “accelerometer 148 on Harris’s . . .
stylus 140 is only disclosed at Figure 5A and paragraph 63,” but a stylus
accelerometer “is not mentioned at any of relied-upon paragraphs 81, 102,
and 107 for any purpose,” namely, to determine that the stylus is moving
(Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 4) is unpersuasive. That argument incorrectly
requires that, to anticipate, every claimed feature be expressly spelled out in
the same paragraph. Appellant relies on, among other cases, Net MoneyIN,
Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008), to assert that
Harris must disclose “all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same
way as recited” to anticipate claim 19. Appeal Br. 7, 11. However, the
Federal Circuit distinguishes Net MoneyIN where the prior art reference
“explicitly contemplates the combination of the disclosed functionalities.”
Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Moreover, the Federal Circuit also explains that a “reference can anticipate a
claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or
combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference,
would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.”
Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (citing In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681
(CCPA 1962)).
Here, even if the portions of Harris discussing the determination of
stylus movement do not explicitly state that movement determination is
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based on the stylus’s accelerometer, a person of skill in the art, reading
Harris, would immediately envisage determining stylus movement using the
stylus’s accelerometer. Harris describes that “stylus 140” senses “movement
metrics” via an accelerometer and such “motion information may be
communicated to a tablet.” Harris ¶ 63 (emphasis added). Harris further
describes that its “[t]ablet 130 . . . is configured to detect the position of, and
motion of, stylus 140 in relation to tablet 130, for example by receiving input
from stylus 140.” Id. ¶ 81 (emphasis added). As both portions discuss
sending stylus information to a tablet — from the same stylus 140 — and
Harris also describes stylus 140 transmitting motion information from its
accelerometer, a person of skill in the art would have understood that its
tablet determines stylus motion based on accelerometer data. Further, like
Blue Calypso, Harris contemplates combining the disclosed stylus
accelerometer motion tracking functionality and the disclosed tablet
functionalities based on tracked stylus movement. 815 F.3d at 1343. For
example, Harris describes that “a combination of inputs may be analyzed to
determine an action to take in response to a gesture made by a stylus. These
inputs may include information collected about the manipulation of the
stylus.” Harris ¶ 60.
In addition, not only is Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because it
ignores what a skilled artisan would understand by reading Harris, it is also
unpersuasive because Harris indeed describes that its tablet determines input
device movement using motion information received from an input device.
The Examiner points out that (Final Act. 5; Ans. 5) Harris’s method
“determin[es] whether the stylus moved closer to the tablet input device, as
in [step] 1050,” as shown in the flowchart of Figure 10 (Harris ¶ 102). In
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describing Figure 10, Harris explains that “determining that the stylus has
moved . . . closer to or farther away from the tablet” can be detected “using
one or more sensors . . . in the stylus.” Id. ¶ 101. Accordingly, Harris
discloses that stylus movement can be determined via sensors in the stylus,
which, as Harris explains, include accelerometers.
Further, to the extent that Appellant argues the Examiner is
improperly relying on inherency (Reply Br. 5; Appeal Br. 10), that argument
is unpersuasive because the Examiner has not stated that the rejection is
based on inherency nor does the Examiner’s rejection need to rely on
inherency (see Final Act. 4; Ans. 3–7).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding
Harris discloses “receiv[ing] data pertaining to input from an accelerometer
on an input device; at least in part based on the data, determin[ing] . . . that
the input device is moving,” as recited in claim 19.

Obviousness of Claim 12
Appellant contends the Examiner erred by improperly combining
Harris and Martin. Appeal Br. 12–13; see Reply Br. 5. Specifically,
Appellant argues “no evidence has been cited at all for the proffered
motivation” and “the rejections are on silent on any evidence that would
prove that the skilled artisan would be motivated to seek out Martin in the
first place without already knowing about it to then combine it with Harris.”
Appeal Br. 13.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that
“Martin teaches disabling execution of the one or more functions at the first
device responsive to determining that the stylus is not moving.” Final
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Act. 5. In particular, Martin describes a system which repositions a cursor
based on “movement of [a] pen 16.” Martin 4:55–62. The Examiner’s
combination “add[s] the cursor movement function disclosed by Martin to
the invention of Harris.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner supports that
combination by reasoning “that when the pen (stylus) stops moving, the
cursor will accordingly stop moving.” Id.
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s stated motivation requires
cited evidence is unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 12–13. That argument attempts
to add a new obviousness requirement that our reviewing court does not
require. Although Appellant relies on In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2016), to support its position, there, the Federal Circuit did not
require that the motivation supporting the obviousness analysis must be
found in evidence. Instead, the Federal Circuit required articulated
“reasoned explanations” supporting the obviousness conclusion. Id. at
1384–85.
Here, Appellant does not challenge the propriety of the Examiner’s
reasoned explanations and motivation for the combination, and, in fact,
acknowledges that the Examiner offered a motivation. Appeal Br. 12
(“Appellant also notes . . . the proffered motivation to combine Martin with
Harris . . . .”). Further, the Examiner’s explanation supporting the
combination — namely, to stop moving a cursor when an input device stops
moving (Final Act. 5) — is rationally underpinned. When the actuation of a
computer input device causes some corresponding feature to occur, e.g., the
movement of a stylus causes the movement of an on-screen cursor, it would
be intuitive that the cessation of input device movement would also cause
the cessation of the feature, e.g., the cursor stops moving when the stylus
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stops moving. Such an intuitive correspondence is typified in the
corresponding movements of a computer mouse and computer display
cursor. Indeed, Harris suggests such a correspondence, supporting the
reasonableness of the Examiner’s proffered motivation. For example, Harris
describes when its “stylus move[s] closer to the tablet input device . . . the
method may . . . zoom in to an area of interest;” when “the stylus move[s]
farther away from the tablet input device . . . the method may . . . zoom out;”
and, when the stylus does not “increase[] or decrease[] its distance to the
tablet, there may be no change in the zoom level in response.” Harris ¶ 102
(emphasis added).4
Furthermore, while not necessary to make our determination, we note
that under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed method
steps, the final method step which the Harris and Martin combination is
relied-upon to teach — “disabling execution of the one or more functions at
the first device responsive to determining that the stylus is not moving” —
need not be performed. Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013-007847, at
6–7 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential). Claim 12, as written, covers at
least two methods, one in which the prerequisite condition for the triggering
step is met and one in which the prerequisite condition for the determining
step is not met. Id. at 7–8. Specifically, the prerequisite condition recited in
the claim “determin[es] whether a stylus is moving.” In the first method, the
prerequisite condition is met (“enabling execution of one or more functions

4 This feature in Harris may, itself, render claim 12 obvious or anticipated.
Because this issue is not before us, should there be further prosecution, we
leave it to the Examiner to determine whether claim 12 is obvious over or
anticipated by Harris.
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at a first device responsive to determining that the stylus is moving”); in the
alternative second method, the prerequisite condition is not met (“disabling
execution of the one or more functions at the first device responsive to
determining that the stylus is not moving”). Accordingly, the broadest
reasonable interpretation encompasses a method where only the step of
“enabling execution of one or more functions at a first device responsive to
determining that the stylus is moving” is performed. Id. As such, it appears
that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 12, the prior art
need not show “disabling execution of the one or more functions at the first
device responsive to determining that the stylus is not moving” in order to
render claim 12 obvious (or anticipated).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred by improperly
combining Harris and Martin.
In addition, Appellant relies on the same arguments as in claim 19,
discussed above, to contend that the Examiner erred in finding Harris
teaches “determining whether a stylus is moving based at least in part on
data related to input from an accelerometer on the stylus,” as recited in
claim 12. Appeal Br. 11–12; Reply Br. 5–6. For the same reasons as
discussed above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding
Harris teaches “determining whether a stylus is moving based at least in part
on data related to input from an accelerometer on the stylus,” as recited in
claim 12.

Remaining Claims 50–60
Appellant does not argue separate patentability for dependent
claims 50–60, which depend directly or indirectly from claims 12 or 19. See
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Appeal Br. 6–14. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 50–60.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
19, 55, 56,
59, 60
102 Harris 19, 55, 56,
59, 60

12, 50–52 103 Harris, Martin 12, 50–52
53 103 Harris, Martin,
Schiller
53
54 103 Harris, Martin,
Schiller, Kasai
54
57 103 Harris, Schiller 57
58 103 Harris, Schiller,
Kasai
58
Overall
Outcome
12, 19,
50–60

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED