Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 23, 2021

2020000473 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/155,886 05/16/2016 Suzanne Marion Beaumont RPS920130100USCNT
710264C
1887
58127 7590 04/23/2021
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
GUERRA-ERAZO, EDGAR X
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2656
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/23/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SUZANNE MARION BEAUMONT, RUSSELL SPEIGHT, and
ROD D. WALTERMANN
____________________

Appeal 2020-000473
Application 15/155,886
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20. Appellant has canceled claims 4,
5, 8, 14, 15, and 18. See Appeal Br. 31–33. We have jurisdiction over the
remaining pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies
Lenovo (Singapore) PTE. LTD. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant describes an aspect of the invention as receiving user input,
identifying an emotion tag associated with the user input, creating and
storing an emotion tag, analyzing the emotion tag, and “modifying an
operation of an application based on the analyzing.” Spec. ¶ 4. According
to the Specification, characteristics of a user input (e.g., tone, inflections,
and volume) may be used to create metadata such as an emotion tag. Spec.
¶ 17. This emotion tag (i.e., a piece of metadata) may be used during
operation of an application. In a disclosed example, a user of a search
application may seek to retrieve an email but can only recall that the email
was sent last week and that the user was excited about a birthday
celebration. Spec. ¶ 34. Thus, the user may provide a search input of
“excited last week.” Spec. ¶ 35. In a disclosed embodiment, the search
application may identify documents associated with an emotion tag of
excitement. Spec. ¶ 36.
Claims 1, 11, and 20 are independent. Claim 1 is representative (see
Appeal Br. 28; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) of the subject matter on
appeal and is reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in
italics:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, at an input component of an information
handling device, user input comprising one or more words
explicitly directed to a search application;
identifying, using a processor of the information handling
device, an emotion tag associated with at least one of the one or
more words;
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searching, using the emotion tag and the one or more
words, at least one document accessible by the search
application; and
identifying, based on the searching, a search result,
wherein the search result does not comprise the one or more
words.

The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
the doctrine of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over the
claims of U.S. Patent No. 9,342,501. Final Act. 13–14.
2. Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without
significantly more. Final Act. 7–12.
3. Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 11–13, 16, 17, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Jaiswal et al. (US
2009/0306979 A1; Dec. 10, 2009) (“Jaiswal”). Final Act. 15–23.
4. Claims 9, 10, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Jaiswal and Wang et al. (US 6,442,593 B1; Aug. 27,
2002) (“Wang”). Final Act. 24–26.

ANALYSIS2
Rejection under doctrine of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting
The Examiner rejected claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20
under the doctrine of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting over

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
April 11, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed October 28, 2019
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed August 26, 2019 (“Ans.”);
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claims 1–19 of U.S. Patent No. 9,342,501. Final Act. 13–14. Appellant
asserts that “the rejection is moot in view of the amendments made to the
claims throughout the prosecution of this case.” Appeal Br. 18.
As an initial matter, we note that no amendments were made to the
claims after the Final Office Action and before Appellant filed the Appeal
Brief. Moreover, in the Response portion of the Final Office Action, the
Examiner maintained the rejection “even after the presented amended
language.” Final Act. 2. Further, in the Answer, the Examiner maintained
that every ground of rejection in the Final Office Action is being maintained.
Ans. 3. Additionally, we note that Appellant has not filed a terminal
disclaimer.
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims or issues, such arguments are considered
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d
1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the appellant fails to contest a ground
of rejection to the Board, . . . the Board may treat any argument with respect
to that ground of rejection as waived.”). Additionally, “[i]f a ground of
rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief,
appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board
may summarily sustain it unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the
rejection in the examiner’s answer.” Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) § 1205.02 (9th ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020)

and the Final Office Action, mailed October 9, 2018 (“Final Act.”), from
which this Appeal is taken
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Accordingly, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 under the doctrine of nonstatutory
obviousness-type double patenting.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 19–26. In
particular, Appellant argues the claims do not recite one of the identified
categories of abstract ideas (i.e., certain methods of organizing human
activity, mathematical concepts, or mental processes), but instead are
“directed to technological improvements to the technological field of
emotion tags.” Appeal Br. 20–22. That is, Appellant asserts the claims set
forth “a method for modifying an output operation of an application using a
previously created emotion tag.” Appeal Br. 22–24. In addition, Appellant
argues the claims provide an inventive concept because the claimed
elements “are not known elements” and are combined in an unconventional
and non-generic arrangement that is not well-understood, routine, or
conventional. Appeal Br. 25–26.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance
for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically
with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office
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Guidance”).3 If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially
recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look
at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the
claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Per the Office Guidance, this first inquiry (“Step 2A”) has two
prongs of analysis: (i) does the claim recite (i.e., set forth or describe) a
judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea such as a mental process), and (ii) if
so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. Office
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A). Under the
Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. Office
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d). If the claim
is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does
not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step (“Step
2B”) is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements,
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at
217; Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05.

3 The Office Guidance, as well as guidance set forth in the Berkheimer
Memorandum, have been incorporated into the latest revision of the Manual
of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2103–2106.07(c) (9th ed.,
Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
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We conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea. More
specifically, Appellant’s claims generally describe using an available
emotion tag associated with a user input as a search input to a search
application. This is consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed
invention. See Spec. ¶ 34 (describing an embodiment of using previously
formed tags to assist a search application), Fig. 4; see also Appeal Br. 5, 8
(Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter, citing Spec. ¶ 34).
Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that
the concept of using an available emotion tag associated with a user input as
a search input to a search application is a mental process (e.g., observations,
evaluations, judgments, and opinions) that is applied and performed in a
computing environment—i.e., an abstract idea.4 See MPEP
§ 2106.04(a)(2)(III); see also Elec. Pwr. Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that “analyzing information by
steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms,
without more, a[re] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea
category”); Content Extraction & Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that claims drawn to

4 Although we describe the abstract idea slightly differently than the
Examiner, the Examiner’s characterization of the idea is not erroneous. “An
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
level of abstraction an examiner uses to describe an abstract idea need not
“impact the patentability analysis.” Apple, 842 F.3d at 1241. That is true
here. Regardless of the level of generality used to describe the abstract idea
recited, the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Accenture Glob.
Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the district court’s abstract idea of
organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract concept.”).
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collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected set, and storing
the recognized data were patent ineligible, noting that “humans have always
performed these functions”); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “the
collection, storage, and recognition of data” to be abstract); Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding the parsing,
comparing, storing, and editing of data to be abstract); Evolutionary
Intelligence LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F. App’x 679, 680 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (affirming the District Court’s determination that
“searching and processing [stored] data” was a patent-ineligible mental
process).
Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that describe (i.e., recite) the concept of using an available
emotion tag associated with a user input as a search input to a search
application, emphasized in italics:
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, at an input component of an information
handling device, user input comprising one or more words
explicitly directed to a search application;
identifying, using a processor of the information handling
device, an emotion tag associated with at least one of the one or
more words;
searching, using the emotion tag and the one or more
words, at least one document accessible by the search
application; and
identifying, based on the searching, a search result,
wherein the search result does not comprise the one or more
words.
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More specifically, the concept of using an available emotion tag
associated with a user input as a search input to a search application
comprises (i) receiving a search query from a user (i.e., the claimed step of
receiving user input comprising one or more words explicitly directed to a
search application); (ii) determining if the user search query is associated
with an emotion tag (i.e., the claimed step of identifying an emotion tag
associated with at least one of the one or more words); and (iii) conducting a
search using the search query terms and the identified emotion tag (i.e., the
claimed step of searching, using the emotion tag and the one or more words).
Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine
whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP
§ 2106.04(d). To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional
elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate
those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception
into a recognized practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, we find the additional limitations do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not
recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other
technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular
machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b));
(iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state
(see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation
(see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
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More particularly, the additional limitations of an input component or
processor of an information handling device, as recited and applied in the
claims, are not a particular machine sufficient to confer patent eligibility to
the judicial exception. At the outset, we note that whether a judicial
exception is performed by a particular machine may be a clue of patent
eligibility, but it is not a stand-alone test. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593,
604 (2010); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Here, the information handling
device (and its components) merely applies the judicial exception and does
not qualify as a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Versata Dev. Group v. SAP
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for
a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in
permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely
as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more
quickly”); MPEP § 2106.05(b); see also Spec. ¶¶ 19–24 (describing the
recited components at a high level of generality), Fig. 1.
Further, the additional limitation of identifying, based on the
searching, a search result, wherein the search result does not comprise the
one or more words is insufficient to confer patent eligibility. Instead, this
limitation merely presents the results of performing the judicial exception—
i.e., identifying a search result based on the provided search criteria (i.e., an
emotion tag and the user input). See Elec. Pwr., 830 F.3d at 1354
(recognizing that “merely presenting the results of abstract processes . . . is
abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”); see also SAP
Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1066
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(E.D. Mo. 2011) (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . .
are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”)
aff’d, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014,
1016–17 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (non-precedential) (determining that the step of
cutting hair after a desired style has been selected is an insignificant
application of the abstract idea and fails to confer patent eligibility); MPEP
§ 2106.05(f). The additional language that the search result does not include
the one or more words of the user input merely refines the result of the
searching step and fails to confer patent eligibility.
In addition, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, we do not find the
claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality or a
technical field. “To be a patent-eligible improvement to computer
functionality, we have required the claims to be directed to an improvement
in the functionality of the computer or network platform itself.” Customedia
Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir.
2020). As discussed above, the claims are directed to using an available
emotion tag associated with user input as a search input to a search
application. That is, the claims are not improving the creation or storage of
emotion tags, nor are the claims improving the operation of a search
application. Instead, the search application is using an additional term (i.e.,
an emotion tag) as part of the search query. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We . . . look to
whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect
that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.”) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336
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(Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a) (“the judicial exception alone
cannot provide the improvement”).
For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or
combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice
(i.e., step 2B of the Office Guidance) to determine if there are additional
limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims
amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at
217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77–79). As stated in the Office Guidance,
many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to
“significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already
considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been
integrated into a practical application. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56;
see also MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I). Thus, at this point of our analysis, we
determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of
limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a
high level of generality. Office Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP
§ 2106.05(II). “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369.
Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (alone or
when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well understood,
routine, and conventional. As discussed above, Appellant describes the
information handling device (and its components) and functions performed
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by the information handling device at a high level of generality. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶¶ 19–24 (describing the information handling device as being
embodied as a personal computer) 42 (explaining the functionality may be
performed by “a processor of a general purpose information handling
device”); see also Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d
1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he invocation of ‘already-available
computers that are not themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance . . .
amounts to a recitation of what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.’” (quoting SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1170)). Additionally, the
functions of receiving user input, conducting a search and presenting the
results of the search are conventional computer functions. See, e.g., I/P
Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“search
engines, content-based filtering, and collaborative filtering were all well-
known in the art”); Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d 1315, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (explaining that receiving a request to execute a database search and
delivering records are routine computer functions that can only be described
as generic or conventional).
To the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek to tie-up (i.e.,
preempt) an abstract idea (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 24), we are unpersuaded of
Examiner error. “‘[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject
matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.’” FairWarning IP LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788
F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F. 3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not
preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the
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e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Further,
“[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d
at 1379.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 6, 7,
9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s finding that Jaiswal discloses
searching, using an emotion tag along with user input, as recited in claim 1.
Appeal Br. 26–28. In particular, Appellant argues Jaiswal describes a
system for creating a transcription corpus of a conversation including
metadata links, but does not describe a search engine or the ability to search
using an emotion tag (i.e., the metadata). Appeal Br. 27–28. Appellant
argues that although Jaiswal discloses a search engine optimized keyword
list, this keyword list is not equivalent to a search engine. Appeal Br. 28.
Moreover, Appellant argues Jaiswal does not disclose identifying a search
result, wherein the search result does not comprise the one or more words
(i.e., the user input), as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 28.
Jaiswal generally relates to a system for “autonomously transcribing
and building tagging data of a conversation.” Jaiswal, Abstract. In
particular, Jaiswal describes a corpus processing agent (CPA) that “monitors
a conversation and utilizes a speech recognition agent to identify the spoken
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languages, speakers, and emotional patterns of speakers of the
conversation.” Jaiswal ¶ 5. A transcription of the conversation, along with
metadata links, is then created. Jaiswal ¶ 5. Jaiswal further describes
detecting emotions in speech using techniques to capture variations in pitch
and tone. Jaiswal ¶ 19. The variations may be scored and correlated to
emotions suitable for metadata tagging. Jaiswal ¶ 19. Jaiswal describes that
the corpus (i.e., transcription with metadata links) of a conversation may be
analyzed and used to populate a database. Jaiswal ¶ 21. Jaiswal describes
various databases including a link database (containing metadata tags of
corpuses), a lexical database (i.e., an electronic dictionary), a conversational
database (a paraphrase reference database), and a popularity index (which is
a database of keywords and phrases of analyzed corpuses). Jaiswal ¶ 16,
Fig. 1. A user of the CPA may reference information of one corpus to that
of another corpus. Jaiswal. ¶ 21. Jaiswal further describes the CPA “may
also contain a search engine optimized keyword list for publishing content of
[the corpuses] for a user.” Jaiswal ¶ 21.
Thus, Jaiswal describes various databases populated with information
from, or related to various conversation corpuses and that the CPA may
contain a search engine optimized keyword list. However, we agree with
Appellant that there is no disclosure that, even if Jaiswal discloses searching
the corpuses or databases using user input and an associated metadata field
(e.g., an emotion tag), a point which we need not decide, Jaiswal does not
disclose identifying a search result “wherein the search result does not
comprise the one or more words” of user input.
For the reasons discussed supra, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 of claim 1. For similar reasons, we also do
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not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 of independent
claims 11 and 20, which recite similar limitations. In addition, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 of claims 2, 3, 6, 7,
12, 13, 16, and 17, which depend directly or indirectly therefrom.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejected dependent claims 9, 10, and 19 over the
combined teachings of Jaiswal and Wang. Final Act. 24–26. The Examiner
does not rely on Wang to cure the deficiencies of Jaiswal, discussed above.
Accordingly, for similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 9, 10, and 19.

CONCLUSION
We summarily affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6,
7, 9–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 under the doctrine of nonstatutory obviousness-
type double patenting.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13,
16, 17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6, 7, 11–13,
16, 17, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 9, 10, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–
13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6, 7, 9–
13, 16, 17,
19, 20
Nonstatutory
obviousness-type
double patenting
1–3, 6, 7,
9–13, 16,
17, 19, 20

1–3, 6, 7, 9–
13, 16, 17,
19, 20
101 Patent eligibility 1–3, 6, 7,
9–13, 16,
17, 19, 20

1–3, 6, 7,
11–13, 16,
17, 20
102(a)(1) Jaiswal 1–3, 6, 7,
11–13,
16, 17, 20
9, 10, 19 103 Jaiswal, Wang 9, 10, 19
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 6, 7,
9–13, 16,
17, 19, 20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv); see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED