Legal Aid Society of Alameda County

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 21, 1997

324 N.L.R.B. 796 (N.L.R.B. 1997)

796
324 NLRB No. 135
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The Employer also contended that two other attorneys—Manag-
ing Attorney and Litigation Director Steve Ronfeldt and Managing
Attorney Paul Rose—are statutory supervisors. In agreement with the
Employer, the Regional Director found that these two individuals
were statutory supervisors and therefore excluded them from the
unit. The Union did not seek review of this finding.
2 The Employer also requested review of the Regional Director’s
findings that three of the Employer’s contract attorneys—Kim Card,
Laurie Gong, and Mary Appel—were not temporary employees and
were therefore included in the unit. The Board, however, denied the
Employer’s request for review with respect to these findings.
3 Sec. 2(11) defines a supervisor as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the em-
ployer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or respon-
sibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or cleri-
cal nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
4 Contrary to the Regional Director’s finding, however, we find
that the Employer failed to demonstrate that Leftridge has similar
authority with respect to clericals. Sweet testified that the managing
attorneys evaluate clericals and that he gives those evaluations ‘‘sub-
stantial weight.’’ However, he also testified that he did not follow
the recommendations in three of eight, or almost 40 percent, of cleri-
cal evaluations prepared in the last 2 years. Further, no specific evi-
dence was introduced regarding any clerical evaluations prepared by
Leftridge or any recommendations made by her regarding retention
or termination of clericals. Finally, we note that the evaluations of
clericals by other managing attorneys that were introduced into evi-
dence do not contain any recommendations. Under these cir-
cumstances, we find the record evidence insufficient to establish that
Leftridge’s evaluation of clericals constituted supervisory authority.
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County and National
Organization of Legal Service Workers, Dis-
trict 65, United Automobile, Aerospace, and
Agricultural Implement Workers, AFL–CIO.
Cases 32–RM–657 and 32–RC–3375
October 21, 1997
DECISION ON REVIEW AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS FOX AND
HIGGINS
The issue presented in this case is whether four of
the Legal Aid Society’s attorneys should be excluded
from the petitioned-for unit of attorneys on the ground
that they exercise statutory supervisory authority over
nonunit law clerks, paralegals and/or clericals, or oth-
erwise exercise statutory supervisory authority.
Following a hearing, on May 14, 1991, the Regional
Director for Region 32 issued a Decision and Direction
of Election. The Regional Director found that one of
the four subject attorneys, senior attorney Evelyn
Frank, did not possess any statutory supervisory au-
thority. With respect to the other three subject attor-
neys, managing attorneys Carolyn Leftridge and
Dwight Dickerson, and staff attorney Susan Spelletich,
the Regional Director found that they did possess stat-
utory supervisory authority with respect to nonunit em-
ployees, but that such authority did not warrant their
exclusion from the unit under the standards set forth
in Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 (1972), and New
York University, 221 NLRB 1148 (1975), as subse-
quently clarified in Detroit College of Business, 296
NLRB 318 (1989), since it was exercised over nonunit
support personnel and was merely ancillary to their
primary responsibilities as attorneys. Accordingly, the
Regional Director found that all four of the disputed
attorneys were properly included in the unit.1
Thereafter, by Order dated June 25, 1991, the Board
granted the Employer’s request for review of the Re-
gional Director’s decision with respect to the status of
the four attorneys as it raised substantial issues war-
ranting review.2 Having reviewed the entire record, we
affirm the Regional Director’s findings that Dickerson,
Frank, and Spelletich are properly included in the unit,
but reverse his finding that Leftridge is properly in-
cluded in the unit.
1. We agree with the Regional Director that
Leftridge’s authority to evaluate and effectively rec-
ommend retention and termination of the paralegals in
her unit constitutes supervisory authority within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.3 Managing attor-
neys evaluate the job performance of paralegals work-
ing under them and recommend whether the paralegals
be retained or terminated. Clifford Sweet, the Employ-
er’s executive director, testified that he gives ‘‘substan-
tial weight’’ to the evaluations performed of paralegals
by managing attorneys, and that during the last 2 years
he followed all but one of eight such evaluations.
Sweet testified that he makes his decision based solely
on whether the managing attorney supplied enough
reasons or documentation for the recommendation in
the evaluation. If there is not enough documentation to
support the recommendation, Sweet informs the man-
aging attorney that the recommendation cannot be ef-
fectuated; he does not ask the managing attorney to
redo the evaluation. From this testimony, it appears
that Sweet bases his decision solely on the managing
attorney’s evaluation and does not conduct an inde-
pendent investigation.
Further, the record indicates that within a year prior
to the hearing, Sweet actually terminated a paralegal
for inadequate performance based on Leftridge’s rec-
ommendation. In these circumstances, we find that the
Employer has carried its burden of establishing that
Leftridge possesses statutory supervisory authority
based on her authority to evaluate and to effectively
recommend the termination of paralegals.4
We disagree, however, with the Regional Director’s
finding that the exercise of this supervisory authority
over nonunit paralegals did not warrant Leftridge’s ex-
clusion from the unit under the Board’s decisions in
Adelphi University and New York University, as subse-
quently clarified in Detroit College of Business. In
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797LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ALAMEDA COUNTY
5 Although the Regional Director found to the contrary based on
the conclusory testimony of Sweet, as indicated above the record
evidence does not support that finding.
those cases, the Board drew a distinction between su-
pervisory authority exercised over unit employees and
such authority exercised over nonunit employees, find-
ing that in the latter situation the Board must evaluate
whether the supervisory functions being exercised ‘‘so
allied the individuals with management as to establish
a differentiation between them and other employees in
the unit.’’ Detroit College, 296 NLRB at 320 (quoting
Adelphi, 195 NLRB at 644). The Board reasoned that
such an inquiry was necessary due to the relative im-
precision of the supervisory question in professional
settings and the fact that professional employees fre-
quently require the ‘‘ancillary services’’ of nonprofes-
sional ‘‘support personnel’’ in order to carry out their
professional duties. Id. (quoting New York University,
221 NLRB at 1156).
As indicated in Detroit College, this inquiry led the
Board in Adelphi to conclude that the university’s di-
rector of admissions should not be excluded from the
petitioned-for unit of faculty members because he had
the authority to hire, fire, and direct his secretary. The
Board found that because the director’s professional
duties were of the same character as those of the unit
employees, and he exercised supervisory authority over
his secretary only infrequently (i.e., less than 50 per-
cent of the time), he was not so allied with manage-
ment as to create a conflict of interest warranting his
exclusion from the unit.
As discussed in Detroit College, the Board in New
York University and other subsequent cases cited
Adelphi as establishing a so-called ‘‘50 percent’’ rule
in such circumstances, and, accordingly, held that any
individual who supervised nonunit employees less than
50 percent of the time was not a supervisor. The Board
in Detroit College, however, rejected such a ‘‘short-
hand’’ approach and instead held that a complete ex-
amination of all the factors present must be made to
determine the nature of the individual’s alliance with
management. The Board stated that relevant factors to
be considered would include, but not be limited to, the
business of the employer, the duties of the individuals
exercising supervisory authority and those of the bar-
gaining unit employees, the particular supervisory
functions being exercised, the degree of control being
exercised over the nonunit employees, and the relative
amount of interest the individuals at issue have in fur-
thering the policies of the employer as opposed to
those of the bargaining unit in which they would be
included. Id. at 321.
The Regional Director reasoned that Leftridge was
hired as an attorney and that her primary work product
was to provide legal services in the area of family law
to indigent clients. Since the paralegals did research,
drafted briefs and pleadings for her signature, and
processed temporary restraining orders under her close
direction, the Regional Director found that Leftridge’s
supervision of paralegals was ‘‘merely ancillary to her
professional duties as an attorney.’’ We disagree.
Contrary to the Regional Director, we find
Leftridge’s supervision of the paralegals more
analagous to the supervision by the coordinators in De-
troit College of the part-time faculty members than to
the supervision by the admissions director in Adelphi
or the librarians in New York University of clerical em-
ployees. In performing such work as drafting briefs
and pleadings for Leftridge’s signature, the paralegals
are not performing work that is ‘‘merely adjunct to
that of the professional and is not the primary work
product.’’ New York University, 221 NLRB at 1156.
Rather, they are directly and substantively engaged in
producing part of Leftridge’s primary work product.
Neither can it be said that Leftridge’s supervision of
employees engaged in writing briefs and pleadings
which will be filed in court under her signature is
merely ancillary to her professional duties as an attor-
ney. We note, in addition, that the record also estab-
lishes that paralegals handle their own cases ‘‘com-
pletely independently’’ of and with no regular input
from Leftridge. Under these circumstances, we find
that the paralegals are not support personnel similar to
the secretaries in Adelphi and New York University,
who engaged in no substantive work of the profes-
sionals who supervised them. Accordingly, we find
that Leftridge’s supervision of paralegals requires her
exclusion from the unit.
2. We agree with the Regional Director that
Spelletich is properly included in the unit. We make
that finding, however, not for the reasons stated by the
Regional Director but because we find that Spelletich
does not in fact exercise any supervisory authority over
unit or nonunit employees. Specifically, we find as a
factual matter that the record does not support the Re-
gional Director’s finding that Spelletich had authority
to hire law clerks.
Although Spelletich is involved in interviewing and
hiring the law clerks, it is clear that other attorneys, in-
cluding Ronfeldt, are also involved in hiring the law
clerks. Spelletich testified that she consults with
Ronfeldt and other attorneys in deciding which appli-
cants to interview, and that at least one other attorney
(or paralegal) will participate in the interviews. Fur-
ther, Ronfeldt testified that Spelletich discusses with
him the law clerks she wants to hire before hiring
them. Thus, we find that Spelletich does not independ-
ently hire law clerks.5 Accordingly, since the Em-
ployer has failed to establish that Spelletich exercises
any statutory supervisory authority, we find that the
Regional Director properly included her in the unit.
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798 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6 Although Dickerson testified in conclusory fashion that he had
the authority to hire his own law clerks, the record indicates that
Dickerson has not actually hired a paid law clerk since 1986, and
there were no law clerks working under Dickerson at the time of the
hearing. Further, there is no record evidence of the duties of
Dickerson’s law clerks when they worked under him. Under these
circumstances, we find the record insufficient to establish that
Dickerson’s hiring authority, which has not been exercised since
1986, ‘‘so allie[s] [him] with management as to establish a differen-
tiation between [him] and other employees in the unit.’’ Detroit Col-
lege, 296 NLRB at 320.
We further find that, in light of the fact that Dickerson’s evalua-
tions of his clericals do not contain any recommendations, Sweet’s
testimony that he did not follow the recommendations of managing
attorneys in a substantial number of cases, and Dickerson’s testi-
mony that he was not aware of his evaluations of clericals having
any impact on the clericals’ compensation or tenure, the Employer
did not establish that Dickerson exercised supervisory authority in
his evaluations of his clericals. See fn. 4, supra.
7 The Chairman would overrule the Detroit College test and re-
place it with a test which focuses solely on whether the nonunit em-
ployee being supervised is a ‘‘support’’ person. In our view, such
a ‘‘shorthand’’ approach is too simplistic and fails to take into ac-
count the complexity of the issues presented by the ‘‘tension be-
tween the Act’s exclusion of [supervisory and] managerial employ-
ees and its inclusion of professionals . . . .’’ NLRB v. Health Care
& Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 581 (1994)(quoting NLRB v. Ye-
shiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980)). We decline to overrule
Detroit College. We also note that no party has sought in this case
to overrule the Detroit College test, and thus the issue has not been
briefed or litigated.
1 Adelphi University, 195 NLRB 639 (1972); New York University,
221 NLRB 1148 (1975); Detroit College of Business, 296 NLRB
318 (1989).
3. We agree, for the reasons stated by the Regional
Director, that Frank exercises no statutory supervisory
authority and is thus properly included in the unit.
Similarly, we agree with his finding that Dickerson ex-
ercises no statutory supervisory authority over unit em-
ployees and that his sporadic exercise of supervisory
authority of nonunit employees is insufficient to war-
rant his exclusion from the unit.6 See Greenspan,
D.D.S., P.C., 318 NLRB 70 (1995); Commercial Fleet
Wash, Inc., 190 NLRB 326 (1971); Meijer Super-
markets, Inc., 142 NLRB 513, 517 fn. 8 (1963). Ac-
cordingly, we find, in agreement with the Regional Di-
rector, that Frank and Dickerson are properly included
in the unit.7
ORDER
The Regional Director’s finding that Leftridge is
properly included in the unit is reversed; the Regional
Director’s finding that Dickerson, Frank, and
Spelletich are properly included in the unit is affirmed;
and the proceeding is remanded to the Regional Direc-
tor for further appropriate action.
CHAIRMAN GOULD, concurring and dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that managing attorney
Dwight Dickerson does not exercise statutory super-
visory authority over contract attorney Mary Appel.
However, contrary to my colleagues, I find it unneces-
sary to reach the question of whether any or all of the
disputed attorneys exercise Section 2(11) supervisory
authority over paralegals, law clerks, or clericals. Even
assuming that all of these attorneys possess statutory
supervisory authority over such employees, I would
nevertheless include them in the petitioned-for profes-
sional unit because their supervision extends only to
nonunit support personnel. Consequently, I agree with
the majority’s inclusion of managing attorney Dwight
Dickerson, senior attorney Evelyn Frank, and staff at-
torney Susan Spelletich but disagree with the exclusion
of managing attorney Carolyn Leftridge.
Salaried professionals, who possess substantial ex-
pertise and technical knowledge based upon a special-
ized and lengthy education, are a vital and expanding
part of the contemporary work force. The issue raised
in this case—whether the Board should exclude from
a professional bargaining unit a professional who has
no supervisory authority over other professionals but
only oversees the work of nonunit employees—is dif-
ficult as it involves both the Act’s exclusion of super-
visors and its inclusion of professionals who in provid-
ing the very services for which they are trained and
hired often find it necessary to supervise the work of
nonprofessional employees. To accommodate the ten-
sion between these provisions, the Board in certain cir-
cumstances has refused to exclude professional em-
ployees from a professional unit merely because they
exercised supervisory authority over nonunit employ-
ees such as secretaries, clerks, etc.1 In explaining its
rationale, the Board stated in Adelphi University, 195
NLRB 639, 644 (1972):
[A]n employee whose principal duties are of the
same character as that of other bargaining unit
employees should not be isolated from them sole-
ly because of a sporadic exercise of supervisory
authority over nonunit personnel. No danger of
conflict of interest within the unit is presented,
nor does the infrequent exercise of supervisory
authority so ally such an employee with manage-
ment as to create a more generalized conflict of
interest of the type envisioned by Congress in
adopting Section 2(11) of the Act.
This rationale was elaborated on in New York Univer-
sity, 221 NLRB 1148, 1156 (1975), where the Board
stated:
Professionals, as well as supervisors, exercise
discretion and judgment, and professional employ-
ees frequently require the ancillary services of
nonprofessional employees in order to carry out
their professional, not supervisory, responsibilities.
But that does not change the nature of their work
from professional to supervisory, nor their relation
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799LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ALAMEDA COUNTY
2 Similarly, for example, aides allegedly supervised by a charge
nurse would not be employees hired to perform as personal support
staff, at least in the limited sense of my use of the term here; instead
the aide and the charge nurses work as a team to provide primary
care.
to management. They are not hired as supervisors
but as professionals. The work of employees that
may be ‘‘supervised’’ by professionals in this cat-
egory is merely adjunct to that of the professional
and is not the primary work product. In short, we
do not believe that any teacher, lawyer, architect,
doctor, editor, etc., whose employer provides him
with the services of a typist, secretary, draftsman,
or similar support personnel, was intended by
Congress to be excluded from the Act by the rote
application of the statute without any reference to
its purpose or the individual’s place on the labor-
management spectrum.
In some respects, I agree with the approach taken in
Adelphi and New York University, and therefore, I
would include in a professional unit those profes-
sionals who supervise nonunit employees if the work
of the nonunit employees is to provide ancillary sup-
port to professionals in the performance of their pro-
fessional duties. To meet this test the support staff
must function in a ‘‘personal’’ capacity to the profes-
sionals. The standard would not be met if the profes-
sionals’ alleged supervisory responsibilities extended to
support staff generally. For example, under this stand-
ard, an attorney in this case would not be included in
the unit if that attorney exercised supervisory authority
over all the Employer’s secretarial staff rather than
secretaries who personally worked for the profes-
sionals.2 Cf. Finkin, The Supervisory Status of Profes-
sional Employees, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 805 (1977).
Contrary to the majority, I am of the view that
Adelphi, New York University, and Detroit College
should be overruled for the following reasons. In
Adelphi and New York University, the Board used a
50-percent test to determine whether professionals who
supervise nonunit employees are statutory supervisors,
finding that professionals would be included in a pro-
fessional unit if their supervision amounted to less than
50 percent of their worktime. That formula was re-
jected by the Board in Detroit College. There, the
Board established a multifactor approach with empha-
sis on whether the nonunit supervision being per-
formed by the professional was part of his primary
work product which would align the professional with
management or whether such supervision was only in-
cidental. However, I find Detroit College confusing as
it is unclear how the separate factors were to be ana-
lyzed, and, unlike the support test described above,
Detroit College improperly focused on the work of the
professional rather than the work of the employee
being supervised.
Detroit College is thus inconsistent with our efforts
during these past 3-1/2 years to diminish wasteful or
unnecessary litigation. See, for instance, Management
Training Corp., 317 NLRB 131 (1995); my concurring
opinion in Fountainview Care Center, 323 NLRB 990
(1997); Glass Depot, Inc., 318 NLRB 766 (1995); my
concurring opinion in Smith’s Food & Drug Centers,
Inc., 320 NLRB 844 (1996); and Douglas-Randall,
Inc., 320 NLRB 431 (1995). The same policies have
been espoused and promoted in the Board’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Appropriateness of Re-
quested Single Location Bargaining Units in Represen-
tation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50, 146 (proposed Septem-
ber 28, 1995).
Consequently, I would overrule the primary v. inci-
dental standard utilized in Detroit College. I do not,
however, reject the premise underlying the Board’s de-
cisions in Adelphi, New York University, and Detroit
College, namely that professionals who only supervise
nonunit employees may nevertheless be included in a
professional bargaining unit. Indeed, I endorse the ra-
tionale for the inclusion of professionals in these cir-
cumstances as set forth by the Board in Adelphi and
New York University.
Indeed, as noted in New York University, profes-
sionals often need the services of employees such as
‘‘a typist, secretary, draftsman, or similar support per-
sonnel’’ (221 NLRB at 1156, emphasis added) to per-
form their professional responsibilities. Since it is this
performance of professional duties which qualifies pro-
fessionals for inclusion in a professional unit, it is irra-
tional to then exclude such employees simply because
they supervise support personnel who assist them in
the performance of their professional duties. Profes-
sionals are employed for their professional expertise,
not to supervise the employees with whom they work.
Moreover, the supervisory authority of the profes-
sional in these circumstances is exercised only with re-
spect to a separately organizable and differently ori-
ented group of employees who are wholly outside the
scope of the unit. Thus, there is no ‘‘divided loyalty’’
problem as the professionals’ supervisory authority is
set apart from their primary interest as employees in
professional matters and concerns. And since profes-
sionals often must use and supervise the services of
nonunit support personnel—whether they be secretar-
ies, draftsmen, clerks, lab employees, or paralegals—
I do not think it was Congress’ intention to thereby
deny such professionals the protections of the Act.
Nor do I think that the Court’s opinion in NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S.Ct. 1778
(1994), requires a finding that the supervision of
nonunit employees be treated the same as the super-
vision of unit employees. The Court in Health Care &
Retirement rejected the Board’s interpretation and ap-
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800 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 None of the four attorneys in dispute has general, overall super-
visory authority. Although two of the four attorneys have the title
managing attorney, they are not the managing attorney for any of
the Employer’s five offices but rather are only in charge of specific
areas of law, i.e., Leftridge is the managing attorney of the family
law clinic in both the Hayward and the Oakland office and
Dickerson is the managing attorney of the landlord tenant clinic in
the Oakland office. Thus, their title managing attorney does not con-
fer any general supervisory authority over the Employer’s entire sup-
port staff; instead, their authority extends only to the nonunit para-
legals and clericals who provide personal support to them in carrying
out their professional duties.
4 This result is in line with other Board cases wherein the Board
has declined to confer supervisory status on employees even though
they meet the literal definition of supervisor. For example, an em-
ployee will not be considered a statutory supervisor although the em-
ployee may have exercised a 2(11) supervisory indicia if such au-
thority is exercised only sporadically or intermittently. Meijer Super-
markets, Inc., 142 NLRB 513, 517 fn. 8 (1963); J. J. Newberry Co.,
249 NLRB 991, 991 (1980); Greenspan D.D.S., P.C., 318 NLRB 70
(1995). Also, an employee who possesses statutory supervisory au-
thority while substituting for a supervisor will not be considered a
supervisor unless such substitution is regular and substantial.
Hexacomb Corp., 313 NLRB 983, 984 (1994); Aladdin Hotel, 270
NLRB 838, 840 (1984). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp., 163
NLRB 723 (1967), affd. 171 NLRB 1239 (1968), enfd. 424 F.2d
1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 831 (1970), where pro-
fessional engineers who exercised statutory supervisory authority
over nonunit employees during certain portions of the work year
were nevertheless included in a unit of engineers and granted rep-
resentational rights for those work periods in which they performed
as nonsupervisory employees.
plication of the statutory phrase ‘‘in the interest of the
employer’’ in finding that the employer’s nurses, who
exercised certain responsibilities over nurses’ aides,
were not statutory supervisors. The Court, however,
made clear the limited nature of its holding. Thus, in
response to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in that case,
which cited and expressed concern about the effect of
the Court’s opinion on various other Board decisions
(including Detroit College and New York University)
involving other types of professionals, the Court em-
phasized that its decision was limited to the Board’s
interpretation and application of the statutory phrase
‘‘in the interest of the employer’’ and cast no doubt
on other Board decisions which do not turn on the
Board’s interpretation of the foregoing statutory
phrase. 114 S.Ct. at 1785.
Moreover, in rejecting the Board’s use of ‘‘in the in-
terest of the employer’’ the Court’s concern was also
directed at the fact that the Board had devised a test
that had a different meaning in the health care industry
than it had in other industries. 114 S.Ct. at 1785. Here,
the inclusion of professionals who only supervise
nonunit employees is not industry specific; it applies to
all professionals in all industries. Consequently, in my
opinion the underlying principle of Adelphi, New York
University, and Detroit College was not rendered in-
valid by the Court’s Health Care & Retirement deci-
sion.
Here, managing attorney Leftridge is assisted by
paralegals who interview clients, perform research, and
draft briefs and pleadings for Leftridge’s signature.
One of these paralegals also works independently with
respect to certain public benefits programs since she is
the only person in that office with any public benefits
experience. Staff attorney Frank also works with para-
legals who, like Leftridge’s paralegals, handle cases
and prepare briefs. Frank reviews their work because
she could at some point ‘‘inherit’’ the case from the
paralegal. Managing attorney Dickerson is assisted by
one full-time and one part-time clerical who perform
various clerical services with respect to Dickerson’s
professional duties. Staff attorney Spelletich is respon-
sible for coordinating the Employer’s law clerk pro-
gram. In this capacity, Spelletich organizes the law
clerk’s initial orientation and training and assigns them
on a rotating basis to the attorneys in her office, in-
cluding herself. The law clerks assist the various attor-
neys with their assigned cases.
All of these paralegals, law clerks, and clericals
clearly provide support for attorneys in the perform-
ance of their professional responsibilities. Both
Leftridge’s and Frank’s paralegals assist in the prepara-
tion of legal documents with respect to cases these at-
torneys are currently handling or are ultimately respon-
sible for. Although one of Leftridge’s paralegals also
performs some independent work, this work not only
directly supports the Employer’s legal operation as a
whole but also indirectly supports Leftridge since she
would have to handle those cases if there were no
paralegal available for such work. Spelletich’s law
clerks not only provide support for Spelletich but for
all of the attorneys in the office. The fact that the law
clerks are pooled and thus do not work exclusively for
Spelletich (although only Spelletich is alleged to be
their supervisor) does not remove the clerks from the
definition of support personnel. The critical factor is
whether the law clerks provide support services to pro-
fessional employees. Since the clerks assist Spelletich
and the other attorneys in the handling of their legal
cases, the clerks are clearly providing support to pro-
fessionals as they perform their professional duties.
Similarly, even though the paralegals and law clerks
perform work that is similar or identical to work that
is normally handled by attorneys, they are still consid-
ered support personnel. In fact, since the attorneys
need only review the work of their paralegals and
clerks rather than do it entirely by themselves, these
employees provide invaluable support to the attorneys
in carrying out their professional responsibilities.3
I would, therefore, affirm the Regional Director and
find that attorneys Leftridge, Dickerson, Frank, and
Spelletich are not supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) and thus are included in the petitioned-
for professional unit.4 The decision of my colleagues
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801LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ALAMEDA COUNTY
5 Though the majority characterizes this dissent as ‘‘simplistic,’’ in
fn. 7 of the majority opinion, supra, the fact is that the formulated
demarcation line takes into account the competing tensions under the
statute. The approach set forth in my opinion is a statutorily appro-
priate reconciliation of both principles involved here, i.e., exclusion
of supervisors, on the one hand, and inclusion of professionals on
the other.
to apply Detroit College to exclude Leftridge will deprive
many professionals of their rights and protections under the
Act and thus is contrary both to the spirit of the Act and the
sound administration of the Act’s provisions.5
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