Lee, Eugene M.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 20, 202013599517 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 20, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/599,517 08/30/2012 Eugene M. Lee 113708.121_CON4 1019 23400 7590 07/20/2020 POSZ LAW GROUP, PLC 12040 SOUTH LAKES DRIVE SUITE 101 RESTON, VA 20191 EXAMINER YESILDAG, LAURA G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3629 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/20/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): dposz@poszlaw.com mailbox@poszlaw.com tvarndell@poszlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte EUGENE M. LEE ____________ Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and CAROLYN D. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This application returns to us after we affirmed the Examiner’s decision to reject then-pending claims 21–38 in part. Ex parte Lee, Appeal 2016-003036 (PTAB Apr. 3, 2017) (“Bd. Dec.”). Prosecution reopened after that decision, and Appellant1 now appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s subsequent decision to reject claims 21–40. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Eugene M. Lee. Appeal Br. 5. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention is an intellectual property (IP) information analysis, searching, and access system that, among other things, administers licenses. To this end, the claimed invention (1) tracks royalty payments paid by licensees according to license agreements as actual royalty rates, and (2) notifies of potential breaches when the rates are below those for most favored nations. See generally Abstract; Spec. 45–47; Figs. 1, 11. Claims 21 and 25 are illustrative: 21. A method for administering licenses, comprising: providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of license agreements associated with a licensing package; tracking, in the computer processor device, payments of royalties paid by licensees according to respective schedules in the license agreements associated with the licensing package, as actual royalty rates; monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of license agreements in the licensing package; and providing, by the computer processor device, an end-user visualization tool which, responsive to clicking on a particular clause in a license agreement of the plurality of license agreements, displays relative usage of the clause in the plurality of license agreements, wherein the clause is a most favored nation rate clause. 25. A method for administering licenses, comprising: providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of license agreements; Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 3 obtaining, by the computer processor device, from public records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in connection with one of the license agreements; tracking, by the computer processor device, compliance of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and providing, by the computer processor device, notification of compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement. RELATED APPEALS On page 5 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant cites ten related appeals, all of which have been decided as follows: Application Number Appeal Number Appeal Status 10/229,273 2009-010022 Decision mailed Apr. 22, 2011 10/229,273 2014-009230 Decision mailed Aug. 5, 2016 13/599,415 2014-003734 Decision mailed Mar. 2, 2017 13/618,979 2014-008495 Decision mailed Mar. 15, 2017 13/619,486 2014-008498 Decision mailed Mar. 15, 2017 13/599,639 2014-009733 Decision mailed Mar. 21, 2017 13/599,206 2014-009364 Decision mailed Mar. 20, 2017 13/803,691 2015-001993 Decision mailed Mar. 29, 2017 13/599,517 2016-003036 Decision mailed Apr. 3, 2017 13/619,151 2018-006242 Decision mailed July 2, 2019 Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 4 THE REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 4–9.2 The Examiner rejected claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as indefinite. Final Act. 9–10. The Examiner rejected claims 21–40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 10–19. The Examiner rejected claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Rivette (WO 00/11575 A1; published Mar. 2, 2000). Final Act. 20–23. The Examiner rejected claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Rivette and Grundfest (US 2002/0165726 Al; published Nov. 7, 2002). Final Act. 24–35. THE INELIGIBILITY REJECTION The Examiner determines that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea, namely (1) processing and managing legal transactions with respect to royalties paid by licensees, and (2) monitoring legal compliance of contractual and legal obligations between licensors and licensees, which involve certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. See Final Act. 10–19; Ans. 11–29. According to the Examiner, the recited 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed July 2, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed January 8, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 2, 2019 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed June 3, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 5 additional elements, including the recited computer components, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea, but merely recite generic computer elements that implement the abstract idea. See Final Act. 15–19; Ans. 14– 21. Appellant argues that the claims are eligible because, among other things, they are directed to specific tools for checking (1) package-wide interaction of actually-paid royalties versus most favored nation clauses, and (2) interaction between public-record-actual activity and geographic and territorial limits of one license agreement. Appeal Br. 20–33; Reply Br. 9– 20. According to Appellant, not only do the claims fail to recite certain methods of organizing human activity, the claims recite additional elements that integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application, including (1) an end-user visualization tool that enables clicking on a particular clause in one agreement resulting in displaying that clause in other agreements in independent claims 21, 27, and 33, and (2) obtaining sales data from public records that indicates a licensee’s geographic or territorial sales, and tracking the licensee’s compliance of that sales activity with geographic or territorial limits under an associated license agreement in independent claims 25, 31, and 37. Reply Br. 10–14. Appellant adds that the recited additional elements are not well-understood, routine, and conventional and, therefore, add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. Appeal Br. 29–30, 32– 34; Reply Br. 15, 20. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 6 ISSUE Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40 as directed to ineligible subject matter? This issue turns on whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether the recited elements— considered individually and as an ordered combination—transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. PRINCIPLES OF LAW An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 7 economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 187 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). That said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 8 concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: 3 See also October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 9 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. ANALYSIS Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38–40: Alice/Mayo Step One Representative independent claim 21 recites a method for administering licenses with the following steps: providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of license agreements associated with a licensing package; tracking, in the4 computer processor device, payments of royalties paid by licensees according to respective schedules in the license agreements associated with the licensing package, as actual royalty rates; monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of license agreements in the licensing package; and providing, by the computer processor device, an end-user visualization tool which, responsive to clicking on a particular clause in a license agreement of the plurality of license agreements, displays relative 4 Although no antecedent basis exists for the first instance of “the computer processor device,” we nonetheless assume that “the computer processor device” was intended to be “a computer processor device.” Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 10 usage of the clause in the plurality of license agreements, wherein the clause is a most favored nation rate clause. As shown in Appellant’s Figure 1, the disclosed invention includes an IP licensing application 108 that assists users in organizing, tracking, storing, searching, and leveraging license agreements. Spec. 23. As explained on the Specification’s page 46, the cost analyzer assigns costs and other payment schedules affiliated with licensing packages, thus enabling licensors and licensees to track royalty and other costs associated with licenses. The Specification further explains that licenses are tracked for “a host of reasons” including, for example, uniformity, consistency, and negotiation strategy success. Spec. 46. Notably, for some users, losing track of royalty rates can be disastrous. Id. For example, a licensor may have signed licensees up to a “most favored nation” royalty guarantee. Id. By failing to monitor the royalty amount in such a circumstance, licensors can be held in breach if they were to lower the license royalty rate below the most favored nation rate, and not offer that rate to the first customer. Id. Appellant’s IP licensing application also includes a royalty tracker 1112 that automatically tracks licensees’ royalty payments. Id. This tracking capability results from data supplied by “compliance tracker” 1110 that can track royalty payments according to a preloaded schedule. Id. 47. The IP licensing application also includes “sales tracker” 1116 that tracks product sales data based on user-defined variables, including geographic and territorial limits linked to public records showing sales data. Id. Turning to claim 21’s eligibility, we first note that the claim recites a method and, therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 11 despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id. The Examiner determines that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea, namely (1) processing and managing legal transactions with respect to royalties paid by licensees, and (2) monitoring legal compliance of contractual and legal obligations between licensors and licensees, which are said to involve certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. See Final Act. 10–19; Ans. 11–29. To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, we (1) identify the claim’s specific limitations that recite an abstract idea, and (2) determine whether the identified limitations fall within certain subject matter groupings, namely, (a) mathematical Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 12 concepts5; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity6; or (c) mental processes.7 Here, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor device,8 and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, all of claim 21’s recited limitations fit squarely within at least one of the above categories of the USPTO’s guidelines. When read as a whole, the recited limitations are directed to (1) tracking paid royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensuring the agreements’ royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations. That is, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, claim 21’s tracking, monitoring, and displaying limitations fit squarely in the 5 Mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. 6 Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. 7 Mental processes are concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. 8 We italicize recited limitations for emphasis. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 13 mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the USPTO’s guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary mental processes including observation, evaluation, and judgment); see also id. (listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including legal obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions). To the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 21’s limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on pages 10 and 11 of the Reply Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above and detailed below, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, every limitation of claim 21 recites an abstract idea. That is, items (1)–(3) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the abstract idea: all other limitations in claim 21 are part of the abstract idea as detailed below. First, (1) “tracking . . . payments of royalties paid by licensees according to respective schedules in the license agreements associated with the licensing package as actual royalty rates,” and (2) “monitoring . . . the actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of license agreements in the licensing package” can be done entirely mentally by merely (1) writing down royalty payments on a piece of paper after they are received from licensees pursuant to license agreements; and (2) cognitively comparing that information to most favored nation rates Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 14 in those agreements. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that a person could construct a map of credit card numbers by merely writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Second, “display[ing] relative usage of [a most favored nation rate] clause in the license agreements” could also be done entirely mentally and with pen and paper by merely (1) cognitively selecting a clause in a license agreement; (2) mentally comparing that clause to clauses in other license agreements; (3) cognitively determining whether the agreements’ clauses match a most favored nation rate clause; and (4) displaying that match by writing it down on a piece of paper. Such steps merely involve observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by merely using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address). The tracking, monitoring, and displaying steps also organize human activity, at least with respect to complying with legal obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including legal obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions). Accord Ans. 11–12. Cf. Shortridge v. Foundation Construction Payroll Service, LLC, 655 F. App’x 848, 849–544 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (holding ineligible claim reciting method of public works construction payroll processing for a contractor including, among other things, producing reports Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 15 indicating whether the contractor complies with applicable jurisdiction- specific rules). In short, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, the recited tracking, monitoring, and displaying steps fit within the mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the USPTO’s Guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea. Notably, the three elements enumerated above are the only recited elements beyond the abstract idea, but these additional elements, considered individually and in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole. First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves a computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated by the Federal Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 16 (see Appeal Br. 23–30; Reply Br. 10–15), we disagree. Even assuming, without deciding, that the claimed invention can (1) track paid royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensure the agreements’ royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations faster or more efficiently than doing so manually, any speed or efficiency increase comes from the capabilities of the generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general- purpose computer do not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of Appellant’s claimed invention is not on improving computer processors as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095. Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. See Appeal Br. 26–27. There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 17 Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three- dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1316. But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed invention here merely uses generic computer components to (1) track paid royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensure the agreements’ royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations. This generic computer implementation is not only directed to mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity, but also does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing McRO). Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance on Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (2018). See Appeal Br. 25. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing device that could display an application summary window that was not only reachable directly from the main menu, but could also display a limited list of selectable functions while the application was in an un-launched state. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. Upon selecting a function, the device would then launch the application and initiate the selected function. Id. at 1360. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention was directed to an improved user interface for computing devices that used a particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of information to the user, unlike conventional user interface methods that displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–63. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 18 That is not the case here. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br. 25), the fact that a user can click on a particular clause to display its relative usage in license agreements in the claimed invention differs substantially from the particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of information to the user, including a limited list of selectable functions while an application is in an un-launched state in Core Wireless. See Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 25), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 25–26) is likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider (ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable filtering solution improved the computer system’s performance and, therefore, was patent- eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea in that case, the claimed invention here uses generic computing components to implement an abstract idea as noted previously. Appellant’s reliance on Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (2018) (Appeal Br. 28) is also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a behavior-based virus scanning system. In Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 19 reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention employed a new kind of file that enabled a computer security system to do that which could not be done previously, including accumulating and using newly-available, behavior-based information about potential threats. Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305. That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 28), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies International v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (Appeal Br. 28) is also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a method for displaying and facilitating trading of market information relating to a traded commodity, including dynamically displaying an indicator in each of a GUI's bid and ask display regions, the regions positioned along a common static price axis. Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1002–06. The claimed invention in that case also displayed an order entry region with locations for receiving trade order commands, and, responsive to selecting a particular location, (1) commodity-related trade order parameters were set, and (2) a trade order was sent to an electronic exchange. Id. at 1003. Notably, the court held that claimed invention did not simply display information on a graphical user interface, but rather required a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the interface’s structure that addressed and resolved a specifically-identified problem in the art and, therefore, was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1004. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 20 That is not the case here. Although the claimed invention displays a particular clause’s relative usage in license agreements responsive to clicking that clause in a license agreement, to the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the interface’s structure that addresses and resolves a specifically-identified problem in the art as in Trading Technologies (see Appeal Br. 28), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance (Appeal Br. 27–28) on Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing eligibility of a claim reciting a data processing system for designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form, where the system included, among other things, (1) a form file that modeled the physical representation of an original paper form and established the calculations and rule conditions required to fill in the viewable form; (2) a form file creation program that imported a background image from an original form; and (3) a form viewer program). That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 27–28), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellant’s reliance on the non-precedential Board decision, Ex parte Scheer, Appeal 2017-011742 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2019) on pages 12 and 13 of the Reply Brief is likewise unavailing. Not only do the facts in that case differ from those at issue here, as a non-precedential decision, it is not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 21 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN AL.pdf. Furthermore, the recited “providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package” also does not integrate the exception into a practical application. First, given its high level of generality, the recited “data store” can be realized by simply providing a file cabinet that stores paper copies of license agreements. Second, even if the recited data store was limited to storing digital data in electronic form— which it is not—the limitation is insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, does not integrate the exception into a practical application for that additional reason. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371– 72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)). On this record, then, the claimed invention does not recite additional elements that (1) improve a computer itself; (2) improve another technology or technical field; (3) implement the abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; (4) transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; or (5) apply or use the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the abstract idea’s use to a particular technological environment, such that the Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 22 claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)– (c), (e)). In short, the claim’s additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole. In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by (1) tracking paid royalties pursuant to license agreements, and (2) ensuring the agreements’ royalty rates are consistent with those of most favored nations, a claim for a useful or beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea. Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38–40: Alice/Mayo Step Two Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 21’s additional recited elements, namely (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause—considered individually and as an ordered combination—do not provide an inventive concept that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea when reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. As noted above, the claimed invention merely uses generic computing components to implement the recited abstract idea. To the extent Appellant contends that the recited limitations, including those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 23 more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), these limitations are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea as noted previously. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional”) (emphasis added); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well- understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)). As noted above, to the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 21’s limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on pages 10, 11, and 15 of the Reply Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; (2) the computer processor device, and (3) providing an end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, every limitation of claim 21 recites an abstract idea. That is, items (1)–(3) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the abstract idea whose generic computing functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (noting that components such an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 24 requirement); accord Spec. 66–71 (describing generic computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act. 15–17; Ans. 20–21 (determining that the recited generic computer components are additional elements that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea). Appellant’s contention that the Examiner allegedly did not comply with the evidentiary requirements under the April 2018 USPTO memorandum mandating these requirements for ineligibility rejections after Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15) is unavailing. To be sure, the Examiner must show— with supporting facts—that certain claim elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional where such a finding is made. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369 (noting that whether something is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the invention is a factual determination). In light of this factual determination, the USPTO issued a memorandum requiring that Examiners support a finding that an additional element of a claim is well-understood, routine, and conventional. Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.), USPTO, Apr. 19, 2018 (“Berkheimer Memo.”), at 2–3 (noting that the Berkheimer decision clarifies the inquiry whether an additional element (or combination of additional elements) represents well-understood, routine, and conventional activity). As noted previously, the recited (1) data store; (2) computer processor device, and (3) end-user visualization tool whose display is responsive to clicking on a particular license agreement clause, are the additional recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well- Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 25 understood, routine, and conventional. Therefore, to the extent that Appellant contends that the Examiner failed to provide evidence that all recited elements—including those indicated on pages 10, and 11, and 15 of the Reply Brief that Appellant incorrectly characterizes as “additional elements”—are well-understood, routine, and conventional (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), such an argument is not commensurate with the more limited scope of the Examiner’s findings in this regard. Rather, the Examiner’s finding is that the elements other than the abstract idea, namely the additional computer-based elements, provide generic computing functionality that is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Final Act. 15–16; Ans. 20–21 (noting that the recited additional elements are well- known generic computing components and, therefore, do not add significantly more than the abstract idea). As noted previously, there is ample evidence of this generic computing functionality in not only the cited case law, but also Appellant’s own Specification. See, e.g., FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1096 (noting that using generic computing components like a microprocessor or user interface do not transform an otherwise abstract idea into eligible subject matter); Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1343–49 (holding ineligible claims reciting providing an intelligent user interface to an online application comprising (1) furnishing plural hyperlinked icons on a displayed web page, and (2) displaying a dynamically generated online application form set responsive to activating an icon as directed to the abstract idea of retaining information in navigating online forms); Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (noting that a database is a generic computer component that does Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 26 not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); Spec. 66–71 (describing generic computer components used to implement the invention). We reach a similar conclusion regarding the recited insignificant extra-solution activity, namely “providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of license agreements associated with a licensing package.” That such a data store is provided does not mean that this data gathering function is performed in an unconventional way to add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Given this limitation’s high level of generality, the recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), we disagree. In conclusion, the additional recited elements—considered individually and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21 and claims 22–24, 27–30, 32–36, and 38 not argued separately with particularity. Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 – Alice/Mayo Step One Independent claim 25 is reproduced below: 25. A method for administering licenses, comprising: Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 27 providing a data store which is configured to store a plurality of license agreements; obtaining, by the computer processor device, from public records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in connection with one of the license agreements; tracking, by the computer processor device, compliance of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and providing, by the computer processor device, notification of compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement. As shown in Appellant’s Figure 11, the disclosed invention’s licensing module 108 not only includes a license compliance tracker 1110 that can track royalty payments according to a preloaded schedule, but also a “sales tracker” 1116 that tracks products sales data based on user-defined variables including geographic and territorial limits linked to public records showing sales data. Spec. 47. Turning to claim 25’s eligibility, we first note that the claim recites a method and, therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 28 The Examiner determines that claim 25 is directed to an abstract idea, namely monitoring legal compliance of contractual and legal obligations between licensors and licensees, which are said to involve certain methods of organizing human activity and mental processes. See Final Act. 10–14; Ans. 22–26. Here, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements; and (2) the computer processor device, all of claim 25’s recited limitations fit squarely within at least one of the above categories of the USPTO’s guidelines and, therefore, recite an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary mental processes including observation, evaluation, and judgment); see also id. (listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including legal obligations, business relations, and following rules or instructions). When read as a whole, the recited limitations are directed to monitoring a licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on publicly-available sales information. To the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 25’s limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on page 16 of the Appeal Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above and detailed below, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the computer processor device, every limitation of claim 25 recites an abstract idea. That is, items (1) and (2) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the abstract idea: all other limitations in claim 25 are part of the abstract idea as detailed below. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 29 First, (1) “obtaining . . . from public records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in connection with one of the license agreements” can be done entirely mentally by merely reading paper records of sales information and cognitively determining the particular geographic or territorial area associated with those sales. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a person could construct a map of credit card numbers by merely writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a particular IP address). Second, “tracking . . . compliance of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements” can be done entirely mentally by merely cognitively determining whether the licensee’s activity comports with the license’s geographic and territorial restrictions—a process that merely involves observation and logical reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by merely using logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from the same IP address). Third, “providing . . . notification of compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement” organizes human activity by merely communicating the licensee’s compliance to another person, such as a colleague or client, either orally or in writing. Cf. In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938, 939–41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding ineligible claims reciting, among other things, receiving medical records information and Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 30 transmitting reports where the claimed invention’s objective was to enable electronic communication of tasks that were otherwise done manually using paper, phone, and facsimile machine); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that a nontechnical human activity of passing a note to a person who is in a meeting or conversation as illustrating the invention’s focus, namely providing information to a person without interfering with the person’s primary activity); LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 993–94, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (holding ineligible claims reciting, among other things, (1) receiving selection criteria from lending institutions and credit data from a computer user, and (2) forwarding the credit data to selected lending institutions as directed to an abstract idea). Therefore, apart from the computer processor device, the recited notification limitation fits squarely within the certain methods of organizing human activity categories of the USPTO’s guidelines and, therefore, recites an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary methods of organizing human activity, including personal interactions and following rules or instructions). Notably, (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the computer processor device discussed above are the only recited elements beyond the abstract idea, but these additional elements, considered individually and in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 25 as a whole. First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves a computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 31 by the Federal Circuit in Enfish. The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution (see Appeal Br. 31–34; Reply Br. 15–21), we disagree. Even assuming, without deciding, that the claimed invention can monitor a licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on publicly-available sales information faster or more efficiently than doing so manually, any speed or efficiency increase comes from the capabilities of the generic computer components—not the recited process itself. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095) (citing Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I, 711 F. App’x at 1017 (“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-purpose computer do not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of Appellant’s claimed invention is not on improving computer processors as tools, but on certain Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 32 independently abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095. Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in McRO. There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three- dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1316. But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed invention here merely uses generic computer components to monitor a licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on public sales information. This generic computer implementation is not only directed to mental processes and certain methods of organizing human activity, but also does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (distinguishing McRO). Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance on Core Wireless. See Appeal Br. 25, 33. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing device that could display an application summary window that was not only reachable directly from the main menu, but could also display a limited list of selectable functions while the application was in an un-launched state. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. Upon selecting a function, the device would then launch the application and initiate the selected function. Id. at Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 33 1360. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention was directed to an improved user interface for computing devices that used a particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of information to the user, unlike conventional user interface methods that displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–63. That is not the case here. To the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 25, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 25–26, 33) is likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider (ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Notably, this customizable filtering solution improved the computer system’s performance and, therefore, was patent-eligible. See id. But unlike the filtering system improvements in BASCOM that added significantly more to the abstract idea in that case, the claimed invention here uses generic computing components to implement an abstract idea as noted previously. Appellant’s reliance on Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (2018) (Appeal Br. 28, 33) is also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a behavior-based virus scanning system. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the claimed invention employed a new kind of file that enabled a computer security system to do Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 34 that which could not be done previously, including accumulating and using newly-available, behavior-based information about potential threats. Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305. That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 28, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellant’s reliance on Trading Technologies International v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (Appeal Br. 28, 33) is also unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims reciting a method for displaying and facilitating trading of market information relating to a traded commodity, including dynamically displaying an indicator in each of a GUI's bid and ask display regions, the regions positioned along a common static price axis. Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1002–06. The claimed invention in that case also displayed an order entry region with locations for receiving trade order commands, and, responsive to selecting a particular location, (1) commodity-related trade order parameters were set, and (2) a trade order was sent to an electronic exchange. Id. at 1003. Notably, the court held that claimed invention did not simply display information on a graphical user interface, but rather required a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the interface’s structure that addressed and resolved a specifically-identified problem in the art and, therefore, was not directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1004. That is not the case here. Although the claimed invention displays a particular clause’s relative usage in license agreements responsive to Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 35 clicking that clause in a license agreement, to the extent Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with prescribed functionality directly related to the interface’s structure that addresses and resolves a specifically-identified problem in the art as in Trading Technologies (see Appeal Br. 28, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Nor do we find availing Appellant’s reliance (Appeal Br. 27–28, 33) on Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (discussing eligibility of a claim reciting a data processing system for designing, creating, and importing data into a viewable form, where the system included, among other things, (1) a form file that modeled the physical representation of an original paper form and established the calculations and rule conditions required to fill in the viewable form; (2) a form file creation program that imported a background image from an original form; and (3) a form viewer program). That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities (see Appeal Br. 27–28, 33), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. To the extent that Appellant relies on the non-precedential Board decision, Ex parte Scheer, Appeal 2017-011742 (PTAB Jan. 30, 2019), such a reliance is unavailing, for not only do the facts in that case differ from those at issue here, as a non-precedential decision, it is not binding on this panel in any event. See PTAB Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 10) § I(B), Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 36 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FIN AL.pdf. Furthermore, the recited “providing a data store configured to store license agreements” also does not integrate the exception into a practical application. First, given its high level of generality, the recited “data store” can be realized by simply providing a file cabinet that stores paper copies of license agreements. Second, even if the recited data store was limited to storing digital data in electronic form—which it is not—the limitation is insignificant pre-solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, does not integrate the exception into a practical application for that additional reason. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data- gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability); accord Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)). On this record, then, the claimed invention does not recite additional elements that (1) improve a computer itself; (2) improve another technology or technical field; (3) implement the abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; (4) transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing; or (5) apply or use the abstract idea in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the abstract idea’s use to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)– Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 37 (c), (e)). In short, the claim’s additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 21 as a whole. In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by monitoring a licensee’s compliance with a license’s geographical and territorial restrictions based on public sales information, a claim for a useful or beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 25 is directed to an abstract idea. Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40: Alice/Mayo Step Two Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 25’s additional recited elements, namely the recited (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the computer processor device—considered individually and as an ordered combination—do not provide an inventive concept that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea when reading claim 25 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. As noted above, the claimed invention merely uses generic computing components to implement the recited abstract idea. To the extent Appellant contends that the recited limitations, including those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two (see Appeal Br. 29–30; Reply Br. 15), these limitations are not additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the abstract idea as noted previously. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1290 Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 38 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional”) (emphasis added); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (instructing that additional recited elements should be evaluated in Alice/Mayo step two to determine whether they (1) add specific limitations that are not well- understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)). As noted above, to the extent that Appellant’s characterizes claim 25’s limitations that are not bolded and underlined on the reproduced claim on page 32 of the Appeal Brief and page 16 of the Reply Brief as not part of the abstract idea, we disagree. As noted above, apart from (1) providing a data store configured to store license agreements associated with a licensing package; and (2) the computer processor device, every limitation of claim 25 recites an abstract idea. That is, items (1) and (2) enumerated above are the only additional elements beyond the abstract idea whose generic computing functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324–25 (noting that components such an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement); accord Spec. 66–71 (describing generic computer components used to implement the invention); Final Act. 15–17 (determining that the recited generic computer components are additional elements that do not add significantly more to the abstract idea). We reach a similar conclusion regarding the recited insignificant extra-solution activity, namely “providing a data store configured to store Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 39 license agreements associated with a licensing package.” That license agreements are stored does not mean that this data gathering function is performed in an unconventional way to add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Given this limitation’s high level of generality, the recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. To the extent Appellant contends otherwise (see Appeal Br. 32–34; Reply Br. 20), we disagree. In conclusion, the additional recited elements—considered individually and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two when reading claim 21 as a whole. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 25 and claims 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 not argued separately with particularity. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REJECTION Regarding independent claim 21, the Examiner finds that Appellant’s original disclosure does not convey to ordinarily skilled artisans possession of monitoring actual royalty rates for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed. Final Act. 5–8; Ans. 3–7. Appellant argues that not only does the Specification convey possession of the claimed invention, the level of skill of ordinarily skill in computers is high and the art is predictable, and, therefore, ordinarily skilled Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 40 artisans would know how to implement the claimed invention, particularly given its predictable algorithm. Appeal Br. 11–14; Reply Br. 3–5. Appellant argues other recited limitations summarized below. ISSUE Has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21–40 under § 112, first paragraph by finding that Appellant’s original disclosure fails to convey with reasonable clarity that Appellant possessed: (1) monitoring, by the computer processor device, the actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the plurality of license agreements in the licensing package as recited in claim 21? (2) the tracking and notification steps in claim 25? ANALYSIS Claims 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38, and 39 We begin by noting that claim 21 differs from the version of that claim that was before us in the earlier appeal. Although the claim’s first two clauses, namely the providing and tracking steps, are identical in both versions, claim 21 formerly recited, in pertinent part, comparing the actual royalty rates to most favored nation rates in the license agreements—a limitation that we held was not supported by the original disclosure to show possession of that feature. See Bd. Dec. 5–8. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 41 Now, claim 21 recites, in pertinent part, monitoring the actual royalty rates in the license agreements associated with the licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates.9 In the Appeal Brief’s Summary of Claimed Subject Matter section, Appellant cites the Specification’s page 46, lines 9 to 21 and cost analyzer 1106 in Figure 11 for supporting the recited monitoring step. On this record, we find that Appellant’s original disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the recited monitoring step. We reach this finding noting the disclosed functionality of cost analyzer 1106 as Appellant indicates (Appeal Br. 5, 13– 14; Reply Br. 4)—a function that is part of IP licensing application 108 in Figure 11. As explained on page 46 of the Specification, the cost analyzer assigns costs and other payment schedules affiliated with licensing packages, thus enabling licensors and licensees to track royalty and other costs associated with licenses. The Specification further explains that licenses are tracked for “a host of reasons” including, for example, uniformity, consistency, and negotiation strategy success. Spec. 46. Notably, for some users, losing track of royalty rates can be disastrous. Id. For example, a licensor may have signed licensees up to a “most favored nation” royalty guarantee. Id. By failing to monitor the royalty amount in such a circumstance, a licensor can be held in breach if they were to lower the license royalty rate below the most favored nation rate, and not offer that rate to the first customer. Id. Appellant’s IP licensing application also includes a royalty tracker 1112 that automatically tracks licensees’ royalty payments. Id. 9 Claim 21’s last clause also differs from its former version, but that change is not pertinent to the written description rejection. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 42 This description warns of a potential consequence of lowering a license royalty rate below the most favored nation rate, namely a possible breach, and, when considered in context, reasonably supports monitoring of these rates for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed. Given this disclosure, considered in light of the functionality that tracks licenses for uniformity and consistency on the Specification’s page 46, Appellant’s original disclosure reasonably conveys possession of monitoring actual royalty rates in plural licensing agreements associated with a given package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in those agreements as claimed. We reach this conclusion noting that patent applications are written for those ordinarily skilled in the art who come to the application with knowledge of what has come before. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Therefore, it is unnecessary to spell out every detail of the invention; only enough must be included in the disclosure to ensure the claims are clear, and convince a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention, and to enable such a person to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. See id. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) claim 21; (2) independent claims 27, and 33; and (3) dependent claims 22– 24, 28–30, 32, 34–36, 38, and 39 for similar reasons. Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 43 Claims 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 We sustain the Examiner’s written description rejection of claim 25 reciting, in pertinent part, (1) tracking, by the computer processor device, compliance of the actual activity by the licensee pursuant to one of the license agreements with the activity permitted under geographic and territorial limits in the one of the license agreements; and (2) providing, by the computer processor device, notification of compliance of the actual activity with the license agreement. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 8–9. In the Appeal Brief’s Summary of Claimed Subject Matter section, Appellant cites the Specification’s page 47, lines 11 to 16 and license compliance tracker 1110 for supporting both limitations. Appeal Br. 7. Later in the Brief, however, Appellant also refers to the royalty payment functionality of application 1112, accounting application 1114, and sales tracker 1116 for supporting the recited tracking step. Appeal Br. 15. On page 47, Appellant’s Specification describes license compliance tracker 1110 that can include an application 1112 for tracking royalty payments according to a preloaded schedule. Payment information received from accounting application 1114 may update an electronic calendar indicating that a royalty payment is received on time, and a license manager can be notified that a payment is late. Spec. 47. The royalty tracker notifies the license manager and licensee of upcoming due dates. Id. Also, sales tracker 1116 tracks product sales data based on user-defined variables that include geographic and territorial limits that are linked to public records showing sales data. Id. But even if this disclosure shows possession of the recited compliance tracking step, Appellant still does not squarely address—let alone Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 44 persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s finding that the original disclosure does not show possession of the recited compliance notification limitation. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 8. That the disclosed invention can notify others about late payments and upcoming due dates does not convey with reasonable clarity that compliance of an activity pursuant to the particular geographic and territorial limits in a license agreement is tracked to show possession of that feature, let alone that notification of such compliance is provided as claimed. That Appellant quotes only claim 25’s tracking step in the associated arguments in the Briefs, but omits the notification step (see Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 5) is telling in this regard. We reach this conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that such a compliance notification would have been obvious from the original disclosure, for that alone is insufficient to show possession of that feature. Although the written description requirement under § 112 does not demand any particular form of disclosure or require a verbatim recitation, a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accord Ans. 9 (noting this point). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 25, and claims 26, 31, 37, 39, and 40 not argued separately with particularity. THE INDEFINITENESS REJECTION We do not sustain the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claim 21. According to the Examiner, not only would ordinarily skilled artisans fail to understand the metes and bounds of the recited “relative usage,” the recited Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 45 monitoring for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates is unclear. Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 10. We disagree. First, the claim recites, in pertinent part, that responsive to clicking on a particular clause in a license agreement, that clause’s relative usage in plural license agreements is displayed. According to the Specification’s page 48, a client can click a mouse on a particular clause, and its relative usage is displayed company-wide or product-wide. Also, the user can hyperlink directly to that clause in a related license agreement to see how it has been used. Spec. 48. The clear import of this discussion is that a selected clause’s “relative usage” pertains to how the clause is used in each agreement with respect to the clause’s meaning and context in those agreements. This interpretation reasonably comports with the plain meaning of the term “usage,” which is defined, in pertinent part, as “the way in which words and phrases are actually used (as in a particular form or sense) in a language community.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/usage (last visited July 8, 2020). Although the Examiner determines that a clause’s “relative usage” can have multiple alternative meanings (Ans. 10), we disagree given its context in the claim when read in light of the Specification and the plain meaning of the term. Despite the Examiner’s determination that it is unclear “how relative is relative usage” (Ans. 10), the claim need not so specify. That the term “relative usage” is broad in scope does not mean that it is indefinite. See In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788 (CCPA 1970) (“Breadth is not indefiniteness.”); MPEP § 2173.04 (citing Gardner). Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 46 We reach the same conclusion regarding monitoring the actual royalty rates for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed. On page 46, the Specification explains that licenses are tracked for “a host of reasons” including, for example, uniformity, consistency, and negotiation strategy success. Although the term “uniformity” is not further defined in this context, the term “uniform” is defined, in pertinent part, as “having always the same form, manner, or degree: not varying or variable.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/uniform (last visited July 8, 2020). Thus, “uniformity” in this context is the state of having the same form, manner, or degree, or not varying or variable. Given this plain meaning, monitoring actual royalty rates’ uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed monitors the actual royalty rates to determine that they do not vary from the most favored nation rates. Despite the Examiner’s determination that it is unclear “how uniform is monitoring rates for uniformity” (Ans. 10), the claim need not so specify. That the term “uniformity” is broad in scope does not mean that it is indefinite. See Gardner, 427 F.2d at 788 (“Breadth is not indefiniteness.”); MPEP § 2173.04 (citing Gardner). Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) independent claim 21; (2) independent claims 27 and 33 that recite commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 22–24, 28–30, 32, 34– 36, and 38 for similar reasons. THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 47 Regarding independent claim 25, the Examiner finds that Rivette administers licenses by, among other things, obtaining sales data indicating a licensee’s geographic or territorial area sales from public records, including a licensing database whose data are accessible from a query statement module. Final Act. 20–22; Ans. 29–31. Appellant argues that Rivette’s invoices and royalty statements are not data obtained from public records, but rather are non-public, self-reported data that may lack a licensee’s unreported sales from public records. Appeal Br. 35–38; Reply Br. 22–23. ISSUE Under § 102, has the Examiner erred by finding that Rivette discloses obtaining, by a computer processor device, from public records, sales data indicating geographic or territorial area sales, as actual activity, by the licensee, in producing products in connection with one of plural license agreements as recited in claim 25? ANALYSIS We begin by construing the key disputed limitation of claim 25 that recites, in pertinent part, “public records.” The Specification does not define the term “public records,” unlike at least one other term whose concrete definition leaves no doubt as to its meaning. See Spec. 2 (defining the term “application” explicitly). The Specification does, however, explain that the IP licensing application includes “sales tracker” 1116 that tracks product sales data based on user-defined variables, including geographic and territorial limits linked Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 48 to public records showing sales data. Spec. 47. Although this passage does not further detail these public records, the Specification elsewhere describes exemplary public data, including public IP databases, press releases, trade magazines, financial databases, and news coverage. See Spec. 36, 59. Although this description informs our understanding of the recited “public records,” the term is not so limited, nor will we import that description into the claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We, therefore, construe the term “public record” with its plain meaning, namely “[a] record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep, such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse.” Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009). That dictionary adds that “[p]ublic records are generally open to view by the public.” Id. Although Appellant proffers a definition of “public” from a general- purpose dictionary in interpreting the term “public records” in connection with the ineligibility rejection (Appeal Br. 31), we decline to adopt this interpretation, for the term “public record” is defined explicitly, and has a particular legal meaning that is commonly understood as noted above. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Absent an express definition in their specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO’s definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation.”). Given our interpretation, we cannot say—nor has the Examiner shown—that sales data, including the number of units sold, from a royalty statement in Rivette’s licensing database as shown in Figure 89 is necessarily from a public record as the term is commonly understood. See Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 49 Rivette 105. Although this sales data indicates a licensee’s geographic and territorial sales, namely those in the United States and Canada as shown by the “US” and “CDN” currency designations in Figure 89, this information is nonetheless provided by the licensee. See Rivette 102 (noting that royalty statements are provided by licensees). To the extent that the Examiner finds that this licensee-provided information is somehow necessarily obtained from public records under the term’s plain meaning, namely those records that (1) governmental units are required by law to keep, and (2) are generally open to public view, there is no evidence on this record to substantiate such a finding. That this licensee- provided data is accessible to (1) the licensor; (2) the licensor’s authorized representatives and administrators; and (3) the computer system that processes that data as described on Rivette’s pages 101 to 108 does not mean that this data is necessarily obtained from public records as claimed. To the extent that the Examiner finds otherwise (see Ans. 29–31), we disagree. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) independent claim 25; (2) independent claims 31 and 37 that recite commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 26, 39, and 40 for similar reasons. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the Examiner’s rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other associated arguments. THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION The Examiner finds that Rivette discloses every recited element of independent claim 21 including monitoring actual royalty rates in a licensing package’s license agreements for uniformity with respect to most favored Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 50 nation rates in agreements in that package. Final Act. 25–26; Ans. 32–34. The Examiner also takes Official Notice that contract clauses have most favored nation rates. Final Act. 29. In addition, the Examiner cites Grundfest for teaching monitoring actual royalty rates with respect to most favored nation rates for uniformity. Final Act. 30. Based on these collective teachings, the Examiner concludes that the claim would have been obvious. Final Act. 30–31. Appellant argues, among other things, that the prior art does not teach or suggest monitoring actual royalty rates with respect to most favored nation rates for uniformity, where the actual royalty rates are royalties that licensees actually paid. Appeal Br. 40–50; Reply Br. 25–26. ISSUE Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21 by finding that Rivette and Grundfest collectively would have taught or suggested monitoring actual royalty rates in license agreements associated with a licensing package for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in the license agreements in the package, where the actual royalty rates are royalties that licensees paid according to respective schedules in the agreements (“the monitoring limitation”)? ANALYSIS As noted above, the key disputed limitation in claim 21 requires monitoring actual royalty rates in license agreements for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates, where the actual royalty rates are royalties that licensees paid according to the agreements’ respective Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 51 schedules. Our emphasis underscores the past tense associated with this payment, namely that it occurred previously. Accord Appeal Br. 49 (noting this point). On this record, we agree with Appellant that Rivette and Grundfest collectively do not teach or suggest the monitoring limitation. To be sure, Rivette’s system (1) compares royalty payments with expected revenue on page 142, and (2) involves license agreements with a “Favored Nation” field on page 73 and Figure 72. Moreover, Grundfest’s paragraph 101 teaches notifying a transaction party if a master transaction agreement (MTA) or corresponding subordinate contract contains clauses related to most favored nation status. But we cannot say—nor has the Examiner shown—that the Rivette/Grundfest system monitors the licensees’ past royalty payments for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates in plural agreements in a licensing package as claimed. As noted previously, “uniformity” in this context is the state of having the same form, manner, or degree, or not varying or variable. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uniform (last visited July 8, 2020). Given this plain meaning, monitoring actual royalty rates’ uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates as claimed monitors the actual royalty rates to determine that they do not vary from the most favored nation rates. That most favored nation rate clauses are known contract provisions as the Examiner indicates (Final Act. 28–29; Ans. 33) does not mean that monitoring licensee’s past royalty payments for uniformity with respect to most favored nation rates would have been obvious. As noted above, in Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 52 light of the plain meaning of “uniformity,” the recited monitoring effectively determines that the past royalty payments do not vary from the most favored nation rates. There is insufficient evidence on this record to support the Examiner’s conclusion that this particular monitoring scheme would have been obvious. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting (1) independent claim 21; (2) independent claims 21, 27, and 33 that recite commensurate limitations; and (3) dependent claims 22–24, 28–30, 32, 34– 36, and 38 for similar reasons. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 21–40 101 Ineligibility 21–40 21–40 112, first paragraph Written Description 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, 40 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38, 39 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, 40 102(b) Rivette 25, 26, 31, 37, 39, 40 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38 103 Rivette, Grundfest 21–24, 27–30, 32–36, 38 Overall Outcome 21–40 Appeal 2019-004854 Application 13/599,517 53 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation
