Lederach Electric, Inc. and Morris Road Partners, LLC (single employers)

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 21, 2011

04-CA-037725 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 21, 2011)

JD–37–11
Lederach, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
LEDERACH ELECTRIC, INC
and Case 4–CA–37725
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 380
Henry R. Protas, Esq., of Philadelphia
Pennsylvania, for the Acting General Counsel.
Robert Krandel, Esq., of Blue Bell, Pennsylvania,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on May 23 and 24, 2011. The complaint alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by making threatening and coercive
statements to employees; and Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by switching the work
assignment of an employee and by discharging four employees because of their union
activity. The discharges are also separately alleged as violations of Section 8(a)(1)
because they were based on employee complaints with the Pennsylvania Department
of Labor and Industry about improper deductions from their pay, a separate protected
activity. The Respondent filed an answer denying the essential allegations in the
complaint.1
After the trial, the Acting General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs, which
I have read and considered. Based on the entire record in the case, including the
testimony of the witnesses, and my observation of their demeanor, I make the following:

1 At the opening of the trial, the General Counsel amended the complaint to clarify a
jurisdictional allegation, which was then admitted, and to withdraw paragraph 7 of the
complaint.
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Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with a facility in Lederach,
Pennsylvania, is engaged as an electrical contractor in the construction industry.
During the past year, Respondent purchased and received goods valued in excess of
$50,000 from suppliers in Pennsylvania, who obtained those supplies directly from
sources outside Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent also admits that the Charging Party (the Union) is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts
Background
James Lederach is the president and the sole stockowner of Respondent. His
wife, Judy, was, until October 2010, the corporate secretary and office manager of
Respondent. The hierarchy of Respondent, after President Lederach, is as follows:
Two salaried project managers, Darren Moyer and Frank Slover, both of whom are
President Lederach’s sons-in-law. In addition, Respondent employs hourly-paid job
foremen, who, according to Lederach, are “under the project managers and they run the
job on the job.” Tr. 11. During the relevant time period covered by this case, roughly
from April through October 2010, Respondent had a total of 18 employees, which
includes the foremen, but not the project managers. Tr. 12.
Frank Slover’s Status as Supervisor and Agent
Respondent took the position in its answer, during the hearing, and even in its
brief, that Project Manager Slover, President Lederach’s son-in-law, was not a
supervisor or agent of Respondent. I find, contrary to Respondent’s position, that
Slover was both a supervisor of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act and an agent of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. Slover
was one of only two salaried project managers, who represented President Lederach in
job meetings with general contractors. Tr. 36. Slover thereafter directed job foremen
“how to execute the work.” Tr. 233. And they had to follow his directions. Tr. 169.
Slover thus had the authority to make job assignments and move employees from one
job to another, utilizing his experience and judgment. Tr. 14-15, 34-36, 167-168, 243-
244. He had authority to remove an employee from a job because of productivity
problems or misconduct. Tr. 14-15, 167. Slover admitted he “disciplined” an employee
for failing to follow appropriate dress policies. Tr. 237. If employees did not follow his
directives on dress policies, he would send them home. Tr. 243. And he had this
authority without having to consult President Lederach beforehand. Tr. 167. President
Lederach also admitted that, if one of his project managers recommended suspensions
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of employees, he followed their recommendations a “majority of the time, because they
used their “best judgment” in making those recommendations. Tr. 35. In addition, as
set forth in more detail below, Slover was specifically involved in and in charge of one of
Respondent’s major projects during the timeframe covered in this case. He dealt with
employee Chris Breen’s personnel problems and specifically assigned him to perform
trench work on that job, after learning that Breen was a union member. Slover
thereafter met with a representative of the Union in connection with resolving unfair
labor practice charges filed against Respondent. And he held an employee meeting
where he required employees to sign acknowledgements that they had received copies
of Respondent’s Company policy.
The above clearly demonstrates that Slover had the authority, in the interest of
Respondent, to responsibly direct the work of employees, assign them work, discipline
them by sending them home and directing them to follow Company or job policies, all
utilizing independent judgment. He also had the authority to effectively recommend
suspending employees, again utilizing independent judgment. Thus, he possessed
several of the indicia of supervisory status set forth in Section 2(11), even though
possession of only one is enough to establish supervisory status. See Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB 686, 687 (2006); and Croft Metals, Inc., 348 NLRB 717, 721
(2006).
Even apart from Slover’s supervisory position, the evidence clearly shows that he
was an agent of the Respondent. He had both actual and apparent authority to speak
for Respondent. He represented Respondent at meetings with general contractors with
respect to the rules and direction of a particular job, and he transmitted those rules and
directives to Respondent’s job foremen, who, in turn, transmitted those rules and
directives to rank-and-file employees. The foremen had to follow Slover’s directives.
Moreover, it is clear on this record that President Lederach placed Slover in a position
of authority, as project manager, in a way that made it clear to employees and others
that Slover was speaking for Respondent. Not only was he sent to represent
Respondent at job meetings with general contractors, but, as shown in greater detail
later in this decision, he spoke for Respondent when meeting with a representative of
the Union about resolving unfair labor practice charges and when meeting with
employees about following Company policy. In these circumstances, there can be no
doubt that Slover was an agent of Respondent. See Wal-Mart Stores, 350 NLRB 879,
884 (2007); and Pan-Oston Co., 336 NLRB 305, 306 (2001).
Respondent’s Relationship with the Union
Respondent calls itself a nonunion employer. About 85 percent of its work
involves Federal, State or local government projects that require the payment of
prevailing wages and benefits for employees. On those jobs at least, Respondent often
competes with union employers. Tr. 21. During the relevant time period, Respondent
had major work at two elementary schools in Montgomery County, both prevailing rate
jobs. The General Nash elementary school was a renovation project and the Glenside
school involved construction of a new building.
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The Union has attempted to have Respondent either recognize the Union or use
its members since at least 2005, when Union Business Representative Francis (Fran)
Clark went to Respondent’s office and spoke with President Lederach. At that time,
Lederach declined to use union members. Clark testified that he thereafter reported
violations by Respondent of State prevailing wage laws to the Pennsylvania Department
of Labor and Industry. Although Respondent has, in the past, been investigated for
alleged prevailing wage violations by the Department, it appears that those matters
resulted in amicable settlements. One such settlement, dated March 13, 2007, was
entered into the record as an exhibit in this case. GC Exh. 4.
Respondent Hires Employee Chris Breen and Later Learns He is a Union
Member; the Union Files Unfair Labor Practice Charges and Withdraws
Them After More Union Members Are Hired
In March 2010, Clark learned that Lederach had obtained some prevailing wage
jobs, probably the Montgomery County school projects mentioned above. He once
again made an effort to speak to Lederach about using union members on those jobs.
When Clark raised the matter in another visit to Lederach’s office, Lederach rejected
Clark’s offer. He replied, according to Clark, “you’ve cost me enough money already,”
and asked Clark to leave the premises. Tr. 49-50. Thereafter, Clark decided to send
unemployed union members to apply for work at Respondent. He directed that they not
hide their union status. They were refused employment.
In the meantime, Respondent had hired Chris Breen, a union member from one
of the Union’s sister locals (Local 670 in Trenton, New Jersey). Breen, who began work
on June 9, 2010, had not revealed his union membership to Respondent before he was
hired. When Clark learned that Breen had been hired, he filed charges alleging that
Respondent’s failure to hire the union members he had referred to Respondent was
discriminatory. An initial charge was filed on June 29, 2010, and an amended charge,
adding more alleged discriminatees, was filed on July 19, 2010. GC Exhs. 6, 7.
Breen worked primarily at the Glenside school project. From sometime in early
June 2010, when Breen began working at Glenside, until October 2010, when he was
laid off, Respondent’s work force on that project increased from about 6 or 7 employees
to about 15 employees. Tr. 76-78.
On Friday, July 26, Breen was asked by Respondent to sign a document
indicating he was unemployed when he was hired. The purpose of the document was
to provide a tax subsidy to the employer in connection with hiring the unemployed.
Breen, however, did not understand the purpose of the document; and, while he was in
the job trailer office at Glenside, he called Union Representative Clark on his cell phone
to ask Clark’s advice. Clark advised not signing the document unless Breen understood
it. Breen then turned the phone over to Project Manager Slover, who spoke briefly to
Clark. In that conversation, Clark identified himself as a union representative. Later
that same day, Slover asked Breen to come to the job trailer and again asked Breen to
sign the unemployment document. Breen declined because he said he still did not
understand the document. Tr. 80-83. Slover then called President Lederach, and,
during a part of their conversation overheard by Breen, Slover stated, “Well, we’re not
JD–37–11
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discriminating anymore. We have a Union employee now working for us.” Tr. 83.
Breen’s testimony about the telephone conversation between Slover and Lederach was
uncontradicted.
Still later that day, Slover told Breen he was quite surprised to learn that Breen
had called Clark. Tr. 86. It is unclear whether Breen ever signed the unemployment
form; nor did Respondent thereafter make an issue of his failure to sign it. Breen,
however, insisted that he was unemployed when he was hired by Respondent, and,
despite an effort by Respondent to show otherwise at the hearing, there is no record
evidence to dispute Breen’s testimony on this point.
Immediately after the conversation between Slover and Lederach in Breen’s
presence on July 26, Slover directed Breen to perform a different job task. He told
Breen to work in a conduit trench outside the school building with another employee and
an excavator. Before he was reassigned, Breen had been working above ground in the
building itself. Indeed, he had been performing inside work not only earlier that day but
for the entire time he had been on the Glenside job. Tr. 83-86. Trench work of this sort
is a much more unpleasant task. Tr. 84. Breen remained on the trench assignment for
about 3 days. Tr. 86.2
On July 27, the day after learning of Breen’s union status, Slover again called
Breen into the job trailer and asked if he was there to “sabotage” the job. Breen
assured him that was not the case. Tr. 87, 101. Slover also asked Breen whether the
unfair labor practice charges filed against Respondent could be dropped. Breen said he
was not in a position to negotiate that issue. Tr. 87-88. The next day, Slover again

2 Slover initially testified, in response to questions from Respondent’s counsel on
direct, that he could not “recall” assigning Breen to do trench work on July 26, or ever.
Tr. 240 Later, on redirect, he was more decisive in his denial that he made such an
assignment. Tr. 247. For reasons discussed in the following footnote, I credit Breen
over Slover in this instance, as well as in other instances where their testimony conflicts.
I found Breen to be a very credible witness, whose testimony survived vigorous cross-
examination. On the other hand, I found that Slover was not entirely forthcoming,
especially when testifying about his job duties. I thought he was trying to avoid being
labeled a supervisor or an agent, in support of Respondent’s litigation theory, rather
than testifying candidly. For example, in response to a question from counsel for the
Acting General Counsel on the trench assignment issue, Slover was asked whether,
notwithstanding his denial that he assigned Breen to do trench work, he had the
authority to do so. His sarcastic response was, “I had the authority to do a lot of things.”
Tr. 247. My assessment of his testimonial demeanor did not inspire confidence.
Moreover, Breen’s testimony that he was assigned to work in the trench is supported to
some extent by that of Foreman Chris Premaza, who testified that Breen did indeed
work in the trench “a lot.” Tr. 253. Premaza also testified that it was he who assigned
that task to Breen. Tr. 252. But he was not specific as to when he made the
assignment, suggesting that he did so simply by “grabbing” whoever was around
because the job needed to be done quickly. Tr. 252-253. I found Breen’s testimony
more specific and detailed than that of Premaza on this point and therefore credit Breen
over Premaza where their testimony conflicts.
JD–37–11
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talked to Breen. He asked how Respondent’s employees could be integrated into the
Union. Breen simply provided Slover with Union Representative Clark’s phone number.
Tr. 88.3
On August 2 or 3, Clark met with Slover and Project Manager Moyer at a coffee
shop in the area. They discussed resolution of the unfair labor practices charges filed
by the Union against Respondent. As a result of this meeting, on August 9, Respondent
hired four union members Clark had referred to Respondent earlier in the year. Tr. 56-
57. Thereafter, the Union withdrew its unfair labor practice charges. GC Exh. 8.4
The four new hires—Jeff Wallace, Chris Rocus, Cameron Troxel and Chad
Scofield—were placed on Respondent’s General Nash school renovation project.
Wallace, Rocus and Troxel were members of the Union. Scofield was a member of a
sister local, but he had also been referred to Respondent by Clark. Tr. 58.
The Layoffs of Wallace, Troxel and Rocus from the General Nash Job
On August 31, Respondent laid off Scofield for work-related reasons. There is
no allegation that that layoff was violative of the Act. However, after Scofield was laid
off, on the same day, Lederach spoke to the other union members on the General Nash
job. He told them about Scofield’s layoff, but he told them that he had no intention of
laying them off if they did good work. Tr. 122, 135. Lederach also mentioned that there
would be more work starting soon and he needed more manpower. Tr. 157-158. The

3 The above is based on Breen’s credible testimony. Slover’s testimony on this point
is less than decisive. He was asked whether he “recalled” accusing Breen of
sabotaging the Glenside job. He responded, “No, I don’t believe I did.” Tr. 238. But he
admitted asking Breen what his purpose was for being on the job (Tr. 246), thus
corroborating at least part of Breen’s account. Nor did Slover deny the remainder of
Breen’s testimony about this conversation, most of which involved withdrawal of the
unfair labor charge. The unfair labor practice charge was indeed withdrawn after
Respondent hired some union members, as discussed more fully below. Breen’s
testimony was attacked on cross-examination, but it was supported by his pretrial
affidavit. See Tr. 109-110. Indeed, Breen’s credibility as a general matter is also
supported by the fact that he took extensive notes of what took place at the Glenside
job. Those notes were turned over to Respondent’s counsel for use in cross-
examination and no questions were asked about those notes. In these circumstances, I
do not credit Slover’s denial that he used the word “sabotage” in their conversation. I
also credit Breen over Slover in all other instances where their testimony conflicts.
4 Slover did not contradict Clark’s testimony about the meeting between him and
Slover and Moyer concerning the unfair labor practice charges. According to employee
Cameron Troxel, when President Lederach hired him on August 5, Lederach specifically
told him that he was being hired because of the unfair labor practice charges filed
against Respondent. Troxel assured Lederach that he would have no problems with
Troxel. Tr. 154. Lederach did not testify about that conversation so Troxel’s testimony
on this point is uncontradicted.
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above is based on the uncontradicted testimony of employees Wallace and Rocus since
Lederach did not testify about this conversation.
Also on August 31, Scofield, Wallace, Troxel and Rocus signed separate
complaint forms with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry alleging a
prevailing rate violation on the part of Respondent. On the same day or the next day,
Union Representative Clark faxed the completed forms to the Department of Labor and
Industry. The employees had earlier discussed among themselves problems they had
with not being paid time and a half for overtime and having health and fringe benefits
withheld from their pay, allegedly in violation of the prevailing wage provisions
applicable to the General Nash job. They also brought the issue to the attention of
Union Representative Clark. Tr. 119, 132-133. The employees had $4 per hour
withheld from their pay, allegedly for fringe benefits that were required to be paid to
employees under prevailing wage rules. Those benefits included such matters as
health insurance, sick and vacation pay. Respondent withheld that amount from
employee paychecks. The union members had health care through the Union. Troxel
testified that, after he received his first paycheck, he called President Lederach and told
him that he did not want to participate in Respondent’s fringe benefit package because
he was already covered. Lederach replied that he had no choice in the matter and had
to withhold that amount from the paychecks. Tr. 140-141.
Lederach did not specifically deny having the above conversation with Troxel.
He testified that he told all the applicants, presumably the union members hired in
August, that Respondent was withholding deductions for health insurance, vacation,
holidays, and apprentice training and that that was somehow allowed under the
prevailing wage laws. Tr. 182. He also testified that, at some point, after the complaints
were filed, the employees came to him and said they were not being paid properly. Tr.
182-183.
In early September, after Clark had faxed the complaints to the Pennsylvania
Department of Labor and Industry, he had occasion to call Slover on the telephone. In
that conversation, Slover told Clark that the union employees should have come to him
before filing the complaints. When Clark said he said he just left it up to the State to
decide whether there were prevailing wage violations, Slover reacted angrily, stating,
“we’re going to come out swinging.” Tr. 61-63.5

5 The above is based on the credible testimony of Clark, who was firm and clear in
his testimony on this point. He was not cross-examined concerning his conversation
with Slover. Nor did Slover specifically deny the substance of the conversation. He did
answer Respondent’s counsel’s question, “Do you recall ever discussing [claims filed
with the Department of Labor and Industry regarding improper deductions from wages]
with Fran Clark,” by stating, “No.” Tr. 241. He also testified he did not recall any
discussion with either Clark or Breen about improper deductions from wages. Tr. 242.
Of course, no one alleged that Breen was ever involved in claiming improper
deductions. In any event, Slover’s lack of recall about these subjects is less than a
complete denial and renders his testimony less reliable than Clark’s on this point.
JD–37–11
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Also at about this time, on about September 2, Slover called a meeting of
employees on the General Nash job. He presented them with a document entitled
“Company Policy,” and had the employees acknowledge receipt of that document by
affixing their signature to an acknowledgement form. The document set forth certain of
Respondent’s rules and benefits, including the statement that health insurance
coverage started after 6 months of employment. GC Exh. 2, Tr. 143, 123-125, 160.
Later that day, according to the credible testimony of Troxel, Slover told him that the
union employees had “stabbed him in the back by going over his head with this
paperwork.” Tr. 143. Troxel replied that he had spoken to Lederach about the
“deductions” and that Lederach had informed him that he had no choice but to make
them. Tr. 144. Slover responded that Troxel should have come to him and not
Lederach about the deductions. Although there is not absolute clarity in Troxel’s initial
testimony, it is clear that, in context, the “paperwork” he mentioned referred to the
deductions from his paycheck that he had earlier discussed with Lederach and that
formed the basis of his complaint, and that of the other union members, with the
Department of Labor and Industry. Troxel reaffirmed his initial testimony on cross-
examination and further confirmed it by reference to his pretrial affidavit, which Troxel
read into the record and adopted as a truthful account of his conversation with Slover.
Tr. 147-149. Indeed Troxel’s affidavit testimony not only clarifies his earlier testimony,
but more sharply illustrates Respondent’s knowledge of the complaints and its concern
over them. In the affidavit, Troxel stated that Slover told him that he had the employees
acknowledge that they had received the Company policy statement “because of
complaints concerning monies being deducted from paychecks . . . . He said he was
pissed off and asked me why did you go to Fran Clark instead of me.” Tr. 147-148.6
On September 9, President Lederach laid off employees Wallace, Troxel and
Rocus. These were the only employees laid off at that time; the remaining employees
on the General Nash job were transferred to the Glenside job. The three laid-off
employees testified that Lederach laid them off in separate conversations at the General
Nash jobsite. According to Wallace, Lederach told him that he was going to lay him off
along with Troxel and Rocus because the job was winding down and he had no other
work for them. When Wallace asked whether Lederach liked their work, Lederach got
angry and said, “you guys were just here to fuck with me. You’re trying to organize my
company . . . and that’s not going to happen.” Tr. 131. When Wallace asked about
being rehired, Lederach replied he would not hire Wallace if he knew Wallace “was
Union.” Tr. 131. Troxel testified that when Lederach laid him off, Lederach referred to
him and his “union buddies”; and when he mentioned possibly going to the Glenside
job, Lederach said, “[g]o ahead and file more charges, see if I care.” Tr. 146. Rocus
did not testify that Lederach made any specific statements about the Union in their
September 9 conversation. Tr. 161-162.
Lederach did not specifically contradict Troxel’s testimony about what was said in
their September 9 conversation. He testified he did not “recall” using the F word with

6 Troxel’s testimony about his conversation with Slover was uncontradicted. Slover
did not deny making the statement to Troxel and he did not deny having the meeting
where employees were required to acknowledge receipt of the Company’s policy
statement.
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Wallace (Tr. 191), or telling any of the employees, when he laid them off, that they were
trying to organize him and he was not going to put up with that. Tr. 192. He made no
distinctions concerning individual conversations and testified that he told all the
employees, “[I]f I would ever call you back and you would want to work for me rather
than the Union, I would take you.” Tr. 192. He further testified that this was the only
comment he recalled making to the employees because he had no problems with their
work. Tr. 192.
I credit the testimony of Troxel and Wallace that Lederach made the statements
that were attributed to him when Lederach laid them off on September 9. They
appeared to be candid witnesses, whose testimony was firm and not shaken on cross-
examination. Lederach, on the other hand, testified mostly that he could not recall what
was said in the conversations at issue. What he did testify about was, however,
corroborative of Troxel and Wallace on some critical aspects of their testimony, namely,
that there was some discussion of the Union and the possibilities of rehire. Indeed,
Lederach’s testimony that he would call the employees back if they wanted to work for
him rather than the Union not only corroborates the testimony of Troxel and Wallace,
but also bears directly on Lederach’s motivation for the layoffs.
After Wallace, Troxel and Rocus were laid off, they received a separate
reimbursement check from Respondent purportedly covering the roughly $4 per hour
fringe benefit amount that was withheld from their pay during their period of employment
(Tr. 125-127, 163-164, 202-203, GC Exh. 14). At the same time, Breen, who was still
employed, also received a similar reimbursement check. Tr. 202-203, 94.7
The Layoff of Breen from the Glenside job
After Respondent discovered that Breen was a union member, Slover, who was
the project manager on the Glenside job, made references to his union status. As
indicated above, Slover assigned Breen more onerous trench duties and asked Breen
whether he was sent to “sabotage” Respondent’s operation. On July 29, Breen was
wearing a short-sleeved T-shirt with a union emblem on the back. Slover asked Breen
to do him a favor and not wear the union shirt on the job because he did not want
trouble from the general contractor. Breen said that was not a problem. According to
Breen, “[I] took it upon myself, I turned my shirt inside out, and not upon Frank’s
request, and that’s how I worked the rest of the day.” Tr. 89. Slover later told Breen he
did not “have to do that,” but Breen said it was his “choice.” Tr. 89.8 It appears that,

7 According to Lederach, after the union employees were laid off, “[W]e, on our own
. . . back paid them the money we had deducted from those benefits.” Tr. 183. Based
on my assessment of Lederach’s reliability as a witness, discussed in more detail later
in this decision, I do not accept that testimony, insofar as it suggests that Lederach
made these payments on his own without considering the complaints to the
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry.
8 The above is based on Breen’s credible testimony. Slover testified that the only
time he told Breen not to wear something was when Breen was wearing a cutoff shirt
with no sleeves, which had a union marking on it. He testified that the policy on the
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even after this conversation, however, Breen wore union insignia on the job. On
another occasion, on August 17, Breen was permitted to leave early because of heat
exhaustion. The next day, when he returned to work and explained his absence to
Slover, the latter commented that he thought Breen had “Unionitis.” Tr. 90.9
In early September, at about the same time that Respondent laid off union
members from the General Nash job and transferred the remaining employees on that
job to the Glenside job, where Breen was working, Breen himself was told not to report
for work for several days. On September 8, Slover approached Breen and told him that
he was “done playing games” with Union Representative Clark and had nothing more to
say. Tr. 92. The next day, Slover told Breen he should take a couple of days off. He
did and he returned to work on the Glenside job on September 16. Tr. 92-94. The
above is based on Breen’s uncontradicted testimony. Slover did not testify about either
the conversation of September 8 or telling Breen to take a couple of days off in early
September.
On October 7, before the end of the workday, Slover approached Breen and said
he was being laid off. Breen questioned the layoff because, as he told Slover, there
was still plenty of work to be done. Tr. 95, 106. In response to questions from Breen,
Slover conceded there were no problems with his work, but he declined to say whether
he would bring Breen back if work picked up. Tr. 99. The above is based on Breen’s
credible testimony. Slover’s testimony on the point, while slightly different, is basically
corroborative. Where their testimony conflicts, I credit Breen for reasons I have already
stated in generally crediting Breen over Slover.
Although Lederach did not personally lay Breen off, he testified in a way that
suggested he did and indeed talked to Breen about the layoff. See Tr. 192-193. He
testified that Breen asked whether Respondent would call him back, then he made a
cryptic comment, “and I recall a letter that we had gotten from Fran Clark that he was a
temporary employee sent to organize our shop.” Tr. 193. Respondent never produced
such a letter and nothing in the record supports Lederach’s testimony that Clark sent
such a letter or that Respondent received it. Lederach later conceded that he had not
directly laid off Breen and did not speak to Breen, although he testified he authorized
the layoff. Tr. 206. He did, however, testify about what he did after the layoff.
Lederach faxed a short handwritten note to Union Representative Clark stating, “Just to

Glenside jobsite prohibited sleeveless shirts. Tr. 236. He also testified that he only
“disciplined” one other employee about clothing and that was someone who wore a
sleeveless shirt. Tr. 237. I find that Breen’s testimony about the T-shirt incident is more
reliable than that of Slover, based, in part, on my assessment of their demeanor and on
my having credited Breen over Slover when their testimony conflicted on other matters.
9 The above is based on Breen’s credible testimony. Slover did not specifically deny
making the “unionitis” statement to Breen. He simply testified he could not “recall”
making such a statement to any employee. Tr. 238-239. Slover also responded to a
question from Respondent’s counsel as to whether he ever joked with Breen about
Breen’s union membership, by stating, “[m]aybe I did, I don’t recall anything specific.”
Tr. 240. Although it is unclear whether the latter was meant to refer to the “unionitis”
remark, I credit Breen’s more detailed version of the conversation.
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inform you your Salt Chris Breen was layed (sic) off today due to cutbacks in labor
force.” GC Exh. 13. Lederach did not explain why he faxed that note to Clark. There
certainly was no reason to do so because the Union did not have representational rights
to such notice and Breen was not hired as a result of the unfair labor practice charges
filed by the Union. Nor was any other employee of Respondent the subject of
“cutbacks” at the time.10
B. Discussion and Analysis
The Independent 8(a)(1) Allegations
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1)
“requiring an employee not to wear a Union t-shirt;” (2) “remarking that an employee
who had been absent the day before had a case of unionitis,” thereby disparaging the
employee’s honesty; (3) accused an employee of “stabbing [a supervisor] in the back”
because he and others had filed claims with a state agency “concerning deductions
from their pay;” and (4) telling an employee he would not be rehired because the
employee was a union member.
As shown in the factual statement set forth above, there is uncontradicted
testimony that Slover told employee Troxel that his claim that Respondent was making
improper deductions from his wages amounted to stabbing him in the back. This was
not an isolated comment because there is also uncontradicted testimony that Slover
made similar comments to Union Representative Clark, who had actually faxed
employee claims of improper deductions to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and
Industry. Four employees had filed the claims after discussing the alleged improper
payments among themselves. Troxel had even discussed the alleged improper
payments with Lederach when he received his first paycheck. There is no doubt that
the discussion of alleged improper payments amounted to concerted protected
activities. Thus, Slover’s comments to employee Troxel constituted an interference with
concerted protected activities and an implicit threat of reprisal for engaging in such
activities. Accordingly, such comments violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Hialeah
Hospital, 343 NLRB 391, 301 (2004).

10 I have difficulty crediting Lederach on any issues of importance in this case. In
addition to his confusion as to whether he spoke to Breen during the layoff
conversation, I found his testimony about the alleged letter from Clark, which was not
supported by the evidence, bizarre. That testimony, as well as that about the faxed
note to Clark, seemed to be based on his union animus. Indeed, he seemed unable,
because of his animus toward the Union, to testify objectively about many of the events
in this case. For example, when testifying about laying off the union employees, he
stated, “The majority of the times when we talked to these individuals that [they] are
saying they are working for Fran Clark, they’re not working for Lederach Electric.” Tr.
207. Lederach conceded that these union employees never gave any indication that
they were not going to continue working for Respondent. Tr. 207. And, indeed, there is
no evidence that any of the union members made statements of the kind Lederach
claimed in his quoted testimony. Nor did Respondent have any problems with their
work, other than with that of Scofield, who was properly discharged or laid off for cause.
JD–37–11
12
It was also unlawful for Lederach to have told employees that he would not rehire
them because of their union membership. As shown in the factual statement, he made
such comments to both Troxel and Wallace when he laid them off on September 9.
Indeed, his own testimony about the layoff conversation confirms that he made such a
statement and suggests he made the statement to all three union employees he laid off
on September 9. Such a statement clearly amounts to a threat of retaliation for
engaging in union activity and thus constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
See Lin R Rogers Electrical Contractors, 328 NLRB 1165, 1167 (1999).
I will dismiss the other two allegations that Slover made unlawful statements to
Breen. Although the credited testimony shows that Slover did indeed ask Breen not to
wear a shirt with a union insignia on the Glenside job, there is no evidence that his
remarks amounted to an order or that the request was coercive in the circumstances.
Breen himself testified that he “took it upon myself” to simply turn the shirt inside out so
that the insignia was not visible. He also testified that Slover later told him he did not
have to “do that.” Moreover, there is considerable evidence that, even after this isolated
incident, Breen wore union insignia on the job. In the face of such evidence, there is no
additional evidence that Slover intervened to prohibit the wearing of union insignia on
the job. Thus, I find that Slover’s request, on this one occasion, was not coercive. I
shall therefore dismiss this allegation of the complaint. I likewise find that Slover’s
remark that he thought Breen’s excused absence on one occasion was a case of
“unionitis” was not violative of the Act. The remark was devoid of context that would
suggest a threat of retaliation and there is no evidence that Breen was penalized for his
absence. Here again, the incident was isolated and not repeated. In the
circumstances, Slover’s remark was not coercive and I dismiss the complaint allegation
that it was.
The Allegations of Discrimination
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by switching employee Breen’s work assignment because it discovered he was a union
member and thereafter discharging him because of his union membership and to
discourage union activities. The complaint also alleges that Respondent discharged
employees Wallace, Troxel and Rocus because of their union membership and
activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1); and because they filed complaints with
the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry about allegedly improper
deductions from their pay, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). All of these allegations charge
discrimination, although the 8(a)(1) allegation involves discrimination based on
concerted protected activity rather than union activity.11

11 Although the complaint alleges that the employees were discharged, the record
evidence shows that they were laid off, and I so find. The distinction is not significant in
this case, however, because it is clear that Respondent did not intend to recall them and
thus the layoff was permanent.
JD–37–11
13
In cases, such as this one, that turn on alleged discriminatory motive, the
analytical framework is based on the Board’s Wright Line decision.12 Under Wright
Line, the General Counsel must make an initial showing that the employee’s protected
or union activity was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Once the
General Counsel makes that showing, the burden of persuasion “shift[s] to the employer
to demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct.” Bally’s Atlantic City, 355 NLRB No. 218, slip op. 2 (2010). The
issue is not simply whether the employer “could have” taken action against the
employee in the absence of protected activity, but whether it “would have.” Carpenter
Technology Corp., 346 NLRB 766, 773 (2006). Put another way, to satisfy its burden,
the employer “cannot simply present a legitimate reason for its actions,” but must
“persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Peter Vitale Co., 310 NLRB 865,
871 (1993).
The Acting General Counsel has met his initial burden of showing that
Respondent laid off employees Wallace, Troxel and Rocus because of their union
membership and activities. They were clearly known union members, whose hiring had
been forced upon Respondent because of unfair labor practice charges filed against it
by the Union. Respondent had grudgingly accepted their hire and it is clear that its
officials did not like having union members in its work force. This is shown by
Lederach’s testimony that he viewed these employees as working not for him but for the
Union, as well as the testimony about Slover’s reaction when he learned that Breen was
a union member. Respondent’s animus against the Union is also shown by the
independent Section 8(a)(1) violations I have found. The evidence of causation is
conclusively shown by what Lederach said when he laid off Wallace and Troxel. He
stated that the union members had simply been sent to organize his work force, which,
as he stated, was “not going to happen.” When Troxel asked whether he was going to
be transferred to the Glenside job, like other General Nash employees, Lederach dared
him to file more unfair labor practice charges. Lederach’s own testimony reveals his
motivation. He essentially admitted that he told the employees he would not rehire
them if they belonged to the Union. In addition, the three union members were the only
ones laid off at the time; all the remaining employees on the General Nash job were
transferred to another of Respondent’s jobs, the Glenside project. In these
circumstances, the Acting General Counsel has clearly met his initial burden of showing
improper antiunion motivation for the layoffs.
The Acting General Counsel has also made an initial showing that the decision to
lay off employees Wallace, Troxel and Roxus was based on their having complained
about allegedly improper deductions from their wages and filed such complaints with the
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry. As shown in the factual statement, the
employees discussed among themselves and with their union representative,
complaints they had about what they believed were improper deductions from their
wages. Respondent had withheld health and fringe benefits payments from the
employees’ paychecks while they were employed, even though they were not covered

12 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
JD–37–11
14
at least by Respondent’s health insurance; and the employees felt that Respondent
failed to pay time and a half for overtime. Through their Union, they thereafter filed
formal complaints concerning these matters with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor
and Industry. Such activity clearly amounts to protected concerted activity. See BCE
Construction, 350 NLRB 1047, 1047 fn. 3 (2007).

I find that Respondent knew about these complaints. Troxel had discussed his
complaints about the alleged improper deductions with Lederach, who said he had no
choice in the matter. Uncontradicted testimony shows that Slover discussed the alleged
claims of improper deductions both with Union Representative Clark and with employee
Troxel within days of the complaints having been filed with the Pennsylvania
Department of Labor and Industry. Lederach himself admitted that the union member
employees had discussed the alleged improper payments with him after the complaints
were filed (Tr. 182-183).13

The finding of discriminatory causation for complaining about improper wage
deductions is well supported by the record. Slover expressed concern that the
employee complaints had been filed without first bringing them to his attention. Within a
few days after these expressions of concern by Slover, the union employees, who had
made the charges of improper deductions, were laid off. Not only does the timing of the
layoffs point to discriminatory causation, but the laid off employees were the only ones
who had raised the issue of improper deductions. And they were the only General Nash

13 Counsel for the Acting General Counsel submitted into evidence a letter from the
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry to Respondent’s attorney with a copy to
Respondent, purportedly relating to claims of improper payments made by the union
members. The letter was dated October 28, 2010; another letter from the attorney to
President Lederach was dated November 2, 2010. GC Exh. 15. Although the General
Counsel submitted the letters only to show that Lederach’s testimony concerning the
issue was not credible, Respondent attempted to show that the letters supported its
position that it never knew about the complaints filed with the Department of Labor and
Industry. As I have indicated above, such knowledge is established by uncontradicted
testimony that Slover mentioned knowledge of those complaints and by Lederach’s
admission that he discussed the alleged improper payments with the union member
employees after the complaints were filed. I rely on that testimony to show not only
knowledge of the filing of the claims, but also Respondent’s concern over the filing of
those claims. This is also supported by the fact that the union employees were given
reimbursement checks for the alleged improper payments shortly after the complaints
were filed with the Department of Labor and Industry and well before the letters
mentioned above were received. Thus, I reject the general denials of Lederach and
Slover that they knew about the filing of the complaints, as coming from witnesses
whom I have discredited on other matters. I also reject Respondent’s argument on lack
of prior knowledge based on the dates of the letters. The letters discussed above do
not specify when and under what circumstances claims were filed with the Department
of Labor and Industry. Nor do they refer to any claims or anything that prompted the
letters. They simply announce an investigation of improper payments. Thus, the letters
do not establish lack of knowledge by Respondent of the claims filed by the union
members prior to that point.
JD–37–11
15
employees who were laid off. Finally, additional support for the finding of discrimination
is shown by Respondent’s payment of reimbursement checks for the improper
payments. The checks were given to Wallace, Troxel and Rocus immediately after their
layoffs. Respondent’s contention that it was always its policy to reimburse the
employees upon their termination is refuted by the fact that it also reimbursed Breen at
this time, even though he was still employed. In these circumstances, the Acting
General Counsel has met his initial burden of showing that the layoffs were based on
the union employees having complained, among themselves and through their Union,
about improper deductions, a concerted protected activity.
Where, as here, the General Counsel makes a strong showing of discriminatory
motivation, the respondent’s Wright Line defense burden is substantial. Bally’s Atlantic
City, cited in full above, 355 NLRB No. 218, slip op. 3. I find that Respondent has not
overcome that substantial burden to persuasively show it would have laid off employees
Wallace, Troxel and Rocus, in the absence of their union activities and their protected
concerted activity of mutually complaining about alleged improper deductions from their
wages. As shown above, these union members were the only employees laid off from
the General Nash job on September 9. The rest of the General Nash employees were
retained and transferred to the Glenside job.
Respondent’s defense on the September 9 layoffs is twofold: First, it contends
that the work on the General Nash job was winding down and someone had to be laid
off; second, it contends that Wallace, Troxel and Rocus were the last employees hired
and therefore justifiably the first ones in line to be laid off. Respondent’s position is
unpersuasive. While it may be true that the General Nash job was winding down, it is
not clear how much work was remaining or whether the three union members were the
ones who had to be laid off. Indeed, it is not clear why they could not have been placed
on another job. The rest of the General Nash work force was transferred to the
Glenside job, and, except for Breen, who, as shown below, was discriminatorily laid off
in October, the next employee laid off by Respondent, Lou Snyder, was not laid off until
April of 2011. Indeed, there is uncontradicted testimony that, on August 31, just a
month before the union employees were laid off, Lederach told them that there would be
more work starting soon and he needed manpower. Moreover, Lederach himself
testified that from September 2010 to the date of the hearing, Respondent had another
“large project, Lakeside Elementary School.” Tr. 188. Thus, I cannot accept as
determinative the conclusory testimony of discredited witnesses Slover and Lederach
that there was no work for Wallace, Troxel and Rocus. In any event, it is insufficient for
Respondent to rely solely on oral testimony to support an economic defense. See
Davey Roofing, Inc., 341 NLRB 222, 223 (2004).
Significantly, Respondent has not submitted documentary evidence as to the
hours worked on the General Nash and the Glenside jobs. That evidence exists
because those jobs were prevailing rate jobs and Respondent was required to submit
records of hours worked to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to assure that prevailing
wages and benefits were being paid in accordance with legal requirements. That
evidence would have been the best evidence of whether work was slowing down at
General Nash and whether there was not enough work at Glenside to retain Wallace,
Troxel and Rocus. Indeed, there might also have been work available at the Lakeside
JD–37–11
16
job, but, here again, no documentary evidence was submitted concerning that job.
Respondent’s failure to submit such evidence, clearly within its possession, leads to the
inference, which I make, that such evidence would not have supported its position. It is
settled law that where relevant evidence that would properly be part of a case is within
the control of a party whose interest it would naturally be to produce it, and he fails to do
so, without satisfactory explanation, the trier of fact may draw an inference that such
evidence would have been unfavorable to him. Martin Luther King Sr. Nursing Center,
231 NLRB 15, 15 fn. 1 (1997). See also Grosvenor Resort, 350 NLRB 1197, 1197 fn. 8
(2007); and RCC Fabricators, 352 NLRB 701, 701 fn. 5 (2008).
At the very least, the absence of documentary evidence to support the lack of
work at any of its jobs shows that the Respondent has not met its burden of overcoming
the initial evidence of discrimination in the layoffs of Wallace, Troxel and Rocus.
Respondent has not shown that it would have laid off those employees in the absence
of their union activities and in the absence of their complaints about allegedly improper
deductions from their paychecks.
The Acting General Counsel has also satisfied his initial burden of showing that
employee Breen was discriminated against when he was given an unpleasant work
assignment after Respondent learned that he was a union member, and again when he
was laid off from the Glenside job.
In accordance with my credibility findings set forth in the above factual statement,
I find that, on July 26, Project Manager Slover assigned Breen to work in a trench
because he had just learned that Breen was a union member. The job is dirty and
unpleasant. And the assignment of Breen to do trench work in the middle of the day
was unusual. He had regularly been working inside the Glenside school building
immediately before the assignment and indeed throughout his time on the Glenside job.
Because the evidence clearly shows as an initial matter that Respondent made the
assignment because of Breen’s recently revealed union membership, the General
Counsel has met his initial burden of showing discrimination. Nor has the Respondent
shown that Breen would have been assigned this unpleasant task at this time, absent
his union membership. Respondent’s only defense to this charge is that everyone
worked in the trench at one time or another. That is not sufficient to overcome the
evidence of discrimination, as shown particularly by the timing of the assignment in this
case. Nor did Respondent persuasively show why it was necessary to give this
particular assignment to Breen at the time it was given. No particular reason was given
as to why Breen, of all the employees on the job, was pulled off his existing assignment
and given the trench work; or why other employees could not have been given that
assignment at that time. In these circumstances, I find that the assignment of trench
work to Breen on July 26 was discriminatory and violative of the Act.
The evidence also shows that Respondent laid Breen off from the Glenside job
because of his union membership and activities. As shown above, Breen was
discriminatorily given a more arduous work assignment after Respondent learned of his
union membership. Just a month before, Respondent had discriminatorily laid off three
other union members from the General Nash project. At that time, President Lederach
had clearly stated that he would not rehire union members. The record also contains
JD–37–11
17
uncontradicted testimony that Slover told Breen in early September that he was done
“playing games” with the Union. Further evidence of union animus is shown by
Lederach’s unnecessary notification to the Union that Respondent was laying off its
“salt.” Breen, the only union member on Respondent’s payroll at the time, was the only
person laid off from the Glenside job in early October. Just a month before, a number of
employees had been transferred to the Glenside job from the General Nash job. Some
of the employees retained by Respondent had been hired after Breen. Thus, on an
objective basis, Breen’s layoff was unusual. In these circumstances, I find that the
Acting General Counsel has established his initial burden of showing that Breen’s layoff
was unlawfully motivated.14
Respondent has not met its burden of proof to overcome the Acting General
Counsel’s initial showing of discrimination in the layoff of Breen. Respondent contends
that Breen was laid off because of lack of work. As I have indicated above,
Respondent’s lack of work defense is not persuasive, in part because of the failure to
produce documentary evidence in support of that defense. In addition, as to Breen’s
situation, many employees with less seniority were retained while Breen was released.
For example, employees Wieand, Kulick, and Nimmerichter were hired after Breen, but
they were retained. Indeed, they had recently been transferred from the General Nash
job and had no prior experience working on the Glenside job. In contrast, Breen had
worked on the Glenside job almost from its inception. Moreover, it is clear that
Respondent had no problem with the quality of Breen’s work. Respondent contends
that Wieand, Kulick and Nimmerichter had worked for Respondent at some time in the
past so their total seniority was greater than Breen’s. But Respondent submitted no
documentary evidence regarding its seniority policy or how it computes seniority. There
is thus no way to assess Respondent’s seniority defense or even its claim (in the
second to last page of its unpaginated brief) that these employees had been recalled
from a prior layoff.
Significantly, employee Lou Snyder, who was also hired after Breen, had no
history of prior employment with Respondent. Yet he was also retained. Respondent’s
explanation for Snyder’s retention over Breen was that Lederach hired Snyder because
Respondent wanted to please an excavating company with whom Respondent did
business. But it turns out Snyder was recommended not by the principals of the
excavating company, but by Snyder’s brother, who was simply an employee of the
company. Respondent’s explanation for retaining Snyder thus has no rational basis and

14 The complaint alleges that Breen was among the employees who filed claims with
the Department of Labor and Industry and that he, as well as Wallace, Troxel and
Rocus, was discharged for that reason. There is no evidence that Breen filed such a
claim, although he was issued a reimbursement check, along with the others, to make
up for improperly deducted wages and benefits. Moreover, Breen was laid off a month
after Wallace, Troxel and Rocus and a month after he was issued the reimbursement
check. There is thus neither a predicate nor a causal connection to warrant a finding of
discrimination based on filing a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industry. In
these circumstances, I cannot find that Breen was laid off because he filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor and Industry. Accordingly, I dismiss that aspect of the
complaint to the extent that it includes Breen.
JD–37–11
18
cannot provide a defense to the charge of discrimination. Respondent’s failure to
persuasively establish an economic defense or persuasively explain laying off Breen
and retaining other less senior employees leaves unrebutted the evidence that he was
laid off because of his union membership and activities. Thus, Respondent has not
shown that it would have laid Breen off when it did in the absence of his union activities.
Conclusions of Law
1. By impliedly threatening reprisals for engaging in protected concerted
activity and by threatening not to rehire employees because of their union membership
and activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By permanently laying off employees Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace,
Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus because of their union membership and activities,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
3. By assigning employee Chris Breen more arduous work, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. By permanently laying off employees Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and
Chris Rocus because they engaged in protected concerted activities in connection with
complaints about improperly withheld payments, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
5. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the meaning of the
Act.
6. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall order it to cease and desist from engaging in such conduct in the future and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having
found that Respondent unlawfully laid off employees Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace,
Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus, I shall order it to offer them full and immediate
reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus daily compound
interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) and
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record
JD–37–11
19
herein, I issue the following recommended15
ORDER
The Respondent, Lederach Electric, Inc., its officers, agents, successors
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening reprisals for engaging in protected concerted activity or
threatening not to hire or rehire employees because of their union membership or
activities.
(b) Permanently laying off, or otherwise discriminating against employees,
because of their union membership or activities, or because they complain about
improper wage payments or engage in other protected concerted activity.
(c) Assigning employees to more arduous work because of their union
membership or activities.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this order, offer employees Chris Breen, Jeff
Wallace, Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful
discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this
decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this order, remove from its files any reference
to the unlawful actions taken against Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and
Chris Rocus, and, within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this has been done
and that the unlawful actions will not be used against them in any way.

15 If no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended order shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be
waived for all purposes.
JD–37–11
20
(d) Preserve, and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place
designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post, at its facility in Lederach,
Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by e-mail, posting on an
intranet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and all former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since September 30, 2010.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 21, 2011
_____________________
Robert A. Giannasi
Administrative Law Judge

16 If this order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the
words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board”
shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–37–11
Lederach, PA
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT threaten reprisals for engaging in protected concerted activity or
threaten not to hire or rehire employees because of their union membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT permanently lay off, or otherwise discriminate against employees,
because of their union membership or activities, or because they complain about
improper wage payments or engage in other protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT assign employees to more arduous work because of their union
membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer employees Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the unlawful
discrimination against them, with interest.
JD–37–11
Lederach, PA
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the unlawful actions taken against
Chris Breen, Jeff Wallace, Cameron Troxel and Chris Rocus, and, within 3 days
thereafter, notify them in writing that this has been done and that the unlawful actions
will not be used against them in any way.
LEDERACH ELECTRIC, INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935
to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to
determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your
rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may
also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS POSTING MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF THE POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED
BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OF
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354.