Leatherwood Drilling Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsMar 13, 1974

209 N.L.R.B. 618 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Leatherwood Drilling Company and Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO. Case 16-CA-5189 March 13, 1974 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND PENELLO On November 20, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Respondent, Leatherwood Drill- ing Company, Odessa, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I Although not affecting the ultimate conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, we find merit in Respondent's claim that the Administrative Law Judge's Decision incorrectly referred to Allstate Construction, inc , as a drilling contractor The record supports Respondent's contention that Allstate is a dirt contractor Likewise, we agree with Respondent that four of the negotiating sessions which Harman held with the U nion on behalf of other contractors during the hiatus period here in question were held with Howell, the Union's business agent, rather than with Fortenberrv, as the Administrative Law Judge found. These apparently inadvertent errors, however, do not affect any material findings of the Administrative law Judge DECISION STA I'EMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Odessa. Texas, on September 25 and 26, 1973, upon a charge filed on June 11. 1973, and a complaint issued on July 24, 1973, alleging that Respondent, Leatherwood Drilling Company, violated Section 8(a)(5) I Pursuant to motion to correct transcript filed by the General Counsel, and consistent with my recollection, and the sense of the matters ret forth therein, I hereby grant said notion, and the transcript is hereby amended and (1) of the Act by, on May 9 , 1973, withdrawing recognition from and thereafter refusing to meet with the Union as the certified collective -bargaining representative of unit employees . Thereafter briefs were filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel. Upon the entire record ,' including my observation of the witnesses while testifying , and careful consideration of the posthearing briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent, a Texas corporation, maintains an office and place of business in Kermit, Texas, where it is engaged in contract oil well drilling. During the calendar year preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 outside the State of Texas. I find that Respondent, at all times material, is and has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act .2 II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges , the answer admits , and I find that Local 826 , International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, is and has been , at all times material , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues It is undisputed that on May 9. 1973, Respondent withdrew recognition and refused to engage in further bargaining with the Charging Union, which had been certified on March 18, 1969, as exclusive representative of employees in the appropriate unit. The General Counsel argues that by said action, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent denies any illegality attendant in its withdrawal of recognition, affirmatively claiming that said action was supported by objective considerations furnishing a reasonable basis for a good-faith belief that the Union no longer enjoyed majority status. The General Counsel attempts to negate said affirmative defense on the following grounds: (1) the facts on which Respondent relies are insufficient to establish a reasonable basis for believing that the Union lost its majority, and (2) even if they were, the claim of doubt was not raised in good faith but was a mere extension of Respondent's initial unwillingness to recognize the Union at the time of certification and its overall bad faith approach to its statutory obligations. 2 Leatherwood Drilling Compan_i, 179 NLRB 549. 551, Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81. 209 NLRB No. 92 LEATHERWOOD DRILLING CO. B. Concluding Findings 1. Background It is conceded that on March 18, 1969, the Charging Union was certified as the exclusive bargaming representa- tive for employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, consisting of all employees working out of the Kermit, Texas, yard, including roughnecks (derrickmen and floor hands), truckdrivers, welders, mechanics and helpers, but excluding office clerical employees, professional employ- ees, guards, watchmen, drillers and supervisors as defined in the Act. That certification resulted from an election conducted pursuant to the eligibility formula first announced by the Board in Hondo Drilling Company, 164 NLRB 416. The Hondo formula was based generally upon the unique pattern of employment among the 50 to 60 oil well drilling concerns operatirg in the Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico. Furthermore, it is a well-known fact that the various contractors situated similarly to Respondent challenged the validity of the so-called Hondo rule and contested certifications based thereon to the Board and then to the courts. Respondent, following the certification and union requests for bargaining, elected also to challenge the certification on this basis, and hence refused to bargain. On November 10, 1969, the Board issued its Decision and Order,3 upholding the validity of the certification, rejecting Respondent's contentions relative to the Hondo eligibility formula, and directing Respondent to bargain with the Union. Initially Respondent refused to comply with this order, electing to litigate the issue in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, C. B. Leatherwood, former president of the Company, and the individual responsible for Respondent's labor relations policy, died in September 1970. With his death, the Respondent decided to recede from its legal position. Thus, in November 1970, the Company notified the Board of its intention to abide by the Board's Order and to recognize the Union. The first bargaining session, however, was not held until March 8, 1972. A second session was held on April 18, 1972, and the third and final meeting was on June 22, 1972. No agreement was reached. Nonetheless, following the June 22 meeting the Union did not contact the Respondent for purposes of resuming negotiations until April 19, 1973. By letter of that date addressed to Brooks Hannan (Respondent's attorney and a principal company spokes- man during the earlier negotiations) over the signature of J. D. Fortenberry, senior business representative of the Union, a request for resumption of negotiations was made. On May 9, 1973, Respondent, through Harman, respond- ed, advising that it "declines to negotiate further for the reason it has a good faith doubt Local 826 represents a 3 179 NLRB 549 d Laystrom Manufacturing Co, 151 NLRB 1482, 1483--84, Little Rock Downtowner, inc, 168 NLRB 107, enfd. 414 F 2d 1084 (CA 8, 1969). See United States Gypsum Company, 157 NLRB 652, 656. The standard though quoted from a representation case is equally applicable as the definition of Respondent's proof obligation on the issues framed here. 6 The General Counsel in this latter regard relies upon Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 186 NLRB 1050, 1051, and United Electric Company, 199 NLRB 603 619 majority of the employees in the bargaining unit." In this latter regard, testimony adduced on behalf of Respondent indicates that the doubt was based upon two factors: (1) a high rate of turnover since the 1969 election, and (2) the Union's failure to seek bargaining between June 22, 1972, and April 19, 1973, a period of 10 months, which according to Respondent suggested an abandonment of the employ- ees by the Union. 2, Analysis As a matter of settled Board authority, an incumbent bargaining representative enjoys a presumption of continu- ing majority .4 After expiration of the certification year and during periods in which a collective-bargaining agreement is not in effect that presumption may be rebutted so as to release an employer from any further obligation to bargain, but the employer, in doing so, "must demonstrate by objective considerations that it has some reasonable grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status ...."5 The basic question involved here is whether the factors relied on by the Respondent meet that standard, and thereby support a defense to the instant complaint. However, the General Counsel, in addition to arguing that they do not, in the alternative, contends that Respondent has historically acted in derogation of the principles of collective bargaining, and hence is not free to assert a good-faith doubt .6 a. The General Counsel's bad faith argument In cases of this type, the Board as a matter of settled policy precludes an employer from raising a defense based upon doubt of majority, "when the employer's unremedied unfair labor practices have a direct bearing and effect upon the question of majority status...." 7 Despite the fact that no unfair labor practice charge had been filed against Respondent in the period between November 1970, when it agreed to bargain with the Union, and the present charge filed on June 11, 1973, which is predicated on the May 9, 1973, withdrawal of recognition, the General Counsel adduced evidence as to the entire course of conduct of the Respondent dating all the way back to the certification in 1969 as a bar to Respondent's affirmative defense based upon doubt of majority. In doing so, the General Counsel, through documentary evidence and 43(b) witnesses sought to establish that Respondent's approach to bargaining was in bad faith and designed "to avoid bargaining with the Union." The complaint contains no allegations that could reasonably be construed as placing such matters in issue. However, I permitted the General Counsel wide latitude in eliciting such evidence. I shall assume for purposes of this Decision, without deciding,8 that any evidence reflecting on state of mind bad faith by Respondent that might relate r Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., supra, 1053. F Although background evidence, relative to state of mind , is plainly relevant , I wonder whether the license, posse%sed by the General Counsel, and perhaps charging parties as well, to go overboard in litigating such matters stands , or should stand, unregulated . To defend against an assertion of surface bargaining requires extensive preparation and study by counsel Where , as here, such matters are not alleged, and not the subject of prior charges or unfair labor practice findings, at a minimum it would seem that limitations should exist to assure full notification to the party adversely (Continued) 620 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to employee defections was probative and relevant to the issue of whether Respondent was debarred from asserting a defense, based upon a doubt of majority. I am convinced, on this record that the evidence adduced by the General Counsel is not sufficient to preclude the Respondent from raising such a defense. It is true that following the Union's certification, the Respondent initial- ly refused to bargain, and did so in defiance of a Board Order. However, its action in this regard was predicated upon a challenge to the propriety of the Hondo eligibility formula, the validity of which was widely questioned by Respondent's competitors, many of whom, to the extent that they were affected thereby, similarly resisted that eligibility determination. I am unwilling to find that the assertion of this legal defense was frivolous, or that the delay in actual bargaining resulting therefrom was indica- tiye of bad faith .9 I am also not persuaded that the record establishes that Respondent's conduct at the bargaining table disclosed a bad-faith state of mind. Respondent accepted union proposals, explained its position in refusing to agree, made counterproposals,10 and duly provided all information requested by the Union.l i Respondent's conduct up to April 1973 did not in any sense suggest a close minded approach or a refusal to accept an agreement it could live with. Concededly, the General Counsel is hard pressed where , as here, he seeks to prove surface bargaining through negotiations limited to three meetings. But, as is apparent from the record, the abbreviated scope of the bargaining prior to the spring of 1973 cannot in fairness be attributed to Respondent.12 There is no indication that it refused to meet , on request of the Union, at any time prior to the withdrawal of recognition. It is true that, during presentation of the defense, the General Counsel, on cross-examination of Paul Leather- wood, elicited testimony that Respondent in February 1973 had granted a general across-the-board increase without notification to the Union. The General Counsel made no effort to amend his complaint in this regard and, in the circumstances , I do not find that this single incident precludes Respondent from asserting a good-faith doubt. In so finding, I note that the Union, during negotiations, had demanded an immediate wage increase outside the framework of a contract. Howell, the Union's business manager, testified, with support from Leatherwood, that affected by such litigation Such a requirement would not only be consistent with ordinary conceptions of fair play , but could avoid the granting of time and resource consuming adjournments I am also curious as to whether with respect to the background matters involved here , a rule of reason could not be invoked as to just how far back and how many "old bones" the General Counsel is free to exhume for inspection in support of the Charging Party's present claim 9 The Respondent 's failure to provide information requested by the Union during this period , was no more indicative of bad faith than its refusal to honor the certification which it felt invalid 10 i do not believe that Respondent's failure to present its contract proposal until the second bargaining session on April 18, 1972, was unreasonable Although the Union submitted its proposal well in advance of the commencement of negotiations , no bargaining session was held until March 8 , 1972, and it strikes me as unreasonable to read anything improper into the Company's submission of a contract proposal at the very next session. 11 It is true that on January 5, 1971, the Union requested information, which Respondent ultimately provided on May 31 , 1971 However, this wage rates were not a significant issue to the parties since both the Union, due to the number of unorganized contractors, and Respondent, due to the scarcity of roughnecks, had to remain competitive in this regard. Howell further testified that it is normal practice for annual wage increases to be granted by drilling contractors in January or February, and that when this occurs, the Union, on notification, has "accepted that wage increase without tying it to the total contract." Although Respon- dent may have engaged in a technical refusal to bargain by failing to consult with the Union, the surrounding circumstances preclude a conclusion that its failure to do so contributed to employee defection from the Union, or that this matter constitutes convincing proof that Respon- dent at all times intended to avoid bargaining with the Union. Although I find General Counsel's arguments based on the alleged bad faith of Respondent totally unpersuasive, this, as will be seen infra, is not fatal to his case. b. The asserted good faith doubt I find Respondent's affirmative defense to be unsubstan- tiated on this record.i3 It is true that the Union made no request for a resumption of negotiations between June 1972 and April 1973. It is also true that in certain circumstances a persuasive argument might be made that substantial delays in requesting a resumption of negotiations may carry a strong suggestion that a union has abandoned employees in the bargaining unit, thereby enforcing an employer's belief that a union had lost its representative status. However, I cannot find, on this record, that either Paul Leatherwood, or his attorney, Brooks Harman, could have made any such assumption in the instant case. It is a well-known fact that the effort to organize the employees among the various drilling contractors in the Permian Basin involved a long drawn out, time-consuming effort, involving extensive litigation. Organization, where successful, was attained on a single-employer basis. Upon acceptance as the majority representative, the Union, following unsuccessful attempts to establish a multiem- ployer unit, has sought to negotiate contracts on a single- employer basis. Brooks Harman, who impressed me as a man highly familiar with the history of organization by this Union in the Permian Basin, and the difficulties faced by delay was adequately explained on the record , since it was clear that in January of that year the Union agreed to a suspension of negotiations because the Company had only one employee on the payroll Thereafter, bargaining did begin and on May 11, 1971, pursuant to its intention to resume negotiations , the Union wrote Respondent requesting the bargain- ing data I see nothing untoward in Harman 's failure to compile the data on an earlier date. 12 The General Counsel argues that bad faith is evidenced by "Respondent's lack of efforts to expedite bargaining." Under the law, Respondent had no obligation to initiate bargaining . N LR B v Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co, Inc., 306 U S 292 . This is particularly so, where, as here, it was the practice of the parties to meet pursuant to union requests for such meetings. 13 The General Counsel's contention that the "objective facts" upon which Respondent claims a doubt of majority were not available to Respondent until after recognition was withdrawn is not supported by a consideration of the record as a whole Cf. NLR.B. v GulJmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (C.A 5, 1966). LEATHERWOOD DRILLING CO. the Union in that connection, represented several contrac- tors during such negotiations, in addition to Leatherwood. In his brief to me, he concedes knowledge of the difficulties encountered by the Union in their efforts to organize employees, and to secure and administer contracts cover- ing employees in this area.i4 The Union simply had too little manpower to deal immediately with complexities presented by the diverse policies and attitudes of the companies with whom bargaining would take place, operational variations among these companies, and geo- graphical dispersal of the various employers. From the foregoing, and other facts, I find that Harman, and Leatherwood, as well, had direct knowledge as to the unlikelihood that the Union would schedule negotiating sessions , without hiatus, until final agreement had been reached. That such delays were known to be inevitable is evident from Respondent's bargaining history. For, while the Employer took steps to comply with the Board's order to bargain and posted notices to that effect in either November or December 1970, and despite the fact that the certification year would commence running at that time, no negotiating session was held until March 8, 1972, well after the Union's protection pursuant to the certification had lapsed. This delay was with assent of the Union, and placed Harman and Leatherwood on notice that from the Union's point of view, delays would be a part of the negotiation process. I fail to see how Respondent could reasonably believe that subsequent delays reflected an intention on the part of the Union to abandon the Respondent's employees. This is particularly so when one considers the fact that in the period June 1972 through April 1973 Harman was actively engaged in negotiations with the Union on behalf of other drilling contractors, including Allstate Construction, Inc., Chaparral Dulling Co., Hondo Drilling Co., McVay Drilling Co., Rod Ric Corporation, A. W. Thompson, Inc., and Tn-Service Drilling Co. On some 23 occasions between June 1972 and April 1973, Harman and Forten- berry, in addition to their other responsibilities, met in connection with these negotiations. From the evidence relative to these negotiations it is apparent that, as to most of the contractors, there were significant time gaps between bargaining sessions . There is no suggestion that in Fortenberry's communications with Harman during this period he in any sense created the impression that the Union lacked an interest in attaining a contract with Respondent. On the other hand, Harman knew that Fortenberry was responsible for representation of the Union in further dealings with Respondent, and that during this period Fortenberry was burdened by other matters." Aside from Respondent's knowledge that delays would be a characteristic of the negotiations, the unreasonable- ness of its interpretation of the Union's inaction is 14 According to Paul Leatherwood 's testimony all his positions taken with respect to the Union were formalized , after consultation with Harman. It is reasonable to infer that Harman, as a co-principle in Respondent's dealings with the Union, would have discussed the "pros" and "cons" of any basis for doubt held by Paul Leatherwood, and for this reason I find that the latter is properly charged with knowledge held by Harman. 15 1 credit Fortenbeny's testimony that he informed Harman generally of the nature of his workload and the scheduling problems they created 621 enforced by the absence of any sensible explanation as to why Respondent would assume that the Union would single out Leatherwood for abandonment, contemporane- ous with its efforts to secure bargaining agreements with Leatherwood's competitors. The Union had long been involved in organization among the crews in the Permian Basin . Securing contracts with all contractors in the Basin was obviously its ultimate objective. It defies commonsense to assume that this was not understood by Respondent. Furthermore, Respondent cites no facts, apart from the delay in securing negotiations, which would suggest that the Union's attitude towards it would differ from that of the other organized contractors. Respondent knew, or should have known, that the Union's interest in obtaining agreements covering Respondent 's operations , was no less than its objectives with respect to Respondent's organized competitors. In this regard, it should be noted that the turnover facts asserted by Respondent as evidencing a doubt of majority, are in all material respects representa- tive of the experience of all drill companies in this area. They would not so drastically differ with the experience of contractors with whom the Union was actively negotiating during 1972 through 1973, as to warrant a belief by Respondent that the Union, being impressed by the turnover history among Respondent's employees, elected to go away. For the above reasons, I find that Respondent did not, and could not, have held a reasonable belief that the absence of communication from the Union between June 1972 and April 1973, either indicated an intention on the part of the Union to abandon the unit, or otherwise contributed to any belief that the Union lost its majority.16 As evidence, more directly bearing on a possible loss of majority, Respondent cites facts revealing a high degree of turnover since the election in 1969. Summarized, these facts show that (1) of the 77 names on the election eligibility list, only 3 employees remained in Respondent's employ as of the hearing date herein, (2) of the 21 employees on a payroll list furnished to the Union on May 20, 1971, only 4 employees listed thereon were eligible to vote in the election, (3) in the 4 years that have passed since the election, the Company employed a total of 1,761 roughnecks to fill 36 jobs, and (4) in the first 5 months of 1973, the Respondent experienced a turnover rate of nearly 900 percent. There is no evidence in this case of employee defections and all of Respondent's witnesses conceded that they were unaware of any employee dissatisfaction with the Union. Furthermore, Respondent, in his brief, concedes that Board precedent does not accept turnover alone as the type of objective consideration that would legitimately support a withdrawal of recognition. Under existing Board authori- ty, in turnover situations, "new employees will be pre- during the period between the summer of 1972 and spring of 1973 This testimony was not subject to direct contradiction , and it is entirely plausible that such explanations were afforded by Fortenberry in view of difficulties that the parties had in scheduling negotiating meetings. 16 Cf. Southern Wipers, Inc, 192 NLRB 816, where inactivity of a union was a factor relied on by the Board in sustaining a good-faith doubt of majority 622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sumed to support a union in the same ratio as those whom they have replaced." 17 Nonetheless, Respondent argues that the turnover situation in the Permian Basin is unique and principles followed in other industries should not be applied to the drilling contractors involved there. A variety of arguments are advanced to support the view that turnover should be honored in this industry as a good-faith defense. Most, however, relate to the high velocity of turnover. In my opinion this fails to persuade that the presumption that replacements will support a union to the same extent as their predecessors is a fallacy in this industry. If it is fair to assume that replacements will support a union where the level of turnover is 50 percent, this assumption is no less valid where the turnover amounts to 900 percent. The fact that nine employees might in a given time period fill a single job previously held by a union supporter, does not warrant an assumption that the ninth replacement will support the union to any lesser degree than the first.18 But, in any event, to recognize an exception, based on turnover, to the good-faith doubt rule would depart materially from the policy considerations underlying the Hondo formula. It should be apparent to any reader of Hondo and other cases involving the drilling contractors in the Permian Basin , that the Board, appreciating the turnover conditions, that existed there, committed itself to the desirability of fashioning means to assure that employees of various contractors operating in this two- state area, despite the transient nature of their employ- ment , could assert their Section 7 statutory rights "to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing...." I have heretofore stated that it is fair to assume that the turnover experienced by Respon- dent is generally representative of that experienced by its competitors in the Permian Basin . Hence, to accept the turnover facts adduced here as substantiating a good-faith doubt of malonty would provide all contractors in the Basin a like defense. Stable collective bargaining could hardly proceed to a meaningful state under such condi- tions, for, the 'drill contractors, on expiration of each collective-bargaining agreement could thereby require the Union to reestablish its malonty as a precondition for negotiation of a successor agreement. See, e.g., Emerson Manufacturing Company, Inc., 200 NLRB No. 33 (JD). Although ultimately the Board might sustain Respon- dent's contention, or even repudiate Hondo, as matters now stand, it is my opinion that to regard turnover as a justification for the refusal to bargain would reduce the elections conducted by the Board in the Permian Basin to a futile exercise and render the status of certification of representatives resulting therefrom to little more than a 17 Laysirom Manufacturing Co, supra, 1484, and cases cited at fn 7; Printers Service, Inc, 175 NLRB 809, 812, NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, 414 F 2d 1084, 1091 (C A 8, 1969) 18 In addition to the degree of turnover, I am not persuaded by Respondent 's arguments based on observations that many of its crewmem- bers must have been employed by nonunion contractors , and that union representatives would have difficulty in maintaining regular contacts with employees These factors are simply too remote to throw any light on the organizational preferences of crewmembers hired from time to time by Respondent These arguments were not asserted as the basis of Respon- dent's doubt when recognition was withdrawn, and hence , though arguably focal point for game playing. In sum , I envision the exception to Board policy sought by Respondent, as, in practical consequence, eventually undermining both the policy considerations which resulted in the Hondo formula and the exercise of self-organizational rights by employees engaged in the drilling industry in the Permian Basin. Accordingly, I find, pursuant to established Board princi- ple,19 that turnover did not furnish a good-faith doubt that the Union continued to represent a majority of Respon- dent's employees, and I find that Respondent, by with- drawing recognition from the Union on May 9, 1973, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Considering the pattern of employment experienced by Respondent in the conduct of its operations, special provision is necessary to assure adequate publication of the provisions of the order herein. Therefore, in accordance with the earlier Board decision, involving Respondent, reported at 179 NLRB 549, 551, I shall recommend that in addition to requiring that copies of the notice be posted at the offices and yards of the Respondent in Kermit, Texas, it will be further provided that copies be posted at crew headquarters on site at all rig operations , and that copies be provided the Union for posting, if the Union is willing, at meeting places in the Permian Basin. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Leatherwood Drilling Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 826, International Union of Operating Engi- neers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Employees working out of the Kermit, Texas, yard, including roughnecks (derrickmen and floor hands), truckdrivers, welders, mechanics and helpers, but exclud- ing office clencal employees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, drillers and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times since March 18, 1969, the Union has been and is now the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the relevant to the question of whether the Board should alter its view with respect to turnover in this industry, they are otherwise in the nature of afterthought and hence cannot be considered as the basis for Respondent's doubt of majority See N L R.B. v. Gulfmont Hotel Co, supra, fn. 13. ie It is true that in Southern Wipers Inc, 192 NLRB 816, the Board accepted "heavy turnover" as one of several factors supporting a good-faith doubt of majority. That case does not reverse prior precedent to the effect that turnover alone will not justify a withdrawal of recognition, and, though not cited by Respondent, I note my view that said decision is inapposite. See also Viking Lithographers, Inc, 184 NLRB 139. LEATHERWOOD DRILLING CO. purpose of collective- bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By withdrawing recognition on May 9, 1973, and refusing thereafter to meet with the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby recommend the following: ORDER L0 Leatherwood Drilling Company , its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate bargaining unit: All employees working out of the Kermit , Texas, yard, including roughnecks (demckmen and floor hands), truckdrivers , welders, mechanics and helpers, but excluding office clerical employees, professional em- ployees, guards, watchmen , drillers, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Withdrawing recognition from and refusing to meet with the Union as exclusive collective-bargaming repre- sentative of employees in the appropriate unit. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local 826, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its offices and yards in Kermit, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 21 Copies of said notice, on forms to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 16, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Similar copies shall be posted at the crew headquarters at all operating drilling sites. Copies shall also be provided the Union for posting (the Union willing) at union halls or meeting places in the Permian Basin . Reasonable steps shall be taken by 623 the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from receipt of this recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 20 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 21 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local 826 , International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of all our following employees: All employees working out of our Kermit , Texas, yard, including roughnecks (derrickmen and floor hands), truckdrivers , welders, mechanics and helpers , but excluding office clerical employees, professional employees , guards , watchmen, dril- lers and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition and refuse to meet with the Union as exclusive collective -bargaining representative of employees in said unit. WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union upon request as the exclusive collective -bargaining represent- ative of the employees in the appropriate unit and if an understanding is reached we will sign a contract with the Union. LEATHERWOOD DRILLING COMPANY (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building , Room 8-A-24, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921.