Lear Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 18, 2020

2019006514 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/227,097 08/03/2016 Gerald PATRICK LEAR 55266 PUS 6025
34007 7590 06/18/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C. / LEAR CORPORATION
1000 TOWN CENTER
TWENTY-SECOND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, CUONG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GERALD PATRICK, SAMUEL HANLON,
MICHELLE A. PERENY, and DAVID HAYNER
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097
Technology Center 3600
Before BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.
PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 9, 11–18, and 20–23.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Lear
Corporation. Appeal Br. 1.
2 “Claim 19 was canceled in the amendment of November 14, 2018.”
Appeal Br. 5. That amendment was entered by the Examiner on December
4, 2018. Claims 7, 8, and 10 are also canceled.
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

2
We AFFIRM IN PART.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER3
The claims are directed to a seat assembly. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A seat assembly comprising:
a seat bottom;
a seat back;
a plurality of sensors operably connected to at least one of
the seat bottom and the seat back to detect a seating condition of
a seated occupant; and
a controller in electrical communication with the plurality
of sensors and the at least one actuator, the controller being
programmed to:
receive input from the plurality of sensors indicative
of a first seating condition of the seated occupant,
compare the first seating condition of the seated
occupant to stored seating conditions of prior seat occupants,
determine that the seated occupant of the first
seating condition is a prior seat occupant,
store the input for the first seating condition of the
seated occupant,
receive input from the plurality of sensors indicative
of a second seating condition of the seated occupant,
compare the second seating condition for the seated
occupant to stored seating conditions of prior seat occupants, and
determine that the seated occupant of the second
seating condition is a prior seat occupant.

3 There does not appear to be antecedent basis for “the at least one actuator”
recited in claim 1.
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

3
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Taira US 2011/0172886 A1 July 14, 2011
Bennett US 2014/0265479 A1 Sept. 18, 2014
Hui US 2015/0045984 A1 Feb. 12, 2015
REJECTIONS4
Claims 1–6, 9, 11–18, and 20–23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) as indefinite.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, 15–17, and 20–23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Hui and Bennett.5
Claims 3–5 and 12–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Hui, Bennett, and Taira.
OPINION
Indefiniteness
Claims 1, 17, and 20 each require “determin[ing] that the seated
occupant of the first seating condition is a prior seat occupant.” The
Examiner explains that “determining that the seated occupant ‘of the first
seating condition’ is a prior occupant” is “unclear and does not make sense
in context” because “[t]he occupant is an occupant of the vehicle, not an
occupant ‘of the first seating condition.’” Final Act. 3.

4 As noted above, claim 19 has been cancelled.
5 Claim 18 is not included in any of the obviousness rejections, but appears
to have limitations remarkably similar to those in claim 9, which is the
subject of the rejection. Compare claim 9 (“wherein the controller is further
programmed to store the input for the second seating condition of the seated
occupant”), with claim 18 (“further comprising instructions for storing the
input for the seating condition of the seated occupant”).
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

4
Appellant responds, disputing the rejection, and noting the
amendment of November 14, 2018 entered by the Examiner, which changed
“prior occupant” to “prior seat occupant” for consistency with prior
recitations of the “seated occupant” in the claims. Appeal Br. 5.
The Examiner responds that “[t]he use of the preposition ‘of’ indicates
that the ‘seated occupant’ is occupying ‘the first seating condition,’” making
“it . . . unclear whether the ‘seated occupant’ is referring to physically
occupying the seat or physically embodying some other concept, such as
sitting in the seat in a particular manner or condition.” Ans. 10. The
Examiner has not established that the claims are indefinite.
We read “determin[ing] that the seated occupant of the first seating
condition is a prior seat occupant,” as recited in claims 1, 17, and 20, as
requiring a determination that a seated occupant causing the sensors to
“indicat[e the] first seating condition” is a “prior seat[ed] occupant.” We fail
to see the ambiguity in the claims asserted by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 1–6, 9, 11–18, and 20–23 as indefinite.
Obviousness
Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, 15–17, and 20–23 as a group.
Appeal Br. 6–7. We select claim 1 as representative. Claims 2, 6, 9, 11, 15–
17, and 20–23 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant relies on the arguments presented with respect to claim 1 for the
patentability of claims 3–5 and 12–14. Appeal Br. 7.
The Examiner finds that Hui teaches the features of claim 1, including
“determin[ing] that the seated occupant of the first seating condition is a
prior [seated] occupant.” Final Act. 4. Appellant does not dispute this
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

5
finding. The Examiner finds that although “Hui suggests a user may have
multiple profiles,” Hui “does not provide extensive detail regarding use of a
second seating condition.” Id. at 5.
The Examiner finds that “Bennett discloses a seat adjustment system
including a controller programmed to receive input from a plurality of
sensors . . . indicative of a second seating condition of the seated occupant.”
Id. (citing Bennett ¶¶ 5, 20–23, 25, 25–38). The Examiner finds that
“Bennett teaches that these features are useful for facilitating automatic
adjustment of vehicle seats.” Id. (citing Bennett ¶ 7). Based on these
findings, the Examiner reasons that “it would have been obvious . . . to use a
second seating condition for comparison as disclosed by Bennett with the
system disclosed by Hui in order to facilitate automatic adjustment of
vehicle seats.” Id.
Appellant responds, “disagree[ing] with the assertion that the profiles
of Bennett are synonymous with the claimed second seating condition”
because “[a] composition of inputs from a plurality of sensors in a seat
assembly for occupant identification is not synonymous to preferred seating
settings.” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant contends that Bennett “identif[ies] . . .
the occupant by use of a fob,” which “would remove the purpose of
identifying the driver by the composition of inputs from the plurality of
sensors in the seat assembly.” Id. at 7. Appellant does not address the
Examiner’s rationale.
In the Answer, the Examiner clarifies the rejection, explaining that
“Bennett was relied on merely for teaching that second seating conditions
may be gathered and differentiated from first seating conditions.” Ans. 11.
The Examiner explains that the rejection “merely requires that the system of
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

6
Hui process the second seating condition (disclosed by Bennett) in the same
manner that it processed the first seating condition (given that the
functionality of processing the data to determine a prior occupant is already
disclosed in the Hui reference itself).” Id. Appellant does not address the
clarification, which effectively renders the arguments presented in the
Appeal Brief moot, leaving the Examiner’s rejection effectively unrebutted.6
For this reason, alone, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–6, 9, 11–17, and 20–23.
Moreover, the cited portions of Bennett support the Examiner’s
rejection. Bennet explains, for example, that “if an occupant has two
profiles, a first profile that provides for a more comfortable ride, and a
second profile that better maintains driver alertness, control component 150
can recommend adopting the second profile based at least in part on
indicators that the driver may be drowsy.” Bennett ¶ 23. This is one
teaching, for example, to modify Hui’s system such that Hui’s sensors would
be used for sensing such a “second seating condition.”
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is reversed. The
Examiner’s rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9, 11–
18, 20–23
112(b) Indefiniteness 1–6, 9, 11–
18, 20–23

6 Appellant did not file a Reply Brief in response to the Examiner’s Answer.
Appeal 2019-006514
Application 15/227,097

7
1, 2, 6, 9,
11, 15–17,
20–23
103 Hui, Bennett 1, 2, 6, 9,
11, 15–17,
20–23

3–5, 12–14 103 Hui, Bennett, Taira 3–5, 12–14
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 9, 11–
17, 20–23
18

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART