LANTIQ BETEILIGUNGS-GMBH & CO. KG

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 30, 2021

2020004107 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/527,123 05/16/2017 Raj Kumar Jain INT200463PNUS 4072 148528 7590 08/30/2021 2SPL Patent Attorneys Landaubogen 3 Munich, 81373 GERMANY EXAMINER PATEL, PARTHKUMAR ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2468 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/30/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Inteldocs_docketing@cpaglobal.com mail@2spl.de PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAJ KUMAR JAIN and RAVINDRA SINGH Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 Technology Center 2400 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, LARRY J. HUME, and JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 16–35, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 1–15. See Appeal Br. 8 et seq. (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE the rejection of claims 16–35, and enter new grounds of rejection for claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and 112(b), and for claim 35 under § 112(e) pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Lantiq Beteiligungs- GmbH & Co. KG. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claimed subject matter is directed to link loss detection. See Spec. (Title). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention “relate to a method comprising detecting a link loss and to a corresponding device. In particular, various techniques relate to detecting a link loss of a physical link based on at least one of a coded signal and decoding of the coded signal.” Spec. 1:6–8. Exemplary Claim Claim 16, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal (emphasis added to dispositive limitation): 16. A method, comprising: receiving a coded signal via a physical link, decoding the received coded signal to obtain a result signal, detecting a link loss of the physical link based on the coded signal, the decoding of the coded signal, or both. 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Dec. 2, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 12, 2020); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Mar. 13, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed June 28, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed May 16, 2017) (claiming benefit of US 62/081,592, filed Nov. 19, 2014). Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 3 REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence: Name Reference Date Li US 2006/0193396 A1 Aug. 31, 2006 Au et al. (“Au”) US 7,212,492 B1 May 1, 2007 Schmidt et al. (“Schmidt”) US 2007/0260965 A1 Nov. 8, 2007 Jain et al. (“Jain”) US 2008/0065968 A1 Mar. 13, 2008 Larsson et al. (“Larsson”) US 2008/0107089 A1 May 8, 2008 Lee et al. (“Lee”) US 2008/0176517 A1 July 24, 2008 Yeom et al. (“Yeom”) US 2009/0083234 A1 Mar. 26, 2009 Kwon et al. (“Kwon”) US 2009/0274242 Al Nov. 5. 2009 Becker et al. (“Becker”) US 2009/0313530 Al Dec. 17, 2009 Suzuki et al. (“Suzuki”) US 2012/0263060 A1 Oct. 18, 2012 Schoppmeier (“Dietmar”)3 US 2013/0003813 Al Jan. 3, 2013 Kuipers US 2015/0063551 A1 Mar. 5, 2015 Jin et al. (“Jin”) US 2015/0110205 A1 Apr. 23, 2015 Urban US 2015/0309852 A1 Oct. 29, 2015 Tu et al. (“Tu”) US 2017/0134569 A1 May 11, 2017 3 We note the Examiner chose to reference the Schoppmeier reference as “Dietmar” in the Final Action. See Final Act. 7. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 4 REJECTIONS Rej. Claim(s) Statutory Basis Reference(s) R1 16, 18, 34, 35 102(a)(2) Lee R2 17 103 Lee, Yeom R3 19 103 Lee, Dietmar R4 20, 21 103 Lee, Kwon R5 22 103 Lee, Becker R6 23 103 Lee, Jain R7 24 103 Lee, Li R8 25 103 Lee, Jin R9 26 103 Lee, Urban R10 27, 28 103 Lee, Larsson R11 29 103 Lee, Larsson, Suzuki R12 30 103 Lee, Schmidt R13 31, 32 103 Lee, Tu, Kuipers R14 33 103 Lee, Kuipers ISSUES AND ANALYSIS Based upon our review of the record, we concur with the particular arguments advanced by Appellant with respect to anticipation Rejection R1 of claims 16, 18, 34, and 35 for the specific reasons discussed below. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 16 for emphasis as follows. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 5 1. § 102(a)(2) Rejection R1 of Claims 16, 18, 34, and 35 Issue 1 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 3–4; Reply Br. 1–2) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Lee is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a method that includes, inter alia, the dispositive limitation of “detecting a link loss of the physical link,” as recited in claim 16, and as similarly recited in independent device claim 34? Principles of Law Anticipation of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102 occurs when each claimed element and the claimed arrangement or combination of those elements is disclosed, inherently or expressly, by a single prior art reference. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A reference inherently discloses an element of a claim “if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Therasense, 593 F.3d at 1332 (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264,1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 6 Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Analysis The Examiner finds Lee discloses loss of a physical link by detection of decoder packet error using end-to-end (E2E) error feedback. “Video decoder 42 only sends E2E error feedback when there is an error and identifies the exact packet that was lost.” Final Act. 4 (citing Lee ¶¶ 33, 42, 45, 49). “[T]he error reported in the E2E error feedback may be attributable to an error occurring in the RL [reverse link] or the FL [forward link]. The E2E feedback does not include an indication of where the error occurred, and thus video encoder 20 typically is unable to determine the origin of the lost packet.” Lee ¶ 42. In response, Appellant contends [a]ccording to applicant’s specification, a link loss is defined as a scenario where the physical link is interrupted and communication is prohibited. (See ¶¶ [0002] (‘the permanent removal of a physical link (link loss)’), [0025] (‘Link loss may correspond to a scenario where the physical link is interrupted and communicated is thus prohibited’)). Appeal Br. 3. We also find the Specification discloses “[l]ink loss of the physical link 151 may occur where the corresponding copper wire is physically Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 7 broken. A further source for link loss may be malfunctioning of the [customer premises equipment] CPE 111 associated with the physical link 151.” Spec. 8:22–24. Appellant persuasively argues: Lee . . . make[s] no distinction between a completely lost packet and data lost within a packet (See paragraph [0030]), and thus do[es] not ascertain whether an error is simply a noise error or whether an error may be due to a link loss. That is, Lee . . . do[es] not identify or detect a link loss as claimed. The methods of Lee . . . (e.g., Figs. 3-4) are applied on a frame by frame basis to control errors in frames of a video over an active link to prevent error propagation, and can be adapted based on channel bandwidth (see, e.g., ¶ [0068]). In contrast, a link loss is not an error that can be controlled in such a manner, as the techniques discussed in Lee . . . would not prevent propagation of the link loss, and there would be no subsequent frames or bandwidth. Therefore Lee . . . do[es] not detect whether there is a link loss, but instead evaluate received video data for errors in general (generically called a lost packet regardless of the size of the data loss), and determines whether the error is an FL error or an RL error. Based on that determination, an error correction is selectively employed. Thus Lee . . . fail[s] to anticipate the invention of claim 16 and its associated depending claims, and the rejection was based on clear error. Appeal Br. 4.4 In light of the Specification and the plain language of the claim, we agree with Appellant that Lee’s detection of occasional packet loss and subsequent application of error correction for that packet loss in a digital 4 Appellant further argues, “What is disclosed in Lee et al. is detecting a loss of a packet, not a loss of a physical link.” Reply Br. 1. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 8 video stream (i.e., link) does not reasonably disclose the disputed step of “detecting a link loss of the physical link,” as recited in claim 16. We disagree with the Examiner because, although we interpret the claims broadly, we do so in light of the Specification. See Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054. Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the dispositive limitation of claim 16, such that we find error in the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 16 and independent claim 34, which recites the dispositive limitation in commensurate form. We further do not sustain Rejection R1 of dependent claims 18 and 35, depending from claims 16 and 34, respectively. 2. § 103 Rejections R2–R14 of Claims 17 and 19–33 In light of our reversal of the rejections of independent claim 16, supra, we also reverse obviousness Rejections R2–R14 under § 103 of claims 17 and 19–33, which ultimately depend from claim 16. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited secondary and tertiary references overcome the aforementioned deficiencies with Lee, as discussed above regarding anticipation Rejection R1 of claim 16. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 9 NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION 3. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), Enablement: Claims 16–35 We enter a new ground of rejection of claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of enablement, based on undue experimentation analysis under the Wands factors, discussed below. Any analysis of whether a particular claim finds support in an application’s disclosure requires a determination of whether that disclosure, when filed, contained sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims so as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention. The statute (35 U.S.C. § 112) has been interpreted to require that the claimed invention be enabled so that any person skilled in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation . . . include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. Id. Whether undue experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual considerations. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. In reviewing for lack of enablement, the Wands court elected to consider “all of the factors.” Id. at 740. However, it is not necessary to review all the Wands factors to find a Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 10 disclosure enabling. Rather, the Wands factors “are illustrative, not mandatory” and what is relevant to an enablement determination depends upon the facts of the particular case. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Warner-Lambert Company v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We now look to pertinent Wands factors. We find that as to Wands factor (5), “the state of the prior art” with regard to the “detecting a link loss of the physical link” step of claim 16 is not known in the prior art, as argued by Appellant. Appeal Br. 3–4. Thus, Appellant has admitted through their argument that the “detecting” step of claim 16 is not known in the prior art. We additionally find that as to Wands factor (8), “the breadth of the claims,” the breadth of the “detecting” step appears to be unbounded as it would allow almost limitless techniques for “detecting a link loss of the physical link based on the coded signal, the decoding of the coded signal, or both.” With respect to Wands factor (6), we note that, ‘[i]t is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.’ Although the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel aspect of an invention must be enabled in the patent. Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc. 501 F.3d. 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 11 The court explained, “when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is required.” Id. at 1284. We find that to be the case with respect to the limitations of “receiving a coded signal via a physical link” and “detecting a link loss of the physical link based on the coded signal,” as recited in claim 16 and as commensurately recited in independent claim 34. While the Specification discloses various statistical techniques and measures applied to a plurality of physical links each carrying coded signals that are processed to determine overall statistics for a plurality of signals (see, e.g., Fig. 2, elements 151, 152; Spec. 7:18–22,5 and see Spec. 8 et seq.), we find the Specification is silent as to how it is technically possible for “a” (single) coded signal to be received on “a” (single) physical link that is claimed as having been physically lost, i.e., a physical link that has been disconnected. As to Wands factor (2), “the amount of direction or guidance presented” by Appellant’s Specification is minimal, if not non-existent, since we find no direction or guidance presented in the discussion in the Specification of how physical link loss detection can be determined by a coded signal that is claimed as being received over a physical link that is claimed as being disconnected, i.e., it is unclear how a physical link that is 5 “Due to the multiple physical links 151, 152 connected to the DSLAM 101, 102 and sharing a cable binder 155, NEXT and FEXT [crosstalk] can be prominent.” Spec. 7:21–22. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 12 lost or broken (e.g., a broken copper wire, see Spec. 8:22–23) can provide a signal, notwithstanding whether the signal is coded or not. Appellant’s Specification discloses: Detecting the permanent removal of a physical link (link loss) can be helpful for controlling communication in a communication system. E.g., in context of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) communication systems employing vectoring for removal of far-end crosstalk (FEXT), removal of physical links subject to link loss from a DSL vector engine calculation can be important in order to avoid negative impacts on remaining DSL channels handled by the DSL vector engine calculation. Reference implementations for detecting link loss of a physical link typically detect the link loss with a comparably large latency and act slowly. E.g., the latency can be as high as between 2 and 10 seconds, e.g., according to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) G.993.2 (2006), section 12.1.4. Such a comparably high latency of detecting link loss can impose significant challenges on DSL vector engine calculations. When a line leaves, it can take a significant amount of time to detect the disconnection of the line. This typically results in a performance loss of data rate during this transitioning phase between link loss and detection of link loss. Spec. 1:12–28. “Therefore, a need exists for advanced techniques of detecting link loss of a physical link. In particular, a need exists for techniques which enable detecting the link loss at a comparably low latency and with a comparably high accuracy.” Spec. 2:3–5. We find that this disclosure merely describes the “what,” and not the “how,” i.e., enablement. Thus, while we find that the disclosure relied upon by Appellant may be sufficient for written description purposes, we find no enabling disclosure Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 13 of how a person with skill in the art would go about achieving the aims and purposes of Appellant’s claimed invention. Finally, as to Wands factor (3), there are no “working examples” presented by Appellant in his Specification, only objectives and aims, as cited above. For example, we find no disclosure in Appellant’s Specification of any technique for receiving a coded signal over a broken physical link, and then using the purportedly received coded signal to determine that the physical link is broken. We find before us an extremely broad claim limitation directed to a highly complex invention for which Appellant has not provided a working example. Further, by implication based upon Appellant’s successful arguments presented with respect to the cited prior art, Appellant also argues that working examples of this element are not found in the prior art. Based on Wands factors (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (5) the state of the prior art and (8) the breadth of the claims, the weight of these factors is directed towards undue experimentation. We conclude that Appellant’s Specification does not enable those skilled in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. Accordingly, we newly reject independent claims 16 and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of an enabling disclosure. We also reject dependent claims 17–33 and 35 which inherit the deficiencies of their respective independent claim. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 14 4. § 112(b) Indefiniteness Rejection: Claims 16–35 Principles of Law We apply the indefiniteness test approved by In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam): “A claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear,” and “claims are required to be cast in clear–as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite–terms.” See Packard, 751 F.3d at 1310, 1313; Ex parte McAward, Appeal No. 2015- 006416 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017) (precedential) at *8–11 (explaining because of different approaches to indefiniteness before the PTAB and the courts, the PTAB continues to follow Packard after the Supreme Court’s Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014) decision). [W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b). Packard, 751 F.3d at 1311. Analysis We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. As discussed above with respect to the enablement rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), the claims are vague and unclear overall at least with respect to the following limitations: “receiving a coded signal via a physical link” and “detecting a link loss of the physical link based on the Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 15 coded signal,” as recited in claim 16 and as commensurately recited in independent claim 34. We find these limitations to be contradictory, or at least confusing, because there is no direction or guidance in the Specification as to how physical link loss detection of “a physical link” can be determined by “a coded signal,” particularly because the (single) coded signal is claimed as being received over the (single) physical link that is also claimed as being disconnected, i.e., it is unclear how a physical link that is lost or broken (e.g., a broken copper wire, see Spec. 8:22–23) can provide a signal, notwithstanding whether the signal is coded or not. Accordingly, we reject, as a new ground of rejection, independent claims 16 and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for indefiniteness. We also reject dependent claims 17–33 and 35 which inherit the deficiencies of their respective independent claim. 5. § 112(e) Improper Multiple Dependent Claim 35 Principles of Law A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is being considered. 35 U.S.C. § 112(e). “35 U.S.C. 112(e), authorizes multiple dependent claims in applications as long as they are in the alternative form (e.g., ‘A machine Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 16 according to claims 3 or 4, further comprising ---‘). Cumulative claiming (e.g., ‘A machine according to claims 3 and 4, further comprising ---‘) is not permitted.” Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 608.01(n)(I). Analysis Multiple dependent claim 35 recites, “[t]he device of claim 34, wherein the device is configured to execute the method of claim 16.” We conclude claim 35 is an improper multiple dependent claim because the claim, as required by the statute, does not refer to claims 34 or 16 in the alternative. Moreover, the addition of a method to device claim 35 does not modify the structure of claim 34.6 Moreover, our reviewing court guides that the patentability of an apparatus claim “depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.” Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Superior Industries v. Masab, Inc., 553 F. App’x 986, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Rader, R., concurring) (“[A] system claim generally covers what the system is, not what the system does.”) Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“The inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”). 6 In the event of further prosecution, we leave to the Examiner to determine whether claim 35 reasonably can be interpreted as constituting a hybrid apparatus-method claim, which has been held indefinite under § 112(b). See Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding an apparatus claim reciting an active transmitting step to be indefinite). Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 17 Thus, it is usually improper to construe non-functional claim terms in system claims in a way that makes infringement or validity turn on their function. Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we reject, as a new ground of rejection, claim 35 as being an improper multiple dependent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112(e). CONCLUSIONS We REVERSE the Examiner’s rejections, however, we enter new grounds of rejections for claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of an enabling disclosure and under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for indefiniteness, and we further enter a new ground of rejection for claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(e). More specifically: (1) Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with respect to anticipation Rejection R1 of claims 16, 18, 34, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), and we do not sustain the rejection. (2) We are persuaded the Examiner erred with respect to obviousness Rejections R2 through R14 of claims 17 and 19–33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we do not sustain the rejections. (3) We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for lack of an enabling disclosure. (4) We enter a new ground of rejection for claims 16–35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for indefiniteness. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 18 (5) We enter a new ground of rejection for claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(e) for being an improper multiple dependent claim. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 16, 18, 34, 35 102(a)(2) Lee 16, 18, 34, 35 17 103 Lee, Yeom 17 19 103 Lee, Dietmar 19 20, 21 103 Lee, Kwon 20, 21 22 103 Lee. Becker 22 23 103 Lee, Jain 23 24 103 Lee. Li 24 25 103 Lee, Jin 25 26 103 Lee, Urban 26 27, 28 103 Lee, Larsson 27, 28 29 103 Lee, Larsson, Suzuki 29 30 103 Lee, Schmidt 30 31, 32 103 Lee, Tu, Kuipers 31, 32 33 103 Lee, Kuipers 33 16–35 112(a) Enablement 16–35 16–35 112(b) Indefiniteness 16–35 35 112(e) Improper form 35 Overall Outcome 16–35 16–35 Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 19 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Appeal 2020-004107 Application 15/527,123 20 Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)