Lahey's of Muskegon

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 10, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 537 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

I. M. JAFFE AND SONS
I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey 's of Muskegon
and Retail Clerks Union , Local 807 , Retail Clerks
International Association , AFL-CIO. Case
7-CA-7020
June 10, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
BROWN AND ZAGORIA
On March 28, 1969, Trial Examiner Jerry B.
Stone issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner ' s Decision and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board has delegated its powers in
connection with this case to a three -member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
entire record in this case , including the Trial
Examiner ' s Decision , the exceptions and brief, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent, I. M. Jaffe and
Sons, d/b/a Lahey's of Muskegon, Muskegon,
Michigan , its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
We agree with the Trial Examiner ' s finding that a reasonable period for
bargaining following the July 26 , 1968, settlement had not elapsed before
the Respondent ' s refusal to bargain , and we are satisfied that he applied
the proper legal test in reaching that conclusion . However , we do not adopt
the apparent view in footnote 8 that Board cases accord controlling weight
to the presence or absence of an impasse in determining the reasonable
time for bargaining under settlement agreements , as the Trial Examiner
himself recognized in arriving at his decision . Such determinations are
governed by all relevant facts surrounding the postsettlement bargaining
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,
under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
537
as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on February
17 and 18, 1969, at Muskegon, Michigan.
The charge was filed on November 4, 1968. The
complaint in this matter was issued on November 25,
1968.
The issue in this case is whether the Respondent has
refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since October 24, 1968. The
critical question is whether a bargaining relationship
created after a settlement agreement executed on July 26,
1968, had had a reasonable time to function.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding, and the General Counsel and the
Respondent filed briefs which have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER'
Lewis Jaffe, Arthur Jaffe, and Sidney Jaffe are, and
have been at all times material herein, copartners doing
business in Muskegon under the trade name and style of
Lahey's of Muskegon.
The copartnership of Lewis Jaffe, Arthur Jaffe, and
Sidney Jaffe, which has its principal office at 131 South
Main Street, Butler, Pennsylvania, operates as a
single-integrated enterprise engaged in the retail sale and
distribution of women's ready-to-wear accessories,
sportswear, and related goods at its several stores located
in various States, and going under different trade names,
such as "Lahey's of Muskegon," which is located in
Muskegon, Michigan, and is the store involved herein
During the calendar year ending December 31, 1967,
which period is representative of their operations at all
times material herein, the copartnership of Lewis Jaffe,
Arthur Jaffe, and Sidney Jaffe referred to above, in the
course and conduct of their business operations, attained a
gross revenue in excess of $500,000 from the sale and
distribution of women's apparel and related goods at their
various stores.
During the year ending December 31, 1967, which
period is representative of its operations during all times
material hereto, Respondent, in the course and conduct of
its business operations, purchased and caused to be
transported and delivered at its Muskegon store, women's
apparel and other goods and materials valued in excess of
$100,000, which goods and materials were transported and
delivered to its store in Muskegon, Michigan, directly
from points located outside the State of Michigan.
As conceded by the Respondent and based upon the
foregoing, it is concluded and found that Respondent is
now and has been at all times material herein an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED2
Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, is and has been at
all times material herein a labor organization within the
The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
'The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein
176 NLRB No. 66
538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Facts'
Supervisory Status
At all times material herein Lewis L. Jaffe has been a
manager and partner of Respondent , and has been and is
now a supervisor and agent of the Respondent , within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
the unit described below, concerning any proposed
changes in group insurance or the method of adjusting
grievances , and concerning wages , hours, and any other
term or condition of employment.
The settlement agreement also set out the appropriate
bargaining unit. Such unit as set forth is the same as
previously has been set out herein as the appropriate
bargaining unit. The settlement agreement further
contained language to the effect that the execution of the
settlement agreement did not constitute an admission that
the Respondent had violated the National Labor Relations
Act.
Appropriate bargaining unit
All full-time and regular part-time employees of 1. M.
Jaffe and Sons , d/b/a Lahey 's, Muskegon , Michigan,
including all sales employees , markers, alterations
employees , and janitors , but excluding professional
employees , office clerical employees , guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
1964 Certification of the Union
On or about February 12, 1964, a majority of the
employees in the unit described above in paragraph 10, by
secret-ballot election conducted pursuant to an agreement
for consent election in Case 7-RC-6084, which election
was conducted under the supervision of the Acting
Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor
Relations Board , designated and selected the Retail Clerks
Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks International
Association , AFL-CIO, as their representative for the
purpose of collective bargaining with the Respondent. On
February 20, 1964, a Board certification of representative
issued to the Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail
Clerks International Association , AFL-CIO.
Event of May 6, 1968 - Unfair labor practice
charges - alleging refusal to bargain
On or about May 6 , 1968, the Charging Party filed an
unfair labor practice charge against Respondent in Case
7-CA-6730, alleging , inter alia, that Respondent had
refused to bargain in good faith.
Event of July 26, 1968, - settlement agreement
Re: Alleged refusal to bargain charges
On or about July 26, 1968, the Charging Party,
Respondent , and the aforementioned Regional Director
executed a settlement agreement in Case 7-CA-6730, in
which agreement the Respondent agreed , inter alia, that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit
described below.
WE WILL, upon request , bargain collectively with
Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association , AFL-CIO , as the exclusive
collective -bargaining representative of the employees in
The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
B. The Exclusive Representative Status of the Union
The General Counsel contends in effect that the
settlement agreement in Case 7-CA-6730, referred to
above, established the Union as the representative of all
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit,
established the Union as exclusive representative of all
employees in said unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment , and other terms and conditions of
employment, and created an obligation upon Respondent
to bargain for a reasonable time with the Union.
Although the General Counsel had pled, and the
Respondent had admitted, that the Union received
certified status in 1964, the General Counsel first said
such evidence was only for background purposes, and later
disavowed any reliance upon the certification to establish
the majority status of the Union as of July 26, 1968.
The Respondent in his pleadings and at the hearing did
not attack the validity or lawfulness of the settlement
agreement as such . The Respondent contended that,
absent a finding of unfair labor practices prior to the
settlement agreement , no obligation to bargain for a
reasonable time ensued as a result of the settlement
agreement.
The Respondent introduced some evidence and made
some offers of proof of employee dissatisfaction prior to
July 26 , 1968, as bearing upon the question of "reasonable
time" for bargaining after the execution of the settlement
agreement on July 26, 1968.
I reject the Respondent's contention that absent unfair
labor practices prior to the settlement agreement there
was not an obligation to bargain for a reasonable time
after the execution of the settlement agreement. A
settlement agreement of the type referred to herein creates
several obligations. One obligation is to comply with the
terms of the settlement agreement. Another obligation is
one created by the commencement of a recognized
bargaining relationship . As to the latter, such obligation is
to recognize and bargain with the other party for a
reasonable period of time . During this reasonable period
of time for bargaining , the status of the Union as
exclusive bargaining representative can not be lawfully
attacked.
The Board with court approval has clearly set forth
that after a settlement agreement there is an obligation to
bargain for a reasonable time and that during such
reasonable period of time the status of the recognized
exclusive bargaining representative is free from attack.'
'Mid-City Foundry Co.. 167 NLRB No. 108 , Poole Foundri• and
Machine Company, 95 NLRB 34, 35-36, enfd . 192 F.2d 740 (C.A. 4), cert.
denied 342 U .S. 954; W. B. Johnston Grain Company , 154 NLRB 1115,
enfd. 365 F . 2d 582 (C.A. l0); N J. MacDonald & Sons, Inc, 155 NLRB
67, enfd . 62 LRRM 2296 (C.A 1)
I. M. JAFFE AND SONS 539
As indicated later in this Decision , I conclude and find
that the bargaining relationship created on July 26, 1968,
had not had a reasonable time to function for a fair
chance to succeed as of October 24, 1968.
As indicated, there has been no attack upon the validity
and lawfulness of the settlement agreement of July 26,
1968. It must be presumed therefore that the underlying
prerequisites for a bargaining obligation existed as of July
26, 1968. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the facts
reveal that at a time on or prior to July 26, 1968, a period
of time properly representative of the employees' desires,
a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit had selected the Union as collective-bargaining
representative of such employees. I further conclude and
find that, by virtue of such facts, as of July 26, 1968, the
Union was and has been at all times since the exclusive
collective -bargaining representative of all employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit.'
C. The Refusal To Bargain
The facts are clear that the Respondent has refused to
bargain with the Union as exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit at
all times since October 24, 1968.
The critical issue is whether the Union on October 24,
1968, enjoyed as of that time an irrebuttable status as
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit . The parties
in their pleadings and in statements at the hearing join
issue on whether as of October 24, 1968, a reasonable
time had been allowed the bargaining relationship created
or confirmed by the settlement agreement of July 26,
1968.
There is no issue as to majority status or exclusive
representative status of the Union on July 26, 1968. The
Union was selected by a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit as bargaining representative on February
14, 1964, and on February 20, 1964, the Union became
the certified exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of said employees. On July 26, 1968, the Respondent and
the Union entered into a settlement agreement of alleged
unfair labor practices in Case 7-CA-6730, and the
Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor
Relations Board approved such settlement agreement. The
settlement agreement , referred to above , provided in effect
that the Respondent would recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit. Shortly thereafter the
Respondent and the Union agreed to an initial bargaining
meeting , and thereafter met on August 29 , September 11
and 17 , and October 8, 1968 . On these dates the parties
met and bargained between 6 and 7 hours.
The events relating to scheduling of bargaining sessions
and to the bargaining sessions themselves are not in
material dispute . Thus , it is clear that on August 2, 1968,
the parties agreed to commence the bargaining sessions on
August 29, 1968, primarily because Carter, for the Union,
'Respondent 's counsel in the litigation of the issues and in his brief
recognizes the basic legal issue herein as being one of reasonable time for
bargaining after the settlement agreement . Some of his arguments however
relate to an argument that employee expression of dissatisfaction should be
considered in evaluating the question of "reasonable time ." I reject such
argument . Furthermore , such contentions have clearly been rejected by the
Board and the courts . See W. B. Johnston Grain Company. 154 NLRB
1115, enfd . 365 F.2d 582 (C.A. 10), for an excellent discussion of virtually
the same contentions and the rejection thereof.
had plans for a 3-week vacation. There is testimonial
conflicts as to whether Stokes made certain statements
indicative of bad-faith bargaining. It is not necessary to
resolve such conflict since the issue and contention in this
case does not concern context or bad-faith bargaining.
There is also testimonial conflict as to whether Carter
made statements to Stokes on the telephone and at the
hearing indicative of bad-faith bargaining with respect to
the question of union security. Similarly it is not necessary
to resolve this conflict. The pleadings did not place in
issue a defense to the effect that Respondent was refusing
to bargain on such grounds. Nor does the evidence reveal
that Respondent's refusal to bargain was on such grounds.
Furthermore, Carter's and Jaffe's testimony clearly
reveals that Carter' s statements in the bargaining sessions
were to the effect that he would negotiate on "union
security." Carter set forth in the bargaining sessions his
reasons for his contended union-security proposals and his
opposition to Respondent's proposal, and Carter made
concessions on his total proposals as quid pro quo for
requested concessions by the Respondent.
For the first two bargaining sessions , constituting
around half of the total bargaining time of the entire
bargaining , the parties discussed certain specific employee
grievances and records pertaining thereto. As to the rest
of the time the parties discussed matter pertaining to the
respective proposals and positions of the parties. The
Union's contract proposal was tendered on August 29,
1968. The Respondent orally presented its position on
dues deductions and union-security problems at the
August 29 and September 11 sessions , presented a written
proposal on union security on September 17, 1968, and
presented its total proposal in effect on October 8, 1968.
The Union made certain modifications and deletions in its
proposals on October 8, 1968.
The Union's contract proposal was in effect the terms
of the expired contract' with certain modifications and
new proposals. Thus many of the paragraphs in the
proposed contract were the same as had been. However,
there were a substantial number of provisions in the
contract which constituted a change from the old contract.
Among items of change were wages and other provisions.
The Company's position on union security and dues
deductions involved a change from the expired contract.
The Company's October 8, 1968, proposal provided in
effect acceptance of the terms of the old contract except
for new . proposed union-security and dues-deductions
provisions and for a wage -and merit- increase proposal.
It is clear that the parties were apart as of the end of
the October 8, 1968 , bargaining session on proposals
relating to union security and dues deductions, on wage
proposals, and on various other proposals included in the
Union's proposed contract which differed from the old
contract.
There was no indication by the parties on October 8,
1968, that they considered themselves at an impasse in
bargaining. Stokes' letter of November 1, 1968, reveals
that the Respondent did not consider bargaining to be at
an impasse. And the facts clearly reveal that an impasse
in bargaining had not been reached on October 8, 1968.
Furthermore, it is clear that there remained many open
issues at the conclusion of the October 8, 1968, sessions.
Bargaining as to wages had just seriously begun when the
issue had been joined with Respondent's proposal of
October 8, 1968. It is noted that Carter, on October 8,
1968, made certain economic concessions which bear
'The old contract had expired on July 1, 1968.
540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
relationship to wages.
Subsequent to the October 8, 1968 , session , the parties
agreed on October 15 , 1968, to meet on October 24, 1968.
On October 24, 1968 , Stokes told Carter that the
Respondent would not meet on that date or thereafter
because an RD petition (to decertify the Union ) had been
filed by employees and that legally the Respondent cound
not bargain .' Henceforth the Respondent has continued to
refuse to bargain with the Union.
Although the Respondent indicated its reason for
refusal to bargain on October 24, 1968 , as being because
of the RD petition , it did not offer to resume bargaining
after said petition was dismissed by the Regional Director
for Region 7 of the NLRB on November 21, 1968, or
after the time to appeal such dismissal had expired.
The Respondent contends that the Union ' s request for
bargaining around 60 days prior to the contract ' s expiring
on July 1, 1968, indicates that 60 days was a reasonable
period of time for bargaining . I note that the contract
required such notice for the purpose of reopening contract
negotiations . I find no value in this contention. The
bargaining revealed issues that obviously had not been
considered by the Union as bargaining issues at the time
of said letter . The reasonable period of time therefore has
to be determined by the bargaining issues and
circumstances involved.
The Respondent also contends that a letter from
Regional Director Brooks (for NLRB Region 7), relating
to the unfair labor practice settlement agreement case,
7-CA-6730, constitutes evidence of what is a reasonable
time for bargaining . This letter , dated October 9, 1968,
advised that the provisions of the settlement agreement
had been carried out and that the case had been closed.
The letter further advised however , "Please note that the
closing is conditioned upon continued observance of the
said settlement agreement and does not preclude further
proceedings should subsequent violations occur."
Since the facts reveal that the parties , as of October 15,
1968, had bargaining issues unresolved and planned
further bargaining sessions , it is obvious that a conclusion
from the Regional Director ' s letter cannot be drawn that
a reasonable time for bargaining had expired. The
reference of the closing ' s being conditioned upon
continued observance of the said settlement agreement
clearly reveals the closing of the case to be administrative
and not determinative of the end of the obligation to
bargain.
Considering all of the foregoing , I conclude and find (1)
that the Union was the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit on July 26 , 1968, (2 ) that the Union as the
recognized exclusive collective- bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit on July
26, 1968 , was entitled to have a reasonable period of time
with such status, being free from attack so as to afford it
a fair chance to achieve successful fruition to bargaining,
(3) that the type and degree of the bargaining issues, the
limited time actually devoted to bargaining , the pending of
the open issues in bargaining on October 24, 1968 , and the
lack of impasse in bargaining as of October 24, 1968,
require a conclusion that the Union and the bargaining
relationship had not been afforded a reasonable period of
time to accord the relationship a fair chance to succeed,'
(4) that since the Union and the bargaining relationship
was entitled to a reasonable period of time to achieve
fruition in bargaining and such time had not been afforded
'An RD petition had been filed on October 21, 1968 , in Case 7-RD-784.
as of October 24, 1968, the Union has at all times since
July 26, 1968, continued its status as exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit, and the Respondent was obligated as
of October 24, 1968, to recognize and bargain with the
Union as collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit, and (5) that the
Respondent, by its refusal to bargain with the Union on
October 24 and thereafter, including November 21, 1968,
and thereafter, has engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the
'appropriate unit described herein. It will therefore be
recommended that the Respondent bargain collectively,
upon request, with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit,
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such
understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. I. M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's of Muskegon,
the Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. All full-time and regular part-time employees of I.
M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's, Muskegon, Michigan,
including all sales employees, markers, alterations
employees, and janitors, but excluding professional
employees, office clerical employees, guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
'See various Board cases holding that where an impasse had not been
reached a reasonable time for bargaining had not occurred. N J
MacDonald & Sons. Inc. 155 NLRB 67; Frank Becker Towing Co. 151
NLRB 466; Mid-City Foundry Co., 167 NLRB No. 108. Poole Foundry
and Machine Company. 95 NLRB 34, 35-36, enfd 192 F 2d. 740 (C.A. 4).
These cases involved various time periods of bargaining from 3 to 6
months It is noted that in The Daily Press. Incorporated. 112 NLRB
1434, 1441-44, a case cited by Respondent as holding that 2 months was a
reasonable time for bargaining , an "impasse" had occurred.
I. M. JAFFE AND SONS 541
4. Retail Clerks Union Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, was on July 26,
1968, and at all times since has been the exclusive
representative of all employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining
within the meaning of the Act.
5. By refusing on October 24, 1968, and at all times
thereafter to bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of all its employees in the
above-described appropriate unit, the Respondent has
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By the foregoing, the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.1°
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further
event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read - "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
'RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, it is
recommended that Respondent , its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Retail Clerks
Union , Local 807, Retail Clerks International
Association , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to
rates of pay , wages , hours of employment , and other
terms and conditions of employment . The appropriate unit
is:
All full-time and regular part-time employees of I. M.
Jaffe and Sons , d/b/a Lahey ' s, Muskegon , Michigan,
including all sales employees , markers , alterations
employees , and janitors , but excluding professional
employees , office clerical employees , guards and all
supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Retail Clerks
Union , Local 807, Retail Clerks International
Association , AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit and embody any
understanding reached in a signed contract.
(b) Post at its store in Muskegon , Michigan , copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix ."' Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 7 , after being duly signed by an authorized
representative , shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all our employees in the appropriate
unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the
Retail Clerks Union, Local 807, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all our employees in the
appropriate unit described below with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms
and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
contract. The appropriate unit is.
All full-time and regular part-time employees of I.
M. Jaffe and Sons, d/b/a Lahey's, Muskegon,
Michigan, including all sales employees, markers,
alterations employees, and janitors, but excluding
professional employees, office clerical employees,
guards and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 500 Book
Building , 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan
48226, Telephone 313-226-3200