Labinal, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 16, 2003

340 N.L.R.B. 203 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

LABINAL, INC. 203
Labinal, Inc. and Nancy Weaver. Case 17–CA–22024
September 16, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On June 20, 2003, Administrative Law Judge John H.
West issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun-
sel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings,1 findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Labinal, Inc., Pryor Creek,
Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.

WE WILL NOT unlawfully maintain a rule which pro-
hibits an employee from discussing another employee’s

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall issue a new notice to conform to the judge’s Order.
pay without the knowledge and permission of the other
employee.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate you concerning
the discussion of salaries and wages with each other.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully suspend and discharge you
because you engage in concerted activities with each
other for the purpose of mutual aid and protection by
discussing employee salaries and wages with each other
and through an employee representative, concertedly
complain about their salaries to us, and to discourage
employees from engaging in these and other concerted
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the rule which prohibits employees
from discussing another employee’s pay without the
knowledge and permission of the other employee, and
advise you in writing that the rule has been rescinded.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Nancy Weaver full reinstatement to her for-
mer job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or
to any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Nancy Weaver whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against her in the form of her discharge,
less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharge of Nancy Weaver, and WE WILL within 3
days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been
done and that the discharge will not be used against her
in any way.

LABINAL, INC.
Charles T. Hoskins Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles S. Plumb, Esq. (Doerner, Saunders, Daniels & Ander-
son, L.L.P.), of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN H. WEST, Administrative Law Judge. A charge was
filed on December 26, 2002, by Nancy Weaver against Labinal,
Inc. (Respondent or Labinal). The charge was amended on
February 13, 2003. On February 21, 2003, a complaint was
issued which alleges that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), by (a)
maintaining a rule prohibiting its employees from discussing
salaries and wages with each other, (b) interrogating employees
concerning their discussion of salaries and wages with each
other, (c) suspending Weaver, and (d) discharging Weaver. The
Respondent denies violating the Act as alleged.
340 NLRB No. 25
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 204
A trial was held in this matter on April 10, 2003, in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. On the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following
Findings of Fact
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, manufactures aerospace wir-
ing components at its facility in Pryor Creek, Oklahoma, where
it annually purchased and received goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of Oklahoma.
The Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Weaver was employed by the Respondent from November
1997 until July 2002. She was a database clerk in the document
control department. At the time of her termination she was
being trained to trade jobs with Gina Soles, who had to transfer
because her husband became the supervisor of her department
and the Respondent prohibits this. The training arrangement,
which went on for weeks before Weaver was terminated in July
2002, involved Weaver and Gina Soles working together one
half a day at Soles’ desk and spending the other half of the day
working together at Weaver’s desk.
Although she could not remember the exact date, Weaver
testified that after Ray Soles had become her supervisor, he
brought her paycheck to her for the first time and he also
brought Gina Soles’ pay stub to her while both she and Gina
Soles were sitting at Gina Soles’ desk. According to Weaver,
this occurred on a Friday. Weaver testified that she and Gina
Soles were sitting side by side with their arms touching in front
of the computer on Gina Soles’ desk; that Gina Soles opened
her pay stub and she saw Gina Soles’ pay rate; that after she
finished her training session with Gina Soles that day she went
back to her desk in document control, and used her calculator to
determine that Gina Soles was making $30,000 a year; that at
the time she was making $27,000 a year; that she then told two
other employees in her department, Celisa Rowland and Kathy
Parrott, about Gina Soles’ salary, indicating that Gina Soles
opened her pay stub in front of her and she had just figured out
Gina Soles’ annual salary; that shortly thereafter Tina Burka
and John Gifford came into the office and she told them that
she had seen Gina Soles’ pay stub and how much she was mak-
ing; that she did not telephone anyone when she found out
about Gina Soles’ pay; and that all of these employees did not
believe that it was fair, and Rowland told her that she should
speak to her supervisor, Debbie Mason, when she returned to
work on Monday.1 On cross-examination Weaver testified that
Gina Soles’ pay stub was open for about 30 seconds; that Gina
Soles did not show it to her voluntarily but rather just opened it;
that she did not tell Gina Soles that she saw her pay rate, or that

1 Previously these employees had discussed the unfairness of Gina
Soles being allowed to take longer lunch hours than anyone else, and to
leave work to get her daughter at daycare.
she intended to disclose it to other employees; that the day Gina
Soles opened the pay stub in front of her was the same day that
she told Rowland, Parrott, Burka, and Gifford about Gina
Soles’ pay rate; that she thought that this all occurred on a Fri-
day and it was June 15, 2002 “or something like that” (Tr. p.
196); that she was not sure of the date but she remembered that
Mason was not there that Friday; that on “08/08/02” she gave a
written statement to the Oklahoma Employment Security
Commission (OESC), Respondent’s Exhibit 2, in which she
indicated that she saw Gina Soles’ paycheck on “07/14/02”;
that July 14, 2002, is a Sunday; that she was not working on a
Sunday; that she believed that the incident occurred in June
2002; that she told the National Labor Relations Board that the
incident occurred on June 14, 2002, which is a Friday; and that
the two prior checks before July 24, 2002 would have been
given to the employees on July 15 and June 28, 2002.
Rowland, who is a clerk in document control, testified that
Weaver called her on the phone and told her that “Gina’s pay
stub was in the desk” (Tr. p. 234); that she was in document
control when Weaver telephoned her; that Weaver did not say
where in the desk she found the pay stub but Weaver did say
that Gina made $30,000; and that Parrott was not at work that
day. On cross-examination Rowland testified that she could not
recall the date when Weaver telephoned her to tell her about
Gina Soles’ pay and it could have been in July or June 2002;
and that before Weaver told her about Gina Soles’ pay informa-
tion, Gina Soles herself had told her, Rowland, about how
much she made.
Rowland testified that the following day, in Rowland’s pres-
ence, Weaver told a group consisting of Mason, Parrott, Gif-
ford, and Burka that Gina Soles opened the pay stub in front of
Weaver; that Mason was present when Weaver made this
statement to her, Parrott, Gifford, and Burka about Gina Soles
opening her pay stub in front of her; that later that day she told
Gina Soles that Weaver had found out how much she, Soles,
made, and she was telling everyone; that she told Gina Soles
that Weaver had said the pay stub was in her desk and she did
not tell Gina Soles that Weaver said that she had gotten into
Gina Soles’ drawer to find the pay stub; and that she told
Weaver that it was “unequal” for there to be that difference in
her and Gina Soles’ pay and Weaver should take the issue to
Mason. (Tr. p. 250.)
Mason testified that she did not know that shortly after find-
ing out Gina Soles’ pay information, Weaver began communi-
cating it to employees.
According to her testimony, on Monday following her seeing
Gina Soles’ pay stub Weaver discussed the difference in her
and Gina Soles’ pay with Mason, who told her that she would
get with her supervisor, Jean-Marc Calmels, to see what could
be done about it.
Mason, who was at Labinal for over 21 years and had re-
signed 3 months before the trial herein, testified that she was
Weaver’s supervisor for over 2 years; that Weaver came to her
and told her that she, Weaver, and Gina Soles, who were cross
training, were sitting at Gina’s desk when Gina opened her pay
stub and Weaver saw that Gina made more money than her, and
this concerned her; that she told Weaver that she would speak
with her supervisor, Calmels; that Weaver spoke to her about
LABINAL, INC. 205
seeing Gina Soles’ paycheck sometime between mid-June and
the end of June, 2002; and that it was about 6 weeks later that
Weaver was fired.
According to her testimony, Mason spoke to Calmels the fol-
lowing week and he told her to get with human resources and
find out what the pay difference was and then get with Nancy
and let her know. Mason e-mailed Jennifer Painter, who is a
human resources representative, and asked her to send Gina
Soles’ and Nancy Weaver’s salary information.
Subsequently Mason called Weaver into her office. Mason
had received an e-mail from human resources indicating what
Weaver and Gina Soles were making. Mason showed it to
Weaver, telling her that Calmels had given her permission to
call human resources, and the e-mail was from Painter. The e-
mail indicated that Gina Soles was making $30,000 a year.
Weaver testified that Mason said that it was not fair.
Mason testified that 2 or 3 weeks before Weaver was termi-
nated she, Mason, discussed Gina Soles’ pay with Weaver. In
response to Mason’s request, Painter e-mailed Gina Soles’ and
Weaver’s salary information. Mason testified that she told
Weaver that Gina probably made more because she previously
was a Boeing employee and she has experience in the aircraft
harness; and that she received that e-mail from Painter within a
week after she, Mason, spoke with Camels about the pay issue.
About 1 week before she was to take over Gina Soles’ job,
Weaver told her supervisor in the document control department,
Mason, that she did not believe that she had adequate training
to take over Gina Soles’ position. Mason e-mailed her supervi-
sor, Calmels, who was on vacation at the time, to set up a meet-
ing regarding the question of whether Weaver had adequate
training. Mason sent Weaver a copy of her e-mail to Calmels.
Subsequently Weaver spoke to Calmels regarding her training.
Gina Soles, who along with her husband no longer work for
Labinal, testified that Rowland told her that one of the days that
she, Soles, was not at work Weaver called her and told her that
she had found Soles’ paycheck in her desk drawer; that that day
she did not do anything to determine whether Weaver had actu-
ally gotten into her desk drawer and her paychecks; that the day
Rowland told her about what occurred, she, Soles, spoke to her
supervisor who was her husband, and he told her to that she
probably needed to speak with Painter in human resources; that
she told Painter what Rowland had told her, namely that Weaver
saw her pay stub and was talking to other employees about it;
that it was not her common practice to put her pay stubs in the
desk drawer, but if she was busy she did; that she did not even
remember that there were actually pay stubs there; that one of
the pay stubs in the drawer was open and the other one was not;
that her pay stub was actually a direct deposit statement; that
usually while she was at work she tore off the tabs and broke the
seal to the pay stub, looked at it, and then put it in her purse; that
there were instances when she was busy or someone was at her
desk when she received the pay stub, and in those instances she
did not open the pay stub, and she would usually put it in her
middle desk drawer under a pencil tray; and that she never
opened a pay stub with someone else present. When asked by
Respondent’s attorney if during her cross training with Weaver,
she, Soles, “ever open[ed] a pay check while . . . [Weaver] was
sitting there next to you, or in her presence,” Soles responded, “I
don’t recall opening a pay check. I don’t recall her opening any
pay checks in front of me.” (Tr. p. 260.). Gina Soles further
testified that opening a paycheck when someone is sitting right
next to her is not something that she ever does; that after talking
to Painter she, Soles, looked in her desk drawer; that there were
two pay stubs in the drawer and one was open and the other was
not; that she does not put open pay stubs in her drawer; that she
did not recall opening the pay stub that was in her drawer; that
she had been told that Weaver claimed that she, Gina Soles,
opened the pay stub in front of her, Weaver, on the 15th (appar-
ently referring to July 15, 2002); that the pay stub for the 15th
was not open and she opened it in front of Mason, who initialed
the pay stub; that she then brought the pay stub for the 15th to
Painter and told her that the pay stub that Weaver supposedly
saw her open was still sealed when she, Soles, took it out of her
desk drawer after Rowland told her what Weaver had done; and
that Weaver never told her that she knew about her pay rate and
was going to tell it to other employees. On cross-examination
Gina Soles testified that while she was at Weaver’s desk she
accidentally opened an e-mail of Weaver’s in or about June
2002 on a day that Weaver was not at work; that she did not
remember what the e-mail was about; that she and Weaver had
been sending e-mails to people, including Calmels, and they
received e-mails back; that it was a practice for her to open the
e-mails when Weaver was not at work; that Labinal had not yet
put her e-mail on Weaver’s computer; that she did not make it a
standard practice to open a pay stub and put it in her desk
drawer but it is possible that she did that; that she did not check
her desk drawer until the day after Rowland told her about
Weaver telling other employees about her, Gina Soles’, pay; and
that she did take long lunch hours but she was not aware that it
bothered other employees, and when she took a long lunch hour
she would work later. When asked by Counsel for General
Counsel if the accidentally opened the e-mail concerned a com-
plaint that Weaver had about inadequate training that she re-
ceived from Gina Soles, Soles testified “Actually, now that you
stated that, I do. I didn’t recall earlier what it was about.” (Tr. p.
276.) On redirect Gina Soles testified that she put the pay stubs
under the pencil tray because the drawer did not lock. Subse-
quently Gina Soles testified, “I know for a fact that I did not
open . . . [her pay stub] in front of anyone.” (Tr. p. 280.)
On July 25, 2002, Mason told Weaver that she was needed in
human resources. Weaver met with the Director of Human
Resources, Thomas Briggs, with Painter, Calmels, and Mason
present. Weaver testified that Briggs conducted the meeting;
that she thought Painter took notes; that the first thing that
Briggs said was “Is this another of your pot stirring episodes”
(Tr. p. 178); that she told Briggs that she did not need to sit and
listen to him calling her a pot- stirrer again; that Briggs asked
her why she had told the other girls about Gina Soles’ wages
and she told him that she did not feel like it was fair; that
Briggs did not ask her how she got the information; that Briggs
told her that they had spoken with three or four employees who
said that Weaver told them what Gina Soles’ wages were; that
Briggs asked her how she would feel if someone talked about
her wages when she was the new kid on the block; and that then
Briggs told her to go back to work.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 206
When she went back on the floor, Weaver told employee
Doris Brezenski what she, Weaver, was accused of at the meet-
ing in human resources. According to the testimony of Weaver,
Brezenski then said that Gina Soles came to her a couple of
weeks ago and told her that Weaver was telling people that she
got into Gina Soles’ desk drawer, got her check out, and was
telling people what Gina Soles made. Weaver then telephoned
Mason, told her what she had just heard, and told Mason that
she had never been in Gina Soles’ desk drawer. Mason told
Weaver that she would call Calmels and tell him.
Later that day, about 3 p. m., Weaver was called into Cal-
mels’ office. Painter, Mason, and Calmels were there. Weaver
was told to sit in the breakroom until it was time to go home,
and to stay home the next day.
Rowland testified that she was interviewed by Labinal su-
pervisors about this issue a couple of days after Weaver found
out how much Soles made, and a couple of days before Weaver
was terminated.
Mason testified that she, along with Briggs, Calmels, and
Painter were present for the interviews of Weaver, Parrott, Row-
land, and Burka; that the interviews all occurred on the same
day, which was 1 or 2 days before Weaver was fired; that she
also participate in the interview of Gina Soles in Briggs’ office;
that Briggs told Weaver that Gina Soles had come to Human
Resources and said that her pay scale was being discussed
amongst the employees and it was a concern to her; that Briggs
asked Weaver if she had seen Gina Soles’ paycheck, or how she
had come about the information; that Weaver told Briggs that
she was sitting next to Gina Soles when Soles opened her pay
stub; that she believed that both Briggs and Weaver used the
word “pot stirrer” but she could not remember the context; that
it was decided to send Weaver home until the decision was
made whether to terminate or suspend her; that Calmels said that
he would talk to his Director, Tim Dickinson, and get his feeling
on the situation; that she was asked if she could trust Weaver
and she respondent “No”; and that she was not asked the basis
for her response but she believed that if Weaver had gone into
the desk and taken the check out, she could not trust Weaver. On
cross-examination Mason testified that during the employee
interviews Rowland told the supervisors that Weaver told her
that she had gotten into Gina Soles’ desk drawer and gotten her
paycheck out of the drawer; that since she was Weaver’s super-
visor, the other supervisors asked her whether she believed
Weaver or Rowland; and that she told the other supervisors that
she believed Rowland. Subsequently Mason testified that when
she was in Briggs’ office, Gina Soles told them that Rowland
came to her and told her that Weaver said that she got into Gina
Soles’ desk and looked at the check.
Thomas Briggs, who has been the Respondent’s director of
human resources for over 5 years, testified when called by
General Counsel that he, Calmels, Painter, and Mason inter-
viewed the involved employees including Gina Soles; that the
number one purpose of the interviews was to determine how
Weaver got the information; that their focus was on how
Weaver got the information, and whether she was authorized to
have it and to disclose it; that he asked Parrott, Rowland, and
Gifford whether they had conversations with Weaver about
Gina Soles’ pay information; that he asked Weaver whether she
had a conversation with Gifford, Parrott, and Rowland about
Gina Soles’ pay information; and that he believed that Weaver
was the one who said “pot- stirrer.”
On July 26, 2002, at about 3 p.m. Painter telephoned Weaver
and told her that she was terminated effective as of July 25,
2002. Painter also told Weaver that she could come in on the
following Monday to pick up her personal belongings, and she
should call so that someone could accompany her. Weaver
testified that Painter did not give any reason for the termination.
Before this, Weaver had never been disciplined by Labinal, she
had no attendance problems, and she had never received verbal
or written warnings of any kind. On cross-examination Weaver
testified that an employee’s pay rate is private and confidential;
that she received an employee handbook at Labinal; that she
was familiar with the rules of conduct that were posted in the
Respondent’s facility; that it would be wrong for an employee
to tell other employees about another employee’s pay without
the knowledge and permission of that employee; that she re-
sented the fact that Labinal allowed Gina Soles to take longer
lunchbreaks than anyone else and leave in the middle of the day
to pick up her daughter; that there is no policy at Labinal with
respect to talking about wages; and that no one other than her
was disciplined even though the others discussed pay.
On July 29, 2002, Weaver was escorted to her desk by Ma-
son to get her personal things, and she was told that her check
would be mailed to her. According to Weaver’s testimony,
when she received her paycheck, there still was no reason given
for her termination. Weaver testified that she never received a
document marked for identification as General Counsel’s Ex-
hibit 17, and she never received any letter from Labinal which
explained why she was terminated.
Rowland testified that she is not aware of any policy or rule
or practice that prohibits employees from talking about pay;
and that employees are entitled to keep their own pay informa-
tion confidential if they want to. On cross-examination Row-
land testified that Gina Soles took a longer lunchbreak than she,
Rowland, was able to take, and Gina Soles was allowed to pick
up her daughter from daycare when she, Rowland, could not
take that kind of leave; that she had conversations with Weaver
and Parrott about this being unfair; and that Weaver resented
Gina Soles because Weaver believed that Soles was getting
special treatment. On recross Rowland testified that she did not
know if she would say that Weaver totally resented Gina Soles
but Weaver’s feelings were based on the fact that Gina Soles
took long lunch hours, got to leave work when other employees
could not, and the difference in pay.
Mason testified that in addition to the employee handbook,
General Counsel’s Exhibit 2, and disciplinary procedures, Gen-
eral Counsel’s Exhibit 3, she remembered a Labinal memoran-
dum from 2001 regarding work ethics that was sent to her su-
pervisor, Calmels, which she distributed to employees who
signed it; and that the memorandum regarding work ethics indi-
cated that “we were not to talk about other people’s pay status”
(Tr. p. 213). On cross-examination by the Respondent’s attor-
ney, Mason testified that in the e-mail that was sent around
Briggs indicated that he believed that it was wrong to look at
other people’s paychecks, and to disclose other people’s pay
information; and that the e-mail referred to instances in which
LABINAL, INC. 207
people find out and disclose other people’s pay information,
rather than discussing their own; and that there was no limita-
tion on employees talking about their own pay information
amongst each other. On redirect Mason testified that at Labinal
while a person was free to discuss their own pay, discussing
anyone else’s pay was prohibited. And on recross Mason testi-
fied that the employees could discuss another employee’s pay
as long as the other employee knew it and was okay with it.
Gina Soles testified that she was not aware of any policies or
rules that employees were prohibited from discussing their pay;
and that no one told her that she could not talk about her pay
and she never knew of any such policy or rule at Labinal. On
cross-examination Gina Soles testified that she considered her
pay information to be private; that she did not actually share her
pay information with another employee before the incident with
Weaver; that she did not share her personal pay information
with Rowland; that she did not recall sharing her pay informa-
tion with anybody; that she did not recall telling Rowland her
pay information; and that she was friends with Rowland, they
sat together at lunch, but they never discussed pay.
When called by the General Counsel, Briggs testified that
before the incident in question he had never had a problem with
Weaver; that General Counsel’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 5, which are
pages from the Respondent’s employee handbook, the discipli-
nary procedures, and the rules of good conduct, respectively,
are in place at Labinal; that in her standard performance evalua-
tion form or annual review in January 2000. General Counsel’s
Exhibit 6, Weaver had a overall performance rating of very
good; that in her standard performance evaluation form or an-
nual review in January 2002, General Counsel’s Exhibit 8,
Weaver had a overall performance rating of exceeds expecta-
tions; and that General Counsel’s Exhibit 10 was a notice he
sent to Jonette Sikes, who was a human resources representa-
tive at the time. The memorandum reads as follows:

DATE: November 5, 1999
TO: Jonette Sikes
FROM: Tim Briggs
SUBJECT: Employee Confrontation
CC:
As discussed, a recent confrontation initiated by you,
with Jason Moore cannot be ignored. There are three is-
sues to be made.
1. You are not to bring a personal dispute to the floor.
2. You should not have touched Jason when you were an-
gry with him.
3. You should not have made a statement that could be
interpreted as a threat.
I expect you to use better judgment than you have dis-
played in this circumstance. You will now have to work
hard to overcome the negative issues that have arisen as a
result of this confrontation.
I also expect that there will be no repeat of this type of
behavior.

Briggs further testified that he did not remember anything about
the 3-day suspension of James Masterson in April 1999, Gen-
eral Counsel’s Exhibit 12, and such a suspension is fairly rare;
that General Counsel’s Exhibit 13 is a memorandum from
Norman Jordan, who at the time was the vice president and
general manager of Labinal, to him dated June 4, 2001, which
reads as follows: “This message is to document that I gave
James Masterson a verbal warning to cease touching female
personnel in the workplace. This was after witnessing him pull-
ing the hair of a QA inspector (Jamie) on Friday.”; that General
Counsel’s Exhibit 14 are memorandums to him from Charles
Campbell, who is the director of quality, and Jordan dated June
15, 2001, regarding the unprofessional conduct of Masterson on
the production floor with respect to very personal and animated
conversations with employee Missy Winfree, who was dating
Masterson, that created “an unprofessional and/or potentially
threatening work environment”; that he believed that General
Counsel’s Exhibit 14 was a written warning but it is not signed
by Masterson and the typical written warning form was not
used in this instance; that Weaver was terminated “for stealing
personal and private, confidential information, and then without
authorization of the owner of that information, she disclosed it”
(Tr. p. 82); that Weaver was told that her offense was stealing;
and that

We could not, at that time, prove that she had stolen it,
but we believed based on what she had said to different
employees and what we were told by those employees,
what we were told by Gina Soles, that we believed, based
on educational evaluation, that that is what had happened.
[Tr. p. 82.]
In response to questions of the Respondent’s attorney,
Briggs testified that the Rules of Good Conduct, General
Counsel’s Exhibit 5 are posted in both of the lunch rooms
and in the mail room, which is in front of the office build-
ing; that the rules which were involved in Weaver’s situa-
tion were listed as violations which may result in termina-
tion on the first offense, namely “B. Unauthorized posses-
sion, removal, or destruction of the property of another em-
ployee or of Labinal, Inc.” and “E. Dishonesty, including
falsifying company records”; that as set forth in General
Counsel’s Exhibit 2, the Employee Handbook, page 9,
Roman numeral IV, Labinal requires its employees to act
honestly and with integrity, insofar as their relationship
with co-workers is concerned; that with less severe of-
fenses Labinal tries to follow the progressive discipline de-
scribed on page 12 of the Employee Handbook but dishon-
esty and integrity was a severe hurdle; that talking about
pay information, in and of itself, is not an offense; that try-
ing to find out how Weaver obtained the pay information of
Gina Soles was the focus of the questioning of the employ-
ees; that the employees told three different stories in that
Rowland said that Weaver telephoned her and told her that
she found the paycheck in Gina Soles’ desk drawer and
Weaver told Rowland how much money Gina Soles made,
Parrott said that Weaver told her that she had seen the pay-
check when Gina Soles opened it in Weaver’s presence,
and Burka said that Weaver told her that she had found or
seen the check on the desk; that Weaver indicated that
Soles had opened the check in front of her so that she could
see the paycheck; and that “[t]hen, if that was, in fact, true,
then certainly disciplinary actions would likely not have
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 208
been necessary because if she [Gina Soles] had not pro-
tected that information —. . . .—it could have been dis-
cussed” (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 95, 96]. Briggs further
testified that during her interview Gina Soles said that typi-
cally she did not even open her pay stub and she would
normally take it still sealed and place it under a pencil tray
in her desk drawer until she took it home; that Gina Soles
also said that she would never open her paycheck near any-
one else and if she did open the pay stub she would put it in
her purse; that Weaver’s supervisor, Mason, said that she
would be more likely to believe Rowland over Weaver; and
that Mason said that she did not feel that she could trust
Weaver in the future, and this was extremely important be-
cause her supervisor was very supportive of the termina-
tion; that none of the supervisors disagreed that Weaver
should be terminated; that Labinal does not have any pol-
icy, rule, or practice prohibiting employees from discussing
their pay; and that Labinal had never had a situation like
this before.

On further examination by General Counsel Briggs testified
that Weaver’s account to him of what happened never varied
but according to the employees, they were given three different
versions of what happened by Weaver.
Painter testified that the investigation of Weaver began on
the morning of July 25, 2002; that she participated in the inter-
views of Weaver, Parrott, Burka, Rowland, Gifford, and Gina
Soles on July 25, 2002; that she took notes of all of the inter-
views; that General Counsel’s Exhibit 16.1 are the notes she
took of the interviews of Parrott, Rowland, and Burka;2 that she

2 In her notes of the interviews, Painter used the initials of the em-
ployees. G.S. is for Gina Soles, N.W. is for Nancy Weaver, K.P. is for
Kathy Parrott, C.R. is for Celisa Rowland, and T.B. is for Tina Burka.
The notes read as follows:
G.S. and N.W. informational meetings K.P.=Yes. She saw
how much and that she saw.
Why? The wages are not fair.
Celisa was there.
How did she find out?
Gina opened check up. They were at Nancy’s desk.
Monday upon Kathy’s return.
Did she want you to help rally for a $?
She made that much money and she started out way after
Nancy did.
Did you feel it was justified?
Yes.
C.R.=Have you been in a conversation where she shared pay?
Yes.
Why?
Gina made more?
Why talk to you?
I don’t know.
Anyone else around?
I don’t know.
When NW told KP were you there?
Probably.
She brought up more than once?!
Did she want your support?
Feedback on whether to go to JM or DM.
How did Nancy find out?
Gina opened check & pay stub in desk, NW looked.
was not sure where the notes of the interviews of Weaver, Gina
Soles, and Gifford are; that she participated in preparing the
documents that the General Counsel requested under subpoena;
that during the interview of Weaver, Briggs asked her whether
she had discussed Gina Soles’ pay information with her co-
workers; that Briggs asked the same question of Rowland,
Burka, and Gifford; that the right side of General Counsel’s
Exhibit 16.1 are her notes of the conversation she was going to
have with Weaver concerning her termination; that she did
telephone Weaver and told her that she was terminated, and
she, Painter, essentially followed her notes during this conver-
sation; that General Counsel’s Exhibit 17 is an undated letter
confirming the termination conversation that she wrote to
Weaver; that while General Counsel’s Exhibit 17 is unsigned,
she would have signed it if she had mailed the letter to Weaver;
that it is possible that she did not mail the letter to Weaver since
it is unsigned; that Labinal does not have any document that
reflects that she mailed this letter to Weaver on a particular day;
that she was involved in assisting Labinal in defending against
Weaver’s claim for unemployment; and that General Counsel’s
Exhibit 18 is a letter, dated August 13, 2002, she sent to the
OESC which indicates as follows:

Nancy Weaver was terminated from Labinal, Inc. on 07-25-
02 due to disclosing confidential information from a company
document (another employee’s paycheck). Such blatant disre-
spect of another employee’s privacy will not be tolerated here
at Labinal, Inc. We feel that Nancy should not receive her un-
employment benefits based on her actions of hurtful conduct
towards another employee.

Painter further testified that as part of her participation in the
unemployment claim, she participated in an investigation con-
ducted by OESC and paragraphs numbered 5 and 6 of General
Counsel’s Exhibit 19, dated August 15, 2002, reflect her state-
ments to the interviewer from OESC. They read as follows:

5. Nancy said she later heard that this other girl was
telling everyone that Nancy had gone through her desk and
found her check stub. Is that the reason Nancy was fired?
No, it was not. We really didn’t go into how she found
out: the fact that she went through private information was
enough but it was more that she had divulged this.
6. Did anyone, at any point, ask Nancy what was going
on—bfore she was fired?
Yes. She admitted telling 4 others of Gina’s salary and
we did investigate; question the other employees and all
their stories were the same. She had told one she looked in
Gina’s desk at the pay stub and she told one it was laying

T.B.= You were told by NW conc. GS pay?
Yes.
When?
I don’t know. Why would she tell you?
I am not sure. Always wondered Texans made?
She said she saw it laying on desk.
It was just the two of us.
I told KP that NW told me. That was only one.
CONT. See Tab # 2
The reference by Burka to “Texans” might have been made
because Gina Soles and her husband are from Texas.
LABINAL, INC. 209
on the desk and she told one that Gina had opened it in
front of her but all the rest was the same story. So, we
didn’t go into how she found out as we couldn’t prove
that. [Emphasis added.]

In response to questions asked by the Respondent’s attorney,
Painter testified that on July 25, 2002, she received a telephone
call from Gina Soles who told her that it had been reported to
her that Weaver had gotten into her desk and took her paycheck
out, found out what she made, and then had told others; that
when they interviewed the employees they were trying to find
out how Weaver obtained the pay information; that Labinal
does not have any policy, rule or practice that prohibits em-
ployees from discussing their own pay or pay in general; that
other than Weaver, none of the employees were disciplined for
talking about other people’s pay; that Weaver received disci-
pline because “[I]t was the manner in which she obtained this
information, by taking it out of the drawer of Gina Soles’ desk”
(transcript page 152); that the fact that Weaver disclosed the
pay information to others without Gina Soles’ permission also
came into play; that in her meetings with Briggs, Calmels, and
Mason no one ultimately disagreed with the decision to termi-
nate Weaver; and that Mason said that Weaver could not be
trusted.
Subsequently Painter testified that during the July 25, 2002
interview of Weaver, Briggs asked her if this was how she
would gather information from someone, by going in their
desk, Weaver said that she did not have to listen to this, and
that was the end of the interview.
General Counsel’s Exhibit 19.1 is the Order of Decision of
the Appeal Tribunal of OESC. As here pertinent, it reads as
follows:

The issue to be resolved is whether the claimant was dis-
charged for a reason amounting to misconduct connected with
the work.
. . . .
The claimant was terminated for revealing another
employee’s salary to other workers. The claimant had seen
the other employee’s paycheck when it was being opened
and noticed the other employee made more than she did.
The claimant then went to some of her co-workers and
complained about this. The claimant did reveal how much
the other person was paid. The claimant felt she was being
paid unfairly. The claimant was then discharged.
Section 2-406 of the Oklahoma Employment Security
Act provides a disqualification for claimants who are dis-
charged from their last employment for misconduct con-
nected with work. . . . The term ‘misconduct’ has been de-
fined as an act or course of conduct evidencing such will-
ful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interest as is
found in deliberate violation or disregard of standard of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his
employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree
or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful in-
tent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substan-
tial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the em-
ployee’s duties and obligation to his employer.
The employer contends the claimant revealed confi-
dential company information. The claimant regarded the
information not as company information but rather infor-
mation belonging to the person whose salary she revealed.
The Hearing Officer finds the claimant is correct in this
assertion. The information as to the person’s salary was
the property of that person and not the employer. This
does not mitigate the claimant’s action, however, but
rather exacerbates it. If the claimant only discussed com-
pany information with the company, no breach of confi-
dentiality would have occurred. The claimant’s actions
violated the personal rights of the other individual in-
volved, however. The claimant misused and breached the
confidentiality of that person. Her actions were done to
create a disruption in the work place and so demonstrate a
disregard of the employer’s interest. The claimant was dis-
charged for misconduct.
The Commission’s determination is AFFIRMED. [Ci-
tations omitted and emphasis added.]

General Counsel’s Exhibit 15.1 was prepared by Labinal in
response to General Counsel’s subpoena. The last two pages
cover employees terminated by Labinal from January 1, 2002
through April 3, 2003. The reason specified therein for the
termination of Weaver is “THEFT OF
PRIVATE/CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.”
Analysis
Paragraph 4(a) of the complaint alleges that since on or
about June 26, 2002, Respondent has unlawfully maintained a
rule prohibiting its employees from discussing salaries and
wages with each other. Counsel for General Counsel on brief
contends that the Respondent maintained a policy prohibiting
the discussion of wages by employees; that supervisor Mason
testified that the Respondent issued ethics rules in 2001 that
prohibited the discussion of an employee’s salary by any other
employee and she distributed this rule to the employees in her
department; and that such a rule is clearly prohibited by the Act
because, by its very nature, it tends to coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights under Section 7 of the Act, including the
right to discuss terms and conditions of employment, Radisson
Plaza Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94 (1992). The Respondent on
brief argues that Labinal did not have a rule prohibiting em-
ployees from discussing salaries and wages; that employees
Weaver and Roland, among others, confirmed this; that the
ethics memorandum referred to by Mason advised employees
they should not find out another employee’s personal pay in-
formation and disclose it to others without the employee’s
knowledge or permission; that Weaver’s co-workers who dis-
cussed pay information with her were not disciplined; and that
there was no limitation on employees discussing their own pay
or salary information amongst one another.
In more ways than one Briggs himself “let the cat out of the
bag” when he testified that if Gina Soles had opened the pay
stub in front of Weaver so that Weaver could see it, “[t]hen, if
that was, in fact, true, then certainly disciplinary actions would
likely not have been necessary because if she [Gina Soles] had
not protected that information—. . . .—it could have been dis-
cussed.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. pp. 95 96.). The Respondent
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 210
on brief submits that the ethics memorandum referred to by
Mason advised employees they should not find out another
employee’s personal pay information and disclose it to others
without the employee’s knowledge or permission. The problem
with such a rule was pointed out by Briggs’ testimony. If
someone innocently obtains such information, as Weaver did in
my opinion, they should be allowed to discuss it with their
fellow employees (as Briggs testified, “it could have been dis-
cussed.”). That would seem to be in accord with common
sense. To prohibit one employee from discussing another em-
ployee’s pay without the knowledge and permission of the
other employee muzzles employees who seek to engage in con-
certed activity for mutual aid or protection. By requiring that
one employee get the permission of another employee to dis-
cuss the latter’s wages, would, as a practical matter, deny the
former the use of information innocently obtained, which is the
very information he or she needs to discuss the wages with
fellow workers before taking the matter to management. Such
an approach adversely affects employee rights. The Respondent
has not established a substantial and legitimate business justifi-
cation for its policy. The Respondent’s policy violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Paragraph 4(b) of the complaint alleges that on or about July
25, 2002, the Respondent unlawfully interrogated employees
concerning their discussion of salaries and wages with each
other. General Counsel on brief contends that Briggs asked
each involved employee if they discussed Gina Soles’ pay in-
formation with Weaver; that such an inquiry was not necessary
to determine how Weaver saw Gina Soles’ pay information;
that Briggs could have limited his inquiry to asking if the em-
ployee knew how Weaver obtained the information; and that
Briggs’ interrogations were overbroad, tended to coerce em-
ployees with respect to their right to freely discuss wages, and
consequently were a clear violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The Respondent on brief argues that the interviews were
tailored to inquire about Weaver’s obtaining and publishing
Gina Soles’ pay information to other employees.
According to Painter’s notes of the interviews, as set forth
above, Briggs (1) asked Parrott, among other things, (a) if
Weaver wanted Parrott to help rally for money, and (b) whether
Parrott “felt it was justified,” (2) asked Rowland, among other
things, (a) why Weaver spoke with her about Gina Soles’ pay
information, (b) why Weaver talked to her, (c) if she was there
when Weaver told Parrott, and (d) whether Weaver wanted her
support [to which, as noted above, Rowland replied that
Weaver was seeking feedback on whether to go to JM (Cal-
mels) or DM (Mason)], and (3) asked Burka, among other
things (a) why would Weaver tell her about Gina Soles’ pay,
and (b) who she told that Weaver told her. As can be seen,
Briggs’ inquiries went beyond trying to determine how Weaver
obtained the pay information and whether she published it. The
involved employees were interrogated by the Director of Hu-
man Resources in his office, with the Industrial Engineering
Manager, a supervisor, and a Human Relations Representative,
who was taking notes, present. An employer violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act when it engages in conduct which has a natu-
ral tendency to restrain employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act. That Section,
which grants employees the right to engage in concerted activi-
ties for mutual aid and protection, encompasses the right of
employees to discuss what wages are paid by their employer, as
wages are a vital term and condition of employment. Triana
Industries, 245 NLRB 1258 (1979). In the circumstances ex-
tant here, the Respondent’s interrogations were coercive and
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Paragraphs 5(b) and (c) of the complaint allege that on July
25, 2002 and on July 26, 2002, respectively, the Respondent
suspended and then terminated Nancy Weaver because em-
ployees engaged in concerted activities with each other for the
purposes of mutual aid and protection by discussing employee
salaries and wages with each other and through an employee
representative, concertedly complaining about employee sala-
ries to the Respondent, and to discourage employees from en-
gaging in these and other concerted activities. Counsel for Gen-
eral Counsel on brief contends that the Respondent suspended
and discharged Weaver for engaging in the protected activity of
discussing salaries; that Respondent’s history of responding to
serious employee misconduct with verbal and written warnings
shows that it took an extreme measure in discharging Weaver;
that as Briggs conceded, Weaver never wavered in her explana-
tion that she saw Gina Soles’ pay information in plain sight
when the two sat shoulder to shoulder and Soles reviewed her
pay statement; and that once the Respondent determined that
Weaver initiated the discussion of Soles’ pay information it
concluded that she must be fired. The Respondent on brief ar-
gues that Weaver’s termination did not violate the Act because
Weaver was not engaged in activity protected by the Act; that
alternatively, Weaver’s termination did not violate the Act be-
cause Labinal’s motivation for terminating Weaver was
Weaver’s acts of theft and dishonesty, not that she was engaged
in discussions relating to wages and salaries; and that notwith-
standing any temptation to revisit this issue with hindsight, the
evidence is undisputed that after an investigation Labinal hon-
estly believed in good faith that Weaver had stolen Soles’ pay
information and disclosed it.
After the interrogations of the involved employees and after
Weaver was terminated effective July 25, 2002, Painter, who
sat in on the interrogations and the subsequent meetings to
determine whether Weaver should be fired, advised OESC on
August 13, 2002, as here pertinent, as follows:

Nancy Weaver was terminated from Labinal, Inc. on 07-25-
02 due to disclosing confidential information from a company
document (another employee’s paycheck). Such blatant disre-
spect of another employee’s privacy will not be tolerated here
at Labinal, Inc.

It is noted that at this point in time nothing is said by Labinal
about any theft of pay information. Two days later Painter gave
the following responses to OESC:

5. Nancy said she later heard that this other girl was
telling everyone that Nancy had gone through her desk and
found her check stub. Is that the reason Nancy was fired?
No, it was not. We really didn’t go into how she found
out: the fact that she went through private information was
enough but it was more that she had divulged this.
LABINAL, INC. 211
6. Did anyone, at any point, ask Nancy what was going
on—before she was fired?
Yes. She admitted telling 4 others of Gina’s salary and
we did investigate; question the other employees and all
their stories were the same. She had told one she looked in
Gina’s desk at the pay stub and she told one it was laying
on the desk and she told one that Gina had opened it in
front of her but all the rest was the same story. So, we
didn’t go into how she found out as we couldn’t prove
that. [Emphasis added.]

Again Labinal does not allege that Weaver was terminated for
stealing the pay information. Indeed, Labinal concedes that it
did not go into how Weaver found out.
As noted above, based on the information provided to it the
OESC Appeal Tribunal, a little over a month later, made the
following finding: “The claimant had seen the other employee’s
paycheck when it was being opened and noticed the other em-
ployee made more than she did.”
As noted above, Briggs testified at the trial herein that
Weaver told him that Soles had opened the pay statement in
front of her so that she could see the pay statement; and that
“[t]hen, if that was, in fact, true, then certainly disciplinary
actions would likely not have been necessary because if she
[Gina Soles] had not protected that information—. . . . — it
could have been discussed” (emphasis added) (Tr. pp. 95, 96).
Now at the trial Painter, in response to the Respondent’s at-
torneys questions, testifies that Weaver received discipline
because “[I]t was the manner in which she obtained this infor-
mation, by taking it out of the drawer of Gina Soles’ desk” (Tr.
p. 152); and that the fact that Weaver disclosed the pay infor-
mation to others without Gina Soles’ permission also came into
play. Now the Respondent is arguing contrary to what it indi-
cated to OESC less than 1 month after Weaver’s termination.
Now Briggs takes the position that Weaver was terminated
because the Respondent believes that she stole the pay informa-
tion and divulged it.3 So now, in effect, the Respondent does
not agree with the finding of OESC that “The claimant had seen
the other employee’s paycheck when it was being opened and
noticed the other employee made more than she did.” In my
opinion, that is exactly what happened. Rowland was not a
credible witness. Her testimony was contradicted (1) by Mason,
who contrary to the testimony of Rowland testified that she did
not know that shortly after finding out Gina Soles’ pay infor-
mation Weaver began communicating it to employees,4 (2) by
Gina Soles, who contrary to the testimony of Rowland, testified
that she did not discuss her pay with Rowland, (3) by Weaver,
who contrary to the testimony of Rowland, testified that she did
not telephone anyone after finding out Gina Soles’ pay, (4) by
Painter’s notes of what Parrott and Burka said during their in-
terrogations on July 25, 2002, which is contrary to Rowland’s
testimony about them both being told at the same time by

3 Briggs’ testimony that Weaver was told that her offense was steal-
ing is not credited. There is no credible evidence of record that Weaver
was ever told this by the Respondent.
4 As noted above, more than once Rowland testified that Mason was
present when Weaver told Parrott, Burka, and Gifford about Gina
Soles’ pay.
Weaver in Rowland’s presence,5 and (5) Painter’s notes of what
Rowland said during her interrogation on July 25, 2002, namely
that “Gina opened check,” and the fact that Painter’s notes
make no mention of Rowland indicating during her interroga-
tion that Weaver telephoned her to tell her about Gina Soles’
pay.6 The Respondent did not thoroughly investigate this mat-
ter. Originally it appears that the Respondent did not choose to
rely on the assertions of Gina Soles if she declared unequivo-
cally that she did not open her pay statement in front of
Weaver.7 Now assertedly the Respondent chooses to rely on
this individual who admittedly took a less than meticulous ap-
proach to maintaining her pay information. Indeed, she admit-
tedly did not even remember that she had a month’s worth of
pay stubs in her unlocked desk drawer. Perhaps Gina Soles
does not remember previously telling her pay information to
Rowland. Perhaps Gina Soles does not remember opening her
pay statement in front of Weaver. I credit Weaver’s unwavering
testimony that she saw Gina Soles’ pay information when Gina
Soles opened the pay statement in front of her.
The Respondent now argues that it honestly believed in good
faith that Weaver stole the pay information. The problem with
this argument is that I do not believe that the Respondent acted
in good faith. Briggs intentionally baited Weaver at the outset
of her July 25, 2002 interrogation by accusing her of “pot-
stirring.”8 The interrogation almost ended there, which would
have served Briggs’ purposes. Painter’s notes of the July 25,
2002 employee interrogations demonstrate that Briggs was
trying to find out if the involved employees supported any at-
tempt to get higher pay. Weaver was terminated because she
5 According to Rowland, she was present when Weaver told Parrott
and Burka, who were together with Mason and Gifford at the time, that
Gina Soles opened the pay stub in front of Weaver. If that was the case,
it is not clear how Burka could have said “she [Weaver] saw it laying
on the desk” during her July 25, 2002 interrogation. But that is exactly
what Painter’s notes of the interrogation indicate. If Rowland were
believed, how could there be more than two versions?
6 According to Painter’s notes of the Rowland interrogation, Row-
land was asked if anyone else was around when Weaver told her about
the pay information. Rowland did not respond that Weaver told her
over the telephone the first time. According to Painter’s notes Rowland
said “I don’t know.”
7 The Respondent did not turn over the notes of Gina Soles’ July 25,
2002 interrogation although they were subpoenaed by Counsel for
General Counsel. Perhaps during her July 25, 2002 interrogation Gina
Soles was less than unequivocal about whether she opened her pay
statement in front of Weaver. General Counsel requests an adverse
inference against the Respondent for failing to produce the notes of
Gina Soles’ interview. I draw an adverse inference that the documenta-
tion which is exclusively within the control of the Respondent, if pro-
duced, would not support the Respondent’s position with respect to
their reliance on what Gina Soles told it.
8 The Respondent did not turn over the notes of Weaver’s July 25,
2002 interrogation although they were subpoenaed by Counsel for
General Counsel. Weaver’s testimony is credited. General Counsel
requests an adverse inference against the Respondent for failing to
produce the notes of Weaver’s interrogation. I draw an adverse infer-
ence that the documentation which is exclusively within the control of
the Respondent, if produced, would not support the Respondent’s posi-
tion with respect to what was or was not said during Weaver’s July 25,
2002 interrogation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 212
was being a “pot-stirrer.” Weaver engaged in protected con-
certed activity. Painter’s notes of the July 25, 2002 interroga-
tions leave no doubt that the Respondent had to appreciate this
fact. And Briggs’ testimony at the trial herein, namely “[t]hen,
if that was, in fact, true, [that Gina Soles opened the pay state-
ment in front of Weaver so that she could see the pay state-
ment] then certainly disciplinary actions would likely not have
been necessary because if she [Gina Soles] had not protected
that information—. . . .—it could have been discussed” (empha-
sis added) (Tr. pp. 95, 96), demonstrates that Labinal appreci-
ated the situation it was faced with and it changed its tack to the
Respondent had a good-faith belief that Weaver stole the pay
information. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act as alleged when it suspended and terminated Weaver for
engaging in concerted protected activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw-
fully maintaining a rule which prohibits an employee from
discussing another employee’s pay without the knowledge and
permission of the other employee.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw-
fully interrogating employees concerning their discussion of
salaries and wages with each other.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw-
fully suspending Nancy Weaver on July 25, 2002.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw-
fully discharging Nancy Weaver on or about July 26, 2002.
6. Respondent’s unfair labor practices described above affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Nancy
Weaver, it must offer her reinstatement and make her whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly
basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of rein-
statement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended9
ORDER
The Respondent, Labinal, Inc., of Pryor Creek, Oklahoma,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

9 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unlawfully maintaining a rule which prohibits an em-
ployee from discussing another employee’s pay without the
knowledge and permission of the other employee.
(b) Unlawfully interrogating employees concerning their dis-
cussion of salaries and wages with each other.
(c) Unlawfully suspending and discharging its employee
Nancy Weaver because employees engaged in concerted activi-
ties with each other for the purposes of mutual aid and protec-
tion by discussing employee salaries and wages with each other
and through an employee representative, concertedly com-
plained about employee salaries to the Respondent, and to dis-
courage employees from engaging in these and other concerted
activities
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rule which prohibits an employee from dis-
cussing another employee’s pay without the knowledge and
permission of the other employee, and advise employees in
writing that the rule has been rescinded.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Nancy
Weaver full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges pre-
viously enjoyed.
(c) Make Nancy Weaver whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
her in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge, and within 3
days thereafter notify the employee in writing that this has been
done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any
way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of back pay
due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Pryor Creek, Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”10 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 17, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
LABINAL, INC. 213
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since June 26, 2002.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.