Kuo-Hsien Hsu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 26, 2019

13782653 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/782,653 03/01/2013 Kuo-Hsien Hsu Y08683US00 2100
150131 7590 09/26/2019
Cooper Legal Group LLC
6505 Rockside Road Suite 330
Independence, OH 44131
EXAMINER
THAI, HANH B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2163
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@cooperlegalgroup.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KUO-HSIEN HSU and FANG-FEI KUO
____________

Appeal 2018-007803
Application 13/782,653
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHN A. EVANS, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Non-Final rejection of Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32, all
pending claims. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.2

1 We refer to the inventors collectively as Appellant. Appellant states the
real party in interest is Excalibur IP, LLC. App. Br. 3.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief (filed August 28, 2017, “App. Br.”), the Reply
Brief (filed February 1, 2018, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to a system and method for generating search
results. See Abstract.
Invention
Claims 1, 10, and 19 are independent. An understanding of the
invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced
below with some formatting added:
1. A method of presenting search results in response to
search query submitted by users and including a search term,
the method comprising:
using a processor device performing steps of:
for respective search results that are identified by the
search term, determining a popularity among users of the search
result for respective time ranges within a day, wherein a first
popularity of the search result for the search term during a first
time range is higher than a second popularity of the search
result during a second time range; and
responsive to receiving from a user a search query
including the search term:
identifying a search results set comprising the search
results that are identified by the search term;
identifying a time range of the day within which the user
submitted the search query;
for respective search results of the search result set,
identifying the popularity of the search result during the query
time range of the day;

December 1, 2017, “Ans.”), the Non-Final Action (mailed October 20, 2016,
“Non-Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed March 1, 2013, “Spec.”) for
their respective details.
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ordering the search results set according to the popularity
of the respective search results during the selected time range of
the day, wherein a first search result is presented before a
second result having a lower popularity for the search term
during the query time range of the day than the first search
result; and
presenting the search results set to the user to fulfill the
search query.
References and Rejections3
Kraft et al. US 7,856,441 B1 Jan. 10, 2005
Dong et al. US 2011/0093459 A1 Oct. 15, 2009
Inagaki et al. US 2011/0231390 A1 Mar. 16, 2010
Jockish et al.
Riley et al.
US 2011/0010367 A1
US 8,909,619 B1
June 11, 2010
Feb. 3, 2011

1. Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32 stand rejected under a NEW
GROUND OF REJECTION under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to a judicial exception without more. Ans. 2–6.
2. Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, 18–26, 28, 30, and 31 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kraft, Dong, Inagaki,
and Riley. Non-Final Act. 4–10.
3. Claims 27, 29, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kraft, Dong, Inagaki, Riley, and Jockish.
Non-Final Act. 10–12.

3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of Claims 19, 20, and 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter in view of the
recitation “computer readable storage medium.” Ans. 6.
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ANALYSIS
CLAIMS 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, AND 18–32:
OBVIOUSNESS OVER KRAFT, DONG, INAGAKI, RILEY, AND JOCKISH.
We have reviewed the rejection of Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, 18–26, 28,
and 30–31 in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s rejection
fails to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We find Appellant’s
arguments persuasive.
Non-recited claim elements.
Appellant contends each of independent Claims 1, 10, and 19 recite,
inter alia, the following claim elements:
1. “determining a popularity among users of the search result for
respective time ranges within a day”;
2. “identifying the popularity of the search result during the query time
range of the day”; and
3. “ordering the search results set according to the popularity of the
respective search results during the selected time range of the day,
wherein a first search result is presented before a second result having
lower popularity for the search term during the query time range of
the day than the first search result.”
App. Br. 28; Reply Br. 16 (underlining and capitalization omitted).
Appellant argues the Examiner’s prima facie case fails to map these
recitations onto the prior art, but rather, maps the art to such non-claimed
elements such as:
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• “Time-sensitive query,”
• “Popularity of search results based on the time range,”
• “Query intent for a time sensitive ambiguous query,”
• “At a particular time of day,” [and]
• “The query intent of the user is determined according to the popularity
of the search results during the selected time range of the day.”
Id.
The Examiner finds “[i]n response to appellant’s argument . . . , a
prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teachings from the
prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed subject matter to
a person of ordinary skill in the art. Once such a case is established, it is
incumbent upon appellant to go forward with objective evidence of
unobviousness.” Ans. 7 (citing In re Fielder, 471 F.2d 640 (CCPA 1973)).
The Examiner further finds that during “patent examination, the pending
claims must be ‘given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
the specification.’” Id.
The Answer fails to respond to Appellant’s contention that the
Examiner does not address the specific recitations of the claims. The
Examiner is of course correct that during examination, claims are given their
broadest, reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification.
However, the Examiner makes no showing that the interpretations, advanced
by the Examiner, bear any relationship to the claim recitations as
enlightened by the Specification. The recitations “time-sensitive query” and
“query intent for a time sensitive ambiguous query” which the Examiner
maps to the prior art (Non-Final Act. 4–5), were present in the claims, as
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originally filed, but do not appear in the claims under appeal. The recitation
“the query intent of the user is determined according to the popularity of the
search results during the selected time range of the day” which the Examiner
maps to the prior art (id. at 6) appears in neither the original claims, nor the
version under appeal.
The Examiner fails to compare the art to the specific recitations of the
claims.
In view of the foregoing, we decline to sustain the rejection of Claims
1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

CLAIMS 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, AND 18–32: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER.
Appellant argues all claims as a group in view of the limitations of
Claim 1. Reply Br. 3. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 rejections with reference to Claim 1, and refer to the rejected claims
collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also
In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Ineligible Subject Matter.
We have reviewed the rejections of Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32
in light of Appellant’s arguments. The rejection of the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an abstract idea is introduced in the
Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 2–6. We have considered in this decision only
those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Reply Brief. Any other
arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We adopt
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as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejection from which this
appeal is taken in the Examiner’s Answer, to the extent consistent with our
analysis below. We provide the following explanation to highlight and
address specific arguments and findings primarily for emphasis. We
consider Appellant’s arguments seriatim, as they are presented in the Reply
Brief, pages 3–14.
Based upon our de novo review of the record in light of recent
Director Policy Guidance with respect to patent-eligible subject matter
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we affirm the rejection of Claims 1, 5, 9,
10, 14, and 18–32. “Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject
matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
As part of the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner includes a “New
Grounds of Rejection” section, in which Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32
are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an abstract idea.
Ans. 3–6. The Examiner asserts that independent Claims 1, 10, and 19 fall
into the abstract idea category of “an Idea of Itself,” and cites Electric Power
Group v. Alstom4 as being the most similar to Appellant’s invention, because
it discloses “collecting information, determining analyzing it [sic], and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” Ans. 3, 4, 5. In
drawing a comparison between Electric Power Group and the independent
claims, the Examiner states that “collecting information” is equivalent to the
step of receiving the user’s search query, the “analyzing” is the same as the

4 Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom, S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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three-step process of determining popularity and the two identifying steps,
and the “displaying” is equivalent to the steps of ordering and presenting the
search results set. Ans. 3, 4, 5. In conclusion, the Examiner alleges that the
claims do not recite “significantly more than the abstract idea” and that
dependent Claims 5, 9, 14, 18, and 20–32 are also drawn to the same
ineligible subject matter without “significantly more.” Ans. 5–6.
Appellant’s initial response to the Examiner’s rejection is presented in
view of the December 16, 2014 USPTO Examination Guidelines on Subject
Matter Eligibility, and includes a list of case law from pages 13–15 of the
guidance. Reply Br. 4. In response to Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
opinions, the USPTO has issued updated guidance. We review this appeal
within the framework of the Revised Guidance 20195 which specifies and
particularizes the Mayo/Alice framework, and conduct a full analysis,
including each step.
Appellant asserts that the Examiner has failed to capture any
“significant technical aspect” of the claimed invention, and has produced a
“wanton ‘overgeneralization’” of independent Claim 10, which would result
in rejection of any invention involving “collecting information, determining
[or] analyzing it, and displaying certain results.” Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant
then submits a list of patent-eligible case law to show the inadequacy of the
rejection, including Enfish v. Microsoft,6 Amdocs v. Openet Telecom,7

5 USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84(4)
Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance,” “Rev. Guid.”).
6 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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BASCOM v. AT&T,8 and McRO v. Activision,9 and conclude that the
Examiner’s Answer has not characterized the claims as amounting to “an
‘idea of itself.’” Reply Br. 7. The next section of the brief explains that the
search engine technology being claimed amounts to an improvement in
search engine technology, by inferring the user’s intent and providing results
that are more consistent with the user’s intent in formulating an ambiguous
query. Reply Br. 8–9. Appellant next asserts the rejection fails to identify a
court case with similar subject matter to the claimed invention, rejecting the
Examiner’s choice of Electric Power Group v. Alstom, which Appellant
contends involves “visualizing data representing an electric power grid,”
which is information of a “specified content,” and bears no “meaningful
resemblance” to the instant invention. Reply Br. 10–12 (underlining
omitted). Appellant notes that the rejection addresses elements of
independent Claims 1, 10, and 19, but ignores dependent Claims 5, 9, 14, 18,
and 20–32 and fails to acknowledge that the dependent claims differ in any
significant way from the independent claims. Reply Br. 13. In conclusion,
Appellant contends that the “significantly more” prong of the analysis is
“100% boilerplate” does not explain the reasons the claims fail to amount to
significantly more” than the abstract idea. Reply Br. 14 (emphasis omitted).

8 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
9 It is not clear which case is being referenced, since no citation is provided.
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A. 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101.10
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as interactions

10 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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such as a fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; see
also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include
physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr,
450 U.S. at 191); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing
India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
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mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an “‘inventive
concept”’ sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Revised Guidance11
The PTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101.
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of

11 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(January 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance,” or “Rev. Guid.”) (https
://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
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organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes)12; and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual for Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)).13
Only if a claim (l) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.14
See Revised Guidance.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
Informed by our judicial precedent, the Revised Guidance extracts and
synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain

12 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
13 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
14 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.

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that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject
matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts;
legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).
Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Under the Revised Guidance, if the claim
does not recite a judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or
subject matter within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above),
then the claim is patent-eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes
the eligibility analysis, except in rare situations identified in the Revised
Guidance.15 However, if the claim recites a judicial exception (i.e., an
abstract idea enumerated above, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon),
the claim requires further analysis for a practical application of the judicial
exception in Step 2A(ii).

15 In the rare circumstance in which an Examiner believes a claim limitation
that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should
nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in
the Guidance for analyzing the claim should be followed. See Guidance,
Section 111.C.
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The Examiner finds Claim 1 is directed to abstract idea of generating
search results. Ans. 3. The Examiner finds the various steps of the claimed
method simply collect and analyze information and display the results of that
analysis analogously to the case of Electric Power Group. Id. The
Examiner finds there are no further limitations that would tend to render the
claims patent-eligible. Id. at 4.
Appellant contends the claims are directed to improvements in search-
engine technology. Reply Br. 4. Appellant argues users often submit
queries with a search-term that may have several meanings, but such an
ambiguous term may more likely intend a particular meaning where the
inquiry is submitted at a particular time of day. Id. Appellant argues the
claims improve search-engine technology by permitting more accurate
interpretation of search queries by accounting for the time of day that a
query was submitted. Id.
The preamble of Claim 1 recites a “method of presenting search
results in response to search query submitted by users and including a search
term, the method comprising.” Table I compares the remaining limitations
of Claim 1 to the categories of abstract ideas set forth in the Revised
Guidance.
Claim 1 Revised Guidance p. 52
[a]16 using a processor device
performing steps of:
A hardware limitation to which the
Guidance is not applicable.
[b] for respective search results that
are identified by the search term,
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind

16 Step designators, e.g., “[a]” were added to facilitate discussion.
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determining a popularity among
users of the search result for
respective time ranges within a day,
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[c] wherein a first popularity of the
search result for the search term
during a first time range is higher
than a second popularity of the
search result during a second time
range; and
Mathematical Concepts
(mathematical relationships).

[d] responsive to receiving from a
user a search query including the
search term:
“Mere data gathering.” Additional
element adds insignificant extra-
solution activity to the judicial
exception. Rev. Guid., 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55 & n.31.
[e] identifying a search results set
comprising the search results that
are identified by the search term;
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[f] identifying a time range of the
day within which the user submitted
the search query;
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[g] for respective search results of
the search result set, identifying the
popularity of the search result
during the query time range of the
day;
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
[h] ordering the search results set
according to the popularity of the
respective search results during the
selected time range of the day,
Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind
(including an observation,
evaluation, judgment, opinion).
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[i] wherein a first search result is
presented before a second result
having a lower popularity for the
search term during the query time
range of the day than the first search
result; and
Insignificant extra-solution activity.
Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 &
n.31.
[j] presenting the search results set
to the user to fulfill the search
query.
Insignificant extra-solution activity.
Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 &
n.31.

Under Step 2A(i) and based on the analysis in Table I, we determine
that limitations [b], [c], and [e]–[h] recite judicial exceptions.

Step 2A(ii) – Practical Application
Where, as here, we determine at Step 2A(i) the claims recite a judicial
exception, we look to determine the presence of additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Revised
Guidance is “designed to more accurately and consistently identify claims
that recite a practical application of a judicial exception []and thus are not
‘directed to’ a judicial exception.” Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. The
claims recite a practical application where an additional element reflects an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field.17 Id. at 55.

17 The Revised Guidance also finds integration into a practical application
where the judicial exception is used in medical treatment or to transform an
article to a different state. Rev. Guid., 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Such
considerations are not before us.
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For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We address these “practical application” MPEP
sections seriatim:
MPEP § 2106.05(a) “Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer
or To Any Other Technology or Technical Field.”

“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or
“‘any other technology or technical field.’” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
Appellant contends:
users often submit queries with a term that may have several
meanings, but users may be more likely to intend a particular
meaning of the term in queries that are submitted at a particular
time of day. It may therefore be possible to interpret search
queries more accurately by taking into account the time of day
in which the query is submitted.
Reply Br. 4.
Claims 9, 18, and 20 contain recitations relating to determining a
Jaccard Distance and a Kullback-Leibler divergence score for various web
queries. Appellant discloses disambiguation of queries based on Jaccard
distances. Spec., ¶ 37. Appellant further discloses “the time sensitivity of
an ambiguous query q is quantified based on symmetrized Kullback-Leibler
divergence.” Spec., ¶ 43. Moreover, Appellant discloses solutions of
formulae related to the symmetrized Kullback-Leibler divergence. Id. ¶¶ 44,
45.
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In McRO, the Federal Circuit found “[a]s the specification confirms,
the claimed improvement here is allowing computers to produce ‘accurate
and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in animated
characters’ that previously could only be produced by human animators.”
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). We find, similar to McRO, the process of Claims 9, 18, and 20
“uses a combined order of specific rules that renders information into a
specific format that is then used and applied to create desired results.” Id. at
1315. Thus, we find at Step 2A(ii), Claims 9, 18, and 20 improve web query
technology, and therefore, are patent-eligible.
The remaining claims fail to recite the Jaccard Distance or Kullback-
Leibler divergence limitations which we find render Claims 9, 18, and 20
eligible. We decline to analyze the claims as though such limitations were
present. Limitations may not be imported into the claims from the
Specification. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870,
875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We find the claims, as generically recited, fail to
transform a patent ineligible concept into an eligible one.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of Claims 1, 5, 10,
14, 19, and 21–32 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
The rejection of Claims 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 18–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 is REVERSED.
The rejection of Claims 9, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
REVERSED.
Appeal 2018-007803
Application 13/782,653

20
The rejection of Claims 1, 5, 10, 14, 19, and 21–32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART