Kora Limitedv.Khangri Sourcing, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 20, 2020

91234807 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020)

GMM
March 20, 2020

Opposition No. 91234807

Kora Limited

v.
Khangri Sourcing Inc. (by substitution)1

Before Zervas, Kuczma, and Johnson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

By the Board:

This case comes before the Board for consideration of Opposer’s motion for
summary judgment on its claim of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act
Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). The motion is fully-briefed.2

1 With its motion, Opposer submitted evidence establishing that D.O.U. Wear, Inc. changed
its name to Khangri Sourcing Inc., effective on December 6, 2017. See 31 TTABVUE 55–57
(name change documents), 31 TTABVUE 37 (Applicant’s answer to Interrogatory No. 33).
Although Applicant has not recorded its name change in the Assignment Recordation Branch
of the USPTO, because appropriate evidence of the name change has been submitted the
Board has updated the case caption and the Board’s records for this proceeding to identify
Khangri Sourcing Inc. as the Applicant and party-defendant. See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 512.02 (2019).
2 For purposes of this order, we presume the parties’ familiarity with the pleadings, the
history of the proceeding, and the arguments and evidence submitted by each party in
connection with Opposer’s motion. We have carefully considered all of the parties’ arguments
and evidence, but for the sake of efficiency do not repeat or discuss all of them. See Omega
SA (Omega AG) (Omega Ltd.) v. Alpha Phi Omega, 118 USPQ2d 1289, 1292 n.11 (TTAB 2016)
(presuming parties’ familiarity with issues raised in summary judgment motion); Guess? IP
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
General Email: TTABInfo@uspto.gov
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB
Opposition No. 91234807

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I. Background
Khangri Sourcing Inc. (“Applicant”), formerly known as DUO Wear, Inc., has
applied3 for registration of the mark QORA (in standard characters) for:
Backpacks; Backpacks compatible with personal hydration
systems, sold empty; Backpacks with rolling wheels;
Leather bags; Travelling bags; Weekend bags, in
International Class 18, and
Hats; Jackets; Pants; Socks; Down jackets, in International
Class 25.
Kora Limited (“Opposer”) has opposed registration of Applicant’s mark on the
ground of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), based on
Opposer’s prior use and registration of the mark KORA for clothing.4 In support of its
claim, Opposer pleaded ownership of Principal Register Registration No. 4941657 for
the mark KORA and design, in the form shown below, for certain clothing items in
Class 25, including hats; jackets, and pants.5

Holder LP v. Knowluxe LLC, 116 USPQ2d 2018, 2019 (TTAB 2015) (Board not required to
repeat or discuss irrelevant arguments).
3 Application Serial No. 87175751, filed on September 19, 2016, based on Applicant’s alleged
bona fide intent use the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b).
4 Notice of Opposition ¶¶ 1–21, (1 TTABVUE 3–6).
5 Issued on April 19, 2016, based on Opposer’s alleged use of the mark in commerce under
Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and claiming October 31, 2013, as both the
date of first of the mark and the date of first use in commerce. Color is not claimed as a
feature of the mark. The registration includes the following description of the mark: “The
mark consists of a stylized involute star with swirled arms circumscribed by a circle. To the
right of the design is the term ‘KORA.’” The registration states that the wording “KORA” has
no meaning in a foreign language.
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Applicant, in its answer, admitted certain allegations in the notice of opposition,
including that the verbal elements of Opposer’s mark and Applicant’s mark are likely
to be pronounced the same,6 but otherwise denied the salient allegations of likelihood
of confusion.7
II. Preliminary Matters
In response to Opposer’s motion for summary judgment, Applicant contends that
Opposer failed to respond to certain discovery requests propounded by Applicant.8
However, Applicant did not previously file a motion to compel discovery. Further, if
Applicant believed that it could not effectively respond to the motion for summary
judgment without first obtaining discovery from Opposer, then it was incumbent
upon Applicant to file a motion for discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See
also TBMP § 528.06. Applicant did not do so, but instead responded to Opposer’s
motion for summary judgment on the merits. Thus, even if certain discovery requests
are outstanding, or Applicant believes that Opposer’s responses to certain discovery
requests are inadequate, that would not justify a denial of an otherwise well-
supported motion for summary judgment. See Avia Grp. Int’l Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal.
Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 7 USPQ2d 1548, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“a litigant’s complaint
that it needed discovery will not be heard on appeal when discovery was precluded
by its own failure to seek Rule 56(f)9 protection”), abrogated on other grounds by

6 Answer ¶ 17 (4 TTABVUE 3).
7 Id. ¶¶ 14–16, 18–21 (4 TTABVUE 3–4).
8 See, e.g., 32 TTABVUE 9–10, 14, 22.
9 Former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) has been carried forward by the 2010 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The textual differences between the
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Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 88 USPQ2d 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793, 1799
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A party may not simply assert in its brief that discovery was
necessary and thereby overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with the
requirement of Rule 56(f) to set out reasons for the need for discovery in an
affidavit.”); Paris Glove of Canada Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 USPQ2d 1856, 1860
(TTAB 2007) (incumbent upon non-movant to file a Rule 56(f) motion if it believed it
needed discovery to respond to the summary judgment motion); see also Bad Boys
Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Yowell, 115 USPQ2d 1925, 1930 (TTAB 2015) (motion for Rule
56(d) discovery denied as moot because party responded to summary judgment
motion on its merits). Accordingly, we have given no further consideration to
Applicant’s arguments that alleged deficiencies in Opposer’s discovery responses
mandate that we interpret Opposer’s alleged discovery omissions in Applicant’s favor
and deny the motion for summary judgment.
III. Opposer’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, thus allowing the case to be resolved as
a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material

former and current rules are purely stylistic. Case law developed under the earlier version
remains authoritative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) Advisory Committee’s notes (2010
amendment); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 90-91 n.19 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The substance of
the rule has not materially changed.”).
Opposition No. 91234807

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fact remaining for trial and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1987). All evidence must
be viewed in a light favorable to the non-movant, in this case Applicant, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Lloyd’s Food Prods.,
Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2029 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland
USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1472 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Board may not resolve
disputes of material fact; it may only ascertain whether such disputes exist. Lloyd’s
Food Prods., 25 USPQ2d at 2029; Opryland USA, 23 USPQ2d at 1472; Olde Tyme
Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
When a movant sufficiently demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts
to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific genuinely disputed facts
that must be resolved at trial. Freki Corp. N.V. v. Pinnacle Entm’t, Inc., 126 USPQ2d
1697, 1700 (TTAB 2018); Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy L.P., 92 USPQ2d 1537,
1540 (TTAB 2009). The non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations in its
pleadings and assertions of its counsel, but must designate specific portions of the
record or produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute as
to a material fact for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Freki
Corp., 126 USPQ2d at 1700. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine only if a
reasonable fact finder viewing the entire record could resolve the disputed matter in
favor of the non-movant. Opryland USA, 23 USPQ2d at 1472; Olde Tyme Foods, 22
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USPQ2d at 1544; Venture Out Props. LLC v Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, 81 USPQ2d
1887, 1890–91 (TTAB 2007).
B. Section 2(d): Likelihood of Confusion
As the movant for summary judgment on its Section 2(d) claim, Opposer must
establish that there is no genuine dispute that (1) it has standing to maintain this
proceeding; (2) it owns a registration for, or is the prior user of, its pleaded mark; and
(3) the contemporaneous use of the parties’ respective marks on their respective goods
would be likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or deceive consumers.
1. Standing and Priority
Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by the plaintiff in every inter
partes case. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co. Inc., 753 F.3d 1270,
111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc.,
94 USPQ2d 1942, 1945 (TTAB 2010); see also Trademark Rule 2.104(a), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.104(a). Opposer may establish its standing by properly making of record its
pleaded registration, if it is the basis for a likelihood of confusion claim that is not
wholly without merit. Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213
USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); see also Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1727–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Pursuant to Trademark
Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1), Opposer properly made of record its
registration for the KORA and design mark by submitting a current status and title
copy of the registration as an exhibit to its notice opposition.10 Opposer also submitted

10 Notice of Opposition, Ex. 1 (1 TTABVUE 7–10).
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a copy of the registration with its summary judgment motion, as an exhibit to the
declaration of its attorney, Mary Margaret L. O’Donnell.11 Finally, in its answer to
the notice of opposition “Applicant admits Opposer is the owner of the U.S.
Trademark Registration Nos. 4941657” and that “the Registration serves as prima
facie evidence of the validity of the Registration, Opposer’s ownership thereof, and
Opposer’s exclusive rights to use its mark in commerce.”12 Accordingly, there is no
genuine dispute of material fact regarding Opposer’s standing.
Additionally, because Opposer’s pleaded Principal Register registration is of
record, and Applicant did not counterclaim to cancel it, priority is not at issue as to
the mark and goods covered by the registration. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s
Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974); L’Oreal S.A. v.
Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1436 n.7 (TTAB 2012).
2. Likelihood of Confusion
In determining the issue of likelihood of confusion and, in this case, whether there
are any genuine disputes of material fact, we consider all of the evidence of record
bearing on the factors delineated in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (the “DuPont factors”); see also Palm Bay
Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73
USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We have considered each DuPont factor that is
relevant and for which there is evidence of record and argument. See M2 Software,

11 Declaration of Mary Margaret L. O’Donnell ¶ 1, Ex. 1 (31 TTABVUE 26, 30–34).
12 Answer ¶¶ 2 and 4 (4 TTABVUE 2).
Opposition No. 91234807

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Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015). We
treat as neutral any DuPont factors for which there is no record evidence or
argument.
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities
between the marks and the similarities between the goods or services. See Federated
Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976); see
also In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
a) The Parties’ Goods and Trade Channels
Our determination regarding whether the parties’ goods are similar is based on
the identification of goods in Applicant’s application and Opposer’s registration. See
Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d
1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark
must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the
application”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d
1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“This ‘relatedness of the goods’ factor compares the goods
and services in the applicant’s application with the goods and services in the opposer’s
registration.”).
Likewise, we make our determination regarding the channels of trade and classes
of purchasers based on the goods as they are identified in the application and
registration. Hewlett-Packard, 62 USPQ2d at 1005; Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston
Computs. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); SquirtCo
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9
v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also In re
Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018); CBS
Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Applicant’s application identifies certain bags in Class 18 and clothing in Class
25. A finding of likelihood of confusion as to any one of the goods in an opposed class
supports a finding of likelihood of confusion as to the entire class. Tuxedo Monopoly,
Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986 (CCPA 1981); Inter IKEA
Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Apple Computer v.
TVNET.Net, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1393, 1397 (TTAB 2007).
Turning first to the International Class 25 goods, Applicant’s “Hats; Jackets;
Pants; Socks; Down jackets” are, in part, identical to Opposer’s hats, jackets, and
pants. Thus, there is no genuine dispute that the parties’ Class 25 goods are identical
in part. With regard to the trade channels for the International Class 25 goods,
neither Opposer’s registration nor Applicant’s application contain any restrictions
regarding the channels of trade or classes of purchasers. Accordingly, and because
the parties’ goods are identical in part, we presume that the parties’ goods are sold in
the same channels to the same classes of consumers. See Nike, Inc. v. WNBA Enters.,
LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1187, 1195 (TTAB 2007) (“Absent any restrictions in the respective
applications and registrations, we must presume that applicant’s apparel and bags
and opposer’s apparel are sold through all normal channels of trade for those goods,
including all the usual retail outlets.”); see also Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank
Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Because the
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parties’ trade channels and classes of consumers are unrestricted, the third and
fourth DuPont factors also favor Citigroup.”); Hewlett-Packard, 62 USPQ2d at 1005
(“absent restrictions in the application and registration, goods and services are
presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers”).
Applicant’s arguments13 regarding expected differences in the physical properties
of the parties’ goods and the alleged differences in the trade channels and classes of
consumers are unavailing because the alleged differences are not set forth in the
identification of goods in either Applicant’s application or Opposer’s registration.
Hewlett-Packard, 62 USPQ2d at 1005; Octocom Sys., 16 USPQ2d at 1787; see also
Interstate Brands Corp. v. McKee Foods Corp., 53 USPQ2d 1910, 1913 (TTAB 2000)
(rejecting applicant’s attempt to distinguish the parties’ snack cakes based, in part,
on their shapes).
Regarding Applicant’s Class 18 goods, Opposer submitted the declaration of its
founder and managing director, Michael Kleinwort, who averred based on personal
knowledge that “in [his] experience as a clothing purveyor, clothing manufacturers
and retailers frequently offer both clothing and bags.”14
Opposer also submitted copies of 25 active third-party, use-based registrations for
marks registered for both clothing and bags.15 Active third-party registrations are
relevant to show that the goods are of a type that may emanate from a single source

13 32 TTABVUE 7–8, 17–22.
14 Declaration of Michael Kleinwort (“Kleinwort Decl.”) ¶¶ 1 and 8 (31 TTABVUE 182–83).
15 31 TTABVUE 100–124.
Opposition No. 91234807

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under a single mark. See, e.g., Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107
USPQ2d 1424, 1432 (TTAB 2013) (third-party registrations covering both wine and
water were probative of the relatedness of those beverages); L’Oreal, 102 USPQ2d at
1440; see also In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015).
Additionally, Opposer submitted copies of printouts from eighteen third-party
websites that offer both clothing and backpacks, as well as travel bags, purses,
handbags, and other types of bags.16 We have considered only those websites that
show the same mark used on both clothing and bags. The websites for retailers
Abercromie & Fitch, Eddie Bauer, Victoria’s Secret, Lacoste (the “crocodile logo”),
Land’s End, and The North Face show use of their respective marks on both clothing
and bags.17 Additionally, the website Moosejaw.com shows use of the marks
ARCTERYX, FJALLRAVEN, and THE NORTH FACE on both jackets and
backpacks;18 the website REI.com shows use of the marks PATAGONIA,
ARCTERYX, and THE NORTH FACE on jackets and backpacks;19 and the website
for ganderoutdoors.com shows use the mark CARHARTT for both clothing and bags.20
None of these marks appear in the third-party registrations submitted by Opposer.
This evidence further establishes that clothing and bags are closely related goods that
commonly emanate from a single source under the same mark. See Hewlett-Packard,

16 See 31 TTABVUE 126–161.
17 31 TTABVUE 126–27, 132, 148–49, 154, 157–58, and 159–60.
18 31 TTABVUE 134–135.
19 31 TTABVUE 134–135.
20 31 TTABVUE 146 – 47.
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62 USPQ2d at 1004 (“whether a single company sells the goods and services of both
parties, if presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis”); see also Detroit Athletic,
128 USPQ2d at 1051 (evidence of third parties offering both types of goods under the
same mark demonstrates relatedness of the goods).
Based on the third-party registrations and websites of record, we find that there
is no genuine dispute that Opposer’s clothing and Applicant’s bags are related. See
Nike, Inc. v. WNBA Enters., LLC, 85 USPQ2d at 1195 (finding opposer’s clothing to
be “closely related” to applicant’s Class 18 bags, stating: “[w]earing apparel is
complementary in nature to accessories for clothing such as purses and tote bags, and
items which are used to transport clothing or carry personal articles such as
backpacks, duffel bags and garment bags”).
Regarding the trade channels for Applicant’s bags in Class 18 and Opposer’s
clothing in Class 25, because the identifications of the goods have no restrictions as
to channels of trade or classes of customers, we must presume that the identified
goods travel through all normal and usual trade channels for such goods, and that
they are sold to all classes of prospective purchasers for those goods. See Packard
Press, Inc. v. Hewlett- Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56 USPQ2d 1351, 1361(Fed. Cir.
2000) (“When the registration does not contain limitations describing a particular
channel of trade or class of customer, the goods or services are assumed to travel in
all normal channels of trade.”); Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115
USPQ2d 1816, 1825–26 (TTAB 2015) (“[A]bsent any explicit restriction in the
application or registration, we must presume the parties’ identified goods to travel
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through all normal channels of trade for goods of the type identified, and we must
consider them to be offered and sold to all of the usual customers for such goods.”).
Here the record shows that Applicant’s Class 18 goods and Opposer’s Class 25
goods are sold online. Indeed, Applicant stated during discovery that both its Class
18 goods and its Class 25 goods “will be distributed direct to consumers through
online retail websites, and brick and mortar retail stores.”21 Similarly, Opposer sells
its Class 25 goods online through its website.22 Additionally, the printouts of third-
party websites submitted by Opposer establish that retailers sell both clothing and
bags online. On some of these websites, clothing and bags are offered online by the
same retailers, which market and sell their own clothing and bags, and on other
websites, online retailers offer both clothing and bags of others. This evidence shows
that the Class 18 goods identified in Applicant’s application, and the Class 25 goods
in Opposer’s registration, are offered via the same online retail outlets to all of the
typical customers for such goods. See Nike, 85 USPQ2d at 1195 (“Absent any
restrictions in the respective applications and registrations, we must presume that
applicant’s apparel and bags and opposer’s apparel are sold through all normal
channels of trade for those goods, including all the usual retail outlets.”).
Applicant’s argument that Opposer only sells its identified clothing via Opposer’s
own website is unpersuasive because the identification of goods in Opposer’s
registration does not limit Opposer’s trade channels. See, e.g., Stone Lion, 110

21 See 31 TTABVUE 66 (Applicant’s supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 10).
22 See Kleinwort Decl. ¶ 5 (31 TTABVUE 183).
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USPQ2d at 1162; Octocom, 16 USPQ2d at 1787. Moreover, Opposer is entitled to
expand or change its trade channels at any time, for example, to include sales through
third-party websites or brick-and-mortar stores. See Detroit Athletic., 128 USPQ2d at
1052 (“Indeed, the owner of an unrestricted registration is entitled to change its
current trade channels at any time.”); CBS, 218 USPQ at 199 (“[A]lthough a
registrant’s current business practices may be quite narrow, they may change at any
time.”).
Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that the parties’ goods will travel through
the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers.
b) Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We now consider the degree of similarity or dissimilarity of the parties’ marks.
Because the parties’ Class 25 goods are identical in part, the degree of similarity
between the marks necessary to support a finding of likelihood of confusion as to these
International Class 25 goods is reduced. Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721; Century
21 Real Estate v. Century Life, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Jansen Enters. Inc. v. Rind, 85 USPQ2d 1104, 1108 (TTAB 2007). We must compare
Opposer’s KORA and design mark and Applicant’s QORA mark “in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay, 73 at
1691 (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). Similarity in any one of these elements
suffices to support a determination of likelihood of confusion. See Krim-Ko Corp. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968); In re Davia, 110
USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014).
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While our ultimate determination regarding likelihood confusion must rest on
consideration of the marks in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more
significant than another, and it is not improper, for rational reasons, to give more
weight to a dominant feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a
consideration of the marks in their entireties. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1160–61;
In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Where a mark consists of a word and a design, as is the case with Opposer’s KORA
and design mark, the word typically is accorded greater weight because it is more
likely to make an impression upon purchasers, to be remembered by them, to be used
by them to request the goods, and to be used to discuss the goods or recommend them
to others by word-of-mouth. See Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908, 1911; CBS, 218 USPQ
at 2001; L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (TTAB 2008) (citing
In re Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (TTAB 1987)); Centraz Indus. Inc. v.
Spartan Chem. Co., 77 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (TTAB 2006). In this instance, the word
KORA is the dominant element of Opposer’s KORA and design mark. The design,
consisting of “a stylized involute star with swirled arms circumscribed by a circle”
(the “star design”) is not entwined with, or superimposed over, the word KORA, but
simply appears next to it. Additionally, the star design is approximately the same
size as the word KORA. The star design is not so prominent or striking that it
overwhelms the word KORA. Rather, the star design is subordinate to the word
KORA and does not draw attention to, or away from, the word KORA, or otherwise
affect consumer perception of the word. Accordingly, the word KORA is the dominant
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element of Opposer’s KORA and design mark. Although Applicant argues that “the
ambiguity concerning the meaning and significance of the stylized lettering and
design” in Opposer’s mark raise a genuine dispute concerning the similarity of the
parties’ marks,23 Applicant has provided no argument or evidence that the star design
would have any significance beyond its presence as a visual element of the mark. See
Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 76 USPQ2d 1616, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). In sum, the
word KORA in Opposer’s mark will be pronounced, whereas the star design will not.
See, e.g., Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because the impact of the design in the overall commercial
impression is minor when compared with the words, a consumer viewing Herbko’s
mark would attach greater significance to the words CROSSWORD COMPANION
than to the crossword puzzle design.”); CBS, 218 USPQ at 200 (“[M]inor design
features do not necessarily obviate likelihood of confusion arising from consideration
of the marks in their entireties.”); see also Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (affirming
the Board’s finding that the wording X-SEED was the dominant portion of Opposer’s
X-SEED and design mark: “This is not a case, therefore, where a larger design is
separate and independent from the literal features of the mark.”); In re Shell Oil Co.,
992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (word portion of RIGHT-A-
WAY marks dominate over differences in arrow designs and script); Bond v. Taylor,

23 32 TTABVUE 14.
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17
119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055–56 (TTAB 2016) (design insufficient to distinguish BLACK
MEN ROCK and design from BLACK GIRLS ROCK! in standard characters); L.C.
Licensing, 86 USPQ2d at 1887 (“In terms of sound, obviously the design portion of
opposer’s mark will be not be spoken, and thus, the marks are identical in this
respect.”); Fram Trak Indus., Inc. v. WireTracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2006 (TTAB
2006) (“The design element in the mark which is the subject of petitioner’s pleaded
application is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the
similarities of the marks.”).
Turning then to consideration of the word KORA in Opposer’s mark and
Applicant’s QORA mark, both words consist of four letters and end with the letters
“-ORA.” Moreover, there is no genuine dispute that the letters “Q” and “K,” and thus
the words QORA and KORA, are pronounced the same. In its answer to the notice of
opposition Applicant admitted that “the verbal elements of [the parties’ marks] are
likely to be pronounced the same.” Additionally, as an exhibit to its motion for
summary judgment, Opposer submitted of a copy of Applicant’s request for a
trademark search, in which Applicant requested “Could you run a [trademark] search
on the Word Mark Qora…. (phonetically meaning KORA which is Tibetan or
Sherpa for the spiritual circumambulation that one does around a STUPA or a
monastery).”24 Based on Applicant’s admission in its answer, and the evidence of
record, there is no genuine dispute that the words KORA and QORA are phonetic
equivalents.

24 31 TTABVUE 93 (emphasis added).
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18
Applicant argues that the parties’ marks have different meanings because
“Applicant’s Mark QORA was derived from the Tibetan and Sherpa word meaning
spiritual circumambulation that one does around a Buddhist monastery or Stupa.”25
Applicant does not offer an English language meaning for the term, or argue that
Tibetan or Sherpa is a common language spoken in the United States.26 See Palm
Bay¸ 73 USPQ2d at 1696 (under the “doctrine of foreign equivalents” words from
modern languages generally are translated into English, but the doctrine should be
applied only when it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would stop and
translate foreign word into its English equivalent). Moreover, as discussed above, in
its request for a trademark search, Applicant stated that QORA “phonetically
mean[s] KORA which is Tibetan or Sherpa for the spiritual circumambulation that
one does around a STUPA or a monastery.”27 Thus, despite Applicant’s arguments
regarding the “ambiguity” of the meaning of the word “Kora” in Opposer’s mark, and
the “divergent meanings” of the parties’ marks,28 the evidence shows that Applicant
understood “Kora” to refer to a Tibetan and Sherpa spiritual walk, and understood

25 32 TTABVUE 16.
26 Applicant’s reliance on its own interrogatory answer in which it stated that QORA in the
Tibetan and Sherpa languages “refers to the spiritual circumambulation that one does
around a Buddhist monastery or Stupa” (see 32 TTABVUE 37, No. 5) is not evidence of the
English language meaning for the term, or that an appreciable number of United States
consumers would recognize the meaning of the term.
27 Opposer also submitted two printouts from Applicant’s website, www.qorawear.com,
accessed on September 2, 2019, both of which contain the following statement “In Tibetan
Buddhism, one performs a kora by walking in a clockwise direction around a sacred site.…
Inspired by this spirit, we at Qora seek to surround all who wear our clothing with a feeling
of peace and harmony in every walk of life.” See 31 TTABVUE 162–164.
28 32 TTABVUE 16.
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19
its QORA mark to the be the phonetic equivalent of “Kora.” We find Opposer’s
argument more persuasive that if consumers were not aware of the derivation of the
words KORA or QORA, the marks still would be similar because they would lack any
connotation. See Interlego AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entm’t Inc., 63 USPQ2d 1862, 1863
(TTAB 2002) (“Given the fact that consumers do not know this derivation, both [the
LEGO and MEGO] marks are similar in that they lack any connotation.”).
In sum, the phonetic equivalence of Applicant’s QORA mark and the dominant
KORA element of Opposer’s mark supports the determination that Applicant’s QORA
mark, for goods that are identical in part and otherwise related to Opposer’s goods,
is likely to be confused with Opposer’s KORA and design mark. See Interstate Brands,
53 USPQ2d at 1913 (finding HOHOs and YOYO’S “highly similar in sound”); see also
Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1912 (affirming Board’s determination that XCEED and X-
SEED and design sound alike when spoken and “any minor differences in the sound
of these marks may go undetected by consumers and, therefore, would not be
sufficient to distinguish the marks”); Krim-Ko, 156 USPQ at 526 (finding the aural
similarities of the marks VEEP and BEEP to be such that confusion would be likely);
Centraz, 77 USPQ2d at 1701 (“what stands out in the comparison between the marks
ICE SHINE and ISHINE (stylized) is the similarity in sound for floor finishing
preparations to be confusingly similar despite the stylization and different spelling”);
In re Total Quality Grp. Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999) (“Applicant’s mark
STRATEGYN and registrant’s mark STRATEGEN are phonetic equivalents and
differ by only one letter.”); Beck & Co. v. Package Distribs. of Am., Inc., 198 USPQ
Opposition No. 91234807

20
573, 576 (TTAB 1978) (despite differences in significance and appearance, likelihood
of confusion found between BECK’S BEER and EX BIER because the marks were
“substantially similar in sound”).
In sum, upon consideration of Opposer’s KORA and design mark and Applicant’s
QORA mark in their entireties, the word KORA is the dominant element of Opposer’s
mark; the words KORA and QORA differ by only one letter; and the letters “Q” and
“K,” and thus the words QORA and KORA, are pronounced the same and are
phonetically identical. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that the parties’
marks are similar.
C. Other DuPont Factors
The parties have not submitted any evidence or arguments regarding other
DuPont factors. Finally, Applicant’s argument that the Examining Attorney did not
cite Opposer’s registration as a bar to registration of Applicant’s mark is irrelevant.29
The decisions made by Examining Attorneys during ex parte examination are not
binding upon the Board; rather the Board must decide each case on its own facts and
record. In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
D. Determination
In summary, Opposer has met its burden of establishing that it is entitled to
summary judgment on its pleaded claim of likelihood of confusion under Trademark
Act Section 2(d). There are no genuine issues of material fact that Opposer has
standing to bring this opposition proceeding; that priority is not an issue; that

29 See 32 TTABVUE 10.
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21
Applicant’s Class 25 clothing goods are identical in part to Opposer Class 25 clothing
goods; that Applicant’s Class 18 bags are related to Opposer’s Class 25 clothing goods;
that the parties’ goods will travel through the same trade channels to the same
classes of consumers; and that the marks QORA and KORA and design are identical
in sound and extremely similar in appearance. Moreover, to the extent that
consumers would recognize the meaning of KORA and QORA as referring to Tibetan
or Sherpa spiritual walk, the marks have the same meaning. Applicant, in its
response, has failed to establish a genuine dispute of material of fact as to any
elements of Opposer’s likelihood of confusion claim.
Opposer’s motion for summary judgment on its claim of likelihood of confusion
under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of
Opposer, the opposition is sustained, and registration of Applicant’s mark is refused.