KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 12, 20212020006115 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/551,167 11/24/2014 Yuechen Qian 2013P02157US01 3675 24737 7590 03/12/2021 PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS 465 Columbus Avenue Suite 340 Valhalla, NY 10595 EXAMINER KOPPIKAR, VIVEK D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/12/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): katelyn.mulroy@philips.com marianne.fox@philips.com patti.demichele@Philips.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YUECHEN QIAN, MERLIJN SEVENSTER, and PAUL JOSEPH CHANG ____________ Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed April 23, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 25, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 26, 2020) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 29, 2019). Appellant identifies Koninklijke Philips N.V. as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 1). Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]he present application relates generally to detecting and visualizing pertinent patient information and finding-specific suggestions in radiology workflow” (Spec. 1:1–2). Claims 1, 8, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system for detecting and visualizing pertinent information and finding-specific suggestions in a radiology report, the system comprising: a clinical database storing one or more clinical documents including clinical data; one or more processors; and a non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to implement: [(a)] a natural language processing engine which processes the clinical documents to detected clinical data pertinent to a patient; [(b)] a context extraction and classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings for monitoring the patient based on detection of suggestion keywords wherein the context extraction and classification engine is configured to detect suggestion keywords including at least the words “attention”, “monitor”, and “surveillance”; and [(c)] a clinical interface engine which generates a user interface which enables the user to view the detected finding-specific suggestions. Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 3 REJECTIONS Claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yeluri et al. (US 2014/0006926 A1, published Jan. 2, 2014) (“Yeluri”) and Boone et al. (US 8,095,544 B2, issued Jan. 10, 2012) (“Boone”). Claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Yeluri, Boone, and Wibbeler (US 2014/0033276 A1, published Jan. 30, 2014). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20 as a group (Appeal Br. 6–9). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 4 patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). 2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 5 The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claim 1 recites “storing documents, processing documents, extracting findings, and generating an interface/report,” i.e., “an abstract idea consistent with the types of ideas found to be abstract by the Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 6 courts,” and that the claim does not include additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Final Act. 3–4). The Examiner also determined that claim 1 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself; that dependent claims 2 and 3 further limit the abstract idea but “do not offer significantly more than an abstract idea”; and that the remaining claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons as set forth with respect to claims 1–3 (id.). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 8–9). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “SYSTEM AND METHOD TO DETECT AND VISUALIZE FINDING-SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AND PERTINENT PATIENT INFORMATION IN RADIOLOGY WORKFLOW,” and describes that radiologists have to work, on a routine Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 7 basis, with an increasing number of images to diagnose patients in an optimal manner (Spec. 1:11–12). “Ideally, the radiologist should understand the outcome of relevant prior (imaging/lab) tests of the patient to best evaluate the disease and its progression over time”; however, “[b]ecause of time pressure, it’s unlikely that the radiologist would review prior clinical data in the workflow” (id. at 1:16–18). “Instead, the radiologist typically uses the background information and reason for exam that are entered by the referring physician” — information that often is very generic and succinct, and generally acknowledged to reduce the radiologist’s interpretation accuracy and, consequently, the total value of the imaging study (id. at 1:19–22). The Specification, thus, describes that, given the limited time that clinicians have to find all relevant clinical information, “it would [be] advantageous to have a system that can present the relevant patient context information upfront and indicate the certainty (‘fidelity’) and relevance of the presented information” (id. at 2:24–26) and also advantageous to have a system that processes a patient’s prior radiology reports, “detects finding- specific suggestions[,] and presents that information upfront before interpretation” (id. at 3:7–9). The claimed invention ostensibly is intended to address these issues by providing a system and method that utilize natural language processing and pattern recognition to present patient context information, indicate the certainty/fidelity and relevance of the information, detect and visualize finding-specific suggestions, and allow radiologists to navigate the pertinent evidence, thereby increasing workflow efficiency (Spec. 3:11–15). Claim 1, thus, recites a system comprising a clinical database storing clinical documents; one or more processors; and a non-transitory computer readable Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 8 medium storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to: (1) process a patient’s clinical documents to detected clinical data, i.e., “[implement] a natural language processing engine which processes the clinical documents to detected clinical data pertinent to a patient” (limitation (a)); (2) extract clinical findings from the clinical data and detect finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings for monitoring the patient, i.e., [implement] a context extraction and classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings for monitoring the patient based on detection of suggestion keywords wherein the context extraction and classification engine is configured to detect suggestion keywords including at least the words “attention”, “monitor”, and “surveillance” (limitation (b)); and (3) display the detected finding-specific suggestions to a user, i.e., “[implement] a clinical interface engine which generates a user interface which enables the user to view the detected finding-specific suggestions” (limitation (c)). The Examiner determined, and we agree, that these limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite “collecting information (e.g., storing documents), analyzing [the information] (e.g., processing the documents and extracting findings), and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis (e.g., generating an interface/report)” (Final Act. 3) — steps that can be performed by a human, e.g., mentally or manually, using pen and paper. Simply put, claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., a concept performed in the human mind, including an evaluation or judgment and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; CyberSource Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 9 Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Circ. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”). SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (non-precedential) (“The claim does not purport . . . to identify any steps beyond those which doctors routinely and consciously perform. Our ruling is limited to the circumstances presented here, in which every step is a familiar part of the conscious process that doctors can and do perform in their heads.”); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (CCPA 1982) (“Appellants’ specification and arguments indicate that their invention is concerned with replacing, in part, the thinking processes of a neurologist with a computer.”). Appellant argues that these limitations are not “concepts performed in the human mind” but rather “an operation performed on a user interface, i.e., the detected finding-specific suggestions” (Appeal Br. 7). Appellant maintains that although “a person might mentally envision generating the user interface (which would be a mental step), the operations of in [sic] claim 1 are not mental steps, because they occur outside of the human mind and modif[y] an entity (the displayed findings) that is outside the human Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 10 mind” (id.). Yet, we find nothing in the claim language that precludes the presentation of the detected finding-specific suggestions using pen and paper. As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. We also are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 “recites additional elements that integrate the alleged [judicial] exception into a practical application of that exception” (Appeal Br. 7). The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ pac/mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) applies or uses the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; (3) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the claim; (4) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing; or (5) applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 11 implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant asserts here that claim 1 is directed to a “system using data received from a clinical database to determine clinical findings and find specific suggestions from the findings, which can be used to diagnose and treat a patient,” and that this falls “under the purview of the second example of practical applications,” i.e., applies or uses the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition (Appeal Br. 8). Yet, there is nothing in claim 1 that provides “a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition.” Importantly too, the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2 is not whether the claimed invention itself (i.e., using data received from a clinical database to determine clinical findings and find specific suggestions from the findings, which can be used to diagnose and treat a patient) is a practical application; instead, the question is whether the claim includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are “a clinical database”; “a non-transitory computer readable medium”; “one or more processors”; “a natural language processing engine”; “a context extraction and classification engine”; “a clinical interface engine”; and “a user interface,” elements that, as the Examiner observed, are recited at a high level of generality, i.e., as generic computer hardware and software Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 12 components (Final Act. 3–4; see also, e.g., Spec. 6:7–8:16, 12:19–21, 13:14–24, 15:12–25). We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 13 We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the recited abstract idea. And Appellant offers no argument to the contrary. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20, which fall with claim 1. Obviousness Independent Claims 1, 8, and 15 and Dependent Claims 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16 We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because Yeluri, on which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest “a context extraction and classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings,” as recited in limitation (b) of claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 8 and 15 (Appeal Br. 9–11). Yeluri is directed to a system and method for automatically processing a report, using natural language processing to identify a text element in the report associated with content external to the report, and providing a hyperlink to the external content (Yeluri, Abstr.). Focusing specifically on radiology reports, for example, Yeluri describes that often a second opinion may be required or desired from a specialist or peer, who is not physically present at the same workstation; “to compensate for this, the reading radiologist may provide a report that includes links and/or other references to external content (e.g., images, electronic medical record data, lab results, etc.) for reader access and review” (id. ¶ 24). These “[l]inks/references can Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 14 be provided in a report as a user is generating the report (e.g., via natural language processing during dictation) or via an inline processing tool to analyze a legacy saved report as it is and/or before it is opened for review by a user” (id.). Yeluri describes in paragraphs 29, 32, and 40, on which the Examiner relies (see Final Act. 6; Ans. 6–7, 14), that “[i[n certain examples, a hyperlink is created around relevant finding(s) in a report that link to relevant image(s)” (Yeluri ¶ 29), and that a user selects a hyperlink to retrieve and view associated information (e.g., lab results, EMR data, etc.) (id. ¶¶ 32, 40). However, we agree with Appellant that although the Yeluri system may be used to find relevant clinical findings, there is nothing in the cited portions of Yeluri that discloses or suggests a “context extraction and classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings, as recited in claims 1, 8, and 15” (Appeal Br. 10). In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). Dependent Claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 Each of dependent claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 ultimately depends from one of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. The rejection of these dependent claims does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. Therefore, we do not sustain the Appeal 2020-006115 Application 14/551,167 15 Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of dependent claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 for the same reasons set forth with respect to the independent claims. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, 20 101 Eligibility 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, 20 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 103 Yeluri, Boone 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20 103 Yeluri, Boone, Wibbeler 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20 Overall Outcome 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, 20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation