KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 12, 2021

2020006115 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/551,167 11/24/2014 Yuechen Qian 2013P02157US01 3675
24737 7590 03/12/2021
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
KOPPIKAR, VIVEK D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YUECHEN QIAN, MERLIJN SEVENSTER,
and PAUL JOSEPH CHANG
____________

Appeal 2020-006115
Application 14/551,167
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed April 23, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 25, 2020),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 26, 2020) and Final Office
Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 29, 2019). Appellant identifies
Koninklijke Philips N.V. as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 1).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The Specification states, “[t]he present application relates generally to
detecting and visualizing pertinent patient information and finding-specific
suggestions in radiology workflow” (Spec. 1:1–2).
Claims 1, 8, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A system for detecting and visualizing pertinent
information and finding-specific suggestions in a radiology
report, the system comprising:
a clinical database storing one or more clinical documents
including clinical data;
one or more processors; and
a non-transitory computer readable medium storing
instructions executable by the one or more processors to
implement:
[(a)] a natural language processing engine which
processes the clinical documents to detected clinical data
pertinent to a patient;
[(b)] a context extraction and classification engine
which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and
detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical
findings for monitoring the patient based on detection of
suggestion keywords wherein the context extraction and
classification engine is configured to detect suggestion
keywords including at least the words “attention”,
“monitor”, and “surveillance”; and
[(c)] a clinical interface engine which generates a
user interface which enables the user to view the detected
finding-specific suggestions.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Yeluri et al. (US 2014/0006926 A1, published Jan. 2,
2014) (“Yeluri”) and Boone et al. (US 8,095,544 B2, issued Jan. 10, 2012)
(“Boone”).
Claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Yeluri, Boone, and Wibbeler (US 2014/0033276 A1,
published Jan. 30, 2014).
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–3, 6–10, 13–17, 19, and 20 as a group
(Appeal Br. 6–9). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include
an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
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patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not
directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’”
to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published
revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in
evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED
PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). 2 That guidance revised the
USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the
Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that
[are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not
“directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception. Id. at 50.

2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates
the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed.
Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).
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The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e.,
Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following
three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain
methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic
principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental
processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next
determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates
the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if
the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is
“directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id.
If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under
revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and
in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive
concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is
the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner
determined that independent claim 1 recites “storing documents, processing
documents, extracting findings, and generating an interface/report,” i.e., “an
abstract idea consistent with the types of ideas found to be abstract by the
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courts,” and that the claim does not include additional elements that
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Final
Act. 3–4). The Examiner also determined that claim 1 does not include
additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea itself; that dependent claims 2 and 3 further limit the abstract
idea but “do not offer significantly more than an abstract idea”; and that the
remaining claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons as
set forth with respect to claims 1–3 (id.).
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal
Br. 8–9). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
The Specification is titled “SYSTEM AND METHOD TO DETECT
AND VISUALIZE FINDING-SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS AND
PERTINENT PATIENT INFORMATION IN RADIOLOGY
WORKFLOW,” and describes that radiologists have to work, on a routine
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basis, with an increasing number of images to diagnose patients in an
optimal manner (Spec. 1:11–12). “Ideally, the radiologist should understand
the outcome of relevant prior (imaging/lab) tests of the patient to best
evaluate the disease and its progression over time”; however, “[b]ecause of
time pressure, it’s unlikely that the radiologist would review prior clinical
data in the workflow” (id. at 1:16–18). “Instead, the radiologist typically
uses the background information and reason for exam that are entered by the
referring physician” — information that often is very generic and succinct,
and generally acknowledged to reduce the radiologist’s interpretation
accuracy and, consequently, the total value of the imaging study (id.
at 1:19–22). The Specification, thus, describes that, given the limited time
that clinicians have to find all relevant clinical information, “it would [be]
advantageous to have a system that can present the relevant patient context
information upfront and indicate the certainty (‘fidelity’) and relevance of
the presented information” (id. at 2:24–26) and also advantageous to have a
system that processes a patient’s prior radiology reports, “detects finding-
specific suggestions[,] and presents that information upfront before
interpretation” (id. at 3:7–9).
The claimed invention ostensibly is intended to address these issues
by providing a system and method that utilize natural language processing
and pattern recognition to present patient context information, indicate the
certainty/fidelity and relevance of the information, detect and visualize
finding-specific suggestions, and allow radiologists to navigate the pertinent
evidence, thereby increasing workflow efficiency (Spec. 3:11–15). Claim 1,
thus, recites a system comprising a clinical database storing clinical
documents; one or more processors; and a non-transitory computer readable
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medium storing instructions executable by the one or more processors to:
(1) process a patient’s clinical documents to detected clinical data, i.e.,
“[implement] a natural language processing engine which processes the
clinical documents to detected clinical data pertinent to a patient”
(limitation (a)); (2) extract clinical findings from the clinical data and detect
finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings for monitoring the
patient, i.e.,
[implement] a context extraction and classification engine which
extracts clinical findings from the clinical data and detects
finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings for
monitoring the patient based on detection of suggestion
keywords wherein the context extraction and classification
engine is configured to detect suggestion keywords including at
least the words “attention”, “monitor”, and “surveillance”
(limitation (b)); and (3) display the detected finding-specific suggestions to a
user, i.e., “[implement] a clinical interface engine which generates a user
interface which enables the user to view the detected finding-specific
suggestions” (limitation (c)).
The Examiner determined, and we agree, that these limitations, when
given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite “collecting information
(e.g., storing documents), analyzing [the information] (e.g., processing the
documents and extracting findings), and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis (e.g., generating an interface/report)” (Final Act. 3)
— steps that can be performed by a human, e.g., mentally or manually, using
pen and paper.
Simply put, claim 1 recites a mental process, i.e., a concept performed
in the human mind, including an evaluation or judgment and, therefore, an
abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; CyberSource
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Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that method steps that can be performed in the human mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper, are unpatentable mental processes). See also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Circ. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose[s] them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev.
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts
have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that
the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and
paper or in a person’s mind.”). SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological
Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (non-precedential) (“The
claim does not purport . . . to identify any steps beyond those which doctors
routinely and consciously perform. Our ruling is limited to the
circumstances presented here, in which every step is a familiar part of the
conscious process that doctors can and do perform in their heads.”); In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (CCPA 1982) (“Appellants’ specification and
arguments indicate that their invention is concerned with replacing, in part,
the thinking processes of a neurologist with a computer.”).
Appellant argues that these limitations are not “concepts performed in
the human mind” but rather “an operation performed on a user interface, i.e.,
the detected finding-specific suggestions” (Appeal Br. 7). Appellant
maintains that although “a person might mentally envision generating the
user interface (which would be a mental step), the operations of in [sic]
claim 1 are not mental steps, because they occur outside of the human mind
and modif[y] an entity (the displayed findings) that is outside the human
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mind” (id.). Yet, we find nothing in the claim language that precludes the
presentation of the detected finding-specific suggestions using pen and
paper. As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract
idea.
We also are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s argument
that claim 1 “recites additional elements that integrate the alleged [judicial]
exception into a practical application of that exception” (Appeal Br. 7).
The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition
(rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element
or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception
into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have
integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if the additional
element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an
improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) applies or uses the
judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease
or medical condition; (3) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the
judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the
claim; (4) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different
state or thing; or (5) applies or uses the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. At the
same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to
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implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a
tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id.
Appellant asserts here that claim 1 is directed to a “system using data
received from a clinical database to determine clinical findings and find
specific suggestions from the findings, which can be used to diagnose and
treat a patient,” and that this falls “under the purview of the second example
of practical applications,” i.e., applies or uses the judicial exception to effect
a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition
(Appeal Br. 8). Yet, there is nothing in claim 1 that provides “a particular
treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition.”
Importantly too, the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2 is not
whether the claimed invention itself (i.e., using data received from a clinical
database to determine clinical findings and find specific suggestions from
the findings, which can be used to diagnose and treat a patient) is a practical
application; instead, the question is whether the claim includes additional
elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the judicial exception
into a practical application. The Examiner determined here, and we agree,
that the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea
are “a clinical database”; “a non-transitory computer readable medium”;
“one or more processors”; “a natural language processing engine”; “a
context extraction and classification engine”; “a clinical interface engine”;
and “a user interface,” elements that, as the Examiner observed, are recited
at a high level of generality, i.e., as generic computer hardware and software
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components (Final Act. 3–4; see also, e.g., Spec. 6:7–8:16, 12:19–21,
13:14–24, 15:12–25).
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a
mental process, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited
in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer
components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they
do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is
not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or
combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial
exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in
the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
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We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not include additional
elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the recited abstract
idea. And Appellant offers no argument to the contrary.
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 6–10, 13–17,
19, and 20, which fall with claim 1.
Obviousness
Independent Claims 1, 8, and 15 and Dependent Claims 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because
Yeluri, on which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest “a context
extraction and classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the
clinical data and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical
findings,” as recited in limitation (b) of claim 1, and similarly recited in
claims 8 and 15 (Appeal Br. 9–11).
Yeluri is directed to a system and method for automatically processing
a report, using natural language processing to identify a text element in the
report associated with content external to the report, and providing a
hyperlink to the external content (Yeluri, Abstr.). Focusing specifically on
radiology reports, for example, Yeluri describes that often a second opinion
may be required or desired from a specialist or peer, who is not physically
present at the same workstation; “to compensate for this, the reading
radiologist may provide a report that includes links and/or other references
to external content (e.g., images, electronic medical record data, lab results,
etc.) for reader access and review” (id. ¶ 24). These “[l]inks/references can
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be provided in a report as a user is generating the report (e.g., via natural
language processing during dictation) or via an inline processing tool to
analyze a legacy saved report as it is and/or before it is opened for review by
a user” (id.).
Yeluri describes in paragraphs 29, 32, and 40, on which the Examiner
relies (see Final Act. 6; Ans. 6–7, 14), that “[i[n certain examples, a
hyperlink is created around relevant finding(s) in a report that link to
relevant image(s)” (Yeluri ¶ 29), and that a user selects a hyperlink to
retrieve and view associated information (e.g., lab results, EMR data, etc.)
(id. ¶¶ 32, 40). However, we agree with Appellant that although the Yeluri
system may be used to find relevant clinical findings, there is nothing in the
cited portions of Yeluri that discloses or suggests a “context extraction and
classification engine which extracts clinical findings from the clinical data
and detects finding-specific suggestions from the clinical findings, as recited
in claims 1, 8, and 15” (Appeal Br. 10).
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. For the same
reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent
claims 2, 6, 9, 13, and 16. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from
which they depend are nonobvious”).
Dependent Claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20
Each of dependent claims 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 19, and 20 ultimately
depends from one of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. The rejection of these
dependent claims does not cure the deficiency in the rejection of
independent claims 1, 8, and 15. Therefore, we do not sustain the
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Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of dependent claims 3, 7, 10,
14, 17, 19, and 20 for the same reasons set forth with respect to the
independent claims.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–10,
13–17, 19,
20
101 Eligibility 1–3, 6–10,
13–17, 19,
20

1, 2, 6, 8,
9, 13, 15,
16
103 Yeluri, Boone 1, 2, 6, 8, 9,
13, 15, 16
3, 7, 10,
14, 17, 19,
20
103 Yeluri, Boone,
Wibbeler
3, 7, 10, 14,
17, 19, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 6–10,
13–17, 19,
20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED