Kolpin Bros. Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 7, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1378 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for for Region 26, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify said Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of the
receipt of this Decision what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.13
It is further recommended that unless within 20 days from the date of the receipt of
this Decision, the Respondent notifies said Regional Director, in writing, that it will
comply with the foregoing recommendations, the Board issue an Order requiring the
Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with economic reprisals if they choose
Transportation Employees Association, or any other union, as their bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT instruct or request our employees to report on the union affilia-
tions or activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
any of our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of Transportation Employees Association, or any other labor
organization.
THURSTON MOTOR LINES, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 746
Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street, Memphis, Tennessee, Telephone No.
534-3161, if they have any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
Kolpin Bros. Co., Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO. Case No. 30-CA-36 (formerly 18-CA-1779). Decem-
ber 7, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 15 , 1964, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
149 NLRB No. 127.
KOLPIN BROS. CO., INC. 1379
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision. The Trial
Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in another
unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision,
together with supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Leedom and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision, the
exceptions, and briefs, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's find-
ings, conclusions, and recommendations, as modified herein.
1. On August 19, 1963, having obtained signed authorization cards
from more than half of the employees in the appropriate unit, the
Union demanded, by letter, that the Respondent recognize its author-
ity to bargain for the employees. At the same time, it filed a petition
for election with the Board. The Employer ignored the Union's
request for recognition.and bargaining, and subsequently engaged in
activity calculated to destroy the Union's majority. As properly
found by the Trial Examiner, this activity-the coercive circulation
of a petition purporting to repudiate the employees' affiliation with
the Union-constituted a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
On October 17, 1963, the Union went to, and was defeated in, a
Board-conducted consent election. The Union did not file objections
to the election based on,the Employer's preelection conduct, and the
results of the balloting were duly certified on October 24, 1963.
Thereafter, the Union filed various unfair labor practice charges
against the Respondent, including an allegation of refusal to bargain
in violation of Section 8(a) (5), as of August 19, 1963, the date of the
Union's original demand for recognition and bargaining.
The Trial Examiner heard evidence on the merits of the 8(a) (5)
allegation. He determined that most of the authorization cards col-
lected by the Union were invalid; that, accordingly, the Union never
attained the status of bargaining representative of a majority of the
employees; and that the 8(a) (5) count should therefore be dismissed.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the Trial Examiner's
finding as to the invalidity of the authorization cards, since we con-
clude that the threshold question of the Union's right to establish its
majority status under Section 8'(a) (5) must, in the circumstances of
this case, be decided against it. 'In Bernell Foam Products Co., Inc.,
146 NLRB 1277, the Board, Member Leedom dissenting on this issue,
1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
held that a union which loses an election may nonetheless be entitled
to a bargaining order, in appropriate circumstances. In the Bernel
case, however, the election was set aside on the basis of meritorious
objections. Where, as here, the election has not been set aside on such
basis and its validity stands unimpaired, we will presume that the
election, which the Union lost, truly expressed the employees' desires
as to representation.'
We therefore hold in this case that the Union is not entitled to a
bargaining order, even assuming the validity of its authorization
cards.
2. We find that the evidence fully substantiates the 8(a) (3) find-
ings as to Smoody, Jones, Grahn, and Trampf, made by the Trial
Examiner. We disagree, however, with his recommendation as to the
time at which the backpay period of Smoody should be terminated.
While the Trial Examiner properly found that Smoody "was offered
work at the same job she was performing on the day of her layoff,
beginning March 10, 1964," the record discloses that the job in ques-
tion (operating a bagging machine) was not her regular job, but one
which she had only occasionally performed as a substitute. The offer
of a full-time job on the bagging machine, particularly in view of the
Respondent's awareness of a disability which prevented Smoody from
performing such work for any length of time, cannot be considered
an offer of reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent
employment. Furthermore, although a letter from Respondent,
admitted into evidence, does state that Smoody failed to accept
Respondent's invitation to come in sometime after February 28, 1964,
and see if they could "work something out," the testimony of Smoody
shows that at some unspecified date before April 8, 1964, the date of
her testimony, she had a conference with the president of Respondent
about her recall. He again offered her the bagging machine job, and
also another job which she had not the skill to perform. In these
circumstances, we cannot agree that Respondent's backpay liability
to Smoody, as of the hearing in this case, had been terminated.2
It should also be noted, as to Jones, that the backpay due her
should be limited to those periods following her layoff during which
she was physically able to accept employment in the type of work
she had previously performed.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
I Cf. Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., Marathon Division , 149 NLRB 627.
2 The Smead Manufacturing Company, 145 NLRB 1632 (Van and Skovbroten).
KOLPIN BROS. CO., INC. 1381
mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that the Respondent, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following
modifications and additions : 3
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) :
"Offer Dora Jones, Eugene R. Trampf, and Leone Smoody imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them and Christine Grahn whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimiation
against them, by payment to Jones, Trampf, and Smoody of the sum
of money each would have earned as wages from the date of the dis-
crimination to the date of offer of full reinstatement, and in the case
of Grahn, from the date of the discrimination to the date of her
reinstatement." 4
2. Add the following subparagraph to paragraph 2:
"(e) Notify Eugene R. Trampf if presently serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and Univer-
sal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after dis-
charge from the Armed Forces."
3. Delete the final sentence and substitute the following :
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the Respondent violated the Act by conduct other than that found to
be violative herein, be, and it hereby is, dismissed."
a The address given in the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision is
amended to read : "The Board 's Thirtieth Regional Office, Commerce Building , 744 North
Fourth Street , Milwaukee , Wisconsin , Telephone No 272-8600 , Extension 3860."
* In each case the amounts shall be less the net earnings during the respective periods,
and in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
and with interest on the backpay due in accordance with Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge, filed respectively on January 8 and Febru-
ary 3, 1964 , by the above-named labor organization , the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board on March 3 , 1964, issued his complaint and notice of
hearing. An answer was duly received from the above -named Respondent . The com-
plaint alleges and the answer denies that the Respondent has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended . Pursuant to notice a hearing was held in Berlin,
Wisconsin , on April 7 and 8 ,1964, before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore.
At the hearing all parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to
present evidence pertinent to the issues , to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs have
been received from General Counsel and the Respondent.
Disposition of the Respondent 's motion to dismiss the complaint , upon which
ruling was reserved at the conclusion of the hearing, is made by the following findings,
conclusions , and recommendations.
1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the record thus made, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial
Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Kolpin Bros . Co., Inc., is a corporation maintaining its office and principal place of
business in Berlin , Wisconsin, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distri-
bution of canvas products.
During the year preceding issuance of the complaint the Respondent manufactured,
sold, and distributed to customers outside the State of Wisconsin products valued at
more than $50,000. During the same period it purchased goods and materials from
sources outside the State of Wisconsin valued at more than $50,000.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is here found that the Respondent
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE CHARGING UNION
Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization admitting
to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Setting and issues
All of the events from which this complaint stems occurred after one of Kolpin's
some 60 employees, a female, had a quarrel with someone in the plant identified only
as "Ronnie" Koplin, in mid-August 1963. According to this employee, Margaret
Brilla, a witness for General Counsel, "Ronnie" asked her if she had had anything to
eat or drink at "break." She said she had not, whereupon he advised her to "quit
your bitching." This admonition, plus the fact, Brilla declared, that the girl next to
her was given "cross-stitching to do" although pregnant, caused her to telephone to
one Bill Boick, a cookie-factory employee, and ask him to come to her home. Boick
agreed, and then she called a fellow employee, Ronald Naparella, and invited him to
her home. Naparella, she testified, had previously voiced some thoughts about getting
a union into the plant.
Bill Boick, it appears from Naparella's testimony (he also being a witness for
General Counsel), works at the Ripon Cookie Factory, but helps out occasionally in
organizing for the Textile Workers. He came to the Brilla home as requested. Brilla
and Naparella asked him how to go about getting organized. He gave them a number
of union cards, and according to the testimony of both Naparella and Brilla told them
to get about 30 percent of the employees to sign them and then he could get someone
from the Union "from Chicago" to come up and tell them about the Union.
Further details of this clearly unusual organizing campaign will be described in a
later section.
In brief preliminary summary, however, the substance of credible evidence estab-
lished by General Counsel himself is to the effect that a lot of cards were signed, a
professional union representative did come to town, Brilla was as dissatisfied with him
as with "Ronnie" Kolpin, and as promptly and as thoroughly disorganized, with
Naparella's help, the same employees she had previously organized.
The Union, however, proceeded with processing a petition it had filed with the
Board, an election was held, and it seems to be no secret that the Union lost the elec-
tion. The Union and General Counsel would now have it found that the Union had
and has majority status as a result of cards signed-not as of the election, and that
the Respondent has unlawfully refused to bargain with the Union.
In addition to the refusal to bargain issue, the complaint alleges that the Respondent
unlawfully terminated the employment of four employees in November and December
1963, and engaged in other conduct depriving employees of their rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
B. The refusal-to-bargain issue
This issue may be quickly disposed of. In the many pages of his eloquent brief
General Counsel strenuously urges that a violation of Section 8(a) (5) must be found
because the Respondent engaged in conduct which dispossessed the Union of its once-
held majority status. In theory his argument is sound, in the opinion of the Trial
Examiner. Evidence adduced from General Counsel's own witnesses, however, fails
, KOLPIN BROS. CO., INC. 1383
to establish the one essential fact upon which his argument must rest if it -is to attain
the quality of a reasonable conclusion : that the Union at any time had been the
actual bargaining representative of the majority of the employees.
In short, while there is no question but- that a majority of the Respondent's
employees did sign union cards, in all but a few cases it is equally well established that
the signers of those cards did so, not to authorize the Union as their representative, but
simply so someone from the Union would come to the hinterland from Chicago and
let them know what the organization had to offer them.
During the first day of the hearing General Counsel called seven employees, each
of whom identified her signature upon a card but each of whom also said that by sign-
ing it she had no intention of seeking membership or of designating the Union as her
representative. The next. day of the, hearing General Counsel and counsel for the
Respondent stipulated to the effect that all other signers of the some 40-odd cards,
unless called to testify to the contrary would testify in substance as had the few called
the preceding day.
Since no genuine "majority" status as the designated bargaining representative has
been shown to exist, at any material time, it can hardly be found and concluded that
the Respondent has refused to bargain with a majority representative as agent for its
employees. It will be recommended that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
C. Interference, restraint, and coercion -
1. The petition
According to the testimony of W. J. Tullar, the Regional Director for the Union,
on August 18 he had a telephone conversation with Boick, previously identified, and
was told that Kolpin's employees had signed about 40 union cards. Upon this advice
Tullar the next day filed a petition with the Board's Regional Office and sent a letter
to Kolpin demanding recognition. As a witness Howard Kolpin, head of the Com-
pany, admitted that he made no reply to the union's letter.
On August 20 Tullar came to Berlin, and met with Brilla and some 30 employees at
Boick's home. According to Brilla's testimony she questioned Tullar pointedly and
thoroughly as to what advantages she and others would derive from union member-
ship. Tullar's replies clearly failed to satisfy Brilla and others present. She wanted
him to "guarantee" them that he could get a "piece rate" for them. She testified as a
witness for General Counsel, "As far as I am concerned Textile had nothing to offer
because he couldn't guarantee us a piece rate. We had to sign up and join that union
before we were sure of anything " Tullar's replies, Brilla said, differed considerably
from what Boick had told her and Naparella. She declared, "Mr. Boick talked to
Ronnie and I, to hear him tell it, we could get two and a half dollars an hour for
piece work in there, that we were getting maybe a dollar and a half for and it did, it
sounded good."
The Trial Examiner finds no reason, having observed Brilla's impulsive nature on
the witness stand, to doubt her testimony: "I changed my mind about that union while
I was at the meeting."
On the Saturday afternoon of the same week, August 24, Brilla and another
employee went to Kolpin's office, where she told him she "was implicated in the
union" and "was sorry I had gotten him into the mess that he was in " Kolpin replied
that if she had gripes she should have come to him sooner.
A few days later Kolpin and a local attorney assembled the employees, apparently
to discuss the petition which had been filed. At this meeting Brilla spoke up and asked
the attorney what she and the others could do about getting the Union out of the
plant. The attorney said that they could write to the Union and ask to have their
cards "removed from the file," or could "draw up a petition but the NLRB would just
toss it in the wastebasket "
On September 6,Kolpin•telephoned•to Brilla and asked her if her offer to get up a
petition was still open-to get the Union out of the shop.1 She said it was, and
promptly prepared one bearing the text:
We the following employees of Kolpin Bros. of Berlin, Wisconsin, wish to have
our petition for election for a union in the textile union or any other affiliation
withdrawn immediately. There has been no bargening [sic] or offers made
between the company or employees.
Brilla and Naparella then proceeded to get some 40 signatures to this "petition,"
thereby completely disorganizing what they had first organized.
1 Kolpin's denial of this conversation is not credited.
1384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In getting signatures to this petition Brilla-told employees that "Howard','-Kolpin-
had told her that he could rttn the plant with 15 or, 20 employees in the past, and
could again, and that she wanted the plant back the way it had,been before she had
started getting'the cards signed. She pointed out that the Union could not promise
any rate increase , and couldn't force Kolpin to grant one if he could not afford it.
Brilla's credible testimony is to the effect that Kolpin told her, in circulating the peti-
tion, to "impress" upon employees that a union "could cripple the shop," and that-he
had only signed a certain contract to give his employees winter work.
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that in circulating this antiunion petition
both Brilla and Naparella were acting as Kolpin's agents and that the Respondent must
be held accountable for their conduct and threats of reprisal in such activity
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that by such antiunion activity the
Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act. -
2. Other 8(a)(1) conduct
Other interference and restraint of employees' rights under Section 7 of the Act,
established by credible testimony include:
a. Before being hired in December 1963, employee Sylvia Putski was asked by
Plant Superintendent Barnhart if she was or ever had been a union member. She had
had no "experience" with a union, and was hired.
b. At about the same time Kolpin persuaded Brilla to implement her offer to circu-
late an antiunion petition, an antiunion committee was set up to further discourage
union membership and activity. On this committee was Joseph Nicholas, head of the
shipping department and here found to be a supervisor within the meaning of the Act
Kolpin, as a witness , admitted that he had considered Nicholas to be a supervisor until
his attorney apparently told him otherwise. The record contains a written warning
slip, signed by Nicholas, as late as December 1963, long after the election. That he
thus exercised authority to issue warnings is sufficient grounds for the finding of
supervisorship.
c. Kolpin told employee Brilla, shortly after the election in October, that by 30
days after this event he "could start cleaning house." Support for the reasonable
inference that by this statement Kolpin intended to convey the threat to lay off union
adherents is found in the fact, as described later, that he did lay off two employees
who had declined to sign Brilla 's petition on November 26, slightly more than the 30
days he had forecast.
D. The terminations of employment
1. Dora Jones and Leone Smoody
These two employees, contrary to several others who testified for General Counsel
and to the stipulation entered into by him, apparently knew what they wanted-a
union-when they signed their cards and were not to be dissuaded from their wishes.
Both refused to sign the petition brought around by Brilla and Naparella. And
according to Brilla's credible testimony on the point, she was specifically directed by
Kolpin to try to get Jones to sign it, but was unsuccessful and so reported back to
Kolpin. Jones, also, was the union observer at the election. While Kolpin denied
having seen the petition itself, after the names were subscribed to it, the Trial Exam-
iner is convinced that he well knew which of his employees had refused to sign. It
bears the signatures of supervisors who, he admitted, he had always figured were
supervisors.
Shortly after the 30 day period following the election, Kolpin proceeded to carry
out the threat voiced earlier to Brilla, as noted above. Jones and Smoody were told
on November 26 that there was no more work for them, and were let go without
previous warning.
In the absence of supporting records, the Trial Examiner cannot accept Kolpin's
claim that lack of work brought about the layoff. At least so far as Jones is concerned,
credible testimony is to the effect that for some time and up to her dismissal she had
been working overtime and that after she left various others were assigned to work.
Not long after the original charge alleging their unlawful dismissals was received by
the Respondent, letters were sent to both Jones and Smoody, offering them reemploy-
ment. Jones, it appears from her testimony, was at the time under the doctor's care,
and could not have accepted the job. When she was released, shortly thereafter, she
was told there was no work for her. The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that at
no time since her dismissal has Jones been offered reinstatement to her former or,
substantially equivalent employment.
As to Smoody, letters in evidence and her testimony indicate that she was offered
work, at the same job she was performing on the day of her layoff, beginning March 10,
KOLPIN BROS. CO., INC. 1385
1964. She declined to accept it. It appears that upon being offered this job she
protested that she could not be upon her feet all day, and that Kolpin then wrote
suggesting that she come to the plant and see if "we can work something out" as to a
job which she could perform. There is no evidence that she took advantage of this
suggestion . Under the circumstances, the Trial Examiner must conclude that the
backpay period, as to this employee, should be terminated as of March 10, 1964.
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the services of both Jones and Smoody
were terminated on November 26, 1963, to discourage union membership and activity,
and that thereby the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. E. R. Trampf
Trampf had been employed by the Respondent about 5 years when suddenly dis-
charged on December 2, a few days after Jones and Smoody were let go. Although
he admitted that he was not particularly active on behalf of the Union, it appears that
he was on the organizing committee and attended union meetings. That he did not
sign the antiunion petition is established by the document itself. Since company
supervisors attended union meetings, it is reasonably inferred that his adherence to the
Union was within management knowledge.
Furthermore, according to Kolpin, Trampf had been observed for a long period to
visit the toilet frequently, yet it is clear, even if certain purported records of such
visits, submitted through Kolpin, are to be given any weight, that no such records
were kept until after his union activity became known to the supervisors-in Septem-
ber 1963.
As a witness Kolpin admitted that never, until he sent Trampf his letter of discharge
on November 27 (to become effective December 2), had he warned Trampf of dis-
charge, for any reason, nor had he any knowledge that any other management repre-
sentative had so warned him.
Trampf was on his annual vacation at the time he received the letter of discharge.
He has not been reinstated.
Under the circumstances described above, including Kolpin's implied threat to
"clean house" and the fact that the letter discharging Trampf was sent the day after
the unlawful terminations of Jones and Smoody, the Trial Examiner concludes and
finds this this employee was also discharged to discourage union activity and that
thereby the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
3. Christine Gratin
Grahn, an employee of some 2 years' service, was laid off on December 27, 1963.
Grahn had not only attended union meetings but also the antiunion meetings con-
ducted by Supervisor Nicholas. At these latter meetings it is undisputed that she
vigorously voiced objections to antiunion remarks made by him and other committee
members. She did not sign the antiunion petition, refusing Naparella's request to
do so.
She was told when terminated that it was because her work was slow. While her
own testimony confirms the fact that she was a low producer, the Trial Examiner is
not convinced that this fact was the cause of her dismissal. She was recalled to her
job early in March 1964, and was still working at the time of the hearing When
returned to her work she was warned by Kolpin that he "didn't want any agitation in
the factory" and that at least two admitted supervisors would be watching her. The
reasonable inference that Kolpin's quoted warning referred to her union activity
supports the conclusion, here made, that her termination in December was discrimi-
natory, and for the purpose of discouraging union activity. Such discrimination con-
stituted interference, restraint, and coercion.
E. Prehearing interference, restraint, and coercion
Credible evidence establishes, and it is here found, that before the hearing opened
the Respondent, through management representatives and counsel, engaged in unlaw-
ful interrogation of employees. Such incidents include:
(1) Late in January 1964, employee Wallace mentioned the fact to Barnhart that
she had just given a statement to a Board agent. She was promptly called to the office,
where she was confronted by Kolpin, Barnhart, and Counsel Roppella. They
demanded to know if she had been threatened by the Board agent, and what she had
told him.
1386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(2) At about the same time Brilla was visited at her home by-Kolpin and the same
attorney . Kolpin asked her if she had given any statement to a 'Board agent. When
she admitted , apparently , that she had the attorney demanded to know what she had
said to "incriminate" Kolpin. According to Brilla's testimony she figured that reveal-
ing the contents of her statement was none of his business , so she replied that she did
not recall . The attorney then asked her how she could remember 2 or 3 months from
then , when the hearing was held , if she could not recall then
At the time of the above interrogations no complaint had been issued , thus the claim
of pretrial investigation is not available to the Respondent . The reasonable and
probable effect of such conduct, whatever its actual design, is to discourage employees
from availing themselves of Board processes and their rights under the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the Trial
Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It will be recommended that the Respondent offer employees Jones and Trampf
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them and
employees Smoody and Grahn whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination against them, by payment to Jones and Trampf a sum
of money each would have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination to the
date of offer of full reinsttaement, in the case of Smoody from the date of the discrimi-
nation to March 10, 1964, and in the case of Grahn from the date of the discrimination
to the date of her, reinstatement In each case the amounts shall be less the net earn-
ings during the respective periods, and in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with interest on the backpay due in accord-
ance with Board policy set out in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
In view of the serious and extended nature of the Respondent's unfair labor prac-
tices it will be recommended that it cease and desist from in any manner infringing
upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating against employees as to tenure of employment to discourage
membership in and activity on behalf of the above-named labor organization, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair'labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner recommends that Kolpin Bros. Co.,
Inc., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO,
or in any other labor organization, by discharging , laying off, refusing to reinstate, or
in any other manner discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment
( b) Threatening economic reprisals to discourage union membership.
KOLPIN BROS. CO., INC. 1387
(c) Interrogating employees concerning union membership and adherence in a
manner violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Offer employees Jones and Trampf immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, and make them and employees Smoody
and Grahn whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due and the right of
reinstatement under terms of these recommendations.
(c) Post at its plant in Berlin, Wisconsin, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by Regional Director for Region
18, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, be posted
by it immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted, and be maintained by it for a
period of 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of
the receipt of the Trial Examiner's Decision what steps it has taken to comply
therewith.3
Finally, it is recommended that the 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint be
dismissed.
2 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
'Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order"
3 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall read. "Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to conduct our labor relations in compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act, we notify you that.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully discourage you from being members of Textile
Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of work to discourage your union activi-
ties, nor will we question you concerning your union sympathies in a manner
unlawful.
WE WILL NOT violate any of the rights you have under the National Labor
Relations Act, to join a union of your own choice or not to engage in any union
activities.
WE WILL offer reinstatement to Dora Jones and E. R. Trampf, and will give
them and Leone Smoody and Christine Grahn backpay.
KOLPIN BROS CO INC,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE -We will notify Trampf, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948,
as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board' s Regional Office, 316 Federal
Building, 110 South Fourth Street, Minneapolis , Minnesota, Telephone No. 339-0112,
Extension 2601, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions.