Kohen-Ligon-Folz, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsNov 27, 1941

36 N.L.R.B. 1294 (N.L.R.B. 1941)

In the Matter of KOIIEN-LIGON - FOLZ, INC. and INTERNATIONAL LADIES? GARMENT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL No. 348 - Case No. C-1893.-Decided November 07, 1911 Jurisdiction : ladies' garment manufacturing industry. Unfair Labor Practices Inteiference, Restraint, and Coercion: anti-union statements by supervisory em- ployees; speech by employer touching on union activity during working hours held not to constitute interference where its purpose and effect was to prohibit activities destructive of efficiency and disruptive of production. Discrimination: discharge for union activity, using violation of alleged regulation as a pretext therefor. Remedial Orders : reinstatement and back pay ordered. Practice and Procedure : Board not bound by settlement agreement, where em- ployer subsequently engages in other unfair labor practices. Hr. E. P. Davis, for the Board. Mr. Emil Corenbleth, of Dallas, Tex.,'for the respondent. Mr. Jack Johannes, of Dallas, Tex., for the Union. Mr. Gilbert V. Rosenberg, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed on December 30, 1940, by International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local No. 348, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region (Fort Worth, Texas), issued its complaint dated April 11, 1941, against Kohen- Ligon-Folz, Inc., Dallas, Texas, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon the respond- ent and the Union. 36 N. L R. B., No. 261. 1294 KOHEN-LIGON-FOLZ, INC. 1295 With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint I alleged in substance that the respondent (1) on stated occasions in 1937, 1939, and 1940, and thereafter, referred in disparaging terms to the Union and made threatening remarks to its employees concerning their mem- bership therein; (2) on and after December 22, 1940, discouraged membership in the Union by discharging Anna Lee Hewett, and re- fusing to reinstate her, because she had joined and assisted the Union and engaged in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and (3) by the fore- going acts interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The respondent filed its answer on April 21, 1941, admitting the allegations of the complaint concerning the nature and interstate character of its business, but denying that it had engaged in or was engaging in the alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on April 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1941, at Dallas, Texas, before Horace A. Ruckel, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board, the re- spondent, and the Union were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. During the course of the hearing the Trial Examiner made a number of rulings on motions and on objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. At the close of the hearing the respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. The Trial Examiner reserved ruling on this motion, and denied it in his Intermediate Report. For reasons hereinafter appearing, this ruling is hereby affirmed. On May 16, 1941, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate Report, copies of which were duly served upon all the parties, in which he found that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. He recommended that the respondent cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative action, including an offer of reinstatement with back pay to Anna Lee Hewett. Exceptions to , the Intermediate Report were thereafter filed by the respondent. The Board has considered the exceptions to the Intermediate Report and, insofar as they are inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be without merit. 1 During the course of the hearing the complaint was amended, without objection, to allege that Ed Finn was the supervisor who made certain intimidatory statements to the employees and not, as originally stated, Lela Lewandowski 1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Kohen-Ligon-Folz, Inc., a Texas corporation having its factory and principal office in Dallas, Texas, is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ladies' dresses. During 1940 the respondent purchased raw materials, consisting principally of cloth, valued at approximately $65,000, all of which were obtained outside the State of Texas. The respondent's gross annual sales eiceed 8170,000, of which approximately 50 percent represents sales made in States other than the State of Texas. The respondent normally employs between 35 and 40 production employees and approximately 10 office, sales, and supervisory employees. H. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local No. 348, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the re- spondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Interference, restraint, and coercion The Union first became active in Dallas, Texas, in ,1934 or 1935 and at the respondent's plant in 1938. In 1937, before the Union started to organize at the respondent's plant, Jo Gibson, a supervisory employee in charge of the respondent's operators, clearly indicated to employees of the respondent its antagonism toward the Union.2 Lela Lewandowski, an employee, testified that in a conversation with Gibson concerning a prospective employee, Gibson asked Lewandow- ski whether she or this prospective employee was a member of the Union and stated that the Union was going to give the respondent trouble and that the respondent had given Gibson orders not to em- ploy members of the Union in the shop. Anna Lee Hewett, an employee named in the complaint as having later been discrimina- torily discharged, testified that in 1937 at a time when several of the respondent's operators, including Hewett, were assisting Gibson in selecting some new operators, Gibson stated that the respondent would not employ any girls who were union members. At the hearing Gibson denied in substance the above statements attributed to her and stated that when hiring operators she did not consider their 3 At that time the Union was known under another local number . On September 28, 1938, the present local (Local No 348) of the Union obtained its charter KOHEN-LIGON-FOLZ, INC. 1297 union affiliation. The Trial Examiner did not resolve this conflict in testimony. However, he found that Gibson notwithstanding her denials, had made other similar anti-union statements to employees of the respondent. We credit the testimony of Lewandowski and Hewett over that of Gibson and find that Gibson made the statements in question. In November 1935 the Union began to organize at the respondent's plant and, despite Gibson's anti-union statements described above, several employees including Hewett, joined and attended its meet- ings. Shortly thereafter in December 1938, Lsster Lorch, the re- spondent's treasurer, addressed a general meeting of the respondent's employees on the subject of union activities during working hours.? At about this time Hewett dropped out of the Union and apparently its organizational activities at the respondent's factory were temporarily discontinued. In February 1940 interest in the Union was revived. Hewett re- joined the Union and became its most active organizer. She openly distributed the Union's weekly bulletin to employees of the respond- ent and, of other dress.manufacturers^in Dallas, -including some located on other floors of the building occupied by the respondent. Hewett testified that in February or March 1940, Gibson approached her in the factory and, after asking what Hewett was smiling about, re- marked that Hewett was "thinking about that damn union," stating, "you fool with me and I am going to show you and that damn union both a thing or two," and warning Hewett that she "had already got [her] foot into something." Lewandowski" testified that in June or July of the same year Gibson told her that Gibson was "mad at the damn union and the paper they print" and that. if the Union came into the respondent's shop she would quit her job. Lewandowski further testified that on that occasion Gibson quoted Joseph Folz, the re- spondent's secretary 'and general manager, as having said that "nothing but the scum of the earth belong to the union." At the hearing Gibson denied having made the foregoing ,statements. How- ever, we, as did the Trial Examiner, accept the testimony of Hewett and Lewandowski as substantially correct and find that Gibson made the statements attributed to her by them. We find further, that by Gibson's anti-union statements to Lewandowski and Hewett, the re- spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On -March 20;1940, Lorch again addressed a meeting of the respond- ent's employees in much the same manner-as he had done in December 1938. His remarks were transcribed and the transcript is in evidence. • The text of this speech is similar to the text of another speech by Lorch made to the employees in 1940, discussed below. 433118-42-vol 36-83 1298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The substance of his speech is as follows : Several employees had re- cently complained that members of the Union "bothered and worried" them in attempting to induce them to join the Union and Lorch wanted to restate his position on "this question." Everyone had his own personal rights, including the right "to join or not join a Union." Employees who were members of the Union and those who were non-members should refrain- from constantly bothering and molesting their fellow employees with reference to their union affilia- tion or non-affiliation, so as adversely to affect efficiency at the factory. The employees' jobs depended solely on their ability to per- form satisfactory work without regard to their union affiliation. Whether or not the employees belonged to a union Was their own business but "while you are working here and while you are on this premise I [Lorch] want it understood that I [Lorch] will not tolerate any interference with anyone's personal views one Way or another, or their desire to work." The Trial Examiner found that the respondent, by Lorch's speech, interfered with, restrained, and coerced the respondent's employees. within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. Although his re- marks are susceptible of the interpretation that lie opposed union activity as such, we believe, under all the circumstances,` that the fair implication of the speech, and its purpose and effect, Were to apprise the employees that the respondent sought to discourage discussions at the plant which would impair the efficiency of the employees and disrupt the production process. We find that Lorch's speech does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Two days after Larch's speech Ed Finn, head of the respondent's cutting department,' came over to Lett aiidowykl's machine where she worked and asked her if she understdod what Lorch meant in his speech and stated that Lorch "meant what lie said" and that "two or three of you girls are going to fool around in the shop and lose your job. I ]Hate to see you lose your job because you are a good operator and a likeable person . . . You have a good job, and I hate to see you lose, mess With the Union and lose it . . . Lester Lorch meant what he said. I worked for him before."' We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Finn's remarks to Lewandowski constituted an unfair labor practice. Finn, apparently without cause, ap- proached Lewandowski at her•lnachine and gave Lorclt's speech an 4 The record indicates that several employees had, in fact , complained to Lorch about the union activities of other employees on the factory floor during working hours Shortly after the speech, the respondent notified Finn and Gibson, supervisory emplovees, by letter, that Lorch 's instructions in his speech were applicable to them as well as to the other employees, and that they should refrain from interference with the Union c In addition to Finn , the cutting department consisted of two cutters and a bundle girl Finn directed the work of these three employees We find that the respondent is account- able for his activities KOHEN-LIDON-F0LZ, INC. 1299 interpretation which strongly suggested that union membership and activity on Lewandowski's part would impair her job security. By Finn's action the respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. In its answer the respondent contends that m settlement of a charge filed by the Union,6 the respondent had posted on May 22, 1940, and kept posted for 60 days thereafter, a notice 7 approved by the Re- gional Director, and that the Board should therefore not consider in this proceeding unfair labor practices alleged to have occurred prior to the (late of the notice. We have hitherto held that where an agreement in settlement of charges of unfair labor practices has been reached in negotiations in which Board agents have participated, we shall, for reasons of policy, not thereafter disturb such agreement and shall refrain from considering the :unfair labor practices antedating the agreenient,5 unless the employer subsequently engages in other unfair labor practices in violation of such agreement, in which event ve have refused to be bound by the settlement agreement .1 In this case, the respondent failed to abide by the terms of the notice and engaged in unfair labor practices after its posting.ra - Under these circumstances we find the respondent's contention to be without merit. B. Tice discharge of Anna Lee Hewett Hewett iv as first employed by the respondent in February 1936, and worked until December 1937, when she quit. She was reem- ployed in September 1938, and worked until she was discharged on December 23, 1940. During the entire period of her employment she was a machine operator. As stated above, during the first part of 1940 she became very active in the Union. She was elected its presi- dent in August of that year. Her activities on behalf of the Union were well known to the respondent. They consisted, among other things, of distributing weekly bulletins issued by the Union to per- G The record does not disclose the exact terms of the asserted settlement How ei er. such omission does not affect our disposition of the respondent's contention 7 The notice set forth the i ights of the employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act uisti ucted all officei s and supervisory employees not to interfere with such rights of the employees : and affirmatively stated that the respondent would not discourage membership of its eniploNees in the Union by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of e iplo3 meat 1 -Hatter of Shenandoah -Dtt,ec 11tnntq Company and Intonational Unio n, of Mine, 11 11 cf Smelter 1Por1,eis,Lo(,al,A"o 26, 11 N. L R B 885 "Matte) of Chambers Coiioatiot and Allied Stone Mounters and Stone Processors International Union, Local l'o. 36, 21 N L R B 808; Matter of Corinth Hosiery Mill, i nc and Amei scan Federation of Hostel y 11Vo, h ers , 16 N L R. B 414. 10 As we have found, Gibson made anti-moon remarks to J ewandowski in June or July 1040 In Section III B, below, we find that in December of that fear the respondent diserimmatoiil} dischai ged Anna Lee iiewett 1300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sons, including employees of the respondent, in the lobby of the building occupied by the respondent and other dress manufacturers. Hewett usually engaged in this activity before going to work. However, on Friday, December 20, 1940, copies of the weekly union bulletins were late in arriving. On that day Hewett distributed them during the lunch period to the respondent's employees on the factory floor in Gibson's presence. Gibson obspryecl Hewett's activity and herself received a bulletin but said nothing to Hewett and made no effort to stop the distribution of the bulletins. During this occur- rence Folz was absent from the plant. When he returned in the late afternoon, Gibson told him that Hewett had distributed union litera- ture in the factory during the lunch period. Folz told Gibson that this was contrary to the respondent's rules, and asked her why she had not stopped Hewett. Gibson replied that she was uncertain as to her authority in this respect. Folz testified that at the conclusion of this conversation with Gibson he determined to discharge Hewett. On'Monday morning, December 23; Hewett was called to Folz's office where Folz told her that what she had done was in violation of a rule of the respondent and asked her why she had not obtained permission beforehand. Hewett replied that-she knew of no such rule and that she understood that she had a right to distribute literature during the employees' lunch period. Folz stated that she had no such right, and forthwith discharged her allegedly for violating the respondent's rules. In its answer the respondent asserts that Hewett was discharged because she distributed pamphlets on the factory floor during lunch period in violation of one of the respondent's "well established and enforced" rules which prohibited such activity. In an effort to estab- lish the existence of this rule the respondent introduced in evidence a notice, dated February 8, 1937, which had been posted at the respondent's former plant.11 The notice read as follows: KOIIEN-LIGON AND CO\1PANY 1 FEBRUARY 8, 1937. NOTICE No solicitors, peddlers or distribution of any advertisements or other literature will be allowed in the factory at any time. It is clear that the notice does not evidence the existence of a rule prohibiting the employees from distributing bulletins in the factory during the lunch period which is recognized as the employees' "own" n On December 31, 1937, the respondent moved its plant to its present quarters. 12 At the time the notice was posted the respondent was doing business under the name of Kohen-Ligon and Company. KOHEN-LIGON-FOLZ, INC. 1301 time.13 The text of the notice and the testimony of a number of the respondent's witnesses clearly indicate that this notice, as found by the Trial Examiner, was intended to apply only to outside solicitors and peddlers and did not purport to regulate the activities of the employees during their lunch period.14 Moreover, irrespective of its text, the notice cannot be considered evidence of a current regulation, since it had not been posted after December 31, 1937, when the respondent moved to its present plant. Folz and Lorch testified that they had not thereafter seen the notice until they came across it while going through the respondent's files in preparation for the hearing.- Some employees testified that they had seen the notice prior to the respondent's moving; others testified that they thought they had seen it since the respondent had moved; while others, including Hewett, testified that they could not recall ever having seen it. We are satisfied and find that at the time of Hewett's discharge this notice was not in effect at the plant. Several witnesses testified that.it was the respondent's policy not to allow solicitation or distribution of literature of any kind on the respondent's premises. However, it is reasonably clear from their 1 1Fola, as well as other witnesses, testified that during lunch period the employees ate lunch at their machines or outside the factory, and stood around in groups on the factory floor and in the halls adjacent thereto and talked 14 Lorch testified in part as follows . Q (By the Board's attoi ney ) What was the occasion for your posting, or having posted [the above-mentioned notice] ^ A Well, a bunch of peddlers and people had been going through the factory at that time Q You mean peddlers who came into the building1 A Selling fruit and candy and that sort of thing, and would go through the factory Q when you had posted [the notice] (lid you anticipate that it would keep peddlers or solicitors off of the factory floor or out of he facory? A Well, it was serving notice to the emplovees that we did not pet mit solicitors and peddlers That was seivmg notice on the employees We did not want them to have anything to do with the peddlers that did come in the [factory] lr Folds testimony was as follows Q (By the Board's attorney ) When did you see the notice following the time that you moved to Noui present location that you now recall? A A couple weeks aco Q Where did y on see it at that tune R7r Fcuz 9 A In getting up the evidence for this trial heie when we went through all the different files looking to see if there was anything bearing on it Lorch testified to the same point as follows. Q (By the Boar'd's attorney ) How long had it been prior to the last week since you had seen the notice in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 2? A It had been a long time • It had been a long time since I had seen it i k 4 S • # t Q Give us the facts or cncmnstances under which you saw Respondent's Exhibit No 2 last week In other words just how was it called to your attention1 A Well we were piepaiing on this case, going through the files and getting all of the information together and all of the things pertaining to it that were in there Q Were Non looking for Respondent's Exhibit No 2 when you found it's A We was just looking for whatever we could find, frankly Q You just happened to run into Respondent's Exhibit No 2. A. That is correct 1302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony and we find that, like the notice, this policy was directed to outsiders and not to the activities of employees during their lunch period. At the hearing Lorch, Folz, and Gibson admitted that they had never orally instructed the employees that it was against the respondent's rules for- them to distribute literature in the factory during their lunch period. In an affidavit given to a representative of the Board, which is in evidence, Gibson stated that the distribution of circulars and advertising material by outside solicitors and col- lectors was against the respondent's rules, but that she was not certain that distributing circulars by employees during their lunch period was against the rules, although that question had never before arisen. In its exceptions, the respondent contends that the "instructions and rules" set forth in Lorch's speech, discussed above, was notice to Hewett that her activities were prohibited by the respondent. We do not so construe his speech. We have concluded that Lorch's speech was directed against activities destructive of efficiency and disruptive of production. It is clear that the distribution of bulletins by Hewett on her own time during the lunch period 11 was not calculated to, and did not in fact, interfere with the work of the employees or otherwise affect their efficiency and that Lorch's remarks were not intended to and did not prohibit Hewett's activities in this regard. We find that there was no rule at the respondent's plant which would prohibit the activities engaged in by Hewett during her lunch-period. Even had there been such a rule, however, its application against Hewett would have been discriminatory. The record shows instances of sales on the factory floor by outsiders; of distribution of commercial and political advertising material by at least three employees other than Hewett; and of occasional solicitation of funds from employees on the factory floor. Gibson admitted that on occasion sales to employees by outsiders had been made on the factory floor 17 but denied knowledge of distribution of commercial and advertising material by any of the employees except Hewett. However, we are satisfied and find that the respondent had knowledge of this activity by its employees and that none except Hewett, who was discharged for her first offense-18 was in any way reprimanded-or disciplined. We are convinced from the entire record, as was the Trial Examiner, that Hewett was discharged because the respondent objected to the nature of the literature distributed by her, rather than the mere act 19 See footnote 13. cups a 11 Gibson stated that she permitted a former employee to make gales in the dressing room of the factory floor because Gibson considered her "one of the girls " 19 In this connection we observe that notwithstanding the respondent ' s contention that it had no knowledge of other employees ' distributing circulars , the respondent summarily discharged Hewett without attempting to ascertain if other employees had engaged in similar acts. ' KCHE -L)CUN- IOLZ . I NC. 1 • 1303 of the distribution.19 The respondent, through Gibson, had previously made it clear, as found above, that, it looked with disfavor not only upon the Union, of which Hewett was the head, but upon its literature which Hewett distributed. We find that Hewett's discharge was motivated by the respondent's desire to prevent, further active union organization among its employees and was intended to serve as a warning to other employees that their interests would best be served by withholding or terminating their membership in the Union. In its answer the respondent alleged that although for many months Hewett had been subject to discharge for creating dissension in the factory and impairing its efficiency, the respondent failed to discharge her until she violated the rule prohibiting the distribution of pamphlets in.the factory; and that Hewett had caused dissension in the plant and violated -the rules to "force the Respondent to discharge her" so that she could institute the instant proceeding. The Trial Examiner refused to permit the respondent to introduce evidence in support of certain of these allegations for the reason that the respondent did not allege that the circumstances referred to con- tributed to its determination to discharge Hewett. The respondent thereupon made certain offers of proof which the Trial Examiner rejected. We have carefully considered these offers of proof along with the entire record, and we find that the offers, if proved, would not affect our conclusion with respect to the discharge of Hewett. We find that the respondent discharged Hewett because of her membership in and activity on behalf of the Union and that it thereby discriminated in regard to her hire and tenure of employment, discouraged membership in the Union, and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Iv. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occur- ring in connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. DIE REMEDY Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices , we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and 19 See Matter of Botany Worsted Mills and Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 4 N. L R . B. 292 , enf'd as mod. National Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C C. A 3). 1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, and to restore as nearly as possible the conditions that existed prior to the commission of the unfair labor practices. We leave found that the respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Anna Lee Hewett. At the time of the hearing and for 4 weeks prior thereto Hewett had been employed by another dress manufacturer in Dallas on a piece-rate basis and earned a weekly salary substantially equal to that received from the respondent. She,:never- theless, desires reinstatement to the employ of the respondent for a number of stated reasons. The respondent contends that Hewett had obtained other regular and substantially equivalent employment and that therefore she is not entitled to reinstatement With back pay. This contention is without merit. Even if Hewett has received substantially equivalent employment, for the reasons stated in Matter of Ford Motor Company and International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, Local Union No. 249,2° We are of the opinion that an order of reinstatement is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.21 We shall, accordingly, order the respondent to offer her immediate and full reinsatement to her former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her, seniority and other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against her, by payment to her of a sum of money equal to the amount which she would normally have earned as wages during the period from December 23, 1940, the date of her discharge, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less her net earnings 22 during said period. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local No. 348, is a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of Anna Lee Hewett and thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in 2031 N L R B, No 170 ni Phelps Dodge Coi poi atior, v National Labor Relations Board , 313 U S 177 22 By net eanungs" is meant earnings less expenses such as for transportation, room, and board , incurred by an emplojee in connection with obtaining wool: and working elsewhere than ion the respondent , which would not ha'e been mcuiied but for his unlaw- ful discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and United 'Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of rlnierice, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590, 8 N L It B 440 Monies received for work peifoimed upon Federal , State, county , and municipal or other work- relief projects shall be considered as earnings See Republic Steel Corporation v l ationat Labor Relations Board, 311 U S. 7 KOHEN-LIGON-FOLZ, INC. 1305 unfair labor practices, within the uieanuig of Section 8 (3) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in and is engaging, in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of jaw, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, Kohen-Ligon-Folz, Inc., Dallas, Texas, and its officers, agents , successors , and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, Local No. 348, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging, laying off, or refusing to reinstate any of its employees or in any other manner discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment; (b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep- resentatives of their choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Anna Lee Hewett immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent employment without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges; (b) Make Anna Lee Hewett whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason.of the discrimination against her by payment to her of a sum of money equal to the amount which she would normally have earned as wages from December 23, 1940, the date of her discharge, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less her net earnings during said period ; (c) Immediately post in conspicuous places throughout its plant, and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the (late of posting, notices to its employees stating: (1) that the respondent will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered to cease and desist in paragraphs 1' (a) and (b) above; (2) that the respondent will take the affirmative actioii set forth in paragraphs 1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR - RELATIONS BOARD 2 (a) and (b) above; and (3) that the respondent's employees are free to become or remain members of International Ladies' Garment Work- ers Union, Local No. 348, and that the respondent will not discriminate' against any employee because of his membership or activity in said organization ; (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region in writ- ing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. MR. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order.