King's Department Store, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1962

138 N.L.R.B. 422 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Alphonso Delgado whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them:
Elsa Pupo Otmara Guerrero
Alberto Gonzalez Cipriano Dopico
Leo Medford Berta Gonzalez
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or re-
maining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization.
ALLURE SHOE CORPORATION,
Employer
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (.Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Ross
Building, 112 East Cass Street, Tampa 2, Florida, Telephone Number, 223-4623,
if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions
King's Department Store , Inc. and Retail Textile Clerks Local
Union No. 454 , AFL-CIO. Case No. 27-CA-1157. August V.
1962
DECISION AND ORDER
Oil May 14, 1962, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding , finding that the
Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint , and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety , as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. There-
after , the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report
and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Rodgers , Fanning, and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate report, the exceptions and briefs , and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings , ' conclusions , and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.'
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
i with respect to the allegation of surveillance, we agree with the Trial Examiner's con-
clusion that the General Counsel failed to sustain his burden of proof In this connection.
we construe the Trial Examiner's findings as a resolution of credibility against the General
Counsel's witnesses.
' we hereby cotrect the following inaccuracies in the Intermediate Repoi t, which do not
materially affect the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, or recommendations tinder
"III B, The allegations of interference, restraint, and coercion," contrary to the Trial
Examiner, we find that the record shows that Respondent's store mannger, Gilcreast,
assembled the employees for it meeting on the day following his return to Denver, rather
than on the same day (see transcript, p 77) Also, contrary to the Trial Examiner
we find that the record shows that the Board agent called employee Layton In the evening
to make arrangements apparently for an interview during the day (see transcript, p 50),
as Layton saw him the next morning
138 NLRB No. 43.
KING'S DEPARTMENT STORE, INC. 423
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint in this proceeding , issued by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board ( also termed the Board herein ), alleges that an employer,
Kings Department Store, Inc . (herein also called the Respondent or Company),
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(29 U.S.C., Sec. 151 , et seq., referred to below as the Act), by informing employees
that it would engage in surveillance of a union meeting; interrogating employees
concerning their union activities ; and instructing an employee not to sign "a union
authorization card ." The Respondent has filed an answer which , in material sub-
stance denies that it engaged in the unfair labor practices imputed to it.'
Pursuant to notice duly served by the General Counsel upon all parties entitled
thereto, a hearing upon the issues in this proceeding has been held before Trial
Examiner Herman Marx, at Denver, Colorado . The General Counsel and the Re-
spondent appeared through , and were represented by, respective counsel; participated
in the hearing; and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , examine and cross-
-examine witnesses , adduce evidence , file briefs , and submit oral argument. The
Charging Party, Retail Textile Clerks Local Union No. 454, AFL-CIO ( also called
the Union herein ), did not enter an appearance . I reserved decision upon a motion
to dismiss the complaint , made by the Respondent after the close of the evidence.
The findings and conclusions made below dispose of the motion . I have read and
considered the briefs filed with me since the hearing.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses , I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. NATURE OF THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS; JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD
The Company is a Massachusetts corporation; maintains its principal office in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts; is engaged in the business of operating "a multi-state chain of
department stores," including a store in Denver, Colorado; and is an employer within
the purview of Section 2(2) of the Act. The issues in this proceeding involve only
the Denver store.
As stipulated at the hearing in this proceeding, the Respondent "in the operation
of its Denver store, annually does a gross volume of business in excess of $1,000,000,
and annually receives goods and materials [valued] in excess of $50,000 directly
from sources outside the State of Colorado." By reason of the interstate shipments
to the Denver store, the Respondent is, and has been at all times material to the issues
in this proceeding, engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act.
Accordingly, the Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
As stipulated at the hearing, the Union is, and has been at all material times,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory statement
The Respondent's Denver establishment is "a self-service department store," en-
gaged in selling a miscellany of products, including wearing apparel and household
supplies and appliances, and employs approximately 75 persons. Its operations are
directed by a store manager named James E. Gilcreast. He is assisted in his man-
agerial functions by one Elvon H. Cohen, who has the title of assistant manager,
serves as the store's personnel director, is vested with authority to hire employees,
and has for some time acted as supervisor of one of the merchandise sales depart-
ments As the Respondent concedes, Cohen and Gilcreast are supervisors within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
The issues require identification of only one other managerial staff member, and
that is George F. Sajac, who is classified as a "department manager," and in that
capacity, as Gilcreast testified, "is in charge of [the] women's ready-to-wear depart-
ment"; supervises the work of its employees (numbering five, according to Gilcreast
1 The complaint is based on a charge filed with the Board on January 23, 1962, by a
labor organization named Retail Textile Clerks Local Union No 454, AFL-CIO. Copies
of the complaint and charge have been duly served upon the Respondent.
424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at one point, and about nine at another); and is responsible for the work that is
done there. The duties of the employees include the arrangement of merchandise
displays in accordance with Sajac's judgment and direction. Taking into account
Sajac's overall responsibility for the functioning of the department, particularly his
power to use judgment in directing the employees he supervises in the arrangement
of merchandise displays for sales purposes, I hold, contrary to the Respondent, that
Sajac is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
The Union began an organizational campaign among the Denver store's employees
in the latter part of 1961, and in the course of its activities scheduled a meeting of
employees for the evening of January 5, 1962, sending advance notification of the
time, date, and place of the meeting, by mail, to some 50 employees. The meeting
was held as scheduled, but only three employees attended.
B. The allegations of interference, restraint, and coercion
On the day of the scheduled union meeting , shortly before the store opened for
business in the morning, two of the employees, Betty Shroll and Mary Allen, who are
sisters (and whose different surnames are apparently marital) sought Sajac's advice
about attending the meeting, doing so because they had previously worked for him
and held him in high regard. At least part of the conversation was held within
earshot of one or more employees in addition to Shroll and Allen.
The major issue in this proceeding, in my view, is whether Sajac, as the General
Counsel claims, made a statement to the sisters to the effect that the Company
would have the meeting under surveillance. As to that issue there is sharp division in
the testimony, the General Counsel calling two employees, Shroll and another named
Dorothy Layton, and the Respondent calling Allen and Sajac.
According to Shroll, she and her sister asked Sajac if their jobs would be jeopard-
ized if they went to the meeting, and he responded that "there would be a spotter
there," and that he knew at least seven or eight employees who would quit "if the
union gets in." Layton testified that she came within earshot of the conversation
"at the end or near the end of it," standing "probably five or ten feet away" from
the participants; that "they were talking about . . . whether if anyone went, would
they lose their job and be fired"; that "we were told that there would be someone
there"; that the word "spotter" was used (by Sajac, according to Layton at a sub-
sequent point); and that Sajac also said not "to do anything foolish," and that Gil-
creast "would take care of things when he got back [from a trip to the East] and
had a meeting."
Sajac's version is that the sisters asked him if the management would have any-
one "at the meeting to see who would go there," and whether they would "be fired
if they did go"; that he stated that as far as he was concerned "there wouldn't be
anybody," and that "Mr. Gilcreast wouldn't be that stupid, to send somebody "
In effect contradicting her sister as to the point at issue, Allen testified in much the
same vein as Sajac.
Two other matters may be noted before passing on the credibility issue described
above. One is that later in the same day, Shroll, bringing up the matter, talked to
Cohen at the store on the subject of "spotters" at the meeting, either telling him
that she would not go because one would be there, or asking him whether any
would be present; and that he replied that he would not be at the meeting because
all the employees were familiar with his car ("a little white convertible," as Shroll
termed it) .2
During the course of the day, also, Gilcreast, who had returned to his post that
day after an absence from the city, assembled the employees at the store, after
learning of the impending union meeting; told them that the Company was grateful
for their efforts during the recent preholiday season; and outlined for his audience
benefit programs the Company maintained for employees. One of the employees,
alluding to the scheduled union meeting, asked Gilcreast whether employees would
be discharged if they attended, and Gilcreast replied in the negative, telling the
group that he "had never threatened them," and was not going to do so
It is unnecessary to decide whether this assurance by the store manager would
have the effect of nullifying any prior statement by Sajac, apparently a relatively
2 Shroll and Cohen differ somewhat as to what the former said on the subject of sur-
veillance According to Shroll, she said that she would not come to the meeting because
of "this spotter " Cohen testified that he could not remember whether it was Shroll who
made the reference to "spotters," but that one of a group of "four people standing
around a (cash) register," as he walked by, asked him whether the management would
"have any spotters at the meeting " The variance need not be resolved, for the end i esult
is the same.
ICING'S DEPARTMENT STORE, INC. 425
minor supervisor, to the effect that the union meeting would be under management
surveillance, for the General Counsel's claim that Sajac made a remark of that
purport is not, in my judgment, established by evidence of preponderant weight.
To be sure, Sajac is an interested witness, for he is a supervisor for the Respondent
and it is the legality of conduct imputed to him that is under scrutiny and, moreover,
Allen, who supports Sajac's version, has expressed opposition to the Union, among
other employees; but, on the other hand, I am also unable to regard the General
Counsel's witnesses, Shroll and Layton, as disinterested. Both have promoted
sentiment for the Union among the other employees, participating actively in its
organizational campaign.
Taking all factors into account, I can see no greater reason to accept the relevant
testimony of Shroll and Layton than that of Sajac and Allen. There is no evidence
of any hostility between the two sisters, and I observed none, and thus, in my view,
Sajac's version gains weight from the fact that Allen supports his testimony rather
than that of her sister.
Moreover, the support Layton gives Shroll does not appear to me to be com-
pelling. Layton was called by the General Counsel on another matter during his
case-in-chief, and gave no testimony at that time as to the point at issue. She was
recalled by the General Counsel to testify regarding the matter after the Respond-
ent had rested, the General Counsel explaining that at the time of her prior testimony
he was unaware that Layton knew of "this conversation [between Sajac and the
sisters] to the extent that she does." By that time, Layton had had an opportunity
to hear the testimony of the three other witnesses on the subject. In the nature of
things, one cannot tell how far her memory has been influenced by testimony she
heard, but it is well to note that although she asserts that she came within earshot
of the conversation "at the end or near the end of it," her version pursues much the
same path as Shroll's on the subject of "a spotter," but that she omits matters
(including Sajac's alleged remark about some employees quitting in the event of
unionization) that in Shroll's account follow the subject. That is not to say that
I believe that Layton willfully colored her account; rather, it is that I am uncon-
vinced, upon my observation of the witness and the context in which she gave her
relevant testimony, that she has a firm recollection of what took place, uninfluenced
by testimony that preceded her account.
Nor does the fact that only three employees appeared at the union meeting lead
me to believe Shroll and Layton rather than Sajac and Allen, for it would be sheer
speculation to conclude that so few came because Sajac said the meeting would be
under surveillance. Shroll quoted Sajac to other employees to that effect and
conceivably some or many stayed away for that reason, but that does not prove that
Shroll quoted Sajac accurately. Moreover, it may be that some, at least, did not
come to the meeting because of lack of interest; perhaps because of Gilcreast's talk
earlier in the day on the subject of benefit programs maintained by the Company
for employees. In short, as regards the issue under discussion, I am unable to
attach any operative weight to the fact that very few came to the meeting.
The sum of the matter is that the General Counsel has the burden of proving his
claim that Sajac made a statement to the effect that the union meeting would be
under surveillance; that he has failed to carry the burden with evidence of pre-
ponderant weight; and that thus the relevant allegations of the complaint must be
dismissed.3
'At one point, Sajac testified: "And I told them as far as I am concerned there
wouldn't be anybody [from management at the union meeting], and I mean these might
be and might not be, but as far as I was concerned, there wouldn't be." (Emphasis
supplied ) Allen does not quote Sajac as telling her and Shroll that "there might be
and might not be" a management representative at the meeting, and the General Counsel,
in his brief, sees in this variance a weighty factor militating against acceptance of the
testimony of both Sajac and Allen. However, it is not all clear that Sajac meant to
quote himself as telling Shroll and Allen that "there might be and might not be" man-
agement surveillance of the meeting Rather, the phrase "I mean there might be and
might not be" appears to me to be an interpolation in his testimony of what he meant by
his statement that "as far as I am concerned there wouldn't be anybody" from manage-
ment at the meeting. That Sajac did not intend to quote himself as telling the sisters
that "there might be" management surveillance is evident from the fact that he quotes
himself as remarking to the sisters that "even Mr. Gilcreast wouldn't be that stupid."
In any case, the emphasis the General Counsel places upon the variance between the
Sajac and Allen versions appears to me to be a clutching at straws, for both accounts,
taken as a whole, are in basic accord, their sense being that Sajac was asked by the
sisters whether the management would have the meeting under surveillance, and that he
replied in the negative.
426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Particularly in the light of these conclusions , the record will not support a find-
ing that the Respondent violated the Act as a result of Cohen's remark to Shroll to the
effect that he would not be at the meeting because his car was familiar to the
employees. The General Counsel's thesis appears to be that this was tantamount
to a statement that the meeting would be under surveillance by another management
representative. However, it was Shroll who broached the subject of surveillance
to Cohen, and his reply appears to me to have been no more than an offhand means
of waving the subject aside. Cohen testified to as much, stating that he was "just
disengaging myself from the conversation." I find this credible in the light of
undisputed testimony by Gilcreast that all supervisory personnel were under instruc-
tions from him to take a neutral position as regards unionization in discussions
with employees, and that he told the assembled employees on January 5 that they
would not be discharged or threatened if they attended the union meeting. In sum,
in the perspective of the whole record, I am unable to view Cohen's remark as a
substantial basis for a finding that the Respondent, through Cohen, unlawfully
"informed employees that [it] would engage in surveillance of a forthcoming union
meeting."
On January 16, 1962, the Company filed with the Board's Denver Regional Office
a charge against the Union alleging violation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) of the Act
as a result of unlawful picketing to secure organization of the employees and recog-
nition by the Company, and the firm's attorney conferred regarding the matter with
an investigator on the Regional Office staff. As undisputed evidence establishes,
the investigator, in connection with processing of the charge, asked, during the
discussion, that the Company secure "and supply the names of the employees who
had been contacted by the Union," and the attorney thereupon, while still in the
Regional Office, called Cohen, the personnel manager, and asked him "to ascertain
the names of those who had been contacted by the Union," and to send the informa-
tion to the investigator at the Regional Office
Later that day or on the following day, Cohen asked a department supervisor
named Lesser if anyone in his department had been approached by the Union, and
Lesser supplied the name of June Lovitt, an employee, who had previously asked
him if anyone would be discharged for attending the union meeting. (Lesser had
replied in the negative.) Cohen shortly thereafter sought out Lovitt and asked her
if the Union had been in touch with her, and she replied that "all of the girls had had
letters" from the Union as far as she knew. Cohen also inquired whether the or-
ganization had called her home and had sent anyone there, to which she replied
that a representative of the Union had spoken to her husband on the telephone,
while she was absent, and that no one from the Union had visited her home.4
The Respondent argues, among other things, that the interrogation of Lovitt is but
an "isolated" incident not warranting a finding that it violated the Act. It is true
that the General Counsel rested his case-in-chief as regards interrogation solely on
the questioning of Lovitt, but there is also evidence, given by Cohen under cross-
examination during the Respondent's case, that he interrogated a number of em-
ployees in somewhat the same vein as he questioned Lovitt, and for the same reason.
In any case, whether or not one takes all the acts of interrogation into account, it
seems to me that a finding that the Respondent violated the Act as a result of any
of Cohen's questions is unwarranted in view of the Government's role in the matter.
To be sure, there is no indication that the General Counsel's representative told the
Company's attorney in so many words that it should secure the desired information
from the employees, but on the record as made, it was not unreasonable for the
Company to seek to comply with the investigator's request in the manner that it did,
for, obviously, the best available sources of the information the investigator re-
quested were the employees themselves. Indeed, one would be hard put to it to
suggest any other effective way that the Company could secure the information the
s Lovitt testified that the interrogation occurred "around the first part of Janu-
ary" ; and Cohen agreed at one point with a suggestion by counsel that he spoke to Lovitt
on January 9 The General Counsel makes a point of this testimony, arguing from it that
the interrogation of Lovitt occurred before the filing of the Company's charge and thus
had no connection with it. However, in my view Lovitt's broad estimate does not con-
clusively establish that the interrogation occurred before the filing of the charge, for there
is testimony by Cohen, Ignored in the General Counsel's brief, that he "believe(s) it (his
conversation with Lovitt) was around January 9th. It was after I had received a call
from our lawyer, Mr. Kitchen " (Emphasis supplied ) In the perspective of the whole
record, I think it likely that the interrogation took place after the Company's charge was
filed on January 16, and as a result of the attorney's telephone call from the Regional
Office, and I have thus made corresponding findings
KING'S DEPARTMENT STORE, INC. 427
Government's representative sought. One may reasonably believe that the Union
would be an unlikely source, and, of course, surveillance of union activities by an
employer is forbidden.
In other words, without intending any implication that the investigator was in any
way remiss in the performance of his duty, it is my view, from what appears in
the record, that, in a practical sense at least , it was the Government itself, albeit
unwittingly, that set the Company on its course of interrogating employees; and
thus I conclude that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to impute any
violation of the statute to the Respondent as a result of the interrogation, and shall,
for that reason, apart from any other factor, recommend dismissal of the relevant
allegations of the complaint .5
The remaining question is whether the Respondent violated the Act by instructing
an employee "not to sign a union authorization card." The background for that
issue is that an attorney on the staff of the General Counsel, in the course of investi-
gating the charge in this proceeding, telephoned Layton about February 1, 1962, to
make arrangements to interview her in the evening after work; that she was uncertain
that her caller was actually a representative of the Government and because of her
uncertainty was afraid to admit a stranger to her home while alone there at night;
and that she informed Cohen of the telephone call and asked his advice in the
matter.
There is some conflict in the evidence as to Cohen's reply. Both he and Layton
are in accord that he advised her to be certain of her caller's "identification," but, in
addition, Layton testified on direct examination that Cohen also told her "not to
sign any cards or anything." It may be noted that her direct testimony does not, in
terms at least, mention " a union card" or "a union authorization card," nor any
claim that she expressed suspicion to Cohen that her caller was a representative of
the Union. It was not until her cross-examination, in response to leading and sug-
gestive questions, that she agreed that she suspected that her caller was a representa-
tive of the Union, that she informed Cohen of her suspicion, and that "in that con-
nection," he told her "not to sign a union card." 6 Be that as it may, Cohen denies
that he mentioned "a union card," and quotes himself as advising Layton not to
"sign anything unless you know what you are signing."
As with the other allegations of unfair labor practices, the General Counsel has
the burden of proving the instructions he imputes to Cohen by evidence of pre-
ponderant weight. Bearing that in mind, the testimony of Layton does not appear
to me to outweigh that of Cohen in the scales of probability. Indeed, his version
seems to me to provide a more substantial basis for findings as to the advice he gave
than does Layton's testimony. The thrust of Layton's account, on direct examina-
tion, of her quest for advice is that she was afraid to admit a stranger to her home
at night merely on the basis of his representation on the telephone that he was a
Board agent and wished to interview her regarding a Board proceeding, and that she
asked Cohen for advice in the premises. It appears to me to be somewhat more
natural that in response to such a quest, he would advise Layton, as he claims, to
assure herself of her caller's identification, and of the contents of anything she
signed, than that he would specify that in addition to making certain of the Board
agent's identification, Layton should not sign "a union card." Moreover, the fact
that Layton departed, under cross-examination, from her initial account of the terms
of the advice she sought, and of the counsel she received, serves to weaken the credi-
bility of her relevant testimony.
The sum of the matter is, to say the least, that I see no reason to accord greater
credence to Layton's claim that Cohen told her not to sign a "union card" than to
Cohen's disclaimer that he did so, and to his account of what he said; and for that
reason alone, I must hold that the General Counsel has not sustained the burden of
5 By the conclusion reached on the interrogation issue. I do not pass on the existence
of any right by an employer to question his employees regarding union activities in order
to support, or to counter, a charge filed under the Act or any position in prospective or
pending litigation Any question of the existence of such a right is not reached in this
proceeding, for I hold no more than that because the interrogation, in the particular cir-
cumstances presented, was a natural outgrowth of the Government's request for informa-
tion, it would not be proper for the Government to place the stigma of statutory violation
on the Respondent.
0In passing, I note that I have some difficulty, to say the least, in reconciling Layton's
testimony that she is an active proponent of the Union with the account she gives, under
cross-examination , that she suspected that her caller might be a representative of the
Union and sought Cohen 's advice in that connection
428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
proving his relevant claim , and that the allegations under discussion should there-
fore he dismissed.?
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in
this proceeding , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is, and has been at all material times, a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Company is, and has been at all material times, an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
3. The record does not establish that the Company committed the unfair labor
practices imputed to it in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law , and the
entire record in this proceeding , it is recommended that the Board enter an order dis-
missing the complaint.
In view of the conclusions reached above regarding the conversation between Cohen
and Layton , I see no need to determine whether Layton's testimony spells out an In-
struction not to sign "a union card ," as distinguished from advice or a suggestion not to
do so, nor whether such advice , suggestion or instruction , whatever label one would
apply to the relevant statement Layton imputes to Cohen, is privileged under Section 8(c)
of the Act , which provides that the expression of "views, argument , or opinion . . . shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice , if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
Local No. 92, International Association of Bridge, Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO [R . W. Hughes Con-
struction Co., Inc.] and C. V. Stelzenmuller , attorney
C. H. Green, business agent of Local No. 92, International Asso-
ciation of Bridge , Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers,
AFL-CIO and C. V. Stelzenmuller , attorney. Cases Nos. 10-
CB-7314-1 and 10-CB-1314-92. September 4, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 23, 1962, Trial Examiner A. Bruce Hunt issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative actions, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Leedom and Brown].
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and brief, and the entire record. The Board hereby affirms the Trial
138 NLRB No. 50.