Kimmel's Shop Rite

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 24, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 440 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

440 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lorraine Urbauer d /b/a Kimmel's Shop Rite and Re- Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
tail Clerks Union Local No. 1105 , Retail Clerks In- orders that Respondent, Lorraine Urbauer d/b/a
ternational Association , AFL-CIO. Case Kimmel's Shop Rite, Vashon, Washington, her
19-CA-6383
September 24, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS , KENNEDY , AND PENELLO
On April 15, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Rich-
ard D. Taplitz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed ex-
ceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
and Respondent filed an answering brief.
Pursuant 'to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
' The Charging Party has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibili-
ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces
us that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91
NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined
the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 Viewing this case in the light of Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 NLRB No. 25 (1974),
which issued subsequent to the Administrative Law Judge 's Decision herein,
we agree with the Administrative Law Judge 's conclusion that the complaint
should be dismissed msofar as it alleges an 8(a)(5) violation or unilateral
action in violation of Sec 8(a)(1). As for the appropriateness of a bargaining
order based on the three instances of unlawful interrogation , we agree with
the Administrative Law Judge that it is not warranted . In the light of this
conclusion , we need not make a finding as to whether the Union enjoyed
majority status.
Member Jenkins does not subscribe to Steel-Fab, for the reasons expressed
in his dissent there . He does not consider the three unlawful interrogations
sufficient misconduct to prevent the holding of a fair election , and therefore
finds it unnecessary to consider whether the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusions regarding the Union 's majority were correct.
3 Subsequent to the issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision,
Respondent moved to reopen the record for the purpose of showing that the
"Notice to Employees" recommended by the Administrative Law Judge was
posted by Respondent from May 3, 1974, to July 3, 1974. On the basis of this
alleged posting , Respondent argues that "no further order or remedy should
be entered in this case ." We find a reopening of the record to be unwarranted
and hereby deny Respondent's motion To the extent that the motion raises
questions relating to the posting of the notice ordered herein, that is a matter
which may be raised at the compliance stage of this proceeding.
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD D. TAPLITZ, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried at Vashon, Washington, on January 16 and 17,
1974, and after the submission of certain stipulations, the
hearing was closed on February 4, 1974. The charge was
filed on April 27, 1973, by Retail Clerks Union Local No.
1105, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union. The complaint issued on Novem-
ber 26, 1973, and, as amended at the hearing, alleges that
Lorraine Urbauer d/b/a Kimmel's Shop Rite , herein called
the Company, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Issues
The primary issues are:
(1) Whether the Company, through its agents , violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promising employees benefits
if they refrained from union activities, threatening employ-
ees if they engaged in union activities, granting wage in-
creases , changing hours and schedules, and interrogating
employees.
(2) Whether the Union represented a majority of the
Company's employees, whether the Company precluded the
possibility of a fair election by engaging ir_ unlawful con-
duct, whether the Company violated Section 8(a)(5) by re-
fusing to bargain with the Union, and whether the
Company should be ordered to bargain with the Union
based on union authorization cards signed by employees.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross- examine
witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs, which
have been carefully considered, were filed on behalf of the
General Counsel and the Company.
Upon the entire record' in the case, and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a Washington corporation, operates a re-
tail food store in Vashon, Washington. During the year
immediately preceding issuance of the complaint the
Company's gross volume of sales exceeded $500,000 and it
purchased goods valued at in excess of $50,000 from firms
which in turn purchased those goods from outside of Wash-
1 The unopposed motion of the Company to correct the transcript of the
record is hereby granted
213 NLRB No. 69
KIMMEL'S SHOP RITE 441
ington. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11 THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Allegations that the Company Violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act
1. Background
The Union began its organizational drive among the
Company's employees on March 13, 1973.2 On that date,
Mervyn Henderson, the Union's president and chief execu-
tive officer, and Allen W. Berglund, the Union's secretary-
treasurer came to the Company's store on Vashon Island,
and asked the store manager, James Kimmel,3 whether they
could talk to the employees. James Kimmel gave them per-
mission and then left for lunch. The union representatives
spoke to a number of employees and left authorization
cards. Thereafter a number of cards were signed.4
At about 9:30 a.m. on March 20, Union Secretary-Trea-
surer Berglund called James Kimmel on the telephone and
told him that he was coming to the store later that morning.
About noon, Berglund, together with Union President Hen-
derson and a representative of the Washington State Media-
tion Service, appeared at the store. Henderson handed
James Kimmel a letter which stated that the Union repre-
sented a majority of the employees at the store, excluding
the manager, guards, and supervisors, and demanded recog-
nition.5
The Company did not recognize the Union as the repre-
sentative of its employees and on March 28 the Union filed
a representation petition in Case 19-RC-6605 for a bargain-
ing unit consisting of all employees employed by the Com-
pany, with the standard statutory exclusions .6
Z All dates are in 1973 unless otherwise specified
James Kimmel is the son of Lorraine Urbauer Kimmel , the owner of the
store . The Company admits and I find that until April 27, 1973, James
Kimmel was a supervisor and that at all times material herein Lorraine
Urbauer Kimmel was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
° The circumstances surrounding these signings and the validity of the
cards are discussed in detail below
S These findings are based on the testimony of Henderson and Berglund
James Kimmel acknowledged that he spoke to the union representatives on
March 20 but he averred that he did not believe he spoke to them on the
phone before they came ,` and he further averred that he did not see the letter
demanding recognition until the date of the trial There were 10 employees
in the bargaining unit on March 20. Before that date , eight of them had
signed authorization cards on behalf of the Union The assertion of Hender-
son and Berglund that they had come on that date to demand recognition
is credible My observation of James Kimmel as he testified and his testimo-
ny as a whole leads me to the conclusion that he either did not have a clear
recollection of the matters he testified to or that he was less than candid I
credit Henderson and Berglund
6 The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the following
unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(b) of the Act.
On about April 24, Berglund and Claude Liday, another
union representative , came to the store and spoke to Lor-
raine Urbauer Kimmel , the owner of the store . Berglund
told her that the Union had the right to represent the em-
ployees through some State of Washington proceedings.7
Kimmel 9 told Berglund that she wanted her employees to
have an election.
On April 26, the Union' s petition for an election was
withdrawn and on May 4, the Company filed a petition for
an election in Case No. 19-RM-1066.
2. The April 15 meeting
a. The statements of Kimmel
(1) Facts
Kimmel held a meeting for all of her employees at her
home at about 8 p.m. on April 15. She acknowledged in her
testimony that she called the meeting to discuss the union
problem. She opened the meeting by telling the employees
that when she acquired the store it was $200,000 in debt and
that over the years she had reduced the debt to $18,000. She
said that during all those years she did not have the money
to go union. Kimmel then turned the meeting over to Ray-
mond Elkins, who was to become the store manager the
following day, saying that Elkins knew more about the
Union than she did because he had a store in Tacoma that
was union .9
(2) Conclusions
Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges that at this meeting
Kimmel violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by saying that
the Company had never gone union all those years; by
promising certain employees that the Company would give
them raises close to the union scale; and by telling certain
All employees of the Company at its Vashon, Washington food store,
excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
7 Apparently some state procedures had been followed and there had been
a card check . However, counsel for the General Counsel stated on the record
that he does not claim that there was an agreed-upon method for determining
majority through a card check and he does not contend that the duty to
bargain arose through anything related to a state proceeding.
9 Lorraine Urbauer Kimmel will be referred to as Kimmel. Her son will
be referred to as James Kimmel.
9 The above findings are based on the credited testimony of Kimmel. Five
other witnesses also testified concerning what Kimmel said at that meeting.
Four employees (Hayfield, Fender, Hendricks , and Staton) testified on be-
half of the General Counsel. Elkins also testified concerning that subject The
testimony of all of those witnesses , except Hayfield, tended in large measure
to corroborate Kimmel's testimony Staton 's testimony did not fully corrobo-
rate Kimmel in that Staton averred that Kimmel said that she could not
afford the Union at this time , while Kimmel averred that she had referred
to the past Hendricks corroborated Kimmel by testifying that Kimmel said
that she hadn 't had a union before because she couldn 't afford one. I believe
that Staton was mistaken in this regard. Hayfield testified that Kimmel told
the employees that she usually gave pay raises in June, and she would try to
come as close to union scale as she possibly could. Hayfield also testified that
in response to a question, Kimmel told the employees that she had not
considered selling the store before the Union had become involved. I, am
unable to credit Hayfield with regard to either of these assertions Her version
of what was said by Kimmel at the meeting was at odds with the testimony
of all five witnesses who also testified concerning that meeting, and I do not
believe that her recollection of the events was accurate
9
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees that layoffs would occur if the Union came in.
As to the first of these allegations, I have found that Kimmel
did tell employees that in the past she could not afford to
go union . However, I do not believe that that statement of
Kimmel went beyond her right to express her views . Section
8(c) of the Act provides that the expressing of any views,
arguments, or opinions shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice, if those expressions contain no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. I do not
believe that Kimmel's statement could fairly be construed
to be a threat. I therefore find that it did not violate Section
8(a)(l) of the Act. As to the other allegations contained in
paragraph 10 of the complaint, the credited evidence fails
to establish them. I shall, therefore, recommend that the
allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint be
dismissed.
b. The statements of Elkins
(1) Facts
Raymond Elkins became comanager of the store , togeth-
er with James Kimmel, on April 16. He became sole manag-
er when James Kimmel left a few weeks later . Before April
16, Elkins worked in the store premises as the owner of the
meat market which he subleased from Kimmel . At the time
Kimmel turned over the meeting of April 15 to Elkins,
Elkins was not yet a store manager . 10 However , Kimmel
conceded in her testimony that a decision to make Elkins
manager was made the first week in March and that the
employees might have found out about it. In any event,
Kimmel remained at the meeting throughout Elkins' presen-
tation and did not dispute anything that he said . Whether
or not Elkins had some sort of anticipatory supervisory
powers on April 15, I find that he was at that time an agent
whose actions were binding on the Company. By introduc-
ing Elkins and turning the meeting over to him , Kimmel
gave him the apparent authority to speak for her, and by
remaining mute when he did speak , she ratified his state-
ments. I t
Elkins testified in detail as to what he said at the April 15
meeting. Four employees called on the behalf of the Gener-
al Counsel also testified as to what he said . The recollection
of the four employees was less than exact. Each corroborat-
ed parts of Elkins' testimony and parts of the testimony of
the other employees , but there was little consistent pattern.
On the other hand , Elkins impressed me as a candid witness
with a very good memory. The following findings are based
primarily on that testimony , which I believe was fully credi-
ble.
Elkins started his presentation by telling the employees
that he wanted to relate some of his experiences with the
10 The Company concedes in its answer that Elkins became the store
manager on April 16 and that from that time on he was a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act.
11 Cf. Mike O'Connor Chevrolet -Buick-GMC Co., Inc., 209 NLRB 701
(1974), where the Board held that an employee was the agent of a company
when he made certain remarks in the presence of an admitted supervisor who
did nothing to disavow them and thereby ratified them . The fact that Elkins
had already been selected to become a supervisor effective the following day
reinforces this conclusion.
Union, and that it made no difference to him whether the
store was union or not. He said that the meat market he
owned at the store was union, as were the other meat market
operations he ran, and he was able to live with the Union.
He told the employees that he had had some trouble with
the Retail Clerks Union in his Tacoma store. He then went
on to describe the situation there as follows: The Tacoma
store was union, but was run like a very small family store.
The cleanup boy boxed groceries, and the box boys checked
in addition to their box boy work. One girl, at her request,
worked Sundays at straight time. That was the condition
when he bought the store, and he assumed things would
continue as they were and that the duties of the employees
could be varied. Three months after he bought the store, the
Union complained that the girl working on Sundays had to
be paid Sunday pay. He told the Union that she had always
done it, and they replied that she couldn't anymore. The
Union also told him to stop having the cleanup boy do
stocking work, and to stop having the stockers do check-
ing work. He was forced to cut help down because he
couldn't afford to move employees up into categories or pay
scales that the Union required. For example, he couldn't
move the box boys up into a junior apprentice classification.
He continued trying to run the store as a small family one.
He hired some of his relatives to work in the store and let
go two of the full-time employees. The Union complained
and brought proceedings against him for the discharge of
those employees, and for the discharge of another employee
that he had fired for insubordination. He immediately re-
hired that third man and he finally settled with the Union
on the two others. He paid backpay and put them on a
preferential hiring list . His relatives joined the Union. He
finally put the store up for sale because economically it was
not working out. In order for a store like that to work out,
the owner had to be there, and he spent most of his time at
Kimmels. The store was sold to a man named Dale Man-
ning. The closing was in March. Manning asked if he had
any problems, and he told him what had happened. The
new owner then said that the store was going to be non-
union , and he replied, "Well, more power to you." After
Manning had taken over, Manning fired every employee,
including Elkins' relatives, and brought his own people in.
The store is now nonunion. His relatives went to the Union
to try to get new jobs, but they didn't receive any help.
Elkins then told the employees that he had three meat
operations, all of which were union, and he had no problems
with them. He said that the Union wouldn't be the burden
at Kimmels that it was for his store in Tacoma, because
Kimmels had the volume to handle it. At that point, Elkins
asked for questions and a number of employees responded.
One of the employees asked if they would get retirement
retroactive to the date of their employment. He answered
that he didn't know about the retail clerks, but he assumed
the Meat Cutters' arrangements were similar and with that
union there was a vesting period of 10 years. He told them
about how credits were accumulated and said that he didn't
believe that most of the employees at Kimmels would bene-
fit from the retirement program.
One of the box boys asked how the status of the box boys
would be affected if the store went union. He answered that
he did not know for sure, but that they could look to one
KIMMEL'S SHOP RITE
of the competing stores, Thriftway, which did about the
same amount of business and had considerably more em-
ployees. He told them that his knowledge was based on the
Meat Cutters Union and it could be explained in terms of
an employee not being eligible for health benefits unless
that employee worked 80 hours a month. He said, "I assume
this is why they have more people over there than we do
because they're keeping them under 80 hours a month." He
also answered the box boy's question by telling him that in
Tacoma the Union told him that the box boy could only box
groceries and could not stock shelves or do anything else.
Another employee asked whether the employees would be
working more or less hours if the Union came in, and Elkins
told them that he could only compare it to Thriftway, which
had more employees than Kimmels. He said he assumed
that if the Union came in, they would be working under the
same contract. When he was asked by an employee how
many full-time employees there would be, he replied that he
thought there would be between three and four and that
they would have more employees rather than less. Elkins
also told the employees that if he were doing the hiring and
it were a union store with higher wages, he would look more
favorably upon hiring family men that he could use for
more skilled work and count on for 8 hours a day when they
were needed.l"
One employee asked a question concerning insurance.
Elkins turned to Kimmel and asked her if she had insur-
ance. Kimmel replied that they always had it.13
Employee Roberta Hayfield asked whether a new owner
would do the same thing that had happened in Tacoma if
the store were sold. Elkins replied, "I don't know whether
he could or not. The only thing I know is that Dale Manning
did it." Another employee asked, "If you, Ray Elkins, buy
the store, will you do that?" Elkins replied that he was
neither for or against the Union, and that he did not believe
that he would do that.14
ii The four employee witnesses who testified about this meeting placed
different emphasis on what was allegedly said Hayfield testified that Elkins
told him they would all work less hours if they went union . Fender averred
that Elkins told one employee that she would work less hours if the Union
came in; that three people would work 40 hours and the rest under 80 hours
a month so that they wouldn't have to put money in the Union , and that
wages would be higher, but the employees would.be working less Hendricks
testified that Elkins told them that if the Union came in, men would be hired
instead of kids, there would be higher pay but less hours; and that only four
people would get 80 hours to entitle them to benefits . Staton testified that
Elkins said that the employees had to work 40 hours for benefits and the
Company would cut down their hours so that they wouldn't get medical.
Hayfield testified that Elkins told-them that if they went union , box boys
would box and do nothing else. I credit Elkins' testimony, as set forth above,
where it conflicts with that of the employees
13 Fender testified that Elkins said that the Union had insurance but the
Company also did, and that the employees could be covered if they wanted
to pay 50 cents a month . None of the other employees who testified concern-
ing what was said at this meeting corroborated Fender with regard to this
testimony I credit Elkins ' testimony upon which the above findings are
based
14 Fender testified that Elkins said that if he took over the store and the
employees went union, things wouldn ' t be as good as they thought they
would be, that Elkins also said that he could get around the Union by laying
everyone off and bringing in friends until he was nonunion ; and that he had
done that in Tacoma Hendricks testified that Elkins said he had let people
go in Tacoma and brought in nonunion help because he didn 't want to pay
benefits , and that he sold the store because the Union cost him so much As
indicated above , I believe that Elkins' recollection of what he said was more
443
Another employee asked a question concerning pay
scales . Elkins said that he was sure Kimmel was going to
review the pay as she had done every year before summer.
He also said that if he were to become the owner of the
store, he would probably review the pay scales also.15
(2) Conclusions
Paragraph 11 of the complaint alleges that the Company,
through Elkins, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act at the
April 15 meeting by stating that if the store were organized
by the Union, working hours would be reduced and there
would be fewer full-time employees; stating that if the store
were organized by the Union, box boys would not be able
to continue doing grocery checking; and stating that if the
store were not organized by the Union, Respondent would
institute an insurance program for store employees.
With regard to the third allegation which relates'to the
institution of an insurance plan, the credited evidence fails
to support it. With regard to the first two allegations, the
credited evidences does indicate that Elkins spoke about
reducing hours and having more part-time employees. In
addition, there is credited evidence that Elkins indicated
that the box boys might not be allowed to dojobs other than
boxing. However, in the context in which Elkins made these
statements , which is set forth in detail above, I do not be-
lieve that he was unlawfully threatening employees with a
loss of benefits or employment if they joined the Union.
Under Section 8(c) of the Act, an employer is free to
convey his opinions concerning unionization. Though this
freedom does not extend to threats of economic reprisal to
be taken solely on his own volition, an employer may state
what he reasonably believes will be the likely economic
consequences of unionization that are outside his control.
As the United States Supreme Court held in N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969):
[An employer's prediction about the consequences of
unionization] must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to de-
monstrably probable consequences beyond his control
... in the case of unionization.... If there is_ any
implication that an employer may . . . take action sole-
ly on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to eco-
nomic necessities ' and known only to him, the
statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on
available facts but a threat of retaliation based on mis-
representation and coercion.
Elkins' experience with the Union in Tacoma appears, to
indicate that the Union did limit the work that could be
done by box boys. The result of such a limitation might well
be to reduce the number of hours that the box boys worked.
Elkins' observation of a comparable store in Vashon indi-
cated that the Union did seek additional benefits for full-
time as opposed to part-time employees with a result that
there were a few full-time employees and many part-timers
accurate than the vaned accounts of these employees, and I credit Elkins
is Staton testified that Elkins not only said that Kimmel would reevaluate
wages, but also said that if it were up to him he would satisfy everyone. I
credit the testimony of Elkins as set forth above
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
who did not work enough hours to qualify for full-time
benefits. This was not only Elkins' observation. The con-
tract the Union had with the other employers, copies of
which were distributed by the Union to the Company's
employees during organization, specifically provides in a
footnote to the appendix that "Courtesy Clerks shall not
work as checkers. Not more than 16 percent (16%) of the
total manhours worked by employees in the bargaining unit
shall be employed in this classification." That clause also
prevents courtesy clerks from performing stocking work.
The contract provides that holiday pay, vacations, sick
leave, and funeral leave are only to be paid for employees
who work over a certain number of hours.
A warning that part-time employees might lose their jobs
if the union prevails may be an unlawful threat if the
employer's prediction about the consequences of unioniza-
tion are not based on objective facts beyond the employer's
control. Helfrich Vending, Inc., 209 NLRB 596 (1974). How-
ever, in the instant case, I believe that the statements of
Elkins, which are alleged in paragraph 11 of the complaint
to be violative of the Act, were reasonable predictions based
on objective economic fact. The logic behind the Board
decision in Appleton Discount, Inc. d/b/a Treasure Island
Food Store, 205 NLRB 394 (1974), applies in the instant
case. In Appleton, the Board refused to find a violation of
Section 8(axl) where "the evidence indicates that the com-
pany representatives did no more than present to employees
their understanding that a labor organization would prefer
full-time employment for a smaller number of employees
over a large part-time complement." In a similar vein, the
Board refused to find a violation in Missouri Heel Company,
a Division of Ripley Industries, Inc., 209 NLRB 481 (1974),
where an employer told employees that if he had to pay a
mold changer the wages of a machinist, he would rather hire
a machinist since the machinist could also do tooling work.
In that case, the Board held that the Company's statement
was a reasonable prediction based on objective economic
fact and was, therefore, lawful.
As General Counsel has not proven the allegations of
paragraph 11 of the complaint by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, I shall recommend that the allegations in
that paragraph be dismissed.
Though not alleged in the complaint, a serious argument
can be made out that Elkins was impliedly threatening to
discharge employees because of their union activities when
he referred to the discharge of the employees in his Tacoma
store after he had sold it, and when he somewhat equivocat-
ed in answering the question whether he would take that
kind of action if he purchased Kimmel's store. In answer to
that question, he said that he "didn't believe" that he would
take such action. However, it is noted that Elkins opened his
presentation by a statement that his own operations were
union, and that it made no difference to him whether the
store was union or not. During the course of the meeting,
he said that he could live with the Union and that the Union
would not be the same type of burden it had been to him
at the smaller Tacoma store. In the context of his entire
presentation, I do not believe that a finding would be war-
ranted that he even impliedly threatened to discharge em-
ployees if he were to buy the store and the store were to go
union.
3. The changes in wages , schedules, and hours-facts
and conclusions
On April 23, Elkins called a meeting of all the employees
at the store. He told them that the purpose of the meeting
was to let them know officially that he was now the manag-
er. He said that he would be in charge of hiring, firing, wage
increases, and scheduling. He added that if any employees
wanted changes in schedules to let him know and he would
do everything he could to make the desired change. Elkins
then talked to them about being friendly to customers, per-
sonal appearances, tardiness, and similar matters. During
this meeting, Elkins told the employees that he had given
everyone a raise and that it was effective immediately. He
said that in some cases the raise was a token one because
he felt that if he wasn't able to give an individual a raise that
individual should be terminated.16 Elkins also said that the
employees should not talk about their raises with each other
as everyone did not get the same raise and that after he
could evaluate their work there might be other raises. He
told the employees that he wrote schedules according to the
employees' performance and that the employees who were
more valuable on the job would get more hours than those
who are less valuable.17
Effective April 23, except for two recent hires, all the
employees were granted wage increases that ranged from 15
cents to $1 an hour. About that time there were some shifts
in schedules and changes in hours. The complaint alleges
that the notification as well as the granting of wage increas-
es and the other changes were independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent contends that all
its actions in this regard were unrelated to any union activi-
ty.
Many people come to Vashon Island for the summer.
June, July, and August are the store's busy months. Almost
twice as much business is done in each of the summer
months as in each of the winter months. Because of this,
the Company has had the practice for many years of grant-
ing wage increases each spring.
In the early part of January 1973, Kimmel asked Elkins
whether he would consider managing the store. There were
many discussions about that topic. In February, Elkins said
that if he did take the job he didn't want to be a figurehead
store manager and he would control hiring, firing, wages
and scheduling. Later in February, she agreed to that. In
very late February or early March, Elkins told Kimmel that
when he became manager he would like to give the raises
that were normally given before the summer starts. She
agreed. All this, as well as the decision to make Elkins
manager, occurred before any union activity. When Elkins
did become manager he had the discretion to determine
16 These findings are based upon the credited testimony of Elkins . Hayfield
and Staton testified that Elkins told the employees that if they weren 't happy
with the raise they might as well leave because they wouldn 't be there by the
time the next pay raise was given out. This was not corroborated by Fender,
who also testified as to what took place at this meeting . I believe that Elkins'
recollection was more accurate than either Hayfield or Staton.
17 Staton testified that Elkins told them something about a 10-minute
break because that was all the Union allowed . Elkins denied making such a
statement . None of the other employees testified that he made it. I credit
Elkins.
KIMMEL 'S SHOP RITE
what the wage rates should be. On April 23, which was a
week after he assumed the comanager role, he informed the
employees that the wage increases were being granted.
Though some of the wage increases were larger than had
been granted in previous years,18 they are not so divergent
from prior practice as to indicate that the Company's moti-
vation in giving the increases was different than it had been
in prior years. The differences can be readily explained by
the fact that a new store manager was making the decisions
with regard to the increases. In these circumstances, I do not
believe that the General Counsel has proven by a prepon-
derance of the credible evidence that the wage increases
were granted to dissuade the employees from union mem-
bership or that they constituted independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
With regard to changes in schedules and hours,19 there is
no credible evidence that the employer was motivated by a
desire to discourage employees from union membership. To
the extent that there were changes, they are all explainable
in terms of a new manager making decisions he felt were
necessary for the efficient running of the business. There is
no allegation nor is there any evidence that the Company
gave less desirable hours of schedules to employees it be-
lieved to be active on behalf of the union. There is no
indication that the Company could have gained anything
in terms of dissuading employees from union activity by its
actions with regard to schedules and hours. Nor was there
anything so radical in tthe changes as to suggest that there
was an ulterior motive. I shall therefore recommend that
those parts of the complaint that allege that the notifica-
tion of and granting of wage increases and the changes in
scheduling and hours constituted independent violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act be dismissed.
4. The interrogation
a. James Kimmel
On March 15, James Kimmel spoke to employee Lodahl
in the store. James Kimmel said that the way most union
19 The wage rates for 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973 are set forth in the record
as Resp Exh. 3.
19 The hours worked by the employees are set forth in Resp Exh . 4. After
the meeting of April 23, Elkins spoke to some of the checkers concerning
what days they wanted off and how they would like their schedules arranged.
On April 23 or 24 , he spoke to Hayfield about her hours . Hayfield said that
she was having problems with her neck and she would prefer to work less
hours than she had in the past He told her he would see what he could do.
(This finding is based on the credited testimony of Elkins Hayfield acknowl-
edged talking about her neck problem with other people but denied mention-
ing it to Elkins I do not credit Hayfield .) On April 23 or 24, Elkins also spoke
to Staton and asked her if she had any particular days off that she needed
and whether she was happy with her hours She said she needed Tuesdays
off for a dentist appointment and that she didn 't care to work as many hours
as she had . About a week later another employee told Elkins that Staton
didn't appear to be happy with her hours He spoke to Staton and asked her
whether he had given her what she wanted . She replied that she had not told
him she wanted less hours and she would like to have about the same hours
she had before. He replied that he was sorry he misunderstood and he would
correct it in the following week 's schedule . He did correct it. (This finding
is based on the credited testimony of Elkins Staton acknowledged that after
her hours were reduced , Elkins asked her how many hours she wanted and
he agreed to give those hours to her and that she also asked for Mondays and
Tuesdays off and he agreed )
445
stores worked there would probably be only a few employ-
ees who worked full hours and that since unions worked
primarily on a seniority basis, box boys who hadn't been
there long would have their hours cut back or wouldn't be
working at all.20 A few days later, Lodahl spoke to Kimmel
again and Kimmel asked whether Lodahl had signed an
authorization card. Lodahl asked Kimmel why he was ask-
ing and Kimmel replied that he knew Lodahl had already
signed because he had verified the signatures. Lodahl an-
swered that he had signed. Kimmel then said that he wasn't
pressuring Lodahl because he (Kimmel) wasn't going to be
working there at the end of the summer.21
On or about April 1, James Kimmel spoke to employee
Hayfield in the store. James Kimmel asked her if she had
signed an authorization and she replied that she had.22
Later in April, James Kimmel told employee Mosley that
he (Kimmel) bet that Mosley was one of the guys who
signed the card for the Union. Mosley did not reply.23
b., Elkins
Employee Fender testified that on April 26 Elkins asked
him, "What are you going to do about the Union?" and that
he (Fender) answered that he didn't know. Elkins testified
that he didn't remember saying anything about the Union.
As indicated above, I believe that Elkins was a creditable
and very observant witness. On the other hand, I believe
that Fender substantially misstated , events that occurred at
the April 25 meeting and that his recollection was not al-
ways accurate. I do not credit Fender's assertion that he was
interrogated by Elkins.
c. Kimmel
Employee Staton testified that on May 1, Kimmel asked
her when the Union had contacted her and she replied that
they hadn't. Staton further averred that Kimmel asked her
when the Union had been in the store and she told Kimmel
that they hadn't. Kimmel testified that she knew the union
men were at the store on March 13 and 20 and that she did
not ask Staton any such questions. I believe that Kimmel
was a candid, careful witness while, as indicated by the
findings above, Staton was not always accurate. I do not
credit Staton's testimony that she was interrogated by Kim-
mel.
d. Conclusions with regard to the interrogation
In Big Three Industries, Inc., 192 NLRB 370 (1971), the
Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's decision
which held:
In determining whether interrogation concerning
20 There is no allegation in the complaint that these remarks were in
violation of the Act The complaint does not allege any unlawful activity by
James Kimmel other than interrogation
21 These findings are based on the credited testimony of Lodahl. James
Kimmel testified that he did not recall making those remarks. I do not believe
that James Kimmel'si recollection was always accurate.
22 This finding is based on the credited testimony of Hayfield.
23 This finding is based on the testimony of Mosley. James Kimmel testi-
fied that he didn 't believe that he said it. I credit Mosley.
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union activities violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, the
Board has held that all the circumstances in which the
interrogation occurs must be considered. Blue Flash
Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591. In that case, the Board
dismissed a complaint where such interrogation was
accompanied by a statement from the company as to
a legitimate reason for the interrogation, where the
company representative assured the employee against
reprisals, and where the company had not demonstrat-
ed union hostility. See also N.L.R.B. v. Camco, Inc., 340
F.2d 803 (C.A. 5, 1965), where such matters as the
place of the interrogation and the rank of the official
doing the questioning were also considered. Though in
Struksness Construction Co., Inc., 165 NLRB 1062, the
Board was concerned with a polling of employees
rather than individual interrogation, some of the lan-
guage in that case is instructive. The Board held: "In
our view any attempt by an employer to ascertain em-
ployee views and sympathies regarding unionism gen-
erally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the mind of the
employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, there-
fore, tends to impinge on the Section 7 rights. As we
have pointed out, 'An employer cannot discriminate
against union adherents without first determining who
they are.' Cannon Electric Company, 151 NLRB 1465,
1468. That such employee fear is not without founda-
tion is demonstrated by the immunerable cases in
which the prelude to discrimination was the
employer's inquiries as to the union sympathies of his
employees." The Board went on to hold that in a poll-
ing situation a violation would be found unless the
purpose of the poll was to determine the truth of a
union's claim of majority; this purpose was communi-
cated to the employees; assurances against reprisal
were given; the employees were polled by secret bal-
lot; and the employer had not engaged in unfair labor
practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
In Struksness the Board revised the Blue Flash criteria to
conform to this new standard.
In the instant case, James Kimmel on three separate occa-
sions singled out employees in the store and interrogated
them concerning union activities. At the time of the interro-
gations, James Kimmel was either store manager or coman-
ager. In addition, the fact that he was the owner's son lent
additional weight to his authority. The interrogations can-
not be considered isolated in that they were directed against
3 employees out of a total bargaining unit of 10. Though the
interrogations all took place in a casual manner, they were
not made in jest. James Kimmel did tell Lodahl that he
wasn't pressuring Lodahl, because he (Kimmel ) wasn't
going to be working there at the end of the summer. In
addition, the other employees knew or were soon to find out
that Kimmel's tenure as a supervisor was to be short-lived.
These factors do take some of the sting out of the interroga-
tion, but, on balance, I find that James Kimmel's interroga-
tions of Lodahl, Mosely, and Hayfield concerning union
activities were coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act?
x Sometime in May, Kimmel posted a notice in the store stating that she
recognized the right of the employees to engage or not engage in union
B. The Refusal-to-Bargain Allegations
1. The effect of the Company's unfair labor practices on
the possibility of a fair election
An employer need not recognize a union solely because
that union asserts that it represents a majority of the
employer's employees. An employer may insist on a Board
election , unless it has agreed to an alternate means for re-
solving the question concerning representation or has en-
gaged in misconduct which is of such a character as to have
a "lingering and distorting effect on any future election."
Mike Velys, Sr., et al. d/b/a R & M Electric Supply Co., 200
NLRB 603 (1972). There is no contention that an agreed
upon method was present in the instant case . As to employ-
er unfair labor practices that warrant a refusal to bargain
finding or a bargaining order, the criteria to be applied is
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in N.L.R.B.
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575. In that case, the high
court held that a bargaining order would be appropriate in
two situations. The first is in the case of "outrageous" and
"pervasive" unfair labor practices where the employer's ac-
tions are so coercive that, even in the absence of a Section
8(a)(5) violation, a bargaining order is necessary to repair
the unlawful effect of those actions. The unfair labor prac-
tices found above do not fall within that category. The
second is " ... in less extraordinary cases marked by less
pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tenden-
cy to undermine majority strength and impede the election
process." The court also held: " . . . An Employer can insist
on a secret ballot election, unless, in the words of the Board,
'he engages in contemporaneous unfair labor practices like-
ly to destroy the union's majority and seriously impede the
election' ". In Ship Shape Maintenance Co., Inc., 189 NLRB
395 (1971), enforcement denied in part 474 F.2d 434 (C.A.
D.C., 1972), the Board expressed the test to be applied in
terms of whether the lingering effects of the unfair labor
practices rendered uncertain the possibility that traditional
remedies could ensure a fair election, and whether the
union's majority card designations obtained before the un-
fair labor practices provided a more reliable test of the
employees' desires and better protected employee rights
than would an election. As stated in Joseph J. Lachniet
d/b/a Honda of Haslett, 201 NLRB 855 (1973), where a
coercive atmosphere is,created by the employer which con-
ventiorial Board remedies may not adequately dissipate so
that a fair election can be held with reasonable certainty, a
bargaining order is warranted.
In the instant case, the only unfair labor practices found
were three instances of interrogation of employees by Store
Manager James Kimmel. In one of those instances, Kimmel
told the employee that he, wasn't exerting pressure and that
activity The notice ended. "I will not in any manner interfere with, restrain,
or coerce you in the exercise of that right , nor will I try to penalize or
discriminate against employees who desire to join or be represented by a
labor organization " The record does not indicate how long the notice re-
mained posted The Company argues in its brief that even if technical viola-
tions did occur , no remedial order is needed because of that notice I believe
the interrogation found above is more than a technical violation and that the
usual Board remedy is warranted.
KIMMEL'S SHOP RITE
he (James Kimmel) was not going to be working there at the
end of the summer. The impact of the interrogations was
further limited by the fact that James Kimmel did leave the
Company's employ. The Board has often refused to issue a
bargaining order where an employer's unfair labor practices
substantially exceeded those of the company's in the instant
case. Thus in Motown Record Corporation, 197 NLRB 1255
(1972), an employer was found to have engaged in seven
separate violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, including
coercive interrogation. The Board refused to issue a bar-
gaining order, pointing out that:
... none of (the seven instances) were directed at em-
ployees in general, none of them seriously jeopardized
the employee's job security, no specific benefits were
promised, and, taken in their context, none could have
so affected the employee or employees involved to such
an extent that they could not cast a free and uncoerced
ballot after the application of the Board's remedies.
See also Gold Circle Department Stores, a Division of Federat-
ed Department Stores, Inc., 207 NLRB 1005 (1973); J. J.
Newberry Company, 202 NLRB 420 (1973); Restaurant Asso-
ciates Industries, Inc., et al., 194 NLRB 1066 (1972); Central
Soya of Canton, Inc., 180 NLRB 546 (1970).
In conclusion, I find that even if the Union did represent
a majority of the Company's employees in the bargaining
unit at the time it demanded recognition, the Board's con-
ventional remedies are sufficient to neutralize the effect of
James Kimmel's unlawful interrogation of employ_ees_so_
that a fair election could be held, and that, therefore, Both-
a refusal to bargain finding and a bargaining order are
unwarranted under the tests enunciated in the Gissel case.
2. The Union' s majority on March 20
An additional reason for reaching the conclusion set forth
above is that the General Counsel has failed to establish by
a preponderance of the credible evidence that the Union
represented a majority of the Company's employees on
March 20 , when it made its demand for recognition. The
parties stipulated that there were 10 employees in the appro-
priate unit on March 20 .25 From March 13 through 16, eight
of these employees , all except , Comstock and Hayfield,
signed union authorization cards . The cards read:
I . . . hereby authorize Retail Clerks International As-
sociation , AFL-CIO, or its chartered local Union to
represent me for the purposes of collective bargaining,
respecting rates of pay , wages , hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment in accordance with
applicable law.
At the time of the Union's demand for recognition on
March 20, those eight employees were the only ones who
had signed authorization cards 26
25 The employees were Comstock, Fender, Grenville , Hayfield, Hendricks,
Lodahl, Mosley, Staton, Russell , and Middling
26 Hayfield signed a card on March 21 The.cntical date for determing
447
The General Counsel in his brief states: "Counsel for the
General Counsel concedes that employees Ken Hendricks
and Rob Mosley repudiated their cards and thus should not
be counted for purposes of majority."
Lodahl credibly testified that when she was given the card
by employee Fender, who was distributing them on behalf
of the Union, Fender told her that the card "was just to have
an election." 27
Hendricks credibly testified that when Fender gave him
an authorization card, Fender told him that if he signed it,
it didn't mean that he was for or against the Union and it
just meant that it would give them a chance to vote.
Mosley credibly testified that when Fender gave him a
card, Fender told him that it didn't make any difference
whether or not he (Mosley) was for or against the Union,
but to sign up to get an election.
Middling did not testify. Her card was authenticated
through the testimony-of-Fender. Fender testified that he
didn't recall whether he told Middling that it didn't matter
whether or not she was for or against the Union and that
she should sign it to get an election. He averred that he
could have told her that. On further examination, he testi-
fied that he didn't think he told her that.
Russell testified that Fender told him that if 50 percent
of the employees signed the card, there would be an election
held by the Union. He also testified that he heard Fender
tell Mosley and Hendricks that it didn't matter whether or
not they were for or against the Union, but they should sign
the card to get an election. Further in his testimony, he
averred that he had heard that conversation with Lodahl
and Mosley. Lodahl signed her card on March 13, and it is
therefore probable that the conversation was on the 13th.
Russell signed his card on the 15th.
In order to establish through authorization cards that a
union represents a majority of employees in a bargaining
unit, the General Counsel must prove that the cards are a
reliable index of the employees' wishes to be represented by
the union. The reliability of the cards must be judged in the
light of all the circumstances surrounding their signing. The
starting point is the wording on the cards themselves.
Where, as here;,the cards are unambiguous in indicating a
desire for representation, they must be given substantial
weight. However, where oral solicitation is inconsistent with
the written wording, further inquiry is required. The Su-
preme Court set forth the applicable criteria in the Gisse!
case, supra, holding:
... we think it sufficient to point out that employees
should be bound by the clear language of what they
sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly
majority status is the date upon which the Union seeks recognition, which
in this case was March 20 Peerless of America, Inc., 198 NLRB 982 (1972),
enforcement denied in part 484 F.2d 1108 (C A 7, 1973) The stipulation
relating to the employees in the bargaining unit is keyed to the March 20 date,
and the General Counsel has not urged a "continuing demand" theory. See
Montgomery Ward & Co, Incorporated 197 NLRB 519 (1972). Hayfield's
card cannot be counted in determining the Union 's majority status as of
March 20. ,
27 Fender testified that he told Lodahl and other employees to whom he
gave cards that the cards authorized the Union as their bargaining agent, and
if they signed the cards there would be an election I credit Lodahl and the
other card signers whose testimony concerning the signing of the cards
differed from Fender's
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated to
direct the signer to disregard and forget the language
above the signature.
The Court pointed out that there was nothing inconsistent
in a solicitor asking an employee to sign an authorization
card which states that it authorizes the Union to represent
him and then telling him that the card will probably be used
first to get an election. On the other hand, the Court held
that a card should not be counted where the solicitor states
that he will use the card only for an election. The Court also
makes it clear that key or magic words are not to be control-
ling, and that the totality of circumstances is to be consid-
ered in determining whether an assurance was given that a
card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an
election.
Fender, in soliciting cards from Hendricks and Lodahl,
said in substance that if they signed the authorization cards
it just meant that the employees would have a chance to
vote. On the basis of that solicitation, I do not believe that
Lodahl and Hendricks' cards can be considered reliable
evidence to establish that at the time of the signing of the
cards they wanted the Union to represent them.
When Fender gave a card to Mosley, he told him that it
didn't make any difference whether or not Mosley was for
or against the Union, but to sign up to get an election. In
effect, Fender was telling Mosley to ignore the language on
the card that gave the Union the right to represent him. No
reliance can be placed on such a card.
The only evidence authenticating Middling's card was the
testimony of Fender, and Fender's testimony, as is set forth
above, was equivocal with regard to the circumstances un-
der which she signed the card. I, therefore, find that General
Counsel has not established that Middling's card should be
counted toward the Union's majority.
Russell was present when two employees were told that
it didn't matter whether or not they were for or against the
Union, but they should sign the card to get an election.
Though the record is not completely clear, it is likely that
Russell signed his card after he heard that conversation. I,
therefore, do not believe that the General Counsel has es-
tablished that Russell's card should be counted 28
In summary, there were 10 employees in the bargaining
unit on the critical date of March 20. One did not sign an
authorization card. One signed after the critical date and
five signed in circumstances under which their cards should
not be counted. Thus, on the critical date, the Union had
only 3 valid authorization cards out of a unit of 10.
In conclusion, I find that except for the matters dealing
with the interrogation of employees by James Kimmel, the
General Counsel has not shown by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that the Company has violated the Act 29
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
Company described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees concerning
union activities, the Company interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Except as set forth above, the General Counsel has not
established by a preponderance of the credible evidence
that the Company violated the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law and upon the entire record and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 30
Lorraine Urbauer d/b/a Kimmel's Shop Rite , its officers,
agents , successors and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
activities on behalf of Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1105,
Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any
other union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its Vashon, Washington, store copies of the
28 See Ford Smith Outerwear, Inc., and H. L. Friedlen Company, 205 NLRB
592 (1973).
29 As I have found that the Company did not have a duty to bargain with
the Union, it follows that those portions of the complaint that allege that the
Company derivatively violated Sec . 8(a)(l) of the Act by making changes in
wages, hours, and schedules without first bargaining with the Union, must
also be dismissed.
30 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions , recommendations and recommended Order herein shall, as pro-
vided by Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Board and become its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
KIMMEL 'S SHOP RITE
attached notice marked "Appendix." 31 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
19, after being duly signed by the Company's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Company immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
31 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial at which all sides had a chance to give evidence,
the National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered
us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
449
To engage in self -organization
To form , join or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representative of
their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things except
to the extent that membership in a union may be
required pursuant to a lawful union-security clause.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, re-
strains or coerces employees with respect to these
rights . More specifically,
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
concerning their activities on behalf of Retail Clerks
Union, Local No. 1105, Retail Clerks International As-
sociation , AFL-CIO, or any other union.
Dated By
LORRAINE URBAUER d/b/a
KIMMEL'S SHOP RITE
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, 10th Floor, Republic Building,
1511 Third Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101, Telephone
206-442-7472.