Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 20, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 815 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. and Lodge No.
724, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFLCIO. Cases 4-CA-7575
and 4-RC-I 1699
May 20, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On December 1, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
David S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, to which the Charging
Party filed a brief in response. A reply brief was also
filed by the Respondent.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,3 as
modified herein.
We are modifying the recommended Order by
including our standard language against construing
our remedial Order as requiring revocation of
previously granted increases in wages or benefits.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for the Administrative
Law Judge's Conclusion of Law 6:
"6. By discharging Stephen M. Chop because of
his union activities, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) and 2(6) and (7)
of the Act. By discharging Allan S. Thomas because
of his protected concerted activities, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(l) and 2(6) and
(7) of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc., Ches-
ter, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in said
recommended Order, as modified herein:
229 NLRB No. 122
Add the following to paragraph 2(a) of the
Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order:
"However, no provisions of this Order shall in any
way be construed as requiring Respondent to revoke
any wage increases or increases in benefits heretofore
granted to employees in the unit aforesaid."
I The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the discharge of
employee Thomas violated Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act and that it is therefore
unnecessary to determine whether Thomas' discharge was also prompted by
his union activities and therefore also violated Sec. 8(aX3) of the Act.
However, the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law 6, apparently
through inadvertence, states that Thomas' discharge violated Sec. 8(aX3)
and (I) of the Act. We shall therefore amend the Conclusions of Law to
reflect that the discharge of Chop violated Sec. 8(aX3) and (1) and the
discharge of Thomas violated Sec. 8(aX I).
3 While we acknowledge that the Union's letter demanding recognition
was received by Respondent on July 10, 1975, and that Respondent
contends that it did not learn of its contents until that evening, inasmuch as
it demonstrated its refusal to honor the demand on July 11, 1975, at the first
opportunity it had to do so, and since on that date Respondent also began
its course of unlawful conduct, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge
that Respondent's obligation to bargain commenced as of July I I.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: The
charge in this case was filed by the Union on September 4,
1975, and was amended thereafter. The original complaint
issued on November 25, 1975, and an amended complaint
issued on March 31, 1976. The complaint as amended
alleges that after the Union had been designated by a
majority of Respondent's service department employees as
their exclusive representative, Respondent solicited griev-
ances and promised wage increases to induce them to reject
the Union, circulated a petition among them to revoke
their authorizations of the Union, and engaged in other
acts of interference which violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act and constituted a refusal to bargain in violation of
Section 8(aX5) of the Act. It alleges further that on August
19, 1975, Respondent terminated employees Stephen M.
Chop and Allan S. Thomas in violation of Section 8(aX3)
of the Act. In its answer Respondent denies the commis-
sion of any unfair labor practices.
The petition in Case 4-RC-1 1699 was filed on July 11,
1975, and a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent
Election was approved by the Regional Director on July
23, 1975. The election was conducted on August 15, 1975,
and resulted in a vote of five for the Union and six against.
Thereafter, the Union filed timely objections to conduct
affecting the results of the election. On November 5, 1975,
the Regional Director issued his Report on Objections to
the Election and Notice of Hearing in which he found that
the issues raised by the objections were the same as those in
the unfair labor practice case and could best be resolved
after a hearing in connection with that case. Thereafter, he
815
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ordered the two cases consolidated for purposes of hearing
and decision.
A hearing in the consolidated cases was held before me
in Wilmington, Delaware, on May 24 and June 21, 22, and
23, 1976. During the course of the hearing the Union
withdrew its Objection 4. At the conclusion of the hearing
the parties waived oral argument. All parties have filed
briefs.
Upon the entire record in this case, including my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc., a Pennsylvania
corporation, is engaged in the retail sale and servicing of
trucks at its Chester, Pennsylvania, facility. During the
calendar year preceding the issuance of the complaint
Respondent sold and distributed products having gross
value in excess of $500,000. During the same period of time
it performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in States
other than Pennsylvania. I find that Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Lodge No. 724, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, referred to herein as
the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union Organizing Campaign and its
Request for Recognition
Respondent's business was started in April 1973 by its
president, Paul Jones, and its executive vice president, S.
Bertram Stiff, Jr., in a small facility in Glenolden,
Pennsylvania. Jones assumed direct responsibility for the
service and parts departments and Stiff for new- and used-
truck sales. By the spring of 1975 the business had grown
and Respondent moved to a new facility in Chester,
Pennsylvania. During 1975, Respondent's business experi-
enced uncertainties in regard to cash flow and finances.
Truck sales were down, and there was confusion and
disruption due to the move, as a result of which Respon-
dent's business, and particularly its parts sales, suffered.
In early June 1975,1 the men in the service department
talked among themselves of their dissatisfaction with what
was going on in the shop. Stephen Chop, a mechanic,
suggested organizing and made contact with the Union
which sent him authorization cards to have signed if he
thought the men in the shop were serious and wanted to
organize. Toward the end of June there was more
discontent, and the men decided they wanted to organize.
Between June 27 and July 1 Chop, with the assistance of
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates which follow occurred in 1975.
2 Respondent's answer admits that a unit consisting of service depart-
ment employees is an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Allan Thomas, obtained signed authorization cards from 9
of the 11 persons employed in the service department.2
By letter dated July 7, 1975, the Union advised
Respondent that it represented a majority of the service
department employees and requested recognition and
bargaining. That letter was received by Respondent on the
morning of July 10. However, according to President
Jones, he did not become aware of the letter until sometime
late that day when he looked at the daily mail for the first
time. As indicated above the petition in Case 4-RC-11699
was filed on July 11.
B. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Following
Receipt of the Union's Request for Recognition
1. The facts
On July 10 and 11 Jones met with the service department
employees. The first meeting on July 10 was held at the
request of the men through Joseph Graham as their
spokesman. They complained about their supervisor, Jim
Bowes, and sought his removal. The Union was not
discussed at this meeting, and, shortly after it ended, Jones
notified Graham that Bowes was no longer their supervi-
sor. On July 11 Jones called the men together and read the
union demand letter to them and told them he needed to
know how to answer it. Jones told the employees about
Respondent's expenses and growth problems, asked that it
be given a chance, and asked the men what they wanted
and if it was money. D'Amico then addressed them
pointing out the disadvantages of a union based on his
prior personal experience at another shop. D'Amico
mentioned the high cost of membership and told the men
they would lose job opportunities because there would be
job classifications and men would be sent home if there
was no work in their classification. Jones then left the men
alone to discuss among themselves what they wanted, after
which they called him back to ask for a 20-percent wage
increase and better insurance. Jones promised to give them
an answer before the day ended and asked if they would
object to the preparation by his secretary of a letter to the
Union revoking their authorizations for them to sign. They
made no response. Later that day, Jones told Graham that
he would grant the men an immediate 15-percent increase
and would give them an additional 5 percent based on
merit after 90 days if everything worked out all right with
the Company. Thereafter, D'Amico came around with the
letter to the Union and asked the men to sign it. A couple
of weeks later Respondent changed insurance companies
and announced the change and increased insurance
benefits to the men. The men also received paychecks
reflecting the 15-percent raise 2 weeks later.
In making these findings I have credited the version of
the General Counsel's witnesses, and not Respondent's.
The principal disagreement is not over whether Respon-
dent promised and granted benefits but over their timing.
Partridge, Basilio, Sheariss, and Graham, who testified that
the benefits were promised after Jones read them the
Union's demand letter, were employed by Respondent at
the time of the hearing and their testimony was contrary to
816
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
their immediate self-interest in pleasing their Employer.
Indeed, in the case of Graham, his initial testimony
deviated from an affidavit he had previously given, and I
am convinced that his testimony and affidavit as well were
influenced by that self-interest.3 Spinelli, the only employee
in the service department who refused to sign a union
authorization card, testified for Respondent that the
promises of benefit were made on July 10, but he patently
weakened on cross-examination when pressed as to his
recollection of the timing of the events. Jones' own
testimony as to these meetings was substantially under-
mined by the notes he prepared for them and the
implausibility of his version. Jones testified that he
prepared notes on a single yellow tablet for his use in
addressing the men at both meetings, that the notes
prepared for the July 10 meeting ended two-thirds of the
way down the second page thereof, and that when he
prepared notes for the July 11 meeting he left two lines
blank and started on the bottom third line of the second
page. However, the notes contain one reference on the first
page which, according to Jones, was not relevant to his
discussions with the men until the matter of the Union was
raised and was not discussed until the second meeting.
Thus, at the bottom of the first page of the notes, Jones
wrote: "Must be classifications-rate could go up or down."
By all accounts the matter of classifications was not raised
until after the Union's demand letter was discussed, and
the notes are persuasive that the wage increases and the
Union's request for recognition were discussed at the same
meeting. Finally apart from the notes, it is not plausible
that without any knowledge of the Union's demand for
recognition or any consultation with his partner Jones
granted a 15-percent increase to the service department
employees with a promise of another 5 percent to follow,
after only an hour or two of deliberation, without any
precedent for general increases and in the face of the
economic problems Jones described to the men and at the
hearing. The conclusion is compelled that Jones knew of
the Union's demand for recognition when he made these
concessions and indeed that he made them only because of
his desire to head off the union organizing effort and
induce withdrawal of the union authorizations.
2. Concluding findings
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting employee grievances,
promising wage increases, threatening employees with loss
of work because of the job classifications, circulating a
petition to revoke union authorizations, requesting employ-
ees to sign it, and granting wage increases and improved
3 However, contrary to Respondent's claim in its brief, Graham's
testimony, when read in context and without omissions of significant
portions, does not support Respondent's version of the timing of the
promises.
4The complaint does not allege this action as a violation.
I Jackson so testified. Stiff testified that he did not recall making such a
statement and denied that he tried to persuade or dissuade the men with
respect to the election. I have credited Jackson who was still employed at the
time of the hearing.
6 Jones conceded that this incident occurred and that shortly before the
election he asked several employees how they felt about the Union. He
testified. however, that Chop's failure to answer him indicated nothing to
him.
insurance. The findings of fact above clearly establish these
violations, and little further comment is required. While
there is doubt as to whether Jones knew of the Union's
request for recognition before agreeing to remove Bowes as
a supervisor on July 10,4 there is no doubt that the July I1
meeting followed receipt of the letter and that Jones'
conduct at and after that meeting was triggered by the
letter and designed to induce the employees to abandon the
Union and sign the revocation petition. With respect to the
statement attributed to D'Amico, although D'Amico
portrayed it as merely a description of his experiences
working in a union shop, the employee witnesses, whom I
have credited, testified that D'Amico told them there
would be classifications and they would lose work
opportunities if the Union became their representative.
D'Amico's comments to the men were a direct threat of
loss of work opportunities, I find that the allegations of the
amended complaint described above are supported by the
evidence and that these violations have been established.
C. Preelection Statements Alleged to Violate the
Act
i. The facts
During the period between the filing of the representa-
tion petition and the election, Respondent President Jones,
and to a lesser extent Vice President Stiff, made statements
to employees which the General Counsel contends show
animus against the Union and violate Section 8(a)(1).
In July or early August, before the election, Vice
President Stiff passed employee Jerry Jackson in the shop
and said that if the Union got in they would probably have
to discontinue furnishing hospitalization insurance and
work uniforms.5
On or about August 13 Jones approached Chop and
talked to him about the job he was working on. Then Jones
asked Chop if he had Chop's support on Friday, the day of
the election. Chop did not answer and avoided the matter
by going on his break which had just begun. 6
On the same day, Jones approached Allan Thomas and
asked him how the attitude in the shop was. Thomas did
not give Jones a direct answer, and Jones asked Thomas if
he thought they still needed the Union. Thomas replied
affirmatively. Jones asked him a couple of more questions
about why Thomas wanted the Union, but Thomas did not
answer. Jones then said that he hoped that Thomas
realized that if the Union came in, he would take away all
their benefits and they could start all over again with the
Union.7
On the morning of the election, Jones passed by Thomas
shortly before the vote and told him that he wanted
I Jones conceded that he interrogated Thomas but testified that he never
made any comment to anyone to his knowledge that benefits would be
changed following the election. I have credited Thomas. Although Thomas
was a dischargee with a clear interest in the outcome of this case, he
impressed me as being candid and straightforward in his testimony and as
having an accurate and detailed memory. Jones also had a clear interest in
the outcome of the case, and I have found his testimony in other respects
lacking in trustworthiness. I am aware that Graham testified that on the day
of the election, 2 days after the conversation described by Thomas, Jones
told Graham that whatever the election outcome he would not hold a
grudge or take away the 15-percent raise. Despite the fact that Graham was
(Continued)
817
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thomas to realize that no matter how the election came
out, on the following Monday morning it would still be a
nonunion shop, that he owned the Company, and that he
would run it any way he pleased.S
On the day of the election Jones approached Graham in
the shop and asked him how it looked and how the men felt
about the Union. Graham replied that it looked about 50-
50.9
On the day of the election, Respondent's executive vice
president, Stiff, approached employee Kevin Partridge
where he was working and said to him "you're on our side
aren't you Kevin" and Partridge replied that he was.'
2. Concluding findings
The amended complaint alleges that Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the conduct of Jones in
interrogating employees regarding their union sympathies,
threatening loss of benefits if the Union won the election,
and telling employees that the shop would remain nonun-
ion no matter how the election turned out. It alleges further
violations by the conduct of Stiff in threatening loss of
hospital benefits and uniforms and interrogating Partridge.
The facts found above support these allegations.
On August 13 Jones interrogated Chop about his own
position toward the Union. With the election imminent
there was no legitimate purpose for the interrogation. It
was phrased in terms of whether Jones had Chop's
"support" and it clearly discomfited Chop. Jones' claim
that Chop's evasion of an answer indicated nothing to him
defies credibility. This was coercive interrogation. The
interrogation of Thomas on August 13 was initially
directed at the overall attitude in the department but also
became personal when Thomas sought to avoid a direct
answer, and the interrogation concluded with a threat of
loss of benefits. This interrogation and threat were also
coercive. The interrogation of Graham standing alone
might be deemed an idle speculative inquiry as to
Graham's prediction of the election outcome, but in the
context of the other interrogation I find it also violative.
called as a witness for the General Counsel and that testimony stands
uncontradicted, I am not persuaded that Graham's testimony in this respect
should be credited but view it as an attempt to curry favor with the
employer for whom he still worked. Graham's manner on the witness stand
displayed stress and discomfort and he was at times evasive. With respect to
the election morning interrogation, in particular, his testimony varied from
his affidavit, and his later testimony shifted as to what he told the
investigator who took his affidavit. Jones' attempt to corroborate Graham in
this regard was more notable in its weakness than its strength, for initially he
testified that after he asked Graham how it looked and Graham replied that
it looked close, he did not remember saying anything to Graham, and Jones
had to be reminded of Graham's testimony before he remembered the
favorable statement Graham attributed to him. Finally, I find implausible
the picture which Respondent projects through Jones' testimony that on the
morning of the election only a short while before the outcome would be
known Jones questioned employees about the election prospects and
volunteered to one of them that he would hold no grudges and take nothing
away if the outcome he did not favor resulted. Such preelection interroga-
tion is not invariably accompanied by threats, but the voluntary reassurance
claimed to have been given in this case is indeed rare. Despite Jones' claim
that he did not care whether his employees were for or against a union, his
conduct on July II was not the result of disinterest, he clearly wanted the
Union to lose and he had taken prompt action on July I I to try to snuff out
the union organizing campaign. I do not believe that he went out of his way
before the election to reassure employees that they could keep the
extraordinary raises he granted to keep the Union out and also could have
the Union as well. For all those reasons I credit Thomas and not Jones.
The statement to Thomas on election morning conveyed
that regardless of what the men wanted Jones would run
the shop as he pleased without a union and that a vote for
the Union was futile. The statement by Stiff to Jackson
constituted a clear threat of loss of existing benefits, and
the interrogation of Partridge by Stiff was coercive for the
reasons set forth above in connection with the interroga-
tion of Chop by Jones. I conclude that Respondent
violated the Act as set forth in the allegations of the
complaint described in the first paragraph of this section.
D. The Alleged Unlawful Discharges of Chop and
Thomas and Alleged Unlawful Statements After the
Election
I. The facts
On two occasions, one shortly before the election and the
other on the day of the election after the men learned that
the Union had lost, groups of employees, including Chop,
Thomas, and several others met off Respondent's premises.
On both occasions Robert Scullion, one of the mechanics,
stated that they should all stick together and that if
anything happened to one of them, the others should stand
behind him. Those present agreed that if anyone was fired
because of union activity, the rest would walk out in
sympathy because they did not feel that anyone should be
fired because of what had happened. This agreement was
not communicated to Respondent.
On the day after the election while Graham and
D'Amico were out on a road test, D'Amico mentioned that
Thomas had been an observer for the Union at the election
and said "if he just steps out of line a little bit, he's done
.. . regardless of whether he's a relative of Mr. Jones or
what." D'Amico also said that with the election over
Respondent would run the business as it wanted.'I
On August 19, the Tuesday after the election, at
approximately 11 a.m., Chop was called to the service
office.' 2 With D'Amico and former Service Manager
Bowes present, Service Manager Gilchrist told Chop that
8 Thomas so testified. Jones testified that he said that no matter what
happened in the election the shop would be opened Monday morning, union
or not. He testified that he could have also said that he owned the shop and
would run it as he pleased. For reasons set forth above, I again have credited
Thomas.
9 For reasons set forth above, I have only credited a portion of Graham's
testimony in this regard.
to Partridge so testified. Stiff testified that he did not recall at any time
from July II through August 15 having any conversation with Partridge
other than purely social and that he did not participate in any activity to
persuade or dissuade the employees with respect to the election. I have
credited Partridge who was still employed by Respondent at the time of the
hearing.
" Graham so testified when recalled by the General Counsel some 4
weeks after the initial hearing session at which he gave the testimony as
discussed above. As indicated. Graham's credibility was placed in doubt
during his initial testimony, and I have found that he was disposed to shade
his testimony in favor of Respondent at that time. When D'Amico testified,
he did not deny Graham's testimony as to this postelection conversation. He
was asked only about a conversation with Graham after Thomas'
termination, and even as to that D'Amico's denial was less than absolute. In
all the circumstances, I have concluded that despite my doubts as to
Graham's veracity during his first appearance on the stand, he is to be
credited as to this conversation with D'Amico.
12 Chop, Thomas, and Partridge testified that earlier that morning dunng
818
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
they had been going over service records, that following a
I-day suspension which Chop had been given in May he
had not learned his lesson, that his workmanship was not
getting any better, and that they were letting him go. With
an obscenity, Chop asked Gilchrist to give him his money
and walked out. 13
On leaving the office Chop went to Allan Thomas and
told him he had just been fired and that he wanted to use
Thomas' pickup truck to take his tools home. Thomas
asked Chop whether the rest of the men should walk out.
Chop said that they had talked about sticking together and
walking out. Chop then went to Partridge and Graham and
told them about his discharge.
An indeterminate period of confusion and milling
around ensued in the shop which lasted about half an hour.
During that time most of the men stopped work, talked
among themselves, and sought to determine whether they
would walk out. Partridge initially sought out Jones to see
whether he would do anything about the discharge, and
Jones indicated that he was not going to do anything about
it. Partridge got his tools and started to push them toward
Thomas' truck. He then ascertained that neither Graham
nor Scullion intended to leave and stood with Graham near
where he had been working. During this period of
indecision, Gilchrist and D'Amico came out on the shop
floor and stood for a while watching the others. After
awhile D'Amico went over to where Partridge and Graham
were standing and told them "either get to work or get out"
and told some others "either get back to work or quit."
In the meantime Thomas had told employee Jackson
that he might as well pack up his tools because everyone
was supposed to walk out if anyone was fired, and Thomas
had started cleaning his tools and putting them away. Then
Thomas ascertained that Graham did not intend to walk
out and decided to talk to Jones to find out what was going
on. However, Jones was in conversation with Partridge,
and Thomas went back to his toolbox to continue cleaning
up while waiting for Partridge to finish talking to Jones. At
this point, D'Amico approached Thomas and asked him
how the job was coming. Thomas said that it was not going
very well. D'Amico asked why, and Thomas said it was
because there was a man missing. D'Amico said that
Thomas had Jackson on the job with him, and Thomas
their break they found themselves sitting apart from other employees and
observed Bowes behind a glass partition apparently laughing at them.
Because of this they commented that it looked like they had been
"fingered." Although this incident may have contributed to their frame of
mind after Chop's discharge, there is nothing in their testimony which
warrants an inference as to the reasons for their isolation or Bowes' laughter.
13 Chop initially testified that Gilchrist also mentioned that Chop had
been observed huddling with other men in the shop as a reason for his
discharge. However, when he was recalled on rebuttal after Gilchrist and
D'Amico had testified, Chop omitted any reference to huddling with other
men in the shop in his version of what Gilchrist told him. Both Gilchrist and
D'Amico testified that there was no mention of it. In these circumstances I
have credited them. Apart from this difference, the only other essential
difference in the versions of what Gilchrist said to Chop relates to whether
Gilchrist stated any specific examples of jobs on which Chop's workmanship
was poor. Although D'Amico testified that he did, Gilchrist did not so
testify, and Chop denied that any examples were mentioned. I credit Chop
in this regard and find that they were not.
14 Thomas so testified. According to D'Amico, when he noticed that
Thomas was picking up his tools he walked over and told Thomas he did not
believe the job was done. He testified that Thomas said he did not intend to
finish it because he was upset about Chop being fired and that he would not
said that he was talking about Chop, not Jackson. D'Amico
then asked what that had to do with Thomas, and he
replied that he was waiting for Partridge to finish talking to
Jones. D'Amico left momentarily and spoke to Gilchrist
and Bowes. Then he returned to Thomas and told him to
go to work on the truck or he was "fired." Thomas
responded that he guessed he had to wait. D'Amico said
that in that case, he was "fired."' 4 Thomas then finished
cleaning up his tools, and went to the locker room where he
joined Chop and told him that D'Amico had fired him.
Chop and Thomas left, and the other employees went back
to work.
About a week after Chop was discharged, Vice President
Stiff approached Partridge and said "you heard what
happened to Steve didn't you." Stiff continued "you're
going to play ball with us now, aren't you?" and Partridge
replied affirmatively.15
Respondent President Jones testified he received a
recommendation to discharge Chop from Gilchrist and
D'Amico based on poor workmanship by Chop on a
number of jobs, the most recent of which involved work on
a diesel engine in a truck belonging to the E. I. Dupont
Company. According to Jones, although he had counseled
patience to Gilchrist on three or four earlier occasions
when Gilchrist had complained to him about Chop, on
August 19 he agreed that Chop should be discharged after
he reviewed with Gilchrist jobs on which Chop had been
responsible for repairs which had to be redone at no charge
to the customer. Jones testified that Chop's faulty work was
the only reason for his discharge and denied any knowl-
edge of Chop's union activities before his discharge.
Gilchrist and D'Amico testified in support of Jones as to
the reason for the discharge and the details of the jobs on
which they found Chop's work deficient. Chop testified
that he was not responsible for the rework in most of the
instances cited by Gilchrist and D'Amico, and his
testimony was supported by testimony of Partridge and
Thomas.
With respect to Thomas, Jones testified that all hiring
and firing in the service department occurred only with his
approval upon recommendation of the service department
supervisors and that no recommendation for the discharge
of Thomas was ever made to him or approved by him.
go back to work until he found out why Chop was fired. D'Amico testified
that he told Thomas that it was none of his business and that he should get
back to work because he was on an important job which had to be finished
by that night. According to D'Amico, Thomas refused to go back on the job,
D'Amico asked Thomas "are you staying or are you going," and Thomas
said he was going. I have credited Thomas. Although the other employees to
whom D'Amico spoke did not attribute the use of the word "fired" to him,
they testified that when D'Amico approached them it was with an
ultimatum to get back to work or get out or quit. These formulations are
closer to Thomas' version than D'Amico's version that he merely inquired as
to whether Thomas intended to go back to work or leave. Moreover,
although D'Amico testified that Thomas chose to leave, he also testified that
when he initially asked Thomas his intentions, Thomas said he would not go
back to work until he found out why Chop was fired, consistent with
Thomas' version that he was waiting to talk to Jones. In these circumstances
it is more likely that Thomas left pursuant to an ultimatum rather than a
mere further inquiry as to his intentions. Based on these considerations as
well as my impressions of Thomas and D'Amico as witnesses which I have
elsewhere indicated, I have credited Thomas.
is Partridge so testified. While Stiff denied having any conversation with
Partridge other than social up to the time of the election, he was not
questioned about this conversation.
819
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Concluding findings
a. Stephen Chop
The General Counsel contends that the reason offered by
Respondent for Chop's discharge was a pretext and that
the real reason for his discharge was his union activities.
Respondent contends that Jones' testimony should be
credited and that Chop's faulty work was the only reason
for his discharge.
Although Jones denied that he knew of Chop's union
activities before he approved Chop's discharge, the evi-
dence otherwise is persuasive that his denial should not be
credited. Gilchrist equivocated in his testimony in this
regard, ultimately conceding that because of Chop's well-
known friendship with Thomas, he assumed Chop was
supporting the Union when he saw that Thomas served as
the Union's election observer. D'Amico also initially
denied knowledge of Chop's union activity, but then
conceded that he also knew that Chop was involved in it at
least as of the day of the election when he saw Chop talking
to Thomas and a few of the union people who were there at
the time. Apart from these concessions, there is other
evidence which supports an inference that Chop's union
activities came to Jones' attention. The shop employed 11
mechanics and helpers at the time of the election. Chop
made the initial contact with the Union and solicited most
of the employees in the service department to sign
authorization cards. Chop also approached several persons
outside the service department and discussed the Union
with them. Among those he spoke to was Tom Jones,
manager of the parts department and son of Paul Jones,
whom he told that the men were going to lean toward a
union if shop conditions did not improve. He also spoke to
Paul Bien, a parts department employee and foster son of
Jones, whom he told that bringing in a good union was the
only way to straighten out problems Bien was experiencing,
and he spoke with Ray Sammons, who was service
department manager until April or May 1975. In the light
of the above, I do not credit Jones' denial of knowledge of
Chop's union activities, and find, based on the testimony of
D'Amico and Gilchrist, the size of the shop, and the
evidence of Chop's union activities in the shop, that the
inference is warranted that, by the time of the election,
Jones was aware that Chop was a leading supporter of the
Union in the shop.
Jones testified that he did not care whether the men
elected union representation or not and that he only sought
to point out to them why it would not be in their best
interests to be represented. However, Jones' conduct upon
receipt of the Union's request for recognition belies those
claims and indicates both hostility to the Union and the
disposition to take coercive action to disrupt its attempt to
organize. D'Amico's statement to Graham on the day after
the election, while directed specifically at Thomas, estab-
lishes intent to retaliate against active supporters of the
Union.
These findings as to knowledge and animus as well as the
timing of the discharge, just a few days after the election,
resulted in a narrow defeat of the Union and, the day after
the Union filed objections to conduct affecting the results
of the election, give support to the complaint allegation
that Chop was discharged for union activity and focus
attention on the reason offered by Respondent for the
discharge.
Jones, Gilchrist, and D'Amico testified that Chop failed
to follow instructions on the Dupont job, and Jones and
Gilchrist testified that in effect that job was the straw that
broke the camel's back. Jones conceded that what Chop
did on the truck was done properly and that if Chop had
been instructed to do only that work, he would have been
wrongfully discharged.
There is no dispute that the Dupont truck was brought in
because of an overheating problem and that after the water
pump was replaced, Chop was instructed to pull the
apparently damaged head off the engine. According to
Gilchrist and D'Amico, D'Amico inspected the engine
after the head was off and instructed Chop to disassemble
it further so that D'Amico could see whether there was
additional internal engine damage. However, they testified,
Chop simply put a new head on and reported to D'Amico
that there was no further damage. They testified that when
they attempted to start it, the engine stopped and that it
had to be completely torn down and rebuilt. Chop,
however, testified that, when he removed the head, he
reported to Gilchrist with D'Amico present that the engine
appeared to be "cooked" from overheating. He testified
that Gilchrist told him that the engine had been recently
overhauled by Partridge, he should not get involved in it,
and he should simply put a new head on it. Partridge
testified that he was present at the time and corroborated
Chop as to what Gilchrist said, adding that Chop then said
jokingly that this was his "gallows" on which they were
going to hang him.
I have credited Chop and Partridge. As noted above, the
fact that Partridge was still employed by Respondent at the
time of the hearing lends credence to his testimony against
Respondent's interests. I am struck also by the lack of any
apparent reason why Chop would have taken it on himself
to replace the head if he had been told to disassemble the
engine further. Chop's version on the other hand furnishes
a reason why Gilchrist wanted to try to avoid further major
work on the engine and has greater plausibility. Whatever
doubt might remain from the evidence as to the Dupont
repair taken alone, the evidence as to the discharge taken
in its entirety reveals Chop as far more credible and
indicates not only that Chop was wrongly held responsible
for the Dupont engine failure but that the entire explana-
tion offered by Respondent for his discharge and the list of
deficiencies attributed to him wasjerry-built.
Thus, there are discrepancies between the testimony of
Jones and D'Amico as to D'Amico's participation in the
conference at which Jones allegedly approved Gilchrist's
recommendation that Chop be discharged as well as
between the testimony of Jones and Gilchrist as to the
nature and contents of the list of Chop's work deficiencies
which Gilchrist allegedly brought with him to the confer-
ence. Although three of the five jobs on which Chop was
allegedly responsible for rework were brought back to the
shop in July, his testimony was uncontradicted that at no
time between May 27 and his discharge was he told that his
work was deficient or that he had to improve. Chop gave
explanations as to each of the jobs which supported his
820
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
claim that the rework was not the result of his defective
work, and that testimony is largely supported by initials
and notations on shop work orders. Gilchrist's testimony
on the other hand proved to be based almost entirely on
reports from D'Amico although he made some claims of
independent knowledge from which he generally then
backed away. Gilchrist testified in one instance that a
second invoice and shop order for one job did not exist
only later to be shown them and identify them. His
testimony showed him to be a highly suggestible witness
willing to testify to what appeared to be in Respondent's
interest with little foundation.1 s While D'Amico generally
appeared to be a more cautious witness, there were
conflicts between his testimony and the documentary
evidence as well between aspects of his testimony and that
of Gilchrist, and in some instances D'Amico failed to
corroborate Gilchrist as to the nature of the deficiencies
attributed to Chop or to refute Chop's explanation of the
job. I find in all the circumstances that Chop, as
corroborated by Thomas and Partridge, is to be credited as
to the work on which his discharge was allegedly based. I
find accordingly that the criticism of Chop's work was not
founded in fact.
I conclude that the reason given by Respondent for
Chop's discharge was a pretext and that the jobs described
in Gilchrist's report for the file were selected from those on
which rework was required without regard to Chop's
responsibility for the rework in order to provide an
apparent justification for a discharge for other reasons.' ?1
also conclude from the Respondent's resort to the pretext,
the timing of the discharge, and my findings above as to
Respondent's animus and knowledge, that Chop was
discharged because of his union activities in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
b. Allan Thomas
The issue as to Thomas is different. The General Counsel
contends that Thomas was discharged because of his union
activities and because of his participation in protected
concerted activity on August 19 immediately following
Chop's discharge. Respondent contends that Thomas was
not discharged and that there was no concerted activity.
I have found above that after learning that Thomas was
waiting to talk to Jones, D'Amico consulted with Gilchrist
and returned to tell Thomas to go to work or be fired.
When Thomas said he had to wait, D'Amico said that in
that case he was fired. On these facts I find, contrary to
Respondent's contention, that Thomas was fired by
16 One telling example appears in Gilchrist's testimony concerning a job
performed for G & A Trucking. Gilchrist identified an invoice showed to
him while he was on the stand and testified, with vagueness as to details,
that the job was brought back because of air-conditioning problems, and
that the date the job was brought back should have appeared in the report
he wrote at Jones' request for the file following Chop's discharge. However,
this job is not mentioned in that report. One of the jobs mentioned was for
G & G Trucking Company. At the hearing an invoice showing the initial
repair for G & G was offered, but there was no invoice or shop order offered
for the rework, and Gilchrist said they did not exist. Although Gilchrist
testified that he relied on D'Amico for his information about the G & A job,
D'Amico was not questioned about it. The state of the record as to the G &
A job offers two alternative conclusions neither of which puts Gilchrist in a
good light. One is that this job was dredged up after the discharge as a
D'Amico after consultation with Gilchrist. The asserted
lack of authority of Gilchrist and D'Amico to discharge
without Jones' approval neither persuades me that
D'Amico's version should be believed nor that Respondent
is not responsible for the discharge. As their notification to
Chop of his discharge indicates, in the eyes of the
employees, Gilchrist and D'Amico had apparent authority
to discharge employees.
The question remains as to the cause of the discharge.
There is no evidence to indicate that Thomas' discharge
was preplanned as was Chop's. Insofar as appears, it came
about as a consequence of the fact that Thomas and the
others stopped work. It would appear that if Thomas had
picked up a wrench and started to work, he like Partridge,
Graham, and others would not have been discharged at
that time. In that sense, it is clear that Thomas' refusal to
resume work was the direct cause of his discharge.
I find, however, contrary to Respondent's contention,
that Thomas was engaged in protected concerted activity
when he refused to resume work. Groups of service
department employees including Chop and Thomas had
twice agreed to walk out if there was discrimination against
any of them. While there is no indication that Respondent
was aware of that agreement, it was apparent on the
morning of August 19 that Chop's discharge led to a period
of about half an hour's duration during which work was
interrupted, employees conferred together, and at least two
of them, Thomas and Partridge, made preparations to put
their tools away and leave. Gilchrist and D'Amico
anticipated possible disruption and went to the shop to
observe it. What happened in the shop was concerted
rather than individual activity and was recognizable to
them as such. I find also that the concerted activity did not
lose protection of the Act because it took place on
Respondent's premises. There was no violence or resort to
physical force and no effort to deny Respondent access to
or use of its property. The fact that Thomas and the others
remained in the shop interfered with operations no more
than if they had left the plant and engaged in the same
work stoppage. I have found that Thomas was told to go
back to work or be fired. D'Amico's ultimatum to Thomas
was not to yield Respondent's right to the use of the
premises but to yield his right to join in the stoppage which
followed Chop's discharge. I conclude that Thomas was
engaged in protected activity on the morning of August 19
and was discharged for refusing to discontinue that activity
upon D'Amico's demand in violation of Section 8(aXl) of
the Act.'1
makeweight to bolster the case against Chop. The other alternative, which
seems more likely, is that the G & A invoice was brought to the hearing
inadvertently in lieu of the invoice which showed the rework on the G & G
job and that when it was shown to Gilchrist on the stand, he simply assumed
that it referred to a job mentioned in his report to Jones and blithely so
testified without any better foundation than the fact that this invoice was
handed to him with the group which otherwise were referred to in his report.
17 In reaching this conclusion I have considered the fact that Chop was
suspended on May 27 for a day for poor workmanship and that, whether
Respondent's reasons for that suspension were good or bad, there is no
evidence that the suspension was related to Chop's union activities which
apparently began thereafter.
18 Golay & Co., Inc., 156 NLRB 1252, enfd. as modified 371 F.2d 259
(C.A. 7, 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 944 (1967); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of
(Continued)
821
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
c. The alleged threats
The amended complaint alleges that D'Amico's state-
ment to Graham on the morning after the election and
Stiff's statement to Partridge about a week after the
election violated Section 8(aX)(1) of the Act. D'Amico's
statement to Graham was a threat of reprisal. After noting
Thomas' service as union observer at the election, he
threatened that Thomas would be fired if he just stepped
out of line a little bit. Clearly employees who just stepped
out of line a little bit were not ordinarily fired for it, and
D'Amico implied that Thomas would be fired because of
his union activity. In the case of Stiff's statement to
Partridge there is greater superficial ambiguity. Respon-
dent points out that both Chop and Partridge had received
I-day suspensions for poor work and that Stiff simply
sought assurance that Partridge would "play ball" in
performing his work, unlike Chop who Respondent
contended had not. The difficulty, of course, is that, since
Chop's union activities were the cause of his discharge, the
construction urged by Respondent is not available, and the
obvious meaning of Stiffs remarks is that he sought
Partridge's assurance that he would "play ball" with regard
to the Union. I find in Stiff's remarks an implied threat that
Partridge would go the way of Chop if he did not give up
support of the Union. I conclude that both statements
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
E. The Alleged Refisal To Bargain
As set forth below, I find herein that the objections to the
August 15 election have merit and recommend that it be set
aside and the representation proceeding be dismissed.
The evidence set forth above shows that, by July 1, the
Union had signed authorization cards from 9 of 11
employees, a clear majority, in a bargaining unit which is
admitted to be appropriate. Between that time and the date
of the election Respondent granted substantial unprece-
dented across-the-board wage increases and improved
hospitalization insurance and solicited and obtained
signatures of all employees to a petition purporting to
withdraw their union authorizations. As the election
approached, Respondent's officers engaged in coercive
interrogation, threatened loss of benefits, and conveyed the
futility of an affirmative vote. Coercion did not end with
the Union's narrow election loss, but continued with the
discharges of Chop and Thomas and the threats of
discharge made to Graham and Partridge.
The question as to whether a bargaining order should
issue is not close. The scope and extent of Respondent's
unfair labor practices in this case both before and after the
election make the likelihood of a fair and free rerun
election infinitesimal and require that the Union's status as
representative of Respondent's employees be ascertained
on the basis of its authorization cards.19 As the Union's
majority is clear, I find that Respondent violated Section
Miami, Inc., 186 NLRB 477 (1970), enfd. 449 F.2d 824 (C.A. 5, 1971), cert.
denied 407 U.S. 910 (1972). AMP, Incorporated, 218 NLRB 33 (1975). 1 find
it unnecessary to decide whether Thomas' union activities also contributed
to D'Amico's decision to discharge Thomas when he did not go back to
work.
19 Idaho Candy Company, 218 NLRB 352 (1975); Westminster Community
Hospital, Inc., 221 NLRB 185 (1975).
8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union of
July 11 when it responded to the Union's request for
recognition by granting an immediate wage increase and
soliciting its employees to withdraw their authorizations.20
IV. THE OBIECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
The objections to the election are based on Respondent's
grant of the wage increases, the solicitation of employees to
revoke their authorization cards, and the preelection
threats of loss of benefits. Although Respondent contends
that all conduct which occurred before the date of the
consent election agreement should be barred from consid-
eration as a basis for setting aside the election, it is settled
that the date of the petition and not the consent election
agreement is controlling.21 As the wage increases were
granted and the circulation of revocation petition occurred
on the same day that the representation petition was filed
with the Board, they may be considered as grounds for
setting aside the election.22
For the same reasons that I have found that the conduct
on which the objections are based violated Section 8(aXl)
of the Act, I also find that the objections have merit. I
recommend that the election be set aside, that Case 4-RC-
11699 be dismissed, and that all proceedings in connection
therewith be vacated in view of my recommendation below
that a bargaining order issue.23
v. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent unlawfully discharged
Stephen M. Chop and Allan S. Thomas, I shall recommend
that Respondent be ordered to offer them immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs, or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. I
shall further recommend that Respondent be ordered to
make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered as a result of the discrimination against them by
payment to each of them of the amount he normally would
have earned from August 19, 1975, until the date of
Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less net earnings to
which shall be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum in accordance with the formula set forth in F W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
As I have also found that Respondent unlawfully refused
to bargain with the Union, I shall further recommend that
Respondent be ordered to bargain collectively with the
Union as representative of its service department employ-
ees.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
20 Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975).
21 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 138 NLRB 453 (1962).
22 Jerome J. Jacomet, d/b/a Red's Novelty Co., el al., 222 NLRB 899
(1976).
23 Trading Port, Inc., supra.
822
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF PHILADELPHIA
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc., is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Lodge No. 724, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All service department employees employed by
Respondent at its Chester, Pennsylvania, facility, but
excluding office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, salesmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times since July 11, 1975, the Union has been
and now is the exclusive representative of the employees in
said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By soliciting employee grievances, promising wage
increases, granting wage increases and improved hospitali-
zation insurance, and conveying to employees that voting
for a union would be futile in order to discourage them
from engaging in union activities; by preparing and
circulating a petition to revoke employee union authoriza-
tion cards and requesting employees to sign it; by
threatening employees with loss of jobs, work opportuni-
ties, and other benefits if they elected to be represented by
a union or otherwise engaged in union activity; and by
interrogating employees about their union activities and
preferences and those of other employees, Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Sections 8(aXl) and 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
6. By discharging Stephen M. Chop and Allan S.
Thomas because of their union and concerted activities,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(aX3) and (1)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. By refusing since on or about July 11, 1975, to
recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the unit
described in paragraph 3, above, while engaging in conduct
which undermined the Union and prevented a fair election,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 24
The Respondent, Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc.,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
24 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
(a) Soliciting employee grievances, promising wage
increases, granting wage increases or improved hospitaliza-
tion insurance, or conveying to employees that voting for a
union would be futile in order to discourage them from
engaging in union activities.
(b) Preparing or circulating any petition to revoke
employee union authorization cards or requesting employ-
ees to sign such a petition.
(c) Threatening employees with loss of jobs, work
opportunities, or other benefits because they choose to be
represented by a union or otherwise engage in union
activities.
(d) Interrogating any employee about his union activities
and preferences or those of other employees.
(e) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or
any term or condition of employment, because they
become members of or engage in activities on behalf of
Lodge No. 724, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, or because they engage in protected concert-
ed activities.
(f) Refusing to bargain concerning rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment,
with Lodge No. 724, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive
representative of all employees in the appropriate unit
described in paragraph 3 in the section of this Decision
entitled "Conclusions of Law."
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to engage
in or refrain from engaging in any or all of the activities
specified in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit described in paragraph 3 in the
section of this Decision entitled "Conclusions of Law" and,
upon request, embody in a signed agreement any under-
standing reached.
(b) Offer Stephen M. Chop and Allan S. Thomas
immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered as a result of discrimina-
tion against them in the manner set forth in the section of
the Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
relevant and necessary to a determination of compliance
with paragraph (b), above.
(d) Post at its Chester, Pennsylvania, place of business,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
2.5 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
(Continued)
823
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 4, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances, promise wage
increases, grant wage increases or improved hospitali-
zation insurance, or convey to our employees that
voting for a union would be futile in order to
discourage them from engaging in union activities.
WE WILL NOT prepare or circulate or request our
employees to sign any petition or letter directed at
revoking employees' union authorization cards.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of
jobs, work opportunities, or other benefits because they
choose to be represented by a union or otherwise
engage in union activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate any employee about his
union activities and preferences or those of any other
employee.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against our employees in regard to their hire or tenure,
or any term or condition of employment, because they
become members of or engage in activities on behalf of
Lodge No. 724, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, or because they engage in concerted
activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
right to engage in or to refrain from engaging in any or
all the activities specified in Section 7 of the Act. These
activities include the right to self-organization, the right
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
WE WILL offer Stephen M. Chop and Allan S.
Thomas immediate and full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to
substantially equivalent jobs, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and WE WILL
make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them.
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain
collectively in good faith with Lodge No. 724, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, for the unit described herein with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, and WE WILL
upon request embody in a signed agreement any
understanding reached. The bargaining unit is:
All service department employees employed at
our Chester, Pennsylvania, facility, but excluding
office clerical employees, professional employees,
salesmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
KENWORTH TRUCKS OF
PHILADELPHIA, INC.
824